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VPRECIS
Chapter I
As an introduction, we observe 1 air law1 in two 
aspects; firstly, how far the technology and social 
organization of aviation have affected the structure of 
rules known as air law, and secondly how far analogies 
from or the principles of other branches of law have been 
found appropriate or inappropriate for the solution of air 
law problems# Various legal problems have sprung from 
the impact of the aviation industry upon existing social, 
political and economic systems and have generated special 
enactments containing special principles and rules, largely 
independent of the existing common law or other relevant 
field of law. This thesis examines the basic structure 
of this newly emerging law in the special setting of 
Australian federalism, a system designed without regard 
for the special problems of aviation or air law; regard 
is had especially to the questions how far human ingenuity 
has enabled some accommodation of often conflicting 
considerations to be established, and how far distortion 
of air law desiderata or of constitutional desiderata
has resulted
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Part I
This Part inquires into the scope of the Commonwealth1s 
legislative powers in respect of aviation under the 
federal Constitution, by reviewing the judicial trends 
or interpretative approaches of the Australian Courts to 
various constitutional powers which have been, or will 
be, relied upon to justify Commonwealth’s aviation 
legislation. The results of this inquiry form the basis 
of measuring the possible and desirable extent of the 
Commonwealth legislative competence on various subjects 
of Australian air law dealt with in the subsequent Parts 
of the thesis.
Chapter II
The principles of federal (inter-State and overseas) 
commerce power (sec.5l(i)) and relevant constitutional 
clauses, viz., navigation and shipping power (sec.98) and 
freedom of inter-State commerce (sec.92), are examined.
In the absence of any specific power of ’aviation’ in the 
Constitution, the ’commerce1 power is an important 
legislative source of aviation control. The Australian 
High Court has tended to decompose and characterize the 
elements of the ’commerce’ power so as not to admit an 
indefinite pursuance of a constitutional power in a way 
which might threaten a predetermined federal distribution
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of competence, and the tendency has been increased by 
doctrines applied under sec.92. It is suggested in this 
Chapter that the more comprehensive and practical concept 
of ’commerce1 by air corresponding to the composite 
realities of the aviation industry should be preferred to 
a logical approach taken by the Court, which insists on 
perpetuating the constitutional dichotomy as between the 
Commonwealth and the States. Principles governing the 
federal commerce power in the Constitution of the U.S.A. 
should have set the proper pattern for the Australian 
document•
Chapter III
The precise scope of federal competence under the 
’external affairs’ power (sec.5l(xxix)) to carry out 
international obligations has not been fully explored 
in judicial decisions. The Commonwealth has tried to 
justify most of its aviation legislation either under 
sec.5l(i) or under this section, but the reliance upon 
this power has been gaining in importance, partly because 
of the rapid development of international legislation in 
this field, and partly because, under this power pursuant 
to the international obligations imposed upon Australia, 
the Commonwealth can disregard the constitutional dichotomy 
between inter-State and intra-State aviation matters.
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Australia has entered into various aviation conventions 
or treaties, and, having regard to the growing development 
of international air navigation, international legislation 
should cover more aspects of air law and correspondingly 
influence national air law. This Chapter attempts to 
provide some theoretical basis for a wider approach to 
the meaning of 'external affairs* and the mode of domestic 
implementation of international air law, through reviewing 
cases (mostly aviation cases) having a direct bearing on 
the constitutional clause.
Chapter IV
Commonwealth legislative powers in relation to 
aviation within, to or from the Commonwealth Territories 
and aviation using Commonwealth facilities, i.e., 
Commonwealth-owned aerodromes, Commonwealth-controlled 
airspace and Commonwealth aircraft, form together an 
important basis for federal competence.
The Commonwealth power under sec.122 enables the 
Parliament to make aviation laws for the government of 
any Territory as it thinks fit, and once the law is shown 
to be relevant to the Territorial aviation it operates as 
a binding law of the Commonwealth wherever territorially 
the authority of the Commonwealth runs, and prevails over
an inconsistent State law
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The power as to the Commonwealth aerodromes flows 
directly from the common law of ownership of land, or 
from sec.52(i) derived from sec.5l(xxxi) or sec.85(i) of 
the Constitution, while the power as to licensed or 
authorized aerodromes stems from other legislative powers 
affecting aviation, such as the commerce and external 
affairs powers. The main questions are firstly the extent 
of the Commonwealth economic control based upon its 
ownership of aerodromes (and facilities) and secondly the 
character of State power over such places.
In examining the scope of the legislative power for 
the Commonwealth controlled airspace (save airspace over 
the Commonwealth aerodromes and Territories) based on the 
federal commerce power, external affairs power or other 
legislative powers affecting aviation (e.g., defence 
power), emphasis should be placed upon different approaches 
to the Commonwealth aerodromes and the Commonwealth 
controlled airspace by virtue of their different legislative 
sources. But the two topics have a clear practical 
interrelation; the questions arise as to whether or how 
far the exclusive power over Commonwealth aerodromes can 
be extended to the use of controlled airspace adjoining 
the controlled aerodromes, and how far the area of this 
airspace may be extended.
XThe Commonwealth has plenary power to regulate 
aviation problems arisingfrom the operation by ’Commonwealth 
aircraft* irrespective of whether it be international, 
inter-State, Territorial or intra-State. Some problems 
of ’shield of the Crown’ might arise from their activities, 
but the scope of the Commonwealth ’legislative’ power is 
mainly a matter of constitutional interpretation of 
sec.5l(xxxix), combined with various legislative heads 
and/or with the general executive power in sec.6l of the 
Constitution. Operations of aircraft by the Australian 
National Airlines Commission, as distinct from aircraft 
possessed or controlled by the governmental departments, 
raise a special problem.
Chapter V
Among various other constitutional powers allowing 
the Commonwealth Parliament to enact aviation legislation, 
four subjects of special importance are discussed: defence, 
full faith and credit, reference of State aviation powers 
to the Commonwealth, and the ’incidental’ power.
Since intermingling phases of civil aviation and 
military activities exist in a number of cases, there are 
problems how far the Commonwealth can extend its legislative 
and executive powers to the field of civil aviation in 
connection with and through its regulation of defence matters.
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Aviation raises many difficult problems of private 
international law, because aircraft traverse national 
borders at extremely high speed and in a short time have 
a relation with many different countries and legal system. 
Hence it is often difficult to determine applicable law 
or jurisdiction to govern crimes, torts, contracts, etc. 
Under the lfull faith and credit1 powers (sec•51(xxiv), 
sec.5l(xxv) and sec.118) of the Constitution, the 
Commonwealth can exercise some control over these private 
international law problems within Australia, but the 
operative scope and effect of these constitutional powers 
has not been fully discussed in Australia. It is necessary 
for us to review Australian cases, make reference to 
American cases and suggest a possible meaning of the 
1 full faith and credit1 clause in the Australian 
Constitution. As an illustration of such Commonwealth 
legislative control involving conflict of laws in aviation 
matters, some problems arising from creation of rights 
in aircraft in Australia in relation to the ratification 
of the Geneva Convention are summarised in Appendix I of 
the thesis.
Attempts at inducing the States to refer under 
sec.5l(xxxvii) the power to make laws with respect to 
aviation were made on several occasions in the Australian 
constitutional history, but none of them has been fully
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successful. There are some unsettled questions in the 
interpretation of the constitutional clause, in particular 
the question as to whether a State referring aviation 
power to the Commonwealth can revoke the reference with 
or without time limitation.
Various aviation powers conferred by the Constitution 
must always be read together with sec•51(xxxix), for, 
whenever the legislative reach of a federal power is in 
question, the extent of its ’incidentality*, whether it 
be regarded as included in the grant of power itself or 
conferred expressly under the placitum, becomes a vital 
issue. The conflicting approaches to the scope of this 
’incidental1 power come from the differing individuals’ 
ideals or convictions as to a desirable political, economic 
and social order in the ’Federation’. In one view, the 
Commonwealth plenary powers in pursuing the ends of any 
power vested under the Constitution are not denied, but 
this approach is maintained only within the restricted 
area where a law said to be incidental to the main power 
cannot, under the guise of incidental powers, intrude 
into the exercise of the constitutional powers of the 
States. Aviation is one of the fields where many types 
of legal relation are intricately inter-related, and the 
determination of their ’incidentals’ materially affects 
the scope of federal power.
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Part II
This Part elucidates the fundamental principles 
and rules governing aviators1 liberty to fly as against 
landowners1 property rights, and as against sovereign 
claims by governments, State and Federal, to control of 
airspace. Such liberty is conditioned by detailed 
governmental regulations of air navigation which are 
designed both for the purpose of the protection of the 
public and for the purpose of regular development of 
civil aviation. Greater legislative control by the 
Commonwealth in this field is suggested.
Chapter VI
Firstly, the principle of ’complete and exclusive* 
sovereignty of States in airspace above their territories 
and freedoms of air in international law is examined. 
Secondly, federal and State jurisdictions in airspace are 
discussed in relation to the special status of Australian 
airspace in constitutional law. Australian federalism has 
so far divided legal competence to accommodate conflicting 
demands of aviation and of surface ownership and 
sovereignty among several dispersed jurisdictions. The 
establishment of a public right of innocent passage as 
against landowners* and States* rights over their lands
xiv
and territories is a basic question for the regular 
conduct of flight activities. Hence, we examine the 
questions whether the Commonwealth can authorize every 
citizen1s liberty to fly over privately held lands or 
States1 territories, and whether it can authorize foreign 
aviators1 innocent passage by virtue of international 
agreements conferring foreign aviators a right to fly 
over the Australian territory. Such Commonwealth 
authorization, if enacted, over-rides State law governing 
surface damage caused by aircraft pro tanto insofar as 
damage arising fbom the mere passage of aircraft so 
authorized is concerned.
Chapter Vll
Governmental regulation of air navigation to ensure 
the safety of the public and regular development of civil 
aviation has become more detailed and complicated in 
accordance with the growth of the industry. This matter 
is almost completely entrusted to the Commonwealth 
authority, particularly under the strong influences of 
international legislative and administrative control of 
air navigation, except some aspects of intra-State licensing 
control. A question remains as to whether the same power 
should extend to economic controls if the policy-making 
decisions for the industry as a whole cannot properly be
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carried out without interfering with intra-State activities. 
This Chapter examines basic features of these international 
regulations and domestic regulatory systems of air 
navigation; main topics of the Commonwealth and States 
regulations which are mostly of technical nature are 
summarized in Appendix II, and legislation relating to air 
corporations and their operations in Appendix III of 
the thesis.
Part III
This Part deals with contractual, delictual and 
criminal responsibilities arising from operations and uses 
of aircraft, viz., carriage by air, surface damage caused 
by aircraft and aircraft crimes. The principles and rules 
governing these liability relations are governed by a 
combination of common law, and Commonwealth and State 
enacted law. The common law rules supplement the 
deficiencies of statutory rules, or, in the absence of 
the latter, are applied directly or by analogy. Commonwealth 
enacted law gives effect to international legislation and 
extends international law to certain flights within 
Commonwealth legislative competence. State enacted law 
operates in the areas not covered by Commonwealth law.
The main objects of our study are to examine the influences 
of international law rules upon Australian legislation,
xvi
differences of these three sources of law, and the 
possible scope of the Commonwealth legislation in these 
sub j ect s.
Chapter VIII
A considerable number of rules of international 
legislation relating to civil liabilities of the owner or 
operator, as carrier, to persons who are, or whose goods 
are, carried in aircraft, have been adopted in the 
Commonwealth statute not only as to the so-called ’ifarsaw' 
carriage, but also as to carriage within the Commonwealth1s 
legislative competence, which has further been extended 
to purely intra-State carriage under the uniform State 
Acts of all Australian States except New South Wales. The 
scope of application of common law rules is therefore 
limited in this field. Principles, occurrence, limitation 
and exclusion of carriers1 liability, measure of damages, 
documents of carriage and action against carriers are 
examined respectively, special reference being made to 
the carrying out of the Convention, and the differences 
between international law, Commonwealth enactments, State
enactments, and common law
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Chapter IX
Present Australian legislation relating to damage 
relations between aviators and persons or property on the 
ground lacks uniformity and requires consolidation. The 
applicable rules may differ in accordance with whether 
the aircraft was at the time of a ground injury engaged in 
international, inter-State or intra-State flights, and 
also in accordance with which Australian State1s territory 
the aircraft was then flying over. International 
legislation is given force in Australia by the Commonwealth 
statute which extends the principles of the Convention 
to two other classes of •international* flights. Purely 
domestic flight, whether inter-State or intra-State, is 
governed by State legislation; only four States have 
enacted statutes dealing with the basic principles of 
liability. Since it is not desirable for such matters to 
be regulated by different principles and rules of liability 
in the one country, special reference is made to the 
possible extent of Commonwealth legislative powers to 
procure uniformity of the relevant law.
Chapter X
The Convention on offences and certain other acts 
committed on board aircraft has not been ratified by 
Australia, but the Commonwealth has enacted an Act dealing
xviii
with crimes on board aircraft and crimes affecting the 
aircraft themselves, by which some problems of conflict 
of laws in respect of criminal jurisdictions are solved.
Some States have also passed legislation amending their 
own criminal law to create offences closely related to 
those created under the Commonwealth Act, though the terms 
and conditions under these States’ statutes differ from 
State to State. This Chapter summarizes the main features 
of the Convention and the Commonwealth legislation on 
these matters, pointing out problems of importance and 
the possibility of Australian ratification of the 
Convention.
Chapter XI
From the foregoing discussions, we draw some concluding 
remarks on the basic structure of Australian air law in 
accordance with the main scheme of the thesis. Apart from 
constitutional amendment, our study suggests ways in which 
the Commonwealth might assume more legislative jurisdiction 
in various aspects of the law. Special emphasis is placed 
upon the influence of international law on the national 
law, deepening awareness of the need for central control 
and lessening the difficulties encountered by Australian 
federalism in civil aviation legislation.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Why ’air law1? As the [following discussions will 
account for the problems involved in the law, 1 air law1 
is for the present definable as ’a body of laws relating 
to flights by aircraft in airspace and relations 
incidental thereto1.
There would be little point in collecting rules of 
law from disparate branches of the law merely because 
they happened to apply to a particular set of social 
relations; however, there is always some antecedent 
probability that a social activity presenting unique 
features, particularly one involving highly specialized 
technological problems, will in time generate rules 
having some degree of cohesion as rules, and having 
characteristics distinguishing them from other rule- 
clusters. Air law exemplifies this situation, as, say, 
in earlier periods did matrimonial law, or more recently 
law concerning factory employment or credit sales to 
consumers.
The writers on air law usually avoid a definition of 
air law and treat the subject as covering the application
2of the existing law of tort, contract or crime to fact 
situations involving the operation of aircraft rather 
than a generic branch of law. But, it is now agreed 
that subjects of the law should be classified and analysed 
in the light of principles and rules of air law itself. 
Accordingly, we shall observe air law in two aspects in 
this Chapter; firstly, how far the technology and social 
organization of aviation have affected the structure of 
rules known as air law, and secondly how far analogies 
from or the principles of other branches of law (e.g,, 
maritime law) have been found appropriate or inappropriate 
for the solution of air law problems.
Man1s dream of flying in the air through centuries 
of history came true when the Montgolfiere balloon was 
successfully realised at Paris in 1783; finally came the 
first successful flight of a power-driven aeroplane, 
achieved by the Wright brothers at North Carolina in 1903« 
The progress of the aeronautical technology and industry 
since then has surpassed imagination, and, having become 
part of every national life, aviation - the youngest of 
all forms of transport - has attained a position as an 
important traffic means with promising potentiality for 
the nation* s and nations* economic and social development. 
Since Duigan*s first powered flight in 1910, the aerial
expansion has rapidly taken place in Australia which is
3well endowed geographically and climatically for the 
development of aviation; the isolation and remoteness of 
many outback centres and the distances between the various 
capitals have greatly contributed to the development« The 
isolated geographical position of the Australian continent 
in the southern hemisphere has made the air-minded 
nation* s eyes to turn to international aviation from the 
early stage of its aviation development. Volumes and 
frequencies of operation of regular internal and oversea 
services by Australian airlines are annually growing at 
a rapid rate. By way of illustration, with unrivalled 
air safety record, Australia is second in world in ton 
miles per head of population, fourth in ton miles by 
domestic operations, and fifth in ton miles by international 
lines.^
1
The total number of registered aircraft owners in 
Australia in 1963 was 1,006, registered aircraft 1,787 
(and 125 gliders), and aerodromes (Government and licensed) 
602 (and 13 flying boat bases). Statistical summaries of 
operations of regular internal services (excluding Papua/ 
New Guinea services) and operations of oversea services 
during the financial year 1962-63 are as follows: Hours 
flown - 217)897 (domestic); 48,669 (international); Miles - 
43j700,000; 20,343jOOO; Paying passengers - 2,832,93^5
294,908: Paying passenger miles - 1,014,867?000; 
1,221,178,000: Freight short ton-miles - 28,270,000;
33j135 j 000: Mail short ton-miles - 3,324,000; 13,191,000. 
Cf. Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, N0.5O,
1964; The Modern Encyclopaedia of Australia and New 
Zealand, pp.121-22.
4Some observations of the medium in which, and the 
instrumentality by which, aviation operates, may help us 
to understand the legal problems corresponding to the 
substantive aspects of the activity and to suggest some 
classification of the problems.
The universality of 1 airspace1, with a special and 
substantially uniform physical nature and chemical 
components, provides a traffic medium where the flying 
instrumentalities are given an inexhaustive possibility 
to disregard natural and political boundaries, with far 
more flexibility than other forms of transport on land, 
or even at sea, or on other waters. Only the portion of 
airspace close to the earth*s surface had been used 
before by mankind in the construction of buildings and 
other similar uses, but with the appearance of aviation 
age this vast stratum then entered into new legal 
conflicts between landowners and aviators, or between 
sovereign States and foreign aviators. Although it is 
doubtful how far ’space* can become the subject of 
ownership, in view of the mobility or non-identity of 
air, ownership of land both at common law and under the 
civil codes has been gradually modified, and construed as 
not to extend in the airspace above the surface without 
limit, so as to harmonize the law with the existence of
aircraft flight. In the international sphere, however,
5each State is now treated as having exclusive sovereignty 
in the airspace above its territory; some doubts however, 
exist as to the arbitrary demarkation of boundaries of 
!airspace-territory', in view of the theory of relativity, 
the rotation of the earth and the physical properties of 
the stratosphere. This doctrine was originally derived 
from States’ experiences during the World War I; their 
self-protection against the potential danger of aviation 
to the subjacent State and its inhabitants, demanded some 
such theory. The rule that a State’s sovereignty extends 
upward has been retained and flight made possible only 
by international agreements and domestic law which treat 
flight as permitted or licensed by the subjacent State.
The legal status of airspace determines the liberty to 
fly above private lands or the freedom of the air in 
the international sky, and so forms a basis for every 
legal problem arising from flight activities in the 
airspace.
The word ’aircraft’ is often used loosely as a 
synonym for ’aeroplane’ which has also slowly become 
synonymous with ’powered aeroplane’. However, both in 
international law and in national law, an ’aircraft’ is 
generally defined as ’any machine that can derive support 
in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air’, thus 
including balloons, kites, gliders, helicopters, airships,
6seaplanes as well as ordinary aeroplanes. The daily 
progress of the technical structure of aircraft towards 
its insatiable conquest of time and space makes it 
difficult to lay down any exact legal definition of 
1 aircraft5, The question whether a rocket is included 
in that definition is an important problem for distinguishing 
•air1 law from ‘outer space1 law. The present air law 
excludes it from its scope of application, partly because 
a rocket engine is a reaction propulsion engine whose 
fuel includes an oxidiser, making it independent of the 
atmosphere, and partly because it resembles a projectile 
launched from and returning to the surface rather than 
an instrument for air navigation. Upon the appearance of 
an intermediate type of rocket having the functions of 
both aircraft and space-vehicles, problems will arise 
whose answer may depend upon the possibility of navigating 
the rocket in airspace.^" The development of modern 
aeronautical science has conferred extraordinary speed 
(nowadays exceeding that of sound) on aeroplanes, greatly 
reducing the time previously spent in travelling over 
long distances. Recently, helicopters have also begun
1
Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation 1933 (Art. l) 
and the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Act 1938 (Title 1, sec. 1 
(4)), Pub. No.706, 75th Congress, as amended by the 
Federal Aviation Act 1958, expressly define ‘aircraft1 
as the one intended for ‘air navigation1.
7to reduce times over much shorter distances. In 
relation to the State*s jurisdictional rights in the 
superincumbent airspace, this has caused complex and 
difficult problems of conflict of laws in determining 
the law applicable to events occurring and acts performed 
on board an aircraft, i.e., crimes, torts, contracts, 
births, deaths, marriages, execution &c. of wills and 
legal instruments. The governmental regulation of the 
aircraft industry extends now to their design, production, 
registration, airworthiness, etc. In private law, an 
aircraft is treated as a movable property, and is prima 
facie governed by general laws, concerning goods or 
chattels. But its legal status has many aspects differing 
from tha t of ordinary movables and in some aspects 
resembling the status of ships. Hence, a tendency to 
accord aircraft a special status as property sui generis 
has emerged in subjects dealing with rights in aircraft, 
precautionary arrest of aircraft or assistance and 
salvage of aircraft or by aircraft at sea.'*'
I
These subjects have been the topics of international 
legislation; the Convention for the Unification of certain 
Rules relating to the Precautionary Attachment, signed 
on May 29 * 1933 j 'the Convention on the International 
Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, signed on 19 June,
1948; the Convention for the Unification of certain Rules 
relating to Assistance and Salvage of Aircraft or by 
Aircraft at Sea, signed on September 29 1938 (which did 
not come into force).
8The history of air law is as old as the practical 
appearance of aircraft; it can readily be imagined that 
police regulation of the machine1s flights led the way 
in the origin of the law, tracing back to the police 
order to regulate the use of the MontgoIf±ere balloon 
in Paris in 1784, but various legal problems have been 
gradually generated by the development of this new social 
phenomenon. Above all, the rapid development of air 
traffic has produced a tendency to enact air law rules, 
wither public law or private law, on an international 
scale; that is because of the 'international1 character 
of aviation and consequently of the necessity of 'uniform' 
national laws. As early as 1919 the Paris Convention 
for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation was adopted by 
38 countries as a first attempt at regulation of 
international public air law on a world-wide scale; it 
has now been superseded by the Chicago Convention of 
1944 with 103 member-States in June, 1964. The convention 
regulates various aspects of the right to fly among the 
sovereign States and requires uniformity of national 
regulations in accordance with prescribed international 
standards. National laws incorporating these public law 
principles and rules of the Convention extend to a wide 
range of subjects, including regulations on aircraft, 
qualifications and training of aircraft pilots, flight
9rules and flight control, aerodromes and air navigation 
facilities, accidents investigation, rescue and search, 
punishment of regulation breaches, etc. Machinery for 
creating and administering international law concerning 
civil aviation has been established in various forms, 
and, in the domestic sphere, government departments and 
local authorities have been specialized in the Executive 
functions. The fast-growing air transport industry by 
airlines has necessitated government economic as well 
as administrative control over the huge industry, for 
example, control over airways corporations (e.g. 
establishment and constitution, governmental loans thereto) 
and laws governing the establishment and operation of air 
transport services (e.g., licensing of air transport and 
commercial flying, co-ordination and rationalization 
scheme). In the international sphere, the economic aspects 
of air transport services of scheduled air services are 
still governed by bilateral agreements among the sovereign 
States concerned in the reciprocal exchange of the 
freedoms of the air. Such public law aspects of civil 
aviation legislation are directed to the development of 
international and domestic civil aviation in a safe, 
regular and efficient manner.
Developments of private law aspects of civil aviation 
legislation are less marked. National laws establishing
10
rights and obligations of private persons and property 
involved in or affected by aviation have developed slowly 
in the process of common law evolution or by the 
application of the existing general law of civil and 
commercial codes3 through which principles have been 
gradually determined by the courts of different 
jurisdictions deciding the particular case presented. 
However, as much flight and carriage by air become 
necessarily international, national private laws affecting 
aviation have been made more uniform by international 
conventions applying directly or by adoption in national 
law and similar considerations have arisen in domestic 
air law which tends in many respects to adopt international 
rules or to provide their origin. One of such major 
subjects is the carrier1s civil liability for damage to 
a passenger, baggages or goods during the carriage by air 
and for damage caused by delay. The legal relations 
arising from operator's liability for damage caused by 
aircraft to third parties on the ground and other instances 
of liability from the operation of aircraft (e.g. aerial 
collision) are unique to aviation and therefore cause 
special legal questions. Laws relating to insurance or 
relations between master and servant in connection with 
use and operation of aircraft, etc. are also included in 
this field. In considering these problems, special
11
characters of aviation activities based upon the 
characteristics of !airspace' and ‘aircraft* must be 
taken into account; for example, owing to the gravity of 
aviation accidents and the difficulty of finding out the 
real cause of the accident, there is a tendency in the 
regulation of international aviation to seek unification 
of actions for surface damage, by confining jurisdiction 
to a Court of the State where the accident actually 
happened, requiring the courts in other States to permit 
uniformly the execution of the original decision."*”
In a short period of aviation development, various 
legal problems have sprung from the impact of the industry 
upon existing social, political, and economic systems.
Such problems cannot satisfactorily be solved or adjusted 
without consideration of these backgrounding factors 
determining the policies of the law; these factors include 
impacts upon or competition with other forms of transport 
(ships, trains, buses or cars), inescapable military 
implications, potentialities in expanding national and
1
Cf. Art. 20 of the Rome Convention of 1952 concerning 
Ground Damage caused by Aircraft, which amended the 1933 
Convention. As another instance of special considerations 
required in air law problems, the estimation of surface 
damage may be calculated in proportion to the weight of 
aircraft, but in the case of aerial collision there are 
some suggestions in favour of deciding a maximum amount of 
compensation irrespective of aircraft1s weight, which is 
based upon the idea that, in an aerial collision, as 
distinct from the collision of ships, there is no co­
relation between the weight of the assailant aircraft and 
the degree of the damage caused thereby.
12
world economy, national interests and prestige, etc. So 
in justifying or in rejecting the principle of the 
limitation of carriers* or operators* liability in air 
law, one must consider such factors as the necessity of 
fostering a national aircraft industry, and the enormous 
costs of running air transport businesses often requiring 
heavy government subsidy or ownership by the government, 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the claim to 
adequate compensation for injury by individual users 
(who are also, in a sense, the 'public* whose interest 
is served by the policy of damages limitation) or in the 
case of surface damage the injustice of making the 
incidental victims on the ground financial supporters of 
aviation against their own wish. The introduction of 
compulsory insurance in this legal relation should also 
be decided upon full consideration of the social and 
economic background of the industry in a particular 
country.
The independence of a field of law is ultimately 
based on our recognition that it consists of the regulations 
most fit to be applied to a certain range of social 
relations having some identity or similarity in their 
nature and phenomena. The more it is felt to be necessary 
to regulate an area of social relations as a unit, the 
more likely is a specialization of the relevant rules,
13
though the extent and rate of specialization varies from 
case to case. Civil aviation is such an area, and, as 
seen from the foregoing outlining of the problems involved 
therein, civil aviation legislation presents such a 
unique regulation-unit. What are, then, its relations 
with common law or general law, with laws concerning 
other forms of transport, and with international law?
Large parts of the field of air law have already 
been regulated by statute law, and the scope for the 
application of the common law correspondingly limited or 
excluded, partly because aviation has developed so rapidly 
that it has had to be regulated by statute and partly 
because it has been to a large extent subject to 
international agreements. But the statutory law does not 
always cover the whole field of the legal relations 
arising from or incidental to aviation; hence, room is 
left for the application of common law rules, as for 
example, both in England and in several States of 
Australia, the common law rules as to trespass or nuisance 
and aviators1 liability for resulting damages, modified 
by statute, apply in certain circumstances where the 
statute law does not apply. Likewise, the general law 
of the civil codes or commercial codes supplement air law 
in countries with such written codes. Statutory 
enactments are naturally predominant in public law aspects
I k
of air law, but in its private law aspects (e.g., laws 
of tort, contract, and conflict of laws) Parliamentary- 
interference has been less. Some particular air law 
topics may be readily solved by the application or the 
analogy of these general law rules, but most of the legal 
principles in air law have special principles, rules or 
usages according to their relevant special features of 
aviation. Hence, regard must always be had to the 
soundness of such general law rules applied to the 
actuality of aviation problems, to the extent to which 
they are so applicable.
The question whether an air carrier is a ’common 
carrier1 is illustrative on these points. It is to be 
observed that opinions differ in treating as a common 
carrier with an insurance liability in common law an air 
carrier who carries on the public employment of carrying 
goods by air for all persons indifferently. In one view, 
the application of the common carrier’s status to air 
carriers is denied on various grounds - that there is 
no precedent for applying this abnormal liability to an 
air carrier, that the modern tendency is to restrict the 
class of common carriers, that since the inception of air 
carriage express written contracts with air carriers have 
been in general use, that there is on principle no 
justification for imposing an extraordinary responsibility
15
upon air carriers, and that it is debatable on purely
historical grounds whether anybody other than a carrier
by land can be said to be a common carrier,’*' Among the
criticisms, the most important point seems to be the
fourth question that there is no a priori reason why air
carriers should be answerable for loss or damage caused
by pure accidents and without any negligence on their
part or the part of their servants. Hence, the question
touches the social requirement and the policy of law of
torts in respect of carriers in general. Negligence
doctrines had important applications in the development
of industries and other spheres of social life in the
nineteenth century, but they have been undergoing changes.
Modern law tends to impose strict liability on the person
who undertakes an industry or business in relation to the
labourers working within the undertaking, and even as to
some aspects of the relation between the undertaking and
the outside public - for example, in connection with
transport accidents. But strict liability in this sense
is distinct from the older established cases such as the
2English rules in Ryland v Fletcher, because the matter
1
E.G.M. Fletcher, The Carrier’s Liability, 1932, pp.248-32. 
As for oppositions against Fletcher’s view, see McNair,
The Law of the Air, 1953» second ed., by M.R.E. Kerr and 
R.A. MacCrindle, p.155*
2
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
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should be considered from the viewpoint of equitable 
distribution of damage occurred in the community. This 
is particularly so in the case of motor traffic which 
involves potential danger for the public, while it is 
extremely important for their ordinary life. Distinction 
may be drawn between the damage caused to third parties 
on the ground and the damage caused to passenger or goods 
carried by aircraft, though sometimes they occur 
simultaneously. We should probably not develop liability 
of the carrier to the consignor of goods by reference to 
the carrier1s liability to third parties; the former is 
essentially in the sphere of contract. The carrier who is 
engaged in carrying as a regular business and holds 
himself out as prepared to carry for anyone who chooses to 
employ him should have a higher duty than that of a private 
or gratuitous carrier, but not absolute liability in any 
sense. Even if strict liability should be imposed upon 
common carriers by legal policy, it may now be considered 
of minor importance, because strict liability almost 
invites extensive transfer of the risk by insurance.
Indeed, the wide-spread use of insurance against fault as 
well as strict liability has tended to weaken civil 
liability as a sanction for careful conduct; ’care* has 
rather to be enforced by criminal sanctions and licensing
17
of operators. By such means society will be able to 
secure the carrier’s or operator’s care for his conduct 
more efficiently. However, carriage by air is normally 
regulated by a contract, and where there is such contract 
the rights and obligations of the carrier and the goods- 
owner depend on its provisions. Moreover, statutory law 
tends to modify the status of common carriers so 
inconsistently with the rights and obligations created 
by the common law as to destroy the concept of common 
carrier; an air carrier who is carrying subject to the 
provisions of either international law or domestic 
statutory law incorporating the international rule, which
allow him to reserve the rights to reject traffic, is no
1longer a common carrier. The question whether an air 
carrier is a common carrier or not should therefore be 
decided in each case in which regard must be had to the 
content of the contract and the effect of the statutes.
It follows that the actual scope of the application of 
common law rules is apt to be small in aviation cases. 
Such statutory rules in air law embody the ’negligence'
1
Cf. Art. 33 of the Warsaw Convention of 1929 as amended at 
The Hague 1955? concerning the unification of certain 
rules relating to international carriage by air; Civil 
Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1952 (C’th) (First 
Schedule, Art. 3 3 ) • Seealso, Shawcross and Beaumont,
Air Law, second ed., pp.31^-315} and cases there cited.
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doctrine with, a shift of the burden of proof from the 
plaintiff to the carrier in respect of the damage occurred 
both to passengers and to goods; they depart from the 
common law rules either in the classification of 1 carriers' 
or in their liability principles.
Land transport by railways or motor-vehicles and sea 
transport by ships have some common features with 
transport by aircraft, so long as they are traffic 
facilities conducted by human activity. Accordingly, 
there is much similarity in regulations concerning their 
safe operations (e.g., regulations concerning dangerous 
goods and explosives). When there are no principles 
applicable to air law problems, the courts may proceed by 
analogy from cases relating to the operation of the various 
forms of land and water transport. Every such similarity 
and assimilation comes from the general nature of ’traffic1.
A number of analogies between maritime law and air 
law appear to exist not only in the terminology but also in 
the legal problems, such as, nationality of aircraft, 
documents carried in aircraft, legal status of aircraft- 
commander, rules of the air and air traffic control, etc. 
Subject matters governed by the fundamental principles of 
air law, e.g., trespass and nuisance in the airspace 
above private lands, or the rights of innocent passages 
in the foreign territorial airspace, are not governed or
19
only partly influenced by the analogy of maritime law. 
Legislation in respect of politico-economic aspects of 
the industry contains policies and principles different 
from those in the shipping industry. Some subjects mostly 
concerned with the legal status of aircraft in private law 
or in conflict of laws may well be regarded as similar to 
the law concerning ships. So, in the commercial dealings 
of aircraft, the introduction of a general recording system 
of documents of sale, &c., as in the case of ships, would 
be desirable, or the application of the 'law of the flag* 
analogous to that of ships would be in most conflict-of-laws 
cases the most satisfactory solution. However, the 
special conditions of air travel should be kept in mind 
even when the analogies are permitted. Take as an instance 
the subject of ’salvage* of or by aircraft at sea, and 
you will find different conditions governing maritime 
navigation and air navigation. An aircraft would 
unreasonably imperil itself if it attempted to land 
whether on sea or water to help another aircraft which 
has crash-landed, and assistance to another aircraft in 
the air is likewise almost impracticable. But merely by 
reporting the location of a crashed plane or one in 
trouble, and by circling or otherwise delaying its 
course in order to do this, an aircraft may run risks
20
sind incur costs which, could be regarded as the basis for
1a salvage type remuneration.
Probably, the applicability of the ’general average’ 
principle in respect of carriers’ liability in maritime 
law would be more illustrative of the relation between 
maritime law and air law. As often pointed out, the 
essence of carriage by air as compared with carriage by 
sea is speed and shortness of duration, and therefore the 
sense of joint liability during a voyage among the interests 
for the adventure of air carriage is less stronger than 
in carriage by sea. Navigation by sea in the past was a 
series of adventures caused by natural violence or 
attack of pirates. There is little adventure in that 
sense in the case of aviation, although the result of an 
aviation accident is often catastrophic. Carriage by air 
will be completed at the longest in a few days, and 
aircraft can take refuge more quickly in case of natural 
violence at the nearest airport. However, in some 
occasions a shortage of fuel or a heavy down-draft may 
cause a commander or a member of the crew of an aircraft
1
See Brussels Convention for the Unification of certain 
Rules relating to Assistance and Salvage of Aircraft or 
by Aircraft at Sea, 1938, Art. 2(3) and Art. 2(7).
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to jettison the cargo overboard or destroy part of the 
aircraft for the purpose of saving the rest of the cargo 
or the aircraft itself. In practice, it will be a first 
consideration for an aircraft operator to save the 
aircraft itself within a short time of peril; the case 
of destruction of a part of aircraft is very rare, as it 
means in most cases the fall of the air-borne machine 
itself. Yet there might be such exceptional cases as 
jettison of cargo or fuel in which the principle of 
general average could be applied to aviation although the 
probability of such cases happening is not as great as in 
carriage by sea. Unless an air carrier is negligent in 
such cases, it cannot be said that the damage was caused 
wilfully by the carrier or his agents. He will be liable
for the surface damage caused thereby, as the Conventions
1or statutes provide, but the carrier*s liability for 
damage caused to the jettisoned cargo to the consignor
1
The Rome Convention of 1933 provided in Art. 2(2) (a)
that the damage caused by an aircraft in international 
flight to persons or property on the surface to give a 
right to compensation includes * damage caused by an object 
of any kind falling from the aircraft, even in the event 
of the proper discharge of ballast or of jettison made in 
case of necessity’. In the new Rome Convention of 1952, 
this provision was omitted, but Art. 1 prescribing the 
fundamental principle of the operator* s liability for 
ground damage which imposes an absolute liability except 
certain cases will cover the case of jettisoning.
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is different from the liability to the third parties on 
the surface. If the owner of the damaged cargo, which 
was chosen fortuitously among several cargoes, can recover 
no contribution from the owners of the property saved from 
the risk it will be against one’s sense of justice. Here 
we can see the ground on which the principle of general 
average should be applied in aviation. In the common law 
by which a few cases of carriage by air still remain 
governed, the applicability of the doctrine seems 
doubtful, particularly as to the common carrier as an 
insurer for the safe carriage of the goods. However, as 
mentioned before, the air carrier’s status at common law 
as a common carrier is ambiguous, and it raises a 
difficult question whether the carrier's action of 
jettisoning cargo was caused by an ’act of God’ (e.g., an 
unpredictable down-draft) so as to exempt him from the 
insurer’s liability. The question has been raised, but 
not settled, as to whether by analogy carriers on land 
are entitled, if not to a common contribution in the 
nature of a general average, at least to compensation for 
expenses incurred by them about the preservation of the 
goods from extraordinary perils. However, it is another 
_
Fletcher, op.cit., p.2l4.
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matter whether the principle should be introduced into
the present legal system of air law; the matter seems to
depend upon the intention of the Legislature. It goes
without saying that, if both of the parties want it, they
can have a special contract to apply the general average
principle in the carriage by air, or otherwise they can
exclude any such ambiguity by express terms of contract
providing for compensation against all risks from any
cause whatsoever, probably with a certain limit of the
1value in air waybills.
The simple statement that maritime law also has a 
certain principle can never in itself be a sufficient 
ground for the similar subject in air law; in order to 
have any significance, it should be proven that the 
principle is a sound one in maritime law, and that the 
reasons why it is a sound principle apply also to aviation.
1
Cf. e.g., Re California Eastern Airways, (1931) U.S.Av.R. 
327j where the principles of general average could have 
been applied, but neither the carrier and the owner of 
the jettisoned cargo, nor the judges raised the question. 
The report of this case suggested the application of the 
general average principle.
2
H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air 
Law, 195^ -j pp. 13-14 referring to the maritime analogy in 
air law in respect of the limitation of air carrier's or 
operator's liability.
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Substantial aspects of aviation sustaining the 
characteristics of air law principles require 
considerations quite different from sea navigation, 
and most of the legal problems arising from aviation 
are to be applied and solved both by their own policies 
of law and by their proper principles of law. Hence, 
the analogy of the maritime law has no general 
application to air law, although it has already been, 
and will in future be, found a convenient source of 
analogy in some cases.1
A number of conceptional and terminological analogies 
may also exist between land traffic law and air law, but, 
apart from specialized technological differences, there 
are some fundamental differences of applicable principles, 
which need only to be briefly mentioned below. First, 
the legal status of airspace and problems connected with 
it are based upon principles and rules peculiar to air 
law which cannot be compared with those of road or 
railway both in the international or the domestic sphere. 
Secondly, the internationality of aviation resembles that 
of sea voyages rather than international railway or road 
carriage, and, as an aircraft has the legal quasi-personality
1
Cf. McNair, op.cit., p.233*
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as with ships in international law, this demands 
considerations in conflict of laws different from those 
of land transport. Thirdly, special considerations based 
upon the nature of aviation (e.g., the possibility of 
an aerial collision happening between more than two 
aircraft in flight by a mere contact with slip-stream, 
etc. without any physical contact), and upon the social 
and economic position of this particular industry, are 
likely to influence most aspects of air law.
An emphasis should be put on the close relation, 
rather than comparison, between international law and air 
law. In accordance with the rapid expansion of 
intercourse between sovereign States, adjustments between 
differing national laws were required to facilitate such 
intercourse. As aviation itself is a traffic facility 
promoting and facilitating such intercourse, this 
tendency is so conspicuous in the field of civil 
aviation legislation. Particularly, with the
internationalization of the individuals’ life, international 
private air law which seeks to unify national law concerning 
private international aviation has gained in importance. 
International maritime law is still in most parts based 
upon maritime customs which have developed in the course 
of long usage by nation-States. There is no international
26
private law of road transport and little uniformity in 
matters of technical regulations and the conventions
1concerning transport by rail are predominantly regional. 
Some provisions contained in the uniform air law relate 
necessarily to the unification of the conflict of laws, 
but most of them concern the substantive law. It should 
be noted, however, that since international law has no 
general international body to enforce it, the obligation 
to unify the domestic laws according to the convention 
and the right to claim that other party-States should 
alter their national laws according to the same convention 
is possessed by each sovereign State, while an individual 
can as a rule claim his right only on the basis of the 
resulting domestic law, not of the international law. 
Accordingly, domestic legislation implementing convention 
obligations in some form will be necessary for the 
effective force of such conventions in the domestic 
sphere. International air law is no exception thereto.
When flight in the air by means of aircraft had 
become practically possible, aviation was so new a 
phenomenon that there were no specific rules to be
_
Cf. 0. Mance, International Road Transport, postal, 
electricity and miscellaneous question, 19 +^7> p.19>
R.L. Wedgewood, International Rail Transport, pp.25, 29*
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applied thereto, and consequently the existing rules of 
common law, civil law, maritime law or international 
customs were applied directly or by analogy. It has now 
connections with almost every branch of law - international 
law, constitutional law, administrative law, conflict of 
laws, maritime law, laws of tort, laws of contract, etc. 
This is an evidence not only of the importance of aviation 
in our every-day life but also of the necessity of making 
the law more uniform. As the real importance of aviation 
lies in its promise, the specialization of this branch of 
law will further be facilitated in accordance with the 
complexity and development of aviation in the future; for 
example, the advent of super-sonic aeroplane has resulted 
in increasing damage problems caused by their noise, 
particularly around aerodromes where such aeroplanes 
land and take off.
’Air law’ is sometimes called ’aviation law’ in 
which topics are apt to be limited to legal problems 
arising from aircraft flights only. Wireless telegraphy, 
broadcasting and other forms of communication of man-made 
radiation in the air also concern the use of the air; 
earlier writers included legal questions connected with 
radio transmission which modern writers expressly 
exclude from the scope of their treaties on
28
1'air law' . It seems more adequate to employ the term
'aviation law' in its broader sense in the place of
that misleading term, but the term 'air law* is now
2sanctioned by usage. The present study is confined to
3'civil' aviation, and to air law in times of peace only.
However, we are concerned with this law in the 
special setting of Australian federalism, a system 
designed without regard for the special problems of 
aviation or air law, and so have also to consider how far 
human ingenuity has enabled some accommodation of these 
often conflicting basic influences to be established, how 
far one factor has distorted the other. We shall first 
examine the Australian Constitution which prescribes the 
respective legislative competences of Commonwealth and 
constituent States on aviation problems (Part i). Then, 
in subsequent Parts, we shall examine main heads of 
Australian air law with special reference to the 
interactions between this new branch of law and the
1
See, e.g. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, 1911; Zollman, 
Law of the Air, 1927*
2
Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., pp.17-18.
3
In the ordinary sense, 'civil' aviation means the one 
not directly identified as military aviation (cf. J.P. Van 
Zandt, Civil Aviation and Peace, ' \ 9 b b  , p.6.)
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existing legal system under the Australian federal 
government. Such subjects include liberty to fly in 
relation to the legal status of airspace and in 
relation to the governmental regulations of air 
navigation (Part II), and contractual, delictual and 
criminal responsibilities arising from carriage by air, 
surface damage caused by aircraft and aircraft crimes 
(Part III). It should be noted that, in view of the 
absence of any consolidated works on air law in Australia, 
the present writer attempts to coordinate as much 
relevant subjects and problems as possible, but this 
object must yield preference to the above-mentioned main 
scheme of the thesis.
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PART I
Aviation and the Australian Constitution
In a federal government, many problems in civil 
aviation legislation, as in many other fields, cannot 
be made clear without having regard to their constitutional 
aspects - the division of powers between the Federal 
Government and the constituent States. It is the object 
of this Part to inquire into the scope of the 
Commonwealth’s legislative powers in respect of aviation, 
by reviewing the judicial trends or interpretative 
approaches of the Australian courts to various 
constitutional powers which have been, or will be, 
relied upon to justify Commonwealth’s aviation legislation. 
It should be noted, however, that, owing largely to the 
meagreness of judicial precedents pertaining to the 
constitutional issues in this field, some deductive 
inferences from relevant subject-matters will be 
indispensable in order to locate aviation powers in the 
whole framework of the Australian Constitution.
Australia possesses a federal form of government, 
where the legislative powers given to the Commonwealth 
are limited and specifically enumerated in the
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1Constitution, the rest of powers remaining in
principle vested in the six States. The subject of
' aviation' is not mentioned in express terms in the
Constitution, the framers of which did not foresee the
novel transport activity by means of aeroplanes which
was only achieved three years after the foundation of
2the Commonwealth. However, the provisions of the 
Constitution are not to be limited by the denotation in 
1900 of the terms used in its various sections. Any 
British statute may properly be applied to new facts and 
new conditions if the words of the statute properly
1
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act enacted 
by the United Kingdom Parliament received the Royal Assent 
on 9th July, 1900. A Proclamation was issued on 
17th September, 1900, that on and after 1st January, 1901, 
the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia should be 
united in a Federal Commonwealth under the name of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. Before the passage of the 
Act, a draft Constitution was agreed by referendum by the 
people of the various States other than Western Australia 
which similarly agreed prior to Proclamation. As to the 
early constitutional history of Australia, see,
A.C. Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development in 
Australia, 1963; Quick and Garran, The Annotated 
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, 1901.
2
A few aerodynamic experiments were being conducted by 
Lawrence Hargrave at the Sydney Observatory in the l890rs, 
but there is no evidence that the framers of the 
Constitution contemplated the subject of aviation in the 
Constitutional Debates. Cf. Hocking & Haddon-Cave, Air 
Transport in Australia, 1951» P*75» S. Brogden, History 
of Australian Aviation, 1960, pp.3-10.
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construed are such as to include such facts and
1conditions, and the Constitution is, inter alia, a 
British Statute.^
Under the Constitution, the Commonwealth Parliament 
acquired legislative power to control aviation under 
sec.5l(i) (trade and commerce with other countries and 
among the States), under sec.5l(xxix) (external affairs), 
and under sec.122 (Commonwealth Territories). In addition 
to these heads, it has incidental power to affect the 
subject-matter by reason of many other powers, e.g., 
sec.51(v) (postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like 
services), sec.5l(vi) (the naval and military defence, &c.) 
sec.51(viii) (astronomical and meteorological 
observations), sec.5l(ix) (quarantine), sec.51(xxvii) 
(immigration and emigration), sec.51(xxxvii) (matters 
referred to the Commonwealth Parliament by State 
Parliament), sec.51(xxxix) (incidental matters), sec.52 
(places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes), 
etc.
1
R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936), 55 C.L.R. at p.627, 
per Latham C.J.
2
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship 
Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129-
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Amendment of the Constitution under sec.128 could 
at any time have created a more specific and ample 
power, but that section requires approval of the majority 
of the people as a whole, and majorities of the people in 
a majority (four) of the States. This has proved a 
major obstacle to amendment. Another possible recourse 
is a reference of power to the Commonwealth by the State 
parliaments under sec.51(xxxvii), but this also has 
proved a weak road. References have been promised by 
all the State governments, but have never been carried 
into effect by all Parliaments.
Before examining the exact scope of these powers, it 
seems appropriate to make a brief account of the 
constitutional history of general aviation powers in 
chronological order.
The first Commonwealth statute applying to civil
aviation was the Air Navigation Act 1920 which
authorized regulations to give effect to the Paris 
2Convention of 1919 and for the control of air navigation
1
No.50 of 1920.
2
Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 
signed on 13 October, 1919» at Paris, and entered into 
force on 11 July, 1922.
_
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in the Commonwealth and the Territories. Prior to that
date, there was practically no law in existence relating
2to aviation other than the police laws of the States.
The 1920 Act was passed apparently in the belief that
the State Parliaments would hand over legislative power
3to the Commonwealth, consequent to the resolution of
kState Premiers’ Conference in May, 1920. Two States
passed the Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) Acts
substantially in accordance with the terms of the
5resolution, and another two States passed Acts on 
different lines. In the other two remaining States, 
bills in accordance with the terms of the resolution
1
Sec.4.
2
No Australian governments provided technical facilities 
or established administrative machinery for civil 
aviation until the end of 1921, and, in the meantime, 
any professed pilot, whether his qualification, was at 
liberty to fly and carry passengers in any machine 
capable of talking off. Cf. Hocking & Haddon-Cave, op.cit. ,
p. 1 .
3
C f . Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth 19275 minutes of evidence, Part 2, 
p.270.
4
Queensland: Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) Act 1921 
(No.30). Tasmania:Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) 
Act 1920 (No.42) .
5
Victoria: Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) Act 1920 
(No. 3 0 1 8 ) . South Australia:Commonwealth Powers (Air 
Navigation) Act 1921 (No. 1469"}""! "
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were introduced, but not passed. Only Tasmania brought 
its Act into operation. However, the federal Act 
commenced in relation to all the States and Territories 
on 28th March, 1921.
It was in 1929 that the Royal Commission on the 
Constitution reported in favour of a grant of power to 
the Commonwealth Parliament over air navigation and 
aircraft. All the expert witnesses who appeared before 
the Commission pointed out, in the light of their 
knowledge and experience of aviation, that the existing
divergencies in State aviation laws, and the overlapping
1of Federal and State authority, were most undesirable.
At another Premiers' Conference in 1929 it was 
agreed that the Commonwealth Parliament should draft a 
model bill for submission to the States transferring full 
power to the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with 
respect to aviation, but the matter was struck out of the 
preliminary agenda for the 1930 Conference. The matter 
was also discussed inconclusively at the Conference of 
Commonwealth and State Ministers in 193^ + • At a
1
Cf. Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth 19275 minutes of evidence, Part 2, 
pp.161-173, 255-286; see esp. the statement by Captain
G.F. Hughes, President of the Aero Club of N.S.W. 
(evidence, p.163; Report, pp.206-207)*
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Premiers' Conference in 1936 it was again agreed that 
the States should pass legislation to enable the
1Commonwealth to exercise general aviation power.
Then, the validity of the federal Act and the Air
2Navigation Regulations made thereunder was successfully 
challenged in the High Court in R. v. Burgess; Ex parte
OHenryk (the first Henry Case) in 1936, in which it was 
held, inter alia, that the Commonwealth Parliament had 
no general control over the subject-matter of civil 
aviation in the Commonwealth, and that the power to 
legislate with respect to external affairs did include 
the power to give effect to international treaties but 
the Regulations made under the Act were in conflict with 
provisions of the Convention so as to be unconstitutional. 
As a result of this decision, the Act was amended by 
omittingreference to the control of aviation generally 
throughout Australia and inserting in its stead the 
words - '(a) in relation to trade and commerce with
other countries and among the States, and (b) within any
_
Cf. Report from the Joint Committee on Constitutional 
Review 1959 j p.68.
2
S.R. 1921, No.33.
55 C.L.R. 608.3
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Territory of the Commonwealth.’ The amendment was held
-jvalid in R. v. Poole; Ex parte Henry (the second Henry 
Case) in 1939*
The Commonwealth Government (United Australia Party -
Country Party) prepared the Constitution Alteration
(Aviation) Bill in 1936 which provided for the insertion
in sec.51 of the Constitution after para, (vi) the
following para.:- '(vi.A) Air Navigation and Aircraft1.
The result of the referendum was a majority of the whole
2people but not a majority in four of the States, so the 
proposal failed.
As a result of the aviation Conference of Commonwealth 
and State Ministers which was convened in April, 19375 
all States agreed to enact in uniform terms State Air 
Navigation Acts, which would in effect adopt the 
Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations as State law. All
3States enacted subsequently such uniform legislation, and
1
61 C.L.R. 634.
2
Votdrg at referendum, 53*56 per cent in favor of proposed 
law. Requisite majority was obtained in Victoria and 
Queensland. Cf. A.F. Davies, Australian Democracy, 1958, 
p . 84.
3
N.S.W.: Air Navigation Act 1938 (No .9)*
Vic.: Air Navigation Act 1937 (No .4502), as repealed and 
substituted by the Air Navigation Act 1958 (No .6197)* 
Queensland: Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.8).
S.A.: Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.2352).
W.A.: Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.6).
T a s .: Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.l4).
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therefore the Commonwealth Regulations applied practically 
to all air navigation within Australia. It is worthy of 
note that this uniformity was attained not by reference 
of powers to the Commonwealth Parliament but by the 
parallel uniform legislation by the States, so that the 
States could repeal or amend their legislation and even 
withdraw from this complementary and reciprocal regime. 
Until recently, this co-operation by the Commonwealth 
and the States has been the basis of the legal system of 
civil aviation in Australia.
In 19^3j all States except Tasmania passed a statute, 
entitled the Commonwealth Powers Act, to refer certain 
matters (including ’air transport’) to the Commonwealth 
Parliament until the expiration of five years after 
Australia should cease to be engaged in hostilities in 
World War 2. The Victoria Act was conditional on valid 
reference by all, so the Tasmanian failure involved also 
non-operation of the Victorian Act.
Following this, the Commonwealth Government 
(Australian Labour Party) attempted another constitutional
N.S.W.: Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 (No .18), s.2(i).
Q ’ld.: Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 (No.19)5 s.2(i).
S.A.: Commonwealth Powers Act 19^ +3 (No.3 ), s.2(g).
W.A.: Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 (No.4), s.2(h).
Victorian Commonwealth Powers Act 1943.
1
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amendment by introducing the Constitutional Alteration
(Post-War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights) Bill in
1944, which provided, inter alia, for the insertion in
sec.51 of the Constitution ’air transport’. The
referendum, however, failed to achieve a majority either
1of the whole people or of the people by States.
Then, the Government proceeded to nationalize inter­
state operators by enacting the Australian National
2Airlines Act 1945 which established the Australian National 
Airlines Commission to operate inter-State and territorial 
services. However, in Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd.
ov. CommonwealthJ (the A.N.A. Case) it was held by the Court 
that certain provisions of the Act relating to licensing 
machinery purporting to give a monopoly of inter-State 
air transport to the Commission, a Commonwealth 
instrumentality to operate national air services,
1
Voting at referendum, 45*99 per cent in favor of proposed 
law. Requisite majority was obtained in South Australia 
and Western Australia. Cf. also A.L.J. vol.l6, 1943> at 
pp.157, 221, 323) and in particular the speech of the
Attorney-General (Dr Evatt) in moving leave to introduce 
the Australian Constitution Alteration (War Aims and 
Reconstruction) Bill 1 942 , at p . 1 60 .
2
No.31 of 1945.
3
( 1 9 4 5 )  71 C.L.R. 29; (leave to appeal to Privy Council 
refused) 71 C.L.R. 715.
4o
contravened sec.92 of the Constitution (i.e., freedom of
inter-State trade and commerce). The Commonwealth Powers
Acts 1943 enacted by New South Wales, Queensland, South
Australia, and Western Australia mentioned above, expired
on 2 September 1950, but in Queensland an Act to continue
the reference to the Commonwealth Parliament of the matter
1of air transport was enacted in the same year. The State 
of Tasmania passed Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act  ^
in 1952 to the same effect. It was in relation to the 
latter Act that the Court held later in 1964 that the 
Australian National Airlines Act gave to the Commission 
authority to establish and operate within Tasmania intra­
state airline services without a licence under the
3provisions of the Tasmanian traffic legislation by virtue 
of the reference of aviation power to the Commonwealth:
R. v. Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal of Tasmania
4and Others; Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd.
1
Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act 1950 (No.2).
2
Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act 1952 (No .46); 
it commenced on 2 April, 1959*
3
Traffic Act 1925-19^1, as amended or as affected by the 
Transport Act 1938*7_
1964, A.L.R. 918; 37 A.L.J.R. 503.
In 1959? the Joint Committee on Constitutional 
1Review, recommending constitutional amendment vesting an 
express power over aviation in the Commonwealth Parliament, 
agreed with the view that since aircraft, irrespective of 
whether they were engaged in intra-State or inter-State 
flights, made use of the same facilities and air space, it 
was altogether absurd that legal power should be determined 
by the physical boundaries of States. But no step for 
constitutional amendment as recommended by the Committee 
has since been taken by the Commonwealth Government.
Although, by uniform State legislation in 1937» the 
Commonwealth Regulations practically applied to all air 
navigation within Australia, most States amended in rather 
different ways their uniform Acts or related transport 
legislation so as to retain a measure of politico-economic 
control over intra-State operations. This caused 
constitutional struggles between the Commonwealth and 
the States with respect to the licensing authority of air 
service operations within a State. Two recent cases, i.e., 
Airlines of New South Wales Pty. Ltd, v. New South Wales
1
Cf. Report from the Joint Committee on Constitutional 
Review, 1959» pp.65-71; see esp. p.69*
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1 2(N o .1) and (N o .2) have had a direct bearing on this 
point. In the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.!), it was held 
that the States still had extensive powers in relation to 
aviation and that their legislation in fact still occupied 
much of the field. But the Court also suggested that the 
Commonwealth had power to move into much of the field then 
occupied by State Acts, either pursuant to the interstate 
trade and commerce power or pursuant to the external 
affairs power. Subsequently, the Commonwealth Government 
amended its regulations so as to apply the existing air 
navigation regulations as Commonwealth law to all classes 
of air navigation - international, inter-State and intra­
state, and established a Commonwealth licensing system 
for intra-State air transport services. The validity 
of these sweeping Commonwealth regulations was tested 
before the Court in the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2).
The Court held by a majority opinion that, upon various 
legislative powers, the Commonwealth need no longer 
depend on constitutional authority ceded by the States 
to enforce air safety regulations on intra-State 
operators, but it also held that a State Act, which
1
37 A.L.J.R. 399-
(1964-65) 38 A.L.J.R. 388.
2
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required intra-State airline operators to have a State 
licence, was not inconsistent with the federal 
regulations. The constitutional dichotomy still remained 
insofar as politico-economic control over intra-State 
aviation is concerned. But it was an epoch-making 
decision in the constitutional history of Australian 
aviation, for at least as to safety factors, a 
constitutional system of aviation control depending on 
complementary legislation by the Commonwealth and the 
States which had operated for nearly 30 years was replaced 
by a system depending mainly on Commonwealth power.
kk
CHAPTER II
Aviation as a Branch of ' Commerce *
By sec.5l(i) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth
Parliament has power to make laws for the peace, order,
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to
’trade and commerce with other countries, and among the 
1States.’
In contrast with the U.S. Supreme Court's approaches
2in the interpretation of the federal commerce power, the
Australian Court has taken 'commerce1 23 as a 'legal'
concept rather than a 'practical' one: It is plainly
3digested in the following view:
The distinction which is drawn between inter­
state trade and the domestic trade of a State... 
may well be considered artificial and 
unsuitable to modern times. But it is a 
distinction adopted by the Constitution and it 
must be observed however much interdependence
1
The State Parliaments also have a concurrent power, 
preserved to them by sec.107 of the Constitution 
(saving of power of State Parliaments), subject to 
territorial limitations, to make laws with respect to 
the same subject.
2
U.S. Constitution, Art.1, sec.8.
3
Wragg v. State of N.S.W. (1953) 88 C.L.R. at pp.385-386, 
per Dixon C.J.
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may now exist between the two divisions of 
trade and commerce which the Constitution 
thus distinguishes....The economic inter­
dependence of trade and commerce among the 
States with the domestic trade of a State 
cannot lead to a weakening of the legal 
distinction which the Constitution itself 
makes.
The doctrine of ’implied prohibitions’ has been
rejected by the High Court, and that of ’immunity of
instrumentalities’ accepted only in a very restricted
form. To this extent, State ’reserved’ powers have
been left without explicit protection; they are open to
potentially indefinite encroachment by federal law
within the granted federal powers and their incidental
penumbra. But on the other hand, neither have the Courts
been at all ready to imply an exclusive quality for
federal powers. The Court has persistently rejected
arguments to attract federal control by virtue of the
’national’ character of subject-matters, or by virtue of
the social desirability or practical advantages of
2federal uniform regulation. The Court has been inclined
1
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship 
Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129.
2
As to the U.S. cases, see, e.g., Escanaba & L.M. Trans.
Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 2 S.Ct. 185, 188, 27 L.ed.442; 
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 23 Wall 713, U.S.R.713* As to the 
Australian cases, see, e.g., Newcastle and Hunter River 
Steamship Co. Ltd, v. Attorney-General for the Commonwealth 
( 1921 ) 29 C.L.R. 357 > R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry, (1936) 
55 C.L.R. 608.
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not to introduce considerations of de facto 
intermingling of national and local factors in the total 
economy into questions pertaining to the Australian 
’federalism’, and such intermingling is recognized when - 
and only when - subjects directly falling within the 
scope of the federal commerce power happen to relate to 
intra-State trade and commerce as well. Moreover, the 
existence of this dichotomy is considered as making
impossible any operation of the incidental power which
1would obliterate the distinction. Accordingly, the 
American doctrine of ’commingling’ of inter-State and 
intra-State commerce has not been authoritatively 
adopted; its modified application to the realities of 
commerce activities has made the Australian position 
different from the U.S.’s not as a matter of degree but 
rather as a matter of basic principle.
2The Court, in applying sec.109 of the Constitution, 
evolved the doctrine known as the ’covering the field’ - 
that is, once a law covering a certain subject-matter has
1
Wragg1s Case, supra, at p.386, per Dixon C.J.
2
Sec.109: ’When a law of a State is inconsistent with a
law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and 
the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
invalid.’
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been passed by the Commonwealth Parliament under a 
legitimate power conferred by the Constitution, it 
confers supremacy upon the Commonwealth over State laws 
which will thus become inapplicable in proportion to 
the intention of the Commonwealth. However, this 
doctrine as such is not an original source of the 
legislative power, and its scope of application depends 
upon the scope of the principal power, thus putting the 
problem back in the interpretative approaches to the 
principal power itself.
With the recent expansion of Australian economy both 
in domestic and in foreign trade and commerce, more 
federal control has of necessity been placed on national 
commercial activity. At least insofar as aviation is
concerned, the special position of the Australian economic
1geography in contrast with that of the United States, no
1
It is submitted that, in the United States, the small 
size and large number of the States and an economic 
situation in which inter-State economic activity is very 
much larger in volume than in Australia, in total and in 
proportion to intra-State activity, have together 
compelled the Courts to pay closer attention to the 
subject than in Australia (G. Sawer, Australian 
Constitutional Cases, third ed., pp.353-354). It may be 
that, as regards the utilization of rivers in Australia, 
some geographical and climatic factors, e.g., very few 
large navigable rivers running among the States and 
irregular rainfall on dry land throughout a year, have 
brought about the slightest awareness of the necessity of 
the ’commingling’ doctrine.
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longer appears to be a strong reason for the 
inapplicability of the American doctrines. The whole
pattern of Australian domestic aviation is dominated
1by inter-State operations, and international control 
has been more predominant than over any other forms of 
transport, owing mainly to the very nature of aviation - 
’Internationality’. From an early stage of Australian 
aviation history, the development of aviation has been 
carried out with the strong guidance of the central 
government either by its financial subsidy to the 
industry or by its administrative control over aircraft 
and their operations. Various kinds of aviation 
facilities have been provided under that Government, and 
de-centralized administration can do more harm than good 
in this area. As compared with the use of the road, 
the highly technical control of air traffic must be 
integrated with important aerodromes as the cardinal 
points; these aerodromes are mostly owned or operated by
1
Exact data of the proportion of inter-State volumes of 
aircraft operations in the whole Australian aviation are 
not available, but, insofar as domestic air transport 
operations are concerned, the passenger short ton miles 
performed by the two biggest domestic air services, 
during 1963-1964 financial year, operating basically on 
inter-State routes occupies 80 per cent of the total air 
services (136.587 million miles). Cf. Fourth Annual 
Report by the Minister for Civil Aviation for year 
1963-1964, Appendix 2.
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the Commonwealth, and are scattered throughout the three 
million square miles of the continent, thus linking the 
net-like air-routes in the Australian air - a medium 
indispensable for inter-State and overseas air traffic as 
well as intra-State commerce by air.
Two other constitutional clauses are relevant to the 
federal commerce power in respect of aviation.
By sec.98 of the Constitution, the power of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to 
trade and commerce ‘extends to navigation and shipping', 
and to railways the property of any State. The meaning 
and scope of this provision has been discussed before the 
Court in many shipping cases, but the Court has been
consistently of opinion, since the decision in
1S.S. Kalibia v. Wilson, that sec.98, being a mere 
explanatory provision, does not enlarge the ambit of the 
trade and commerce power conferred by sec.51(i)* Hence, 
attempts to rely upon the proposition that the express 
‘extension’ of the commerce power to 'navigation and 
shipping’, considered as a distinct subject of legislation,
1
(1910) 11 C.L.R. 689.
2
See also Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of 
the Australian Commonwealth, 1901, p.873.
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provides the Commonwealth with the power to deal with
1'intra-State' shipping have been unsuccessful. 
Undoubtedly, this definition clause should now be read 
as if the subject of ’aviation’ - a new traffic means 
which was advented after the date of the Constitution - 
were included in it. But it is unlikely that in that 
connection s . 9 8  would be treated as obliterating the 
distinction between inter-Stateness and intra-Stateness 
inherent in s.5l(i)* This construction of sec.9 8 , 
coupled with the limited scope of sec.5l(i)> stands in
1
C f . Newcastle and Hunter River Steamship Co. Ltd, v . 
Attorney-General for Commonwealth, supra; Isaacs and 
Powers JJ.’s minority opinions in Australian Steamships v . 
Malcolm (1914) 19 C.L.R. 2 9 8 , at p p . 3 3 1 and 337, and
R. v. Turner; Ex parte Marine Board of Hobart (1 9 2 7 ) 39
C.L.R. 411, at pp.434-436, based upon historical context of 
sea commerce and good sense of the constitutional 
interpretation.
2
See E. Sikk, Commonwealth Legislative Power over Australian 
Coastal Shipping, 29 A.L.J., pp.104-108, arguing that until 
the date of operation of the Westminster Adoption Act, the 
Commonwealth had power to make laws with respect to 
intra-State shipping insofar as those laws could be 
described as a regulation of the coastal trade within the 
meaning of sec.736 of the Merchant Shipping A ct, 1894 
(imp.). The author of the article admits that the 
Commonwealth surrendered its power, if any, by adopting 
sec.5 of the Statute of Westminster, but suggests that 
the Commonwealth should resume the power by an appropriate 
repeal of the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act adopting 
sec.5, so that the Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912-1935 
which was passed before the date of operation of the 
Adopting Act might be validated as suggested by a recourse 
to sec.7 3 6 .
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sharp contrast to the U.S. position. There, even though 
no provision corresponding to sec.98 was contained in 
the Constitution, it was early established that the 
Congressional power over 1 2commerce1 comprehends
’navigation1 regarded as an inseparable subject of
1commerce. There also the nature of the air and airspace
as a universal channel of communication has been
emphasized; the Congressional power over navigation on
navigable waters was given a very extensive interpretation
on grounds connected with the practical necessities of sea
and shipping, and similar grounds were even more cogent
2and readily applied in the aviation field.
1
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wheat.1; Cooley v. Board of 
Port Warden's ( 1851 ) 12 How.299; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall 557-
2
See, esp. Northwest Airlines, Inc, v. Minnesota, 3 2 2  
U.S. 2 9 2 ,  303 (1 9 ^ ^ )  per Jackson J. ; Re Veterans’ Air
Express Co., ( 1 9 4 8 )  DC NJ. 7 8 F.Supp. 6 8 4 ;  (CH) Aviation
Cases 2 ,  1 4 ,  6 0 2 - l 4 ,  at 607*  It was once urged in the
United States that the power to control intra-State 
commerce in navigable waters, deriving from the provision 
vesting admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the 
federal courts (U.S. Constitution, Art.35 sec.2) under 
which Congress might pass regulatory acts to some extent 
could be made analogous to aviation. But the soundness 
of the analogy was seriously doubted in view of the 
decision that airplanes were not subject to maritime 
jurisdiction. Cf. A.L. Newman II, Aviation Law and the 
Constitution, Yale Law Journal, v o l . 3 9 ,  1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 0 ,  
p.11l4n. (continued on p. 52)
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Sec.92 of the Constitution provides that 'on the 
imposition of uniform customs, trade, commerce, and 
intercourse among the States, whether by means of 
internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely 
free.' The federal commerce power has been analysed and 
expounded in connexion with sec.92 cases, which involve 
two important questions, viz., 'what is meant by "Inter- 
State trade and commerce"?' and 'what constitutes an 
impairment of freedom in "inter-State trade and commerce"?' 
The first question will be taken up later when we examine 
the scope of sec.5l(i)* Various principles have been 
established by the Court with respect to the second 
question: two points appear to warrant mention here.
1 ( continued from p.51)
Sec.76(iii) of the Australian Constitution empowers the 
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws conferring original 
jurisdiction on the High Court in any matter of 'admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction'. This sub-section is 
construed to be limited in its operation to a grant of 
power to confer jurisdiction and an attempt in 
S.S. Kalibia v. Wilson, supra, to read it in the extended 
sense attributed to similar words in the United States 
as including a grant of legislative power relating to 
substantive law in admiralty and maritime matters has 
been rejected by the Court. Likewise, sec.5 of the 
Australian Constitution providing that 'the law of the 
Commonwealth shall be in force on all British ships, the 
Queen's ships of war excepted, whose first port of 
clearance and whose port of destination are in the 
Commonwealth', is not a grant of power, but an extra­
territorial extension of the operation of Commonwealth 
Acts, otherwise valid, to ships of the class mentioned.
Cf. Wynes, The Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers 
in Australia, third ed., p .89 and cases there cited.
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First, it was arguable whether this clause does or 
does not bind the Commonwealth as well as the States; in 
McArthur (w. & A.) Ltd, v. Queensland, it was held that 
the clause did not bind the Commonwealth, but since the
2decision of the Privy Council in James v. the Commonwealth 
the prevailing view has been that it does, unlike in the 
United States where the corresponding freedom is from 
State action only. The reason is the simple literal one 
that the federal commerce power as contained in sec.31(i) 
is expressly stated to be 'subject to this Constitution’, 
of which sec.92 is part. In the U.S.A., the corresponding 
freedom is not express at all, but is an implication from 
the federal commerce power.
Secondly, in determining whether a law is invalidated 
by this immunity clause, the general test now adopted by 
the Court is that which was laid down by the Privy Council
Oin Bank of N.S.W. v. Commonwealth^ (the Bank Nationalization 
Case) which substituted a new test for the one adopted 
by James' Case; the new test was reaffirmed in Hughes and
1
(1920) 28 C.L.R. 330.
2
(1936) A.C. 378; 35 C.L.R. 1.
3(1948) 76 C.L.R. 1; (1949) 79 C.L.R. 497; (1950) 
A .C. 235.
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1Vale Pty. Ltd, v. N.S.W. which overruled earlier
2transport cases. The criteria are, first, whether the
effect of the legislation is, in a particular respect,
direct or remote, and, secondly, whether in its true
character it imposes a burden or is merely regulatory.
In applying these concepts, the Court has also attempted
to analyse trade and commerce by reference to its
essential characters or attributes, and its consequential,
3ancillary or incidental factors. Laws concerning 
those ancillary matters regulate commerce and are 
generally likely to be consistent with the freedom of 
trade, commerce and intercourse among the States, provided
1
(1955) A .C . 241; 93 C.L.R. 1.
2
E .g ., 0. Gilpin Ltd, v ♦ Commissioner for Road Transport
and Tramways (N.S.W.) ( 1 935) 52 C.L.R. 189; Riverina
Transport Pty. Ltd, v. State of Victoria (1937) 57 C .L .R . 
327; McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. 432.
3
Cf. Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd, v. State of N.S.W. (No .2) 
(1935") 93 C.L.R. 127 • The Court gave the f ollowing 
examples of those ancillary matters in the road 
transportation: ’The hours during which a journey is made,
what equipment should be carried for emergency or for 
handling or securing the goods, the axle-weight or the 
wheel-weight of the laden vehicle, the relief on a long 
journey the driver should have, the height or width of the 
load, the number and position of lights to show the width 
or the overhang, the crowding of vehicles upon a given 
route incapable of carrying so many and the means and 
method of limiting the traffic, the relations within New 
South Wales of the carrier to the consignor and consignee, 
the records to be kept and documents to be used, the 
receipt, safe carriage and delivery of goods.’ (at p.l63)*
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that they are not used or do not operate to impede or 
restrict the activity itself.
Language similar to the above has always been used 
in the cases on sec.92. What distinguishes the Bank 
Nationalization Case and Hughes & Vale Case from the 
earlier transport cases is the point of view from which 
the notions of prohibition and regulation were approached. 
In the earlier cases, the approach was collectivist and 
concerned with the trade as a whole; consequences for 
individuals were regarded as ’incidental*. Under the new 
approach, the individual natural or legal person is 
regarded as having a right to engage in interstate trade 
and commerce, and laws which either stop him from doing 
so or impose burdens beyond the needs of reasonable 
regulation are prima facie invalid.
There has only been one aviation case having a direct
1bearing on this clause; it is the A .N .A . Case, where the 
question was whether the Commonwealth Australian National 
Airlines Act 1945, purporting to confer on the Commission, 
created under the Act to conduct inter-State and
1
Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd, v. Commonwealth 
(1945) 71 C.L.R. 29; 71 C.L.R. 715- 
2
No.31 of 1945.
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lTerritorial airline services for the transport by air
for reward of passengers and goods, a monopoly in respect
of such services, and the licensing regulation of the
2Air Navigation Regulations made under the Commonwealth 
Air Navigation Act 1920-1936, contravened sec.92. The 
Australian National Airlines Act provided, inter alia; 
that air licences (issued under the Regulations) should 
cease to be operative so long as ’adequate airline 
services'^ were provided by the Commission (sec.46); that
1
’Inter-State airline service’ means a service providing 
for the transport by air, for reward, of passengers or 
goods and operating from one place in Australia to 
another place in Australia and having scheduled stopping 
places in two or more States; ’Territorial airline 
service’ means a service (not being an inter-State airline 
service) providing for the transport by air, for reward, 
of passengers or goods and having a scheduled stopping 
place in a Territory of the Commonwealth (sec.4). If the 
service had scheduled stopping places in more than one 
State it would be an inter-State airline service and not 
a Territorial airline service (71 C.L.R. at p.64, per 
Latham C.J., and at p.102, per Williams J.)
2
S.R. 1937 No.81 - 1940 No.25.
3
No.50 of 1920 - No.93 of 1936.
4
'Adequate airline service' means - (a) an inter-State 
airline service which is adequate to meet the needs of 
the public for inter-State transport by air between 
scheduled stopping places of the service; or (b) a 
Territorial airline service which is adequate to meet the 
needs of the public for transport by air between scheduled 
stopping places of the service of which at least one is 
within a Territory of the Commonwealth (sec.4).
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the licensing authority should not issue a licence under 
the Regulations to any other person than the Commission 
unless the licensing authority was satisfied that, having 
regard to the airline licences operated by the Commission, 
the issue of a licence was necessary to meet the needs 
of the public with respect to inter-State airline 
services or territorial airline services (sec.47); and 
that a person should not enter into a contract for the 
transport of any person or goods in the course of any 
prescribed inter-State airline service or territorial 
airline service operated by any person other than a 
person holding an airline licence in respect of that 
service not being a licence which was inoperative by 
virtue of sec.46 of the Act (sec.49)*
All of the Justices distinguished the earlier 
transport cases on the grounds that there was a great 
difference between co-ordination and regulation and 
simple prohibition, and held the monopolizing provisions 
invalid as contravening sec.92. With respect to the 
validity of the provisions of the Act monopolizing in 
the Commonwealth Territorial air services, more detailed 
discussions will be made later, and it is sufficient
See Chapter IV, post.
1
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here to say that those provisions, insofar as they 
related to Territorial airline services, were held valid 
within the powers conferred by sec.122 of the Constitution.
Another sec.92 question in this case was whether 
reg.79(3) of Part VII of the Air Navigation Regulations 
was valid. Reg.79(3) provided that ’the Director-General 
may issue a licence (in these Regulations referred to as 
’an airline licence') upon such conditions, in addition 
to compliance with these Regulations, as the Director- 
General considers necessary or he may refuse to issue the 
licence.’ The effect of this provision was to set the 
Director-General absolutely at large, with the result that 
he could exercise his discretion upon any ground whatever/ 
The vesting of such a discretion to control inter-State 
transportation was held by all Judges invalid as 
inconsistent with sec.92.
The A .N .A . Case was decided before the Banking Case 
and Hughes and Vale Case (No .1). In effect, the Court’s 
conclusion was no more than that absolute prohibition of 
inter-State commerce by air was not ’regulation’ and was
1
Part VII applied to inter-State trade and commerce and 
to the Territories by virtue of reg.6.
2
71 C.L.R. at p.67, per Latham C.J.
therefore contrary to sec.92; nevertheless, an obiter
die turn of Latham C.J. touched the core of the problem:
The Act is a prohibition...of such services, 
and that prohibition is quite independent of 
any considerations relating to safety, efficiency, 
air-worthiness, & c ., which otherwise might have 
been relied upon as the basis of an argument that 
the statute regulated such services in the sense 
of introducing regular and orderly control into 
what otherwise might be unregulated, disorderly, 
possibly foolishly competitive, and therefore 
inefficient services. ( i t a l i c s a d d e d )
Did this remark suggest the possible extent to which the
Commonwealth could regulate the economic aspects of
inter-State air transport by introducing a co-ordination
and rationalization scheme, without infringing sec.92?
If so, it might be criticized as having been affected by
the principles of earlier transport cases, but it can be
read as being quite consistent with the Privy Council's
view in the Banking Case that, in considering the meaning
of ’regulation', every case must be judged on its own
facts and in its own setting of time and circumstances,
in regard to some economic activities and at some stage
2of social development. However, the Hughes and Vale
3Cases and later transport cases established the more
1
71 C.L.R. at p.61.
2
79 C.L.R. at pp.640-641.
As to these cases, see Wynes, op.cit., p.370, et seq.
3
6 o
restrictive view that any governmental control over the 
licensing system must be truly regulatory (e.g., safety 
considerations), and must not interfere with freedom 
to carry out the very activity constituting inter-State 
trade.
Since the decision in the A .N .A . Case, the federal 
licensing regulations, insofar as they relate to inter­
state operations, have limited the Director-General's 
discretion to safety considerations. By the new 
regulations in 1964, federal licensing control was
drastically extended to intra-State operations; the
1validity of this was upheld later, except for one
purporting to give exclusive operation to federal licences.
But the conditions to be imposed upon inter-State
operators in the use of their aircraft, as distinct from
right to perform the operation, are still limited to
those relating to the safety of operations so as to
2accommodate the licensing system to sec.92. An inevitable 
result is that, while the Director-General's discretion 
is limited only to safety considerations as to inter-State 
operations, it may not be so limited as to other classes
1
Airlines of N.S.W. v. State of N.S.W. (No.2), 38 A.L.J.R.
388 .
2
Reg.199(2).
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of operations including intra-State ones, because s.92 
has there no direct operation. The conditions to be 
imposed upon purely intra-State services are limited to 
'matters concerned with the safety, regularity and
1efficiency of air navigation and to no other matters’.
The words 'safety, regularity and efficiency of air 
navigation1 were probably introduced in the domestic 
legislation pursuant to the obligation imposed by the 
Chicago Convention, but the Court, having construed the 
treaty words in a narrow sense and rejected the 
Commonwealth's intrusion into State commerce power, 
restricted those implicative expressions to the safety of 
flight operations.
2In R. v. Anderson; Ex parte IPEC-Air Pty. Ltd., 
where the company’s application for permission to import 
five Douglous DC.4 aircraft to conduct an inter-State air 
freight service was refused by the Director-General of 
Civil Aviation, the company contended before the High 
Court inter alia that the refusal of permission involved 
a contravention of sec.92 of the Constitution. By reg.4(2) 
of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations made 
_
Reg.199(4).
(1965) 39 A.L.J.R. 66.
2
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under the Customs Act 1901-1963,^ the importation into
Australia of the goods (specified in the Regulations)
was prohibited unless the conditions, restrictions or
requirements to the description of the goods including
aircraft were complied with. It was specifically
provided that the importer should produce to the Collector
of Customs the permission in writing of the Director-
General of Civil Aviation to import the goods. Apart from
questions whether the refusal of the company* s another
application for a charter licence for its inter-State
operations was valid under the licensing provisions of
2the Air Navigation Regulations, and whether the refusal
of permission was exercised within the scope of the
3Director-General1 2s administrative functions, the Court 
held per curiam that the connexion between the refusal of 
import permission and the prevention from engaging in 
inter-State trade was too remote to make the refusal 
obnoxious to sec.92 of the Constitution. According to 
the Court's opinion, the operation precluded by sec.92 
is an operation with reference to or in consequence of or
1
1901 (No.6)-1963 (No.48).
2
Regs. 197 and 199(2).
See Chapter VII, post.3
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restricting or burdening something which itself forms 
part of inter-State trade, commerce or intercourse or in
itself supplies some element or attribute essential to
1that conception; it will not be enough that it affects
something which, because it is sine qua non to the
existence of some subject of freedom which sec.92
guarantees, has a consequential effect on what might
2otherwise have been done in inter-State trade. The 
Director-General’s action is a refusal to lift a 
prohibition upon the doing of something (importation) 
which is itself altogether apart from inter-State trade, 
and the conclusion would be the same even if it had been 
the imposition of a prohibition instead of a refusal to 
lift a prohibition.^
One point to add to the effect of sec.92: - the
question of 'border hopping’ which is described as
1
39 A.L.J.R. 66,  at p.71, per Kitto J., at p.72, per 
Taylor and Owen J J.
2
Grannall v. Marrickville Margarine Pty. Ltd. (1955)
93 C.L.R. 55 j at P*78.  See also Wragg v.  N.S.W. (1953)
88 C.L.R. 353,  at pp.7 1, 72,  78,  79- 
3
39 A.L.J.R. 66,  at p . 7 1 ,  per Kitto J. Taylor and Owen JJ 
referred to the point that it was not possible to impugn 
the regulation by an investigation of the reasons for 
its enactment or the motives which called it forth 
(at p.72).
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’deviating from the normal course of journey in order
to cross and then immediately recross a State border in
the expectation, or hope, that this exercise will convert
what would otherwise be an intra-State transaction into
an inter-State one protected by sec.92 of the Constitution.’
The question has been raised in relation to road transport 
2cases, but, in view of the factual differences between
the use of road and air, the problem in aviation will not
take an identical form. A modern aircraft flies through
the universal airspace which enables aircraft operations
to deviate from the normal course with far more freedom
than in road transport. An aircraft operates in the short
duration of journey with tremendous speed, so that the
crossing and recrossing of States’ borders may be performed
in the twinkling of an eye. Hence the test adopted by
3Harris v. Wagner to subdivide the whole journey into 
several sections is hardly applicable to aviation cases, 
where there seems to be only one question to satisfy
_
P. Brazil, Border Hopping and Section 92 of the 
Constitution, 34 A.L.J. p.77«
2
Naracoorte Co. Pty. Ltd, v. Butler (1956) 95 C.L.R. 455; 
Golden v. Hotchkiss ( 1959) 101 C.L.R. 568; Beach v. Wagner
(1959)  101 C.L.R. 6 o 4; Harris v. Wagner (1959) 103 C.L.R. 452 .
3
(1959) 103 C .L .R .  452.
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common sense: Is the whole journey from the beginning to
the end intra-State or inter-State? An air journey 
linking aerodromes of its departures and destination within 
a State, a part of which is performed merely by traversing 
over other State*s territory, may generally be categorized 
as *intra-State*, except, perhaps, when the sole object 
of crossing and recrossing is also to carry out the 
operations, e.g., a sight-seeing flight. The rule of 
the road cases is that if the crossing and recrossing 
of the border is neither a necessary nor natural and 
appropriate means of carrying out the operation, nor an 
ordinary or usual incident of the operation, the carriage 
is not as a whole protected by sec.9 2; this rule may well 
be applied by analogy to aviation, provided that what is 
necessary, natural, appropriate, etc., is determined in 
the light of factual circumstances of the aircraft 
operation. When the journey is interrupted by landing 
on an aerodrome outside the State where the places of 
the departure and destination locate, the question becomes 
more complex. The Commonwealth Civil Aviation (Carriers* 
Liability) Act 1959-1962^ applies to the carriage where,
No.2 of 1959, as amended by No.38 of 1962.
1
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under a contract of carriage, the carriage is to begin
and end in the one State or Territory of the Commonwealth
(whether at the one place or not) but is to include a
landing or landings at a place or places outside that
State or Territory, and such a carriage is deemed to be
carriage between the place where the carriage begins and
that landing place, or such one of those landing places
as is most distant from the place where the carriage
begins, as the case may be. This means in turn that
the Act (Part IV-Domestic Carriage) does not apply to
carriage which has the place of departure and the place
of destination in the same State but merely passes over
2the other State*s or Territory's land. In such a case,
a contract of carriage including a landing place outside
the State is a factor to determine its inter-State
character, and likewise various other factors, e.g.,
fuel supplying, embarkation, disembarkation, etc., as
well as ’necessary* and ’ordinary’ factors, will become
relevant. As to the operation by two different border
3hoppers, precedent is provided by a road case where it
_
Sec.27(3)•
2
Semble, the scope of the Act could be extended to the 
border-hopping carriage for the sight-seeing purposes if 
so contracted by the parties. Cf. Chapter VI, post.
3
Naracoorte Co. Pty. Ltd, v. Butler (1956) 95 C.L.R. 455-
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was held that such an operation of carriage performed 
by successive carriers was protected by sec.92.
Apart from those border hopping situations, the 
continuance of 1inter-State' commerce by air must also 
be determined by a number of factual factors; an air
transport activity between two points within a State may
1in a particular instance be of an inter-State nature,
as for example, a successive carriage by several aircraft
operators which is regarded by the parties as a single
operation whether it has been agreed upon by a single
contract or by two or more contracts, is of an inter-State
nature, even if some part of the carriage is performed
2within a State.
'Aviation' as a subject of legislation includes 
various subject-matters relating not only to the business 
of carrying people and goods but also to aircraft, 
flying-personnel, and the equipment and service staff 
incidental thereto, - which together constitute the whole
1
Cf. McArthur's Case, supra, at p.5^9*
2
Sec.27(^) of the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 
1959-1962, supra. Another example may be an air transport 
activity extending to two or more States where a part of 
the carriage is connected with other forms of transportation 
(e.g., road or railway) between places within a State, and 
the whole journey regarded by the parties as a single 
operation.
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system of administration of civil aviation. The scope 
of such aviation matters to be dealt with by the federal 
legislature under sec.51(i) of the Constitution is 
determined by the test whether they are sufficiently 
connected with trade and commerce inter-State or overseas.
Again by contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
standpoint that in cases where there is transportation
the element of profit is not necessary in order to
1constitute ’commerce', the Australian Court has attached
great importance to the nature of movement of commodities
for 'reward' or for 'profit'; behind this view exists a
strong argument that the word 'intercourse' used in
sec.92 is not to be found in sec.5l(i)> and therefore
the federal commerce power does not include '(non-
commercial) intercourse'. However, the gap between the
wide definition of the general concept of 'commerce'
3adopted early in McArthur's Case and the tendency to
1
Cf. M. Ramaswamy, The Commerce Clause in the Constitution 
of the United States, pp.289-90.
2
C f . P.D. Phillips, The Trade and Commerce Power; Essays 
on the Australian Constitution, second ed., 1961, Chapter V,
p. 13^.
3
28 C.L.R. at p .547. In this case, the meaning and content 
of the words 'trade and commerce' were defined broadly as 
'the class of relations between mankind which the world 
calls "trade and commerce'”, and also as 'all the commercial 
dealing and all the accessory methods in fact adopted to 
initiate, continue, and effectuate the movement of persons 
and things, tangible or intangible, from State to State.'
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associate commerce with pecuniary gain has been
1considerably reduced in the later judicial trend. It 
was not until the A.N.A. Case in 19^ +5 that the Court 
advanced the view that transportation (including 
transportation by air), for reward, itself was included 
in the category of ’commerce*, as against the argument 
that transportation was only a means by which such 
commerce could be conducted. Dixon J. (as then he was) 
said that there was not much covered by the word
2’intercourse’ that fell outside the commerce power.
But no judicial authority deals with the question whether 
transport activities unrelated to ’reward' (e.g. ’joy 
flying' by private aircraft) across the State borders
3should be included in inter-State ’commerce’ as such. 
Although no question of the relation between ’commerce’ 
and ’aviation’ was directly raised in the first Henry Case, 
it was pointed out that the expression ’air navigation’ 
covered a much wider field than the concept of ’trade
1
Cf ., A.N.A. Case, supra, and Banking Case, supra.
2
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3
As
C.L.R. at pp.81-8 3 •
to the U.S. cases on this point, see Phillips, op.cit.
pp.133-4.
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1and commerce’. The A.N.A. Case made it clear only that
the Commonwealth had power under the commerce power to 
create instrumentalities to conduct Inter-State air 
services carrying persons and goods for reward, 
irrespective of the question whether the persons or goods 
carried were being or to be carried for the purposes of 
trade and commerce independently of the carriage itself. 
The Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.2) is an authority for the 
general proposition that at least as to aviation 
regulations in the interests of air safety, all classes of 
aircraft operations came within the competence of the 
federal legislature. There are some uncertain areas; for 
example, a question arises as to whether the subject of 
liability of operators for ground damages is within the 
competence of the Commonwealth Parliament under the 
’commerce’ power, even in relation to interstate flight, 
since the regulation thereof would directly affect State 
competence over injured persons or damaged property. 
Meagreness of judicial authorities pertaining to aviation 
problems compels us to be speculative on this point, 
probably by referring to other ’commerce’ cases and, in 
particular, transport cases, but, in view of the nature of
55 C.L.R. at p.672, per Dixon J.
1
aviation as an independent branch of national economic 
activity having countless relations with almost every 
aspects of human life, in which highly technical and 
throughout control must be maintained in perfect order, 
any microscopic characterization of subject-matters 
arising from that activity would entail inefficiency in 
civil aviation development.
A grant of legislative power, as in sec.51(f)?
carries with it a grant of power over all matters
ancillary and incidental to the subject-matter of the
power. But constitutional prohibitions like sec.92, where
freedom is guaranteed in respect only of acts, matters,
or things which fall squarely within inter-State trade and
commerce, has been interpreted as not having such a wide
1incidental scope. From this differing approach demanded 
by the different operative scope of sec.51(i) and sec. 92, 
it would follow that the commencement, continuance and 
termination of the protection of sec.92 are not necessarily 
the same as those of the legislative reach of sec.51(i).
1
This has been recognized by the Court, and is reinforced 
either by the proper interpretation of the words ’with 
respect to’, which is applicable only to sec.51(i), or by 
the restrictive interpretation of the unusual constitutional 
terms, ’absolutely free', used in sec.92. See, further,
R. Anderson, Recent Trends in the Federal Commerce Power 
and Sec.92, A.L.J. vol.29, 1955-6, p.277; K.H. Bailey,
Fifty Years of the Australian Constitution, 25 A.L.J., 
1951-2, p.314.
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The interpretative mode of the Australian Court to 
sec.51(i) problems has been to fix a central or essential 
concept of ’commerce’ under the influence of sec.92, and 
include associated features to such an extent as are 
reasonably necessary for achieving the main object of the 
guarantee. But the scope of the federal commerce power 
depends largely upon the question how far those 
incidental or ancillary features of the inter-State and 
overseas commerce are to be included in the granted power.
The effect of the incidental power conferred upon the 
Commonwealth Parliament by sec.5l(xxxix) of the Constitution, 
whether it be regarded as being implied in the grant of 
power itself or conferred expressly under the placiturn, 
operates in two inter-related aspects; one relates to the 
extent to which the main power can comprehend various 
subject-matters relevant to the main subject of the power, 
such as things or acts other than ’aviation’ (e.g., sale 
of liquor’ in aircraft or on aerodromes), and the other 
relates to the permeability of the power into ’intra-State' 
commerce fields.
A tendency to take a broad view of ’commerce’ is 
shown by the Court’s decisions in Huddart Parker Ltd, v .
Commonwealth (and following shipping workers' cases) and
-
(1931) 44 C.L.R. 492.
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1O ’Sullivan v. Noarlunga Meat Ltd., though by no means
2to the extent shown in the United States. In the former
case, a Commonwealth enactment giving preference to
unionists among persons offering for work in loading or
discharging cargo or fuel for the purpose of oversea or
inter-State transport was held to be a law with respect
to trade and commerce with other countries and among the
3States. In the latter case, the validity of the Commerce 
(Meat Export) Regulations of the Commonwealth, 
constituting an extremely elaborate and detailed set of 
requirements relating to site, materials of construction, 
arrangement, dimensions and many other items, which must 
be complied with before registration could be obtained 
of premises to be used for the slaughter of stock for
4export, was upheld under the federal commerce power. Two
general conclusions may be drawn from these decisions.
5Firstly, they reject a restricted view based upon a
1
( 1 95*0 92 C.L.R. 565 •
2
As to the U.S. trend since 1936, see Phillips, op.cit., 
pp.137-8.
3
See, esp. Dixon J. ’s view, 44 C.L.R. at pp.508-516.
4
See, esp. Fullagar J.'s view, 92 C.L.R. at pp.586-597-
5
See e.g., S tarke J. ’s view (a dissenting opinion) in the 
Huddart Parker Case, 44 C.L.R. at 507- It could be argued 
that the shipping case was influenced by the history of the 
Imperial Merchant Shipping Acts, for which there is no 
analogy in the aviation field.
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sharp distinction between ’commerce’, conceived solely 
as the movement of goods in an actual course of commercial 
operation, and acts, facts or things at stages before or 
after such operation begins or ends. Secondly, they 
establish that once a subject of law is treated as a part 
of commerce between States or with other countries, is 
objectively identified as being done or carried out for 
'inter-State' or ’over-seas’ commerce, then the subject 
is in its entirety open to the impact of Commonwealth law, 
irrespective of the relations which may exist between the 
subject and non-commercial matters, and even though the 
impact of Commonwealth law may be thought adverse to the
2commerce rather than beneficial. In a more recent case, 
the Court was of opinion that the federal commerce power 
was not restricted to the protection or development of 
inter-State or overseas trade and commerce, or the benefit 
of those engaging therein, but extended, subject only to 
express limitations such as s*92, to forbidding inter­
state or overseas trade or commerce itself or anything 
_
C f . D ’Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. at p.110: ’Every
power and every control the denial of which would render 
the grant itself ineffective.’
2
Redfern v. Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd. (1964) 37 A.L.J.R. 
41 3.
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occurring in or directly affecting such trade or
1commerce.
However, on the question of permeation of federal 
commerce power into intra-State commerce, the judicial 
trend to expansive interpretation is less marked.
Elements of the power are decomposed and characterized so 
as not to admit an indefinite pursuance of a constitutional 
power in a way which might threaten a predetermined 
federal distribution of competence. Aviation cases are 
no exceptions to this trend.
In 193^5 one Henry Goya Henry was charged before a 
Court of Petty Sessions of N.S.W. on an information laid 
by an officer of the Civil Aviation Branch of the 
Department of Defence, that he flew in contravention of 
the Air Navigation Regulations without being licensed in 
the prescribed manner. His licence had been suspended by 
the civil aviation authorities two days previously for a 
period of 14 days. None of the flights went beyond a 
short distance from the Mascot Aerodrome, Sydney, N.S.W., 
nor beyond the boundaries of the State of N.S.W. He was 
convicted, and an appeal came before the High Court.
_
37 A.L.J.R. at p .419, per Menzies J.
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Although the arguments in this case centered mainly
around questions of the external affairs power, which
are discussed later, all of the Judges rejected the
argument that Commonwealth aviation legislation, i.e. the
Air Navigation Act 1920 and the Regulations made thereunder,
purporting to control air navigation generally throughout
the Commonwealth, could be supported under the federal
commerce power. Having relied upon earlier shipping cases,
the Court refused to introduce in aviation fields such
considerations as ’wisdom', ’expedience’, ’same air',
’commingling’ or other similar notions, and put an
emphasis upon the express constitutional distinction
between the power over inter-State and overseas commerce
and the power over intra-State commerce, however much
inconvenience might be resulted from maintaining such
distinction. The judgment of the case did not go further
than this general proposition insofar as the commerce
power was concerned; hence, much uncertainty remained
as to the scope of federal commerce power in relation to
aviation. Latham C.J. did not give a flat denial of the
possibility of intermingling of the
2and commerce; he said:
_
See, Chapter III, post.
55 C.L.R. at p.629.
2
two divisions of trade
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A new problem would be raised if in any given 
case it were established by evidence in respect 
of a particular subject matter that the 
intermingling of foreign and inter-State trade 
and commerce with intra-State trade and commerce 
was such that it was impossible for the 
Commonwealth Parliament to regulate the former 
without also directly regulating the latter.
No such evidence, however, has been presented 
in this case, and it will be necessary to deal 
with such a question only when it is directly 
raised.
A similar observation was made by Evatt and McTiernan JJ.
1in their joint judgment. It appears, however, that 
those remarks might well have been taken as much the same 
as the view that the domestic commerce of a State could 
be affected only to the extent necessary to make 
effectual the exercise of the federal power in relation 
to commerce among the States. The application of this 
view depends wholly upon how one sees what is the ’direct 
or proximate relationship' between inter-State aviation 
and intra-State aviation in the light of factual 
circumstances. Probably, it would have been still 
premature to talk about the complexity and integration of 
national economic activity as one can in the i960's.
Therefore, it is desirable to repeat here what 
constitutes the concept of 'inter-State (or foreign)
55 C.L.R. at p .677.
1
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trade and commerce.' The concept grew out of a simple
notion of 'crossing1 of things or acts across the States'
borders (or the Australian territorial limits). The
Australian Court defined adequately the term long ago in
1McArthur's Case: 'All the commercial dealing and all the
accessory methods in fact adopted to initiate, continue,
and effectuate the movement of persons and things, tangible
and intangible, from State to State.' In the United States,
the general concept of 'commerce' is not much different
from the Australian one, but the judicial minds have at
least since 1936 adopted a more practical approach to the
basic concept. There, activities which may be intra-State
in character when separately considered but have such a
close and substantial relation to inter-State commerce
that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions are placed
2under the federal commerce power. In determining such 
a 'close' and 'substantial' effect upon the inter-State 
'commerce' grasped as a flow of acts, things, etc. among 
States which comprise every features affecting the stream
_
28 C.L.R. at p.5^7*
2
Cf. e.g., Schechter Corporation v. United States, 295
u . s .  495, 55 S . C t .  837,  79 L.Ed.1570, 97 A.L.R. 947-
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of that commerce, the Supreme Court in National Labor
1Relation Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 
took judicial notice of the magnitude of a steel enterprise 
in the light of the whole national economy, and upheld the 
validity of the provisions of the federal National Labor 
Relations Act which in effect safeguarded the right of the 
steel company’s employees to self-organization and 
freedom in the choice of representatives for collective 
bargaining because of the serious effect upon inter-State 
commerce of a stoppage of those operations by industrial 
strife.
Similarly the aviation industry can be regarded as a 
complex whole whose key features are inter-State. The 
overwhelming volume of the international and inter-State 
air transport activities have prescribed the industry’s 
pattern in Australia, to such an extent that operations 
on intra-State routes can be regarded as extension lines 
of such nation-wide air networks. Under such circumstances, 
passengers and cargo carried on intra-State routes may well 
be considered part of the flow of those coming from or 
destined for other States or overseas. As in many other
_
(1937) 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 
1352.
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aviation countries, the restricted activities of aircraft 
manufacturing industry in Australia oblige the Australian 
airliners to depend on the overseas supply of aircraft 
designed and constructed by a small number of manufacturing 
countries, such as, U.S.A., U.K. and France; similarly 
with aircraft equipment and aircraft fuel. Intra-State 
operations must depend much on the facilities provided 
primarily for international and inter-State aviation 
purposes, which are owned, operated or heavily subsidized 
by the federal Government. Out of 11 domestic airline 
operators engaged either in inter-State or in intra-State 
services, only four companies are independent of the 
business organizations having a wide inter-State 
operations or the Commonwealth Government-owned 
establishment. But in the Airlines of N.S.W. Cases, 
discussed below, where the Commonwealth’s competence on 
economic control over intra-State aviation was questioned, 
the Court did not take judicial notice of these practical 
features of 'commerce’ by air in Australia. Instead it 
adhered to the long-established view that the economic 
interdependence of inter-State commerce with the intra- 
State commerce could not lead to a weakening of the 
constitutional dichotomy. Nor did the plaintiff base 
his arguments upon those facts, probably because he
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despaired of the Court adopting such an argument in view 
of its traditional approach to the problem.
As a result of the decision in the first Henry Case, 
the Air Navigation Act was amended by omitting the words 
1 in the Commonwealth and the Territories' and inserting 
in their stead the words - ’(a) in relation to trade and 
commerce with other countries and among the States, and 
(b) within any Territory of the Commonwealth' (sec.4).
The scope of the regulation-making power as defined in 
the Act has since been modified on several occasions, but 
the general proposition in respect of the federal commerce 
power which was established in 1936 has been maintained.
The assumption was that any attempt to go beyond that 
limit would render a Commonwealth law ultra vires, unless 
supported by other legislative sources. In the meantime, 
uniform State legislation was adopted by the States' 
Parliaments so as to subject all air navigation within 
Australia to the Commonwealth Regulations. Because of the 
practical results of this co-operative system of 
Commonwealth and State legislative powers, the Commonwealth 
for long refrained from further testing of its 
constitutional powers in this field. At the time of 
enactment of the uniform State Air Navigation Acts the 
Commonwealth's requirements were limited to licensing of
82
personnel and airworthiness and registration of aircraft. 
When the Commonwealth amended its regulations to require 
a licence for air service operations, it became apparent 
that the formula of the uniform State Acts gave the
Commonwealth administrative control over economic as
1well as safety aspects of intra-State operations.
Because of the economic effect of air services on road 
and rail, some States took measures to retain their 
politico-economic control over intra-State air services 
operations either in the uniform Acts or related transport 
legislation.^ In the Airlines of N.S.W. (No.1) Case,^  
the question arose as to whether there was an 
inconsistency under sec.109 of the Constitution between 
such a co-ordination legislation of a State and licensing 
provisions of the Commonwealth Regulations made under the 
Air Navigation Act 1920-1960.
Airlines of N.S.W., the plaintiff, owned beneficially 
by Ansett Transport Industries Ltd. running one of the 
two biggest domestic airliners (Ansett-A.N .A .) in 
Australia, were operating aircraft licensed by the
_
Cf. Poulton, Notes on Air Law, 1955j p.11.
2
As to those States’ legislation, see Chapter VII, and 
Appendix II, post.
3
(1964) 37 A.L.J.R. 399.
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Commissioner for Motor Transport for the carriage of 
passengers and goods upon routes within New South Wales, 
pursuant to the licensing provisions of the State Transport
(Co-ordination) Act (N.S.W.) 1931-1956,^ which required,
2inter alia,any person who operated an aircraft otherwise
than in the course of and for the purposes of inter-State
trade to hold a licence for the aircraft (sec.12), and
authorized the limitation of a licence to specified routes
or a specified area (sec. 15)* Additionally, the plaintiff
3was the holder of an 'airline licence' issued by the 
Director-General of Civil Aviation pursuant to regs.198 
and 199 of the Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations.
Reg.198 forbade the use of aircraft in regular public 
transport operations except under the authority of and 
in accordance with a licence (in the Regulations referred 
to an 'airline licence’) issued by the Director-General. 
Reg.199(2) provided: ’Where the proposed service is an
interstate service, the Director-General shall issue an
1
No.32 of 1931 - No.16 of 1956.
2
'Aircraft' was covered under the definition of 'motor 
vehicle’ and ‘public motor vehicle' (sec.3(l)).
3
The Commonwealth licence which was necessary for the 
inter-State journey contained a condition that the 
licence was issued subject to compliance with the 
provisions of the State transport legislation insofar as 
was applicable.
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aerial work, charter or airline licence, as the case 
requires, unless the applicant has not complied with, or 
has not established that he is capable of complying 
during the currency of the licence with, the provisions 
of these Regulations, or of any direction or order given 
or made under these Regulations, relating to the safety 
of the operations.’ In October, 1961, the State’s 
Commissioner announced its decision to reallocate air 
routes within New South Wales to increase East-West 
Airlines’ share of passenger traffic so as to reduce 
the plaintiff’s share pro tanto. The plaintiff issued 
a summons in the High Court, seeking a declaration that 
it was entitled to carry on its services without obtaining 
a licence or permit under the State Act, and the dispute 
was referred to the Full High Court for decision.
The whole Court upheld the validity of the licensing 
provisions of the State Act as being not inconsistent 
with the Commonwealth legislation, on the grounds that 
the Commonwealth’s licensing regulations were governed
by reg.6(l) (application of the Regulations) which did
not generally apply to air navigation within a State,
and therefore having no application to the use of aircraft
in public transport operations within a State in intra-
2State air navigation outside ’controlled airspace’. The
argument that the field to be occupied by the Commonwealth
laws dealing with aviation was so wide that the operation
of State laws in any way touching aircraft or their
operational use for any purpose solely within the State
3might be excluded, was flatly rejected. In considering 
the more specific contention as to whether the provisions 
of the State Act were inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Commonwealth Regulations, pursuant to sec. 109 of the 
Constitution, three Judges referred to the legislative
'I
1
Reg.6(l): ’Subject to the Regulations the Regulations
apply to and in relation to (a) international air 
navigation within Australian territory; (b) air navigation 
in relation to trade and commerce with other countries and 
among the States; (c) air navigation within the 
Territories; (d) air navigation to or from the Territories; 
and (e) air navigation in controlled airspace which 
directly affects, or which may endanger, the safety of 
persons or aircraft engaged in a class of air navigation 
specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (d) of this sub­
regulation. '
2
’Controlled airspace’ was defined as meaning ’an airspace 
or an aerodrome and the airspace in its vicinity designated 
by the Director-General in pursuance of reg.95 of these 
Regulations.’
37 A.L.J.R. at p .407, per Taylor J.
3
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intention discoverable in the Commonwealth legislation,
but they could not find it to be exclusive upon the
1matter of intra-State trade. However, the Court did not
take the course of saying that if the Regulations did
apply to intra-State air navigation, there would be an
inconsistency between the Transport Co-ordination Act in
2relation to aircraft and the Regulations. Two important
dicta were expressed with respect to the possibility
of the Commonwealth's taking over legislative fields then
retained by the States; one suggested the application of
3the external affairs power only, and the other mainly 
the application of the external affairs, commerce, and
4incidental powers. For the present purpose, the latter
dieturn by Windeyer J. deserves citation here:
In my opinion the powers with respect to trade 
and commerce with other countries and among 
the States (s.5l(i))> external affairs 
(s.5 1 (xxix)), and incidental matters as 
described in s.5 1 (xxxix), are ample to give 
the Commonwealth Parliament complete power 
over all air navigation in Australia. The
1
37 A.L.J.R. at p .407, per Taylor J.; at p.411, per Menzies J. 
at p.412, per Windeyer J.
2
Cf. a review of the case made by Barwick C.J. in the 
Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2).
3
37 A.L.J.R. at p .402, per Dixon J.
4
37 A.L.J.R. at p p .411-412, per Windeyer J.
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need fir the Australian nation to perform its 
international obligations under treaties and 
conventions relating to air navigation, 
together with the trade and commerce power, 
suffice, in my view, to bring the subject 
within the legislative power of the national 
Parliament. Some ancillary matters involved 
in the effective control of air traffic fall 
also within the scope of other powers given 
by s.51 of the Constitution....1 see no reason 
for confining the interest and concern of the 
Commonwealth with air navigation to areas of 
the superincumbent air that have been declared 
to be controlled air space. As I see it, 
Commonwealth power extends to the control of 
the movement of all aircraft in all air space 
above Australia and its territories....The 
proper regulation in the interests of safety 
of the operations of interstate and overseas 
airlines, and the due execution by Australia 
of the international obligations it has accepted, 
may well make it desirable that the one authority 
should exercise sole control of all movement of 
aircraft in the air and of matters connected with 
such movement, that is to say of all matters 
connected with how aircraft may be used.
A petition by Airlines of N.S.W. for special leave 
to appeal against the High Court decision was dismissed 
by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in July,
1964. In October, the Commonwealth Government amended 
the Regulations so as to apply them as Commonwealth law 
to all classes of air navigation - international, inter­
state and intra-State, by adding to reg.6(l) a paragraph 
(f) which, in the context of the other paragraphs of that 
regulation as amended, purported to make the Regulations 
as a whole apply to intra-State air navigation. It also
88
established a Commonwealth licensing system including 
intra-State air transport services, by adding reg.200B 
which purported to authorize a person holding an airline 
licence under the Regulations to conduct, in accordance 
with the licence and with the laws of the Commonwealth, 
the public air transport operations to which the licence 
referred, thus making such conduct of operations not 
unlawful by reason of anything in the laws of a State. 
Regs. 198 and 199 were made applicable to intra-State air 
transport services by force of reg.6(l)(f). Two other 
amendments were made to the regulations by the addition 
of two new regulations, reg.320A and reg.320B, which 
related respectively to landing and taking off on or 
from Commonwealth-owned aerodromes without the permission 
of the Director-General and to flight in controlled 
airspace without the like permission. Apparently, the 
Commonwealth Government relied heavily upon the 
implications in dicta, mentioned above, that suggested 
the Commonwealth could assume greater control of aviation. 
Immediately after this, the N.S.W. Government struck back 
with emergency legislation, i.e., the Air Transport Act 
1964, amending the Transport Co-ordination Act by making 
that Act no longer applicable to carriage by air of 
passengers and goods, and by providing massive fines for
persons and companies conducting intra-State services 
without a N.S.W. Government licence. The State Act 
prohibited a person from the carriage by aircraft of 
passengers or goods for reward or in the course of 
business within N.S.W. unless (a) the aircraft was 
licensed under the Act, (b) the carrier was the holder of 
a licence, and (c) the carriage was over a route in 
respect of which the licence had been granted (sec.3)«
It provided for the manner in which applications for 
licences might be made and the Commissioner for Motor 
Transport was authorized to grant or refuse any 
application for a licence (sec.5)* In deciding whether 
to grant or refuse a licence and the conditions, if any, 
subject to which it should be granted, the Commissioner 
was directed to have regard to considerations concerned 
with the rationalization of transport services within the 
State (sec.6). The plaintiff's application for licences 
for its operations on a route between Sydney and Dubbo 
(N.S.W.) was refused under the State Act, while the 
East-West Airlines' application for federal licences for 
its operations on the same route was refused by the 
federal Director-General under the Commonwealth Act. 
Hence, the plaintiff commenced the suit before the Court, 
asking a declaration that the Commonwealth Regulations
90
and the State Act were inconsistent and the former 
prevailed: Airlines of N.S.W. (No .2) Case.
The Court examined at first the validity of the 
relevant provisions of the Commonwealth Regulations.
Having found no need for any further answer in relation 
to reg.6(l) than would be given in the answers in relation 
to other regulations, the Court held regs.198, 19 9 j 320A
and 320B valid as applying to intra-State air navigation, 
and held reg.200B invalid insofar as it purported by 
virtue of reg.6(l) to apply to intra-State air navigation. 
The Court noted a functional difference between regs.198 
and 199j on the one hand, and reg.200B on the other; 
namely that the former related to only ’the use of an 
aircraft when engaged in the carriage of passengers or 
goods between places’, and the latter related to the 
’source of authority of the carriage by aircraft of 
passengers and goods between places.' In upholding the 
validity of those licensing provisions of regs.198 and 199} 
Barwick C.J. expressed the opinion that because of the 
inevitable impact of unsafe, irregular or inefficient 
air operations of an intra-State airline operator upon 
the safety of the air for inter-State and foreign trade 
and commerce by air, and upon the development of that 
trade and commerce, the Commonwealth system of licensing,
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as itself a safety procedure and also a means of ensuring
observance of other safety measures, could validly
include in its operation intra-State commercial air
1transport operations and operators. Similar views 
giving much attention to the nature of air navigation in 
Australia in the modern age, were expressed by other Judges.
1
He upheld the validity of those provisions under the 
external affairs power, too, but found more ample legislative 
justification in the commerce power.
2
Kitto J. said: ’In respects which hardly need to be
emphasised it is sui generis among methods of transport, 
and indeed among all forms of trade and commerce. The 
speed at which modern aircraft move through the sky; their 
constant liability to sudden and wide deviation in flight 
by reason of mechanical or human deficiencies, the 
vagaries of the weather, the behaviour of other aircraft 
and other causes; the multiplicity of flights required 
to satisfy the demands of modern life; the multiplicity 
and interrelation of the routes to be served; all these 
matters and more combine to make air navigation in this 
country a complex of activities of such a kind that what 
happens at any given time and place in the course of an 
air operation close or distant in time or space. The 
significance of distances, of geographical relationships, 
is necessarily different for a problem concerning air 
navigation than for a problem concerning any other form 
of transport ... (l)t is impossible to assume in advance 
that any impairment of the safety, regularity or 
efficiency of intra-State air navigation will leave 
unimpaired the safety, regularity and efficiency of the 
other departments into which air navigation may be divided 
for constitutional purposes. It follows from these 
considerations, in my opinion, that a federal law which 
provides a method of controlling regular public transport 
services by air with regard only to the safety, regularity 
and efficiency of air navigation is a law which operates 
to protect against real possibilities of physical 
interference the actual carrying on of air navigation, 
(continued on p.92)
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Some Judges ascribed the legislative sources of regs.198 
and 199 either to the external affairs power or to the 
commerce power, and some to the commerce power only. One 
Judge expressly suggested the possibility of 'intermingling1 
of inter-State and intra-State aviation which was 
suggested by Latham C.J. some 30 years before, and 
regarded the situation contemplated in this case as 
raising the same kind of problem. But this recognition 
of 1 intermingling1 does not go beyond air safety matters. 
Following the traditional mode of statutory interpretation, 
the Court does not admit the federal power’s predominance 
over purely intra-State commercial activity. In the 
reasoning of the Court, it was one thing to say that the 
safety of inter-State and international commercial air 
transport cannot be secured without including intra-State 
commercial air activities within the operation of the 
safety measures, but it was quite another to say that the 
stimulation or authorization of intra-State commercial 
air services is in any sense a safety measure. A complete
1 ( continued from p.91)
and therefore is, in every application that it has, a law 
’with respect to' such air navigation as is within federal 
power, and none the less so because it is also legislation 
with respect to that intra-State air navigation which is 
not within the power.’ 38 A.L.J.R. at p .4o8.
1
38 A.L.J.R. at p .429, per Owen J.
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absence of intra-State air services might contribute to
the safety, regularity and efficiency of other air
navigation; so, too, might the restriction of intra-State
services to those chosen by the Commonwealth to operate
such services under Commonwealth control; however, to go
further, and seek to add chosen intra-State air services
to other air traffic is a matter outside Commonwealth
constitutional power.^ Reg.200B - the so called ’enabling
provision’ giving ’positive authority’ was thus 
2invalidated. It became apparent that, as a practical 
result of the co-existence of the valid Commonwealth’s 
licensing regulations and the State Act, an airline 
operator must hold both authorities’ licences to operate 
on intra-State routes, thus creating a situation of 
’stalemate’ or ’deadlock’, whenever their respective 
licensing policies conflict each other. The answer of
1
See, e.g., Menzies J.’s opinion, 38 A.L.J.R. at pp.419-20.
2
The Court upheld the validyt of the Regulations requiring 
intra-State operators to hold federal permission or 
authority if they wished to use Commonwealth-owned 
aerodromes (reg«320A) and fly in Commonwealth-controlled 
airspace (reg.320B), of which we shall discuss respectively 
elsewhere in this Part, but it will be sufficient here 
to say that this may have the practical effect to authorize 
the Commonwealth licensing of nearly all intra-State 
airline operators only under those provisions because 
nearly all the intra-State services penetrate controlled 
airspace and need access to Commonwealth-owned aerodromes. 
See, Chapter IV, post.
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the Court to such circumstances is a time-honoured one - 
a 'co-operation* of the federal and State Governments.
Since the fields covered by the federal and State laws 
were directed to different subjects, the Court plainly 
concluded that no provision of the Air Transport Act was 
inconsistent with such valid Commonwealth regulations 
within the meaning of sec.109 of the Constitution. The 
Chief Justice alone found inconsistency between the two 
sets of law on the ground that the Commonwealth expressed 
its intention to be the sole authority in the licensing 
of the use of aircraft in air operations in Australia, 
and therefore, in choosing to effect its control over the 
carriage of passengers and goods by air within the State 
by a system of licensing of aircraft for particular
routes of particular operators, the State law was
1inconsistent with the federal law. This view rests on
1
Barwick C.J. said: 'Indeed, it would in my view be a
strange conclusion that in setting up this licensing 
system as itself a safety measure, the Commonwealth 
merely intended to reserve to itself a veto on the choice 
by the State of the aircraft to be used by a particular 
operator in air operations, to make itself merely the 
final as distinct from the sole and exclusive 
authority to determine what aircraft should be used in 
public air transport operations. If the characteristics 
of aircraft and the identity of the operator and their 
inter-relationship are themselves safety factors in 
relation to the use of the air by interstate and foreign 
trade and commerce, it would be incongruous in my view 
(continued on p*95)
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the difficulty of separating the field of a certain 
subject-matter from others when, as with aviation control, 
the subjects are closely correlated. Few aviation 
matters can be said to have no connexion with the safety 
of aircraft operations; hence the question of the extent 
to which the fields covered by federal safety law would 
override State aviation legislation presents an 
interesting problem which should be made clear henceforth 
by judicial authorities upon special facts. However, 
insofar as is maintained the view that the federal commerce 
power does not go further than regulating intra-State 
aviation in respect only of its safety aspects, and any 
economic control over that operation is ipso jure 
reserved to the State’s constitutional power, the 
inconsistency argument is likely to have a limited scope, 
for the safety field to be occupied by the federal law 
remains in principle distinct from the politico-economic 
questions within State control.
The question of the Court’s fundamental attitude to 
constitutional interpretation precedes that of
1 (continued from p.9^ -)
that the suitability of the aircraft and the identity of 
the operator should be established as the result of 
compromise and accommodation between administrators 
subject to different ministerial control, one of whom is 
not necessarily concerned with the safety of the air.’
38 A.L.J.R. at p .399. See also P.H. Lane, The Airlines’ 
Case, 39 A.L.J. 17-
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inconsistency - the Court’s attitude adhering to 
literality of the constitutional dichotomy, in spite of 
its awareness of the predominant necessity of federal 
control, even when, as this case in fact verified, 
situations imperilling safety, regularity and efficiency 
of aviation might be left unsolved. When ’literalism’ in 
the interpretation of the Constitution, the nation's 
fundamental instrument of the political as well as legal 
nature, combines with a 'logic’ containing a 
predetermined notion of the federal context, an 
insistence on perpetuating the constitutional balance 
as between the Commonwealth and the States, there will be 
little hope for the effective and elastic application of 
the Constitution to problems arising from the 
’realities’ of such ’commerce’ activity as ’aviation’ 
rapidly growing towards its conquest of time and space.
Yet this logical block is not inevitable; the Constitution 
can be interpreted differently. The principles applied 
by the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. to their federal 
commerce are equally capable of application to the
Australian document.
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CHAPTER III
Aviation as a Subject of ’External Affairs’
By sec.51(xxix) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth
Parliament has power to make laws with respect to
1’external affairs’. The Commonwealth has tried to 
justify most of its aviation legislation either under 
sec.5l(i) or under this section, but the reliance upon 
this power has been gaining in importance, partly because 
of the rapid development of international legislation in 
this field, and partly because, under this power, the 
Commonwealth may make laws not only with respect to 
’international’ aviation but also with respect to 
'domestic' (including ’intra-State') aviation, pursuant 
to the international obligations imposed upon Australia, 
with a complete disregard of the constitutional dichotomy 
between inter-State and intra-State matters. It is not 
strange, therefore, that the meaning and scope of sec.51 
(xxix) have been expounded by the Court mostly in relation 
to aviation cases.
_
See also sec.5l(xxx) of the Constitution empowering the 
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to ’the 
relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the 
Pacific. ’
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It was pointed out early in 1936 that the
international personality of Australia had been
recognized rather than created by the Statute of
Westminster, and that the relations contemplated by
international conventions were not those of the States
of Australia with other countries but those of Australia,
including all the States, with other countries, all the
State governments together having been unable to create a
2truly Australian right or obligation. However, apart
from such an implied principle, the Australian Constitution
has no such explicit provision forbidding the component
States from entering into obligations with foreign
3countries as the U.S. Constitution has; hence, the 
States can enjoy some concurrent exercise of the external 
affairs authority, unless the subject is covered by a 
Commonwealth law or interfered with by some actual 
exercise of the Commonwealth authorities. For instance, 
a State Government may negotiate commercial dealings with 
a foreign country for the purchase of aircraft purported
1
1931, 22 Geo. V. c.4.
2
35 C.L.R. at p p .635 and 645 5 per Latham C.J.; as to the 
historical development of the Australian status in the 
international society, see J.G. Starke, The Commonwealth 
in International Affairs (Essays on the Australian 
Constitution, second ed., - Chapter XIII).
3
U.S. Constitution, Art.1, sec.2.
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to be used solely for intra-State aviation within the 
State on behalf of its agents or some private company, 
although the Commonwealth may by such measures as import 
restrictions under the Customs Act interfere with such a 
State's action. An interesting problem will arise as to 
whether the Commonwealth can interfere with the U.K. - 
(Australian) States relations under sec . 5 1 (xjcix) , but
1this is not the place to explore the question further.
A complex and rather theoretical problem of the
relationship between international law and municipal law
a choice between dualism and monism, and (if the latter
is preferred) a choice between the two sets of law in
hierarchial order in law - is also outside the scope of
the present study; suffice will it be to say here that,
in general, the provisions of the international law must
be given binding force in the national law by the
appropriate method, for, borrowing the words used by 
2Lord Atkin there is a clear distinction in English law 
between 'formation' and 'performance' of international
1
Cf. G. Sawer, Australian Constitutional Law in relation 
to International Relation and International Law (not 
published yet).
2
Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for 
Ontario and Othersj (1937) A .C . 32^, at p .347, per Lord 
Atkin. Cf. McNair, Law of Treaties, 1961, pp.78, etseq.
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obligations constituted by a treaty (comprising any
agreement between two or more sovereign States). The
necessity or mode of such an appropriate national legislation
depends upon whether the international rule is a well-
established customary law, or whether it affects the
private rights of the subjects, involves any modification
1of the common or statute law, or has other nature. A
sharp contrast exists between the English common law rules
and the U.S. law in this respect; in the United Kingdom,
no treaty is self-executing, with a very limited class of 
2exceptions. It is to be observed that those English 
common law rules on the position of international law 
have been inherited by Australia, and, in the complete 
absence of any constitutional clause pertaining to that 
matter, they form part of law within the Australian 
federal government, where, as in other federal countries, 
the treaty-making power is generally vested in the 
Commonwealth Government while the legislative powers on 
the subjects of a treaty are divided as between the
_
In any case, it is a well-established international law 
rule that no State can plead a deficiency in its 
municipal law or organization against a claimant of a 
breach of treaty obligation or of a rule of customary 
international law.
2
McNair, Law of Treaties, p.81.
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Commonwealth and the States. It is the purpose of the 
present study to inquire into the extent to which the 
Commonwealth constitutional power can carry out 
international obligations relating to aviation matters 
by entering the sphere of the State’s legislatures.
It was in the first Henry Case in 1936 that the High 
Court established a rule that the ’external affairs’ 
power involved the power to carry treaties into effect 
and extended far enough to bring within the scope of the 
powers of the Commonwealth Parliament subjects which, 
without a treaty, would have been beyond those powers.
Not until then was sec.5l(xxix) in general, and in respect
of aviation in particular, directly presented before the
1High Court. As has been mentioned before, the Court 
held in that case that the Commonwealth Air Navigation 
Act 1920 (sec.4) and Regulations made thereunder for the 
general control of air navigation throughout the
1
It has been arguable whether the Commonwealth Parliament 
could bring into force international conventions or 
treaties relating to aviation by virtue of the external 
affairs power, as the Royal Commission on the Constitution 
reported in 1929 (see, Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Constitution, 19295 p.205)* In Roche v. Kronheimer 
(1921), 29 C.L.R. 329j the majority of the High Court 
sustained the Treaty of Peace Act 1919-1920 under the 
defence power, except Higgins J. who was equally disposed 
to hold that it was valid under the power of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with reference to 
’external affairs’.
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Commonwealth could not be supported under the commerce 
power, and then the discussions turned to the examination 
of sec.51(xxix) as the only possible source of power to 
validate the Commonwealth aviation legislation.
The Court held that the power to legislate with
respect to 'external affairs' was expressly conferred
upon the Commonwealth Parliament by the Constitution, and
therefore 'no question of interference with the rights of
1the States arises'. Hence, the contentions that the 
power should be limited either to some external aspect of 
other specific subject-matters of federal power, or to 
the extra-territorial extension of such other powers, 
were rejected. This meant that the central Government 
having power to control the two processes of 'formation' 
and 'performance' of international obligations could, in 
principle, extend its legislative power to any subject 
upon which it could make a treaty. But the precise 
limits thereof have not been defined clearly. Latham C.J. 
expressed a general view that there was a limitation 
upon the power - that the Executive Government and the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth were alike bound by the 
Constitution, as the power was expressly given 'subject
_
55 C.L.R. at p.636, per Latham C.J.
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to this Constitution*, and the Constitution could not 
be indirectly amended by means of an international
agreement made by the Executive Government and subsequently
-\adopted by Parliament. Laws made in pursuance thereof 
which dealt with matters expressly prohibited by the 
Constitution (e.g., sec.92) would likewise be invalid.
In this respect only, there is a possibility for the 
Commonwealth to invoke a ’federal clause* as an excuse 
for failure to implement a treaty because of the municipal 
constitutional structure. The following three queries 
seem to cast some light on the precise scope of the power, 
as reasoned a posteriori from cases having a direct 
bearing on sec.51(xxix).
Firstly, it was argued in the first Henry Case 
whether the power was limited to matters which in se 
concerned external relations or to matters which might 
properly be the subject matter of international agreement. 
It is to be noted that what was argued about is not the 
scope of the subject-matters to be negotiated or agreed 
with foreign countries by the Commonwealth Government on 
a diplomatic level, which is theoretically unlimited 
within a legitimate competence of the Executive Government
55 C.L.R. at p.642.
1
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under the Crown sovereignty, but the scope of those 
matters with respect to which the Commonwealth Parliament 
can attract the exercise of its legislative power under
sec.5l(xxix) of the federal Constitution. Dixon J.
1expressed a rather restricted view:
If a treaty were made which bound the Commonwealth 
in reference to some matter indisputably 
international in character, a law might be made 
to secure observance of its obligations if they 
were of a nature affecting the conduct of 
Australian citizens. On the other hand, it 
seems an extreme view that merely because the 
Executive Government undertakes with some other 
country that the conduct of persons in Australia 
shall be regulated in a particular way, the 
legislature thereby obtains a power to enact 
that regulation although it relates to a matter 
of internal concern which, apart from the 
obligation undertaken by the Executive, could 
not be considered as a matter of external affairs. 
The limits of the power can only be ascertained 
authoritatively by a course of decision in which 
the application of general statements is 
illustrated by example. (Italicsadded)
55 C.L.R. at p.669. Although Starke J. limited also the 
power to matters ’of sufficient international significance 
to make it a legitimate subject for international 
co-operation and agreement', the applicability of the 
power in this case was justified on a more broad criterion 
that the Convention recognized sovereignty of the 
contracting States in the airspace above their territories, 
conferred rights upon Australia and her citizens and 
assumed obligations in respect of airspace above Australia 
towards foreign powers or States and their nations. 
According to him, a law providing for the carrying out 
and giving effect to an international convention of this 
character concerned Australia’s relations and intercourse 
with other Powers or States and the rights and obligations 
which resulted, and was thus a law for the peace, order 
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to 
external affairs (55 C.L.R. at pp.660-665)*
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In this case, however, he recognized (as Latham C.J.
did) the predominantly international character of
’aviation'. Evatt and McTiernan JJ., in their joint
judgment, were more definite and sweeping. Upon the
general view-point that, in consequence of the close
connection between the nations of the world, and their
recognition of a common interest, and of the necessity
of co-operation in matters affecting social welfare, it
was no longer possible to assert that there was any
subject-matter which must necessarily be excluded from
the list of possible subjects of international negotiation,
2international dispute, or international agreement, they
3defined the scope of the power as follows:
It is not to be assumed that the legislative 
power over ’external affairs' is limited to 
the execution of treaties or conventions; 
and ... the Parliament may well be deemed 
competent to legislate for the carrying out 
of ’recommendations’ as well as the ’draft 
international conventions’ resolved upon by 
the International Labor Organization or of 
other international recommendations or 
requests upon other subject matters of concern 
to Australia as a member of the family of 
nations. The power is a great and important one.
1
Latham C.J. maintained a view that it was impossible to 
say a priori that any subject was necessarily such that it 
could never properly be dealt with by international 
agreement ( 5 5  C.L.R. at p . 6 4 l ) .
2
55  C . L . R .  a t  p p . 6 8 0 - 6 8 1 .
55  C.L.R. a t  p . 687.
3
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This wide application of the power as to the subject- 
matters of a treaty, etc., seems to come off victorious 
in the long run with the rapid expansion of the scope of 
international legislation under the impetus of the 
internationalization of individuals’ life in the world. 
Sir Robert Garran, commenting on the case, said that 
’attempts to define the proper limits of international
1agreements are not likely to have much greater success’.
2Later, Professor Sawer went further and said:
An international agreement or understanding 
need not be in the precise and detailed form 
of a treaty or convention, and the Federal 
Parliament can honour obligations of 
conscience or of international solidarity 
which are conducive to an international 
relationship although not distinctly 
required by its terms.
A reasonable enlargement of the scope of subject-matters
comprehended by the concept of 'external affairs' brings
about a flexible interpretation of the ’form' of
international agreements, and, as circumstances require,
the power can be exercised in the complete absence of any
3such formal agreement. In R. v. Sharkey, the Court
1
R.R. Garran, The Aviation Case, 10 A.L.J. 277> at p.299*
2
G. Sawer, Execution of Treaties by Legislation in the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2 U.Q.L.J. 300.
(19^9) 79 C.L.R. 121.
3
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upheld unanimously the validity of sec.24A of the
Commonwealth Crimes Act defining sedition under the
external affairs power, because the relations between
Australia and the other nations of the Commonwealth,
though not embodied in formal agreements of any kind,
were of such importance to the Australian Commonwealth
that the protection of the constitutional structure of
all the Dominions was a proper matter of interest to the
Federal Parliament. It is submitted that Sloan v .
2Pollard could have been related to the external affairs
Opower. In the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2) , in order 
to prove the validity of the new Commonwealth 
regulations applying Commonwealth's licensing system to 
all aircraft including aircraft operating in intra-State 
air transport services, the plaintiff relied upon, 
inter alia, Art.37 of the Chicago Convention of 1944 
requiring the unification of rules, regulations and 
practices of air navigation, which reads as follows:
1
1914-1946 (No.12 of 1914 - No.77 of 1946).
2
(1947) 75 C.L.R. 445* The Court upheld a Commonwealth 
butter rationing regulation on the basis of the defence 
power alone, when the scheme was entered into in order 
to discharge agreements for the supply of food to the 
United Kingdom made in the closing stages of the Second 
World War.
G. Sawer, op.cit., p .301.
3
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Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate 
in securing the highest practicable degree of 
uniformity in regulations, standards, proceedings, 
and organization in relation to aircraft, 
personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all 
matters in which such uniformity will facilitate 
and improve air navigation. To this end the 
International Civil Aviation Organization shall 
adopt and amend from time to time, as may be 
necessary, international standards and recommended 
practices and procedures dealing with ... (11 items
of topics) ... and such other matters concerned 
with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air 
navigation as may from time to time appear 
appropriate.
The international standards, &c. to be established from 
time to time by I.C.A.O. have no binding force in the 
strict sense of international law, and the contracting 
States need not comply with them ipso jure. They are 
different from similar provisions of the Paris Convention 
of 1919 which were completed by 8 Annexes which had the
same effect, and came into force at the same time, as the
1Convention itself. In other words, the provisions of the 
Chicago Convention impose merely 1 moral* obligations 
upon the contracting States so as to make them comply with 
those obligations * to the greatest extent* , in view of 
the fact that there still exist differences in the 
development in civil aviation among them. No Justice 
raised a doubt on this point; all assumed tacitly that 
the Commonwealth Parliament could lawfully carry out
1
Cf. Chapter VII, post
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those 'obligations', described as 'the benefit which 
the treaty or convention gives’ (Barwick C.J.) or 'the 
Commonwealth promised collaboration' (Kitto J.), under 
sec.5 1(xxix) of the Constitution. Hence, the wider 
approach to the meaning of ’external affairs' seems to 
have been supported both by later decisions of the Court 
and by academic authorities.
Secondly, a question arises as to the manner in which 
the Commonwealth can carry out those obligations or 
requirements by its domestic legislation.
In the first Henry Case, all Justices were of opinion 
that the first part of sec.4 of the Air Navigation Act 
1920 that empowered the Governor-General to make 
regulations for carrying out and giving effect to the 
Paris Convention was valid upon the aforesaid grounds, and 
then they examined whether the regulations purporting to 
be so made under the external affairs power were really 
regulations for that purpose. The majority of the Court 
applied the tests of 'substantial conformity’, ’faithful 
pursuit' or 'strict conformity’. Latham C.J., requiring 
substantial conformity, did not argue minor divergences, 
but referred to three matters of principle which were 
'at the root of the Convention' but which were 
disregarded in the regulations. Those inconsistencies
1 10
were concerned with, the definition of registrable 
nationals in the registration of aircraft, the exception
of the application of the Convention, and the requirements
1of licensing of personnel of aircraft. Dixon J.,
requiring faithful pursuit, did not permit wide
departure from the Convention, as illustrated in the
inconsistency between the Convention and the regulations
2upon the same subjects discussed by the Chief Justice.
Evatt and McTiernan JJ., requiring strict conformity, 
illustrated meticulously various subjects which were 
required by the Convention to be enforced in the domestic 
laws, but which enforcement was not provided by the 
regulations, or which were dealt with in the regulations 
but were not required by the Convention, and they required 
complete observance (including even exact metric
omeasurements) of the Convention. Accordingly, the 
majority concluded that the whole of the regulations, 
being inseverable, was invalid, because they were not 
regulations made, as required by sec.4 of the Act, for 
the purpose of carrying out and giving effect to the 
_
55 C.L.R. at pp.645-654.
2
55 C.L.R. at pp.673-675.
55 C.L.R. at pp.690-695.
3
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Convention or any amendment thereof. Starke J.’s 
opinion was in substance based upon the widest approach 
on this point. Having examined the provisions laid down 
both in the Convention and the Regulations, he upheld 
their validity from the point of view of rendering them 
effective in all circumstances and conditions or giving 
the flexibility in administration that was desirable and 
even necessary in relation to the international agreement. 
He said:^
All means which are appropriate, and are adopted to 
the enforcement of the convention and are not 
prohibited, or are not repugnant to or inconsistent 
with it, are within the power. The power' must be 
constructed liberally, and much must necessarily 
be left to the discretion of the contracting 
States in framing legislation, or otherwise giving 
effect to the convention. For instance, general 
safety and other regulations may be necessary for 
supplementing the convention, and probably 
exemptions are legitimate where it appears 
unnecessary or undesirable that the provisions of 
the convention should apply ... A construction of 
the power that enables a ready application of the 
convention to various circumstances and conditions 
is preferable to one that insists upon an 
inflexible and rigid adherence to the stipulations 
of the convention. After all, we should remember 
that the power is conferred for the purpose of 
carrying out an international and not a mere local 
agreement. (italics added)
55 C.L.R. at pp.660-665.
55 C.L.R. at pp.659-660.
2
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In this connexion, the second Henry Case must be
mentioned. The question in that case was whether a rule
2of the Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations providing 
that an aerodyne should not, except when departing or 
landing, fly over an aerodrome at a lower height than 
2,300 feet, was authorized by the provisions of the Air 
Navigation Act 1920-1936 enabling the Governor-General 
to make regulations for the purpose of carrying out and 
giving effect to the Paris Convention and for the purpose 
of providing for the control of air navigation in relation 
to inter-State and foreign trade and commerce, and within 
any territory of the Commonwealth. Annex D to the 
Convention provided that 'subject to any special local 
regulations which may exist: (a) Flight over a landing
area at a lower height than 700 metres is prohibited for 
aerodynes, save in the case of a departure or landing', 
and in Annex A the expression 'landing area' meant the 
part of an aerodrome reserved for departures and landings 
of aircraft. On the other hand, 'aerodrome' was defined
_
R. v. Poole; ex parte Henry ( 1939) 61 C.L.R. 634.
2
S. R. 1937j No.81, rule 51(0 of the First Schedule.
3
After the first Henry Case, the Air Navigation Act 1936 
was passed so as to amend sec.4 of the original Act 1920.
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in the regulations to include ' the landing area, neutral 
zone and building area’ included within any defined 
ground used for the landing or departure of aircraft.
The defendant (one Henry Goya Henry) in the case 
flew over the neutral zone of the aerodrome at Mascot,
N.S.W., at a lower height than 2,300 feet, but he was not 
either departing or landing. Latham C.J., applying a 
rigid test, considered that the rule could not be 
described as a regulation for giving effect to the 
provision of the Convention prohibiting flight over a 
landing area, because, according to the Convention, the
landing area was part only of an aerodrome and therefore
1it was a different area from the neutral zone. But a 
majority of the Court (Rich, Starke, Evatt and McTiernan JJ.) 
held that the Commonwealth regulation was valid, upon the 
grounds that the Convention prescribed such height in 
respect of the landing areaalone ’subject to any special 
local regulations’ and that, on the whole the correlation 
was substantial and the extension was not an improper 
mode of ensuring compliance. It was made clear that the 
regulations need not necessarily be a reproduction of 
the rules contained in the Convention; their substantial
1
61 C.L.R. at p .641.
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accordance could be judged from the intention of the
parties to the Convention or from the language used in
the Convention. Dixon J. upheld the validity of the
regulations under the commerce power, whose reasonings
we will discuss in relation to the Commonwealth powers
over Commonwealth-owned aerodromes at a later stage.
Starke J. adhered to the wider view which he expressed
in the first Henry Case and, according to him, no more
unpracticable tribunal could be imagined than a court of
law for determining what regulations were desirable or
necessary for carrying out an international air 
2convention. Certainly aviation involves detailed 
governmental control of a highly technical nature, with 
problems of integration which must be left to experts.
Thirdly, in determining what may be enacted under 
the external affairs power, the content of the treaty or 
convention must be ascertained; probably, this question 
must precede the second question concerning the mode of 
implementation of international obligations, for the 
latter is, to a large extent, prescribed by what each 
individual Judge finds in a treaty or convention.
1
6 1 C.L.R. at p.644, per Rich J.
6 1 C.L.R. at pp.647-648.
2
Therefore, while all of the Justices followed the general 
test of ’faithful pursuit’ in the Airlines of N.S.W. Case 
(No.2 ), their opinions as to the extent of international 
obligations imposed by the Chicago Convention were 
considerably divided. As has been mentioned before, one 
of the crucial questions in the case was whether the 
Commonwealth licensing regulations applying to all classes 
of aircraft and their operations (some based on safety, 
regularity, and efficiency considerations, and some based 
on purely economic ones) were authorized by the provisions 
of Art.37 and Annexes thereto, or by any other provision 
of the Convention. Barwick C.J. limited the extent of 
the obligation, particularly of Art.375 to the uniformity 
of national air safety regulations, as distinct from the 
encouragement of air transport operations or authorization 
of persons to carry them on. According to the Chief 
Justice, however, within this limitation the Convention 
should not be read narrowly, and the Commonwealth can 
carry out this obligation in advance by enacting all 
regulations which are appropriate to securing such 
uniformity. Thus, 'the securing of the benefit which 
the treaty or convention gives', which the Chief Justice 
added as an additional test to the traditional 'faithful 
pursuit' and might have been taken as suggesting a wide
application of the power, can only be workable within 
this limit. McTiernan, Menzies and Owen JJ. also found 
no provisions for licensing air transport operations in 
any Annex or in the Convention itself, but, as the Chief 
Justice did, upheld the validity of the licensing 
regulations of the use of all aircraft (regs. 198 and 199) 
as provisions adapted to carry out and give effect to 
the Convention. In their opinions, no express and 
precise undertaking by the Commonwealth to maintain 
control over every aircraft entering the airspace over 
Australia could be found either in the Convention itself 
or in any of the Annexes, but the scope of the 
Commonwealth’s obligations was so wide that it would be 
a reasonable way for the Parliament to secure the 
fulfilment of Australia’s international obligations to 
require owners of national aircraft to register them, 
to maintain them in a condition of airworthiness, not to 
use them except as authorized and, in using them, to 
comply with standards, procedures and practices as 
established under the Convention; furthermore, the 
licensing of persons to own, use and fly particular 
aircraft for particular purposes upon particular routes 
is a method Parliament might adopt of achieving the
foregoing ends. However, since no express obligation 
was imposed upon the contracting States to set up a 
system whereby all those who wished to conduct air 
services within their territories must obtain licences 
to do so, reg.200B was invalid. Kitto, Windeyer and 
Taylor JJ., having found that none of the Annexes or 
Art.37 dealt with the subject of regular public 
transport operations, found also that the Convention 
did not empower Commonwealth to make the licensing 
regulations (including regs. 198, 199 and 200B) at all.
Taylor J., rejecting the argument that there was a 
functional difference between regs. 198 and 199j on the 
one hand, and reg.200B, on the other, invalidated all 
of the Commonwealth licensing regulations, whereas Kit to 
and Windeyer JJ. held regs. 198 and 199 valid under the 
federal commerce power.
1
See, e.g., Menzies J.’s opinion, 38 A.L.J.R. at pp. 
417-^18. Menzies J. specifically favored the remarks 
made by Starke J . in the first and second Henry Cases 
as to the scope of the external affairs power. Menzies J. 
pointed out that the provisions of the Convention were 
not confined to international civil aviation and 
international air transport services, that the ’air 
navigation1 referred to in Art.37 was not confined either 
to aeronautics or to international air navigation, 
and that some of the 15 Annexes referred only to 
international civil aviation (e.g., Annex 6) but others 
were not so limited.
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The judgments in the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.2) 
clearly show that the extent to which the Convention can 
be implemented varies largely with what one finds in a 
treaty or convention. In fact, the Australian Court has 
not been unwilling to take judicial notice of the 
'situations' surrounding both international legislation 
and domestic enactments, even to such an extent that it 
often disregards a Parliamentary judgment, based upon
the Executive's, of world 'situations’ at a given point
1of time or its estimation of benefits to Australian
external relations which are obtainable from a particular
international agreement. The power is essentially a
purposive and composite one, and there should be much
room for the discretion of the rule-making authority to
determine, in the particular case, what are the
appropriate and effective means of carrying out and
giving effect to the Convention. The incidental powers
contained or carried with the federal powers which
enable the Commonwealth to attain the end of the power
most effectively are expressly given to the federal ’external
affairs’ power no less than to the commerce power.
_
The same question is raised as to the defence power of 
the Commonwealth Parliament; cf. Australian Communist 
Party v. Commonwealth ( 1 95 1) 83 C . L. R . 1 , at pp . 262-2(3 3 , 
per Fullagar J.
The difficulty of ascertaining the real objective
of the Convention and the scope of the corresponding 
domestic implementation thereof may be illustrated in the 
following example of an international air legislation.
"IThe Geneva Convention of 19^ -8 concerning international 
recognition of rights in aircraft, which has not been 
ratified yet by Australia, does not impose upon the 
contracting States de jure obligation to maintain a public 
record in respect of proprietary rights in every national 
aircraft. But the assumption at the conclusion of the 
Convention was that the contracting States would themselves 
maintain a record in their own interest; in fact, unless 
a record is established most of the practicable 
objectives of the Convention will be lost. Such a 
’situation* as implied in the Convention should provide 
an ample justification for the Commonwealth to maintain 
a public record in respect of rights and interests in 
all Australian aircraft, if Australia ratified the 
Convention. A question arises as to how far and in what 
manner the Commonwealth can exercise the external affairs
_
The Convention was adopted on 19th June, 19^ -8, and came 
into force between the U.S.A. and Mexico in 1950. The 
Commonwealth of Australia signed the Convention on 
9 June, 1950, but has not ratified it as yet. See 
Appendix I, post.
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power in carrying out this international requirement
of 'maintenance of a public record’, which could mean
either the establishment of a recording system for
purposes of private law (e.g., creation, validation,
effects, priorities, etc. of recorded rights) or the mere
keeping of a record with no function of 'recording' for
such private law purposes. However, the Convention
seems to be essentially one of 'recognition' which deals
with 'conflict' problems, quite different from establishing
a detailed recording system or defining exact consequences
of recording which was at one time unsuccessfully drafted
with the object of obligating the contracting States to
1set up a uniform recording system. Nevertheless, this 
implication from the legislative history of the Convention 
does not set the limit of possible Commonwealth domestic 
legislation; such legislation may be justified as 
implementing and supplementing the Convention so as to 
give the fullest effect to its application in Australia.
It is on this point that 'common sense’ takes an active 
part, and conduciveness to the purposes of an 
international agreement of a particular domestic
See, Wilberforce, The International Recognition of Rights 
in Aircraft, 2 I.L.Q. , 19^-8-1949, p.426.
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legislation is evaluated in accordance with the 
individuals’ ideals for the political, economic and 
social situations surrounding acts or things as 
contemplated in the international agreement. In this 
particular instance, it seems that the Commonwealth 
can at least provide for the validity of such recorded 
rights in order to ensure faithfully the basic object 
of the Convention, i.e., ’reciprocal recognition’ of 
recorded rights. If the Court in the Airlines of N.S.W. 
Case (No.2) looked upon the expression ’safety, 
regularity, and efficiency of air navigation’ on a more 
broad perspective towards the most effective facilitation 
and improvement of air navigation as a whole, the 
decision might have been a different one.
There has been always an apprehension that, if the 
federal Parliament can legislate on any subject of 
international understanding, the general balance of 
constitutional power as between Commonwealth and States 
would be seriously modified. When Dixon J. (as then he 
was) tried to limit the power to matters indisputably 
international in character, or when Latham C.J. was 
afraid of an indirect amendment of the Constitution by 
means of an international agreement, they might have had 
such an apprehension. If, for example, the Commonwealth
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Government entered into an agreement with, a foreign 
country or with foreign countries to attain a 
rationalization or co-ordination of the domestic aviation 
in the territory of each party-State as a part of an 
international scheme as contemplated in the agreement, 
could the Commonwealth Parliament carry out this 
obligation merely by reason of its participation in that 
plan? Whether or not the Commonwealth should do so is a 
purely political matter, but there is no reason why 
the Commonwealth Parliament cannot implement the 
obligation whether it be in the form of a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement. Some limit is provided by the 
express constitutional prohibitions which will render a 
Commonwealth enactment contrary to them invalid, and/or 
by the Parliamentary refusal to give ratification thereto.
In connection with this question, there is a question 
of ’fraud on power’ - a question as to whether the 
Commonwealth Government has made an international agreement 
in bad faith simply with the object of extending federal 
power. In the first Henry Case, three Judges (Latham C.J. 
and Evatt and McTiernan JJ.) raised this question, but 
found no such suggestion applied in the case. However, 
there would be little point of considering it, since, 
once the subject has a basis of the granted power, the
1 23
motive or wisdom of its actions should be left to the 
Parliament; this is particularly so in the case of a 
’purposive' legislative power. It is submitted that 
there is a strong authority for the view that the King’s 
representative must always be presumed to have acted in 
good faith. ^
Internationalization of individual's life is a 
notable tendency of the modern times. Aviation is a 
traffic medium of such an international cultural
exchange, and, owing to its very nature of 1 internationality’ ,
the industry itself has demanded a monistic control to
such an extent as the domestic aviation law has developed
under the strong influence of international legislation.
Indeed, the writers on Air Law said, no other system of
law has been so rapidly developed by sovereign States
collaborating for national and international objects at 
2the same time. Australia is a member-State of the 
Chicago Convention '\Q) h h , International Air Services 
Transit Agreement 19^4, International Sanitary Convention 
19335 Warsaw Convention 1929 (as amended by the Hague
1
G. Sawer, op.cit., p.299n 5 citing Dixon J . ’s remark 
in the Australian Communist Party C a s e (83 C.L.R. at
p.179) •
2
Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, second ed., p.10.
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Protocol 1955 and supplemented by the Guadalajara 
Convention 1961), Rome Convention 1952, and 26 bilateral 
arrangements exchanging traffic rights for scheduled 
international air services. In accordance with the 
complexity and development of air navigation in future, 
the international legislation with more variety of aviation 
subjects will occupy an important position in aviation 
law. In the United States, the treaty power was once 
relied upon to put the regulation of aeronautics in the 
hand of Congress, but the view that such legislation would 
be sustained under the commerce power finally prevailed.
In Australia where the federal commerce power has been 
construed narrowly, the external affairs power may well 
be regarded as a legislative source of a great potentiality 
for controlling domestic aviation by the ’permeation* of 
international law. A bold approach to the power is 
perhaps the quickest route to extension of Commonwealth 
authority in an area whose problems require centralised 
control.
1
C f . A.L. Newman II, Aviation Law and the Constitution, 
Y.L.J. v o l . 3 9 ,  1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 0 ,  p . 1 1 1 4n .
Ilk
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CHAPTER IV
Aviation in relation to ’Commonwealth Territories' 
and ’Commonwealth Facilities’
1. Aviation within, to or from the ’Commonwealth 
Territories’
Under sec.122 oT the Constitution, the Commonwealth
Parliament may make laws ’for the Government of any
1territory surrendered by any State to and accepted by 
the Commonwealth, or of any territory placed by the Queen 
under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, 
or otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth’. The Territories 
of the Commonwealth include the Australian Capital
2Territory, the Northern Territory and Papua-New Guinea.
For the purpose of aviation, as the Air Navigation 
oAct 1920-1963^ defines, the Territory of the Commonwealth 
includes the territorial waters thereof and the airspace 
over any such Territory or territorial waters.
1
Sec.111 empowers the Parliament of a State to surrender 
any part of the State to the Commonwealth, whereupon it 
becomes subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth.
2
Other Territories are Ashmore and Cartier Islands, 
Australian Antarctic Territory, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, 
Heard and McDonald Island, Norfolk Island, Christmas 
Island and Jervis Bay.
Sec.3(3)•
3
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Sec.26(l) of the Air Navigation Act empowers the 
Governor-General to make regulations '(c) in relation 
to air navigation within a Territory of the Commonwealth 
or to or from a Territory of the Commonwealth’. When 
the power was questioned in the A .N .A . Case, discussed 
below, 'Territorial airline services’ was defined in the 
Australian National Airlines Act (C’th) 19^ +5 as a 
service (not being an inter-State airline service) 
providing for the transport by air, for reward, of 
passengers or goods and having a scheduled stopping place 
in a Territory of the Commonwealth. As pointed out by 
Judges, such a Territorial service was either a service 
with all its stopping places in a Territory or Territories, 
or with stopping places in a Territory or Territories and 
also in a single State; if the service had scheduled 
stopping places in more than one State it would be an 
inter-State airline service and not a Territorial service.^ 
This construction was primarily designed to escape from 
the application of sec.92 (as in fact it was successful 
in that case), and is narrower than that with which we
1
Sec.4.
2
71 C.L.R. at p .64, per Latham C.J. and at p.102, per 
Williams J .
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are going to discuss below in relation to the nature 
and scope of the ’Territorial aviation’ power. The 
concept of ’Territorial aviation’ for the present purpose 
is simply ’air navigation within the Territories,’ and/or 
’air navigation to or from the Territories’, irrespective 
of whether it has stopping places in more than one State; 
this definition is in accord with the scope of the 
regulation-making power under the Air Navigation Act and 
the scope of application of the Regulations made 
thereunder.
In the first Henry Case, a general authority of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to legislate with respect to 
aircraft in the Territories of the Commonwealth was not 
questioned, and the Court simply assumed that it existed. 
In the A .N.A. Case, one of the questions was concerned 
with the validity of the provisions of the Australian 
National Airlines Act 19^ +5 giving the Commonwealth air 
service a monopoly in Territorial air services, and 
therefore the relation between such Territorial aviation 
and sec.92, together with the nature of 'Territorial 
power’ generally, was discussed. Latham C.J. said that 
the Commonwealth Parliament could make laws for the
See, e.g., 55 C.L.R. at p.675j per Dixon J.
1
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government of any Territory as it thought fit:
The Commonwealth Parliament may make laws which 
completely control all matters within a Territory, 
and therefore can provide for a monopoly of air 
services and exclude all competition within a 
Territory. It can, as between Territory and 
Territory, establish complete control over air 
services because it can in each Territory control 
all landings and all departures and all other 
activities in relation to the services.
However, according to the Chief Justice, a law in respect
of a Territory could cperate only within the Territory
2and was capable of effect only as a territorial law:
Thus the Commonwealth Parliament can legislate 
under s.122 with respect to what may be called 
the Territorial end of a service between a 
Territory and a State, even though a Territorial 
law cannot deal with the State end of such a 
service. In this sense, but in this sense only, 
the Commonwealth Parliament can provide for the 
establishment of air service between a Territory 
and a State - in just the same way and to the 
same extent as the Commonwealth Parliament can 
authorize the establishment of an air service 
between Australia and India.
A similar view denying Commonwealth power under sec.122 to
make laws having operation outside a Territory so as to
3bind a State was expressed by Williams J. Although the
Court was unanimous in its conclusion holding the
1
71 C.L.R. at pp.62-63.
2
Ibid.
71 C.L.R. at pp.102-103-
3
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’Territorial aviation’ provisions in the said Act 
valid, Dixon J. did not share the views just mentioned 
in respect of the nature and scope of sec.122. According 
to him, it was hard to see why sec.122 should be 
disjoined from the rest of the Constitution, and it was 
absurd to contemplate a central government with authority 
over a territory and yet without power to make laws,
’wherever its jurisdiction might run’, for the establishment, 
maintenance and control of communications with the 
territory governed. *
It is not intended here to inquire further into 
this constitutional controversy as to the relation of the
2power given by sec.122 to the remainder of the Constitution.
3However, on this point, Lamshed v. Lake seems to have 
established the view of Dixon J. while a minority 
adhered to the view that a law made under sec.122 could 
not be made operative within a State or as an attempt to
1
71 C.L.R. at p p .144-145.
2
Cf. Buchanan v. Commonwealth (1913) 16 C.L.R. 315;
R. v. Bernasconi (1915) 19 C.L.R. 629; Porter v. R. Ex parte
Ye'e ( 195^) 37 C.L.R. 432. See, also, H. Zelling, The 
Territories of the Commonwealth, Essays on the Australian 
Constitution, second ed., Chapter XII, and cases there 
cited.
(1958) 99 C.L.R. 132.
3
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impose a restraint on the constitutional powers of the 
States. As the case related to transportation by road 
between a Territory (the Northern Territory) and a State 
(South Australia), the decision given by the Court may 
well be applied by analogy to 'Territorial aviation* 
problems. The question was whether the Commonwealth 
Northern Territory (Administration) Act 1910-1955? 
providing that trade, commerce and intercourse between the 
Northern Territory and the States whether by internal
2carriage or ocean navigation should be absolutely free, 
prevailed over the Road and Railway Transport Act 1930-1939
O(S.A.) requiring for a licence to carry goods, by virtue 
of sec.109 of the Constitution. The plaintiff’s 
arguments that a law under sec.122 could not operate 
outside that Territory and that it was not a law of the 
Commonwealth within the meaning of sec. 109 of the 
Constitution were rejected; instead, the Court said that 
’once the law is shown to be relevant to that subject 
matter it operates as a binding law of the Commonwealth 
wherever territorially the authority of the Commonwealth
1
Cf. McTiernan and Williams JJ.’s views.
2
Sec.10.
Sec.14.
3
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1runs,’ and prevailed over an inconsistent State law.
Some clauses of the Constitution may not be applicable
to laws made under sec.122fcy the very nature of
'Territory’, but some clauses (e.g., sec. 51 ^ ocxix) ) do
apply to the power over ’Territory’ regarded as an
element of the whole organic body of the Commonwealth.
Moreover, sec.92 applies to trade, commerce and
intercourse between two States during its passage
3through a Territory. It goes without saying that, a 
Territory being not a ’State’, sec.92 does not apply to 
trade and commerce as between a State and any adjoining 
Territory, or trade and commerce which passes through 
one State when proceeding from one Territory to another; 
hence, unless there is a valid law of the Commonwealth to 
the same effect as sec.92, ’there is no presumption which 
can be spelt out of the general nature of the Constitution 
in favour of free trade between States and adjoining
4territories.’
1
99 C.L.R. at p .141, per Dixon C.J.
2
Chapter I (Part V), most of Chapter V, and Chapter III, of 
the Constitution.
3
99 C.L.R. at p.143, per Dixon C.J.
4
Zelling, op.cit., p.330.
Sec.26(4) of the Air Navigation Act provides that
regulations affecting air navigation to or from the 
Northern Territory have effect notwithstanding sec. 10 of 
the Northern Territory (Administration) Act 1910-1959*
Since the effect of sec.10 equivalent to sec.92 of the 
Constitution is created merely by a law of the Commonwealth 
and not by the Constitution, the Commonwealth is at liberty 
to override the effect of sec.10 by its other legislation; 
hence, sec.26(4) is undoubtedly a valid provision. But, 
a constitutional problem arises, for ’air navigation to 
or from the Territory' is a broad concept comprising of 
passing through the Territory in the course of air 
navigation between two or more than two States, or passing 
through two or more than two States in the course of air 
navigation to or from the Territory. The application of 
sec.92 to the first category was pointed out by Dixon C.J. 
in Lamshed's Case. A flight merely passing through the 
airspace over the Northern Territory in the course of air 
navigation between two States, say, Brisbane (Q’ld) to 
Wyndham (w.A.), may be regarded as an ’inter-State' 
flight, for, the Territory in such a case is nothing but 
a border-line between Queensland and Western Australia 
for sec.92 purposes. How about an aircraft operating 
between the said cities which stops at Darwin in the
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Northern Territory? The second category is, for example, 
air navigation from Sydney (N.S.W.) to Darwin or vice 
versa passing through the airspace over Queensland or 
stopping at Brisbane. Any such question must be solved 
in the light of facts and circumstances, and, in 
characterizing the operation so as to decide the 
applicability of sec.9 2 , similar considerations as in 
the border-hopping cases under that section may well be 
applied by analogy. It will depend upon whether the 
stopping at Darwin is for the purpose of non-traffic 
purpose or for traffic purpose, whether the goods or 
passengers are consigned or contracted from Brisbane to 
Wyndham, or whether the Sydney-Darwin flight having a 
stopping place at Brisbane is a necessary or an ordinary 
course of the business, etc. An interesting case was 
provided, when, pending the High Court's decision in the 
Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.2) , the company operated under 
the federal licence flights from Dubbo to Canberra, with 
the co-operation of Ansett-A.N .A . operating between 
Canberra and Sydney. Both companies are the subsidiaries 
of the Ansett Transport Industries Ltd., and the flights 
from Sydney to Dubbo or vice versa, the licences of which 
were otherwise refused by the N.S.W. State Act, were 
practically carried out via Canberra (The Australian
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Capital Territory). It is an interesting problem 
whether the Airlines of N.S.W. alone could perform the 
whole journey from Sydney to Dubbo via Canberra, 
without a State licence merely by reason of its having 
a stopping place in the Commonwealth Territory.
Apart from aviation within a Territory over which the 
Commonwealth has a complete control, the scope of the 
power to legislate with respect to aviation to or from 
the Territory depends much upon what is fairly incidental 
to the exercise of the power to make laws for the 
government of the Territory, and every circumstances
surrounding the special position of the Territory must
1be taken into account. The power over the Australian 
Capital Territory needs special considerations, for there 
is a question whether the source of power for laws for 
A.C.T. is sec.52(i) (seat of Government) or sec.122. 
Opinions are divided, but, it is sufficient to say, for 
the present purpose, that both powers are exclusive and 
plenary. The nature and scope of the Commonwealth power 
over 'Commonwealth Territories' will be discussed in more 
detail when we examine the power over 'places acquired by 
the Commonwealth' in relation to the Commonwealth-owned 
aerodromes.
Cf. Lamshed's Case, supra.
1
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2. Aviation using the ’Commonwealth. Facilities' 
Commonwealth. Aerodromes
By sec.52(l) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth
has an exclusive power to make laws for the peace, order,
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to
the seat of the Commonwealth and ’all places acquired by
the Commonwealth for public purposes’. With this must be
read together sec.51(xxxi) providing that the Commonwealth
Parliament has legislative power with respect to 'the
acquisition of property on just terms from any State or
person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament
1has power to make laws.’
The Commonwealth power to acquire land for aerodromes 
and to control those aerodromes flows from these 
constitutional clauses, and a large number of important 
aerodromes are now owned and operated by the Commonwealth.
1
See also sec.83 of the Constitution, providing that all 
State property of any kind used exclusively in connection 
with departments of the public service transferred to the 
Commonwealth become vested in the Commonwealth which may 
also acquire property from the States, used, but not 
exclusively, in connection with such departments.
2
The number of aerodromes throughout Australia and its 
Territories at 30 th June, 1964, was 636. One hundred and 
twenty-five important aerodromes were owned by the 
Commonwealth and ^11 by local authorities and private 
interests. Cf. Fourth Annual Civil Aviation Report, p.62.
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The acquisition of land for, and administration of, such 
aerodromes is primarily placed under the statutory
responsibility of the Department of Interior by virtue of
1the Lands Acquisition Act and the Administrative
Arrangements Order. Under the Air Navigation Regulations,
the Minister for Civil Aviation is empowered to establish,
provide, maintain and operate aerodromes, and the
imposition of conditions of the use thereof is placed under
2the control and management of the Director-General. 
Moreover, Commonwealth enactments relating to surface 
traffic or business concessions on or in such Commonwealth
1
Land Acquisition Act 1906-1936 was repealed by Land 
Acquisition Act 1955 (No .68)-1957 (No .4).
2
Sec.26(l) of the Air Navigation Act 1920-1963 defining 
the scope of the Commonwealth regulation-making powers 
enumerates, after those relating to commerce, external 
affairs and Commonwealth Territories, power to make laws 
'in relation to air navigation being regulation with 
respect to any other matter with respect to which the 
Parliament has power to make laws.' Sec.26(2)(c) of the 
same Act prescribing in detail the subject-matters to 
be included in the Regulations without limiting the 
generality of the abovementioned regulation-making power 
provides for 'the establishment, maintenance, operation 
and use of aerodromes and air route and airway 
facilities and the licensing of aerodromes other than 
aerodromes maintained by the Commonwealth.' Under those 
provisions, the Air Navigation Regulations provide, 
inter alia, for the establishment, &c. of aerodromes 
(reg» 82), licensing of aerodromes (reg.84) and 
authorization of places for use as aerodromes (reg.85).
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1aerodromes specifically vest the administrative
responsibility in the Department of Civil Aviation. But
our discussion here is confined to the Commonwealth
legislative power in relation to aerodromes so acquired,
whatever the administrative arrangements between the
Commonwealth governmental offices may be.
For the purpose of the Air Navigation Regulations, an
'aerodrome’ is generally defined as 'an area of land or
water (including any buildings, installations and
equipment) established, licensed or approved under Part IX
of these Regulations and intended for use either wholly
or in part for the arrival, departure or movement of 
2aircraft.' However, a clear distinction must be made 
between aerodromes acquired by the Commonwealth for public
1
Airports (Surface Traffic) Act i960 (No .4o ) , prescribing 
provisions for the control of surface traffic within 
Commonwealth aerodromes; Airports (Business Concessions)
Act 1959 (No.89)» aiming at facilitation of development of 
the business potential of airports of the Commonwealth so 
as to obtain the maximum economic return from land, 
terminal buildings and other facilities not required for 
operational purposes and to meet the requirements of the 
travelling public for goods and services. The Commonwealth 
has also enacted the Air Navigation (Charges) Act 1952 
(No.101)-1957 (N0 .87), prescribing the charges payable, in 
accordance with the Schedules to the Act, in respect of the 
use by aircraft of aerodromes, air route and airway 
facilities, meteorological services and search and rescue 
services maintained, operated or provided by the Commonwealth. 
2
Reg.5(1)•
1 3 8
purposes and aerodromes merely licensed or authorized by 
the Commonwealth, ownership or possessory interest of 
which is vested either in private persons or in local 
authorities. The term ’acquisition' in sec.51(xxxi) of 
the Constitution has been construed as including
1acquisition of possession as well as of full title; hence,
in the Commonwealth enactments, concerning aerodromes,
mentioned above, ’airport’ includes an aerodrome owned or
2'held under lease' by the Commonwealth. We are here 
concerned only with such aerodromes, described as 
'Commonwealth aerodromes.' The sources and scope of 
legislative power of the Commonwealth in relation to 
Commonwealth aerodromes is different from that which applies 
to aerodromes merely licensed or authorised by the 
Commonwealth. The power as to Commonwealth aerodromes 
flows directly from the common law of ownership of land, 
or from sec.52(i) derived from sec.51(xxxi) or sec.85 of 
the Constitution, while the power as to licensed or
1
See, e.g., Minister for the Army v. Dalziel (19^)
68 C.L.R. 261. Cf. R.W. Baker, The Compulsory Acquisition 
Powers of the Commonwealth, Essays on the Australian 
Constitution, second ed., Chapter VII, p.193j et seq.
2
Sec.3(1) of the Airports (Surface Traffic) Act 1960.
The term is defined in the same way in the Airports 
(Business Concessions) Act 1959*
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authorized aerodromes stems from other legislative powers 
affecting aviation, such as, sec.5l(i)j sec.51(xxix) and 
in relation thereto sec.51(xxxix). The scope of the latter 
power might be confined to safety considerations to secure 
the regular passage of international, inter-State or 
Territorial air navigation on or around such aerodromes, 
but the former power goes further than that so as to 
authorize the Commonwealth to make laws as it thinks fit.
It should be noted, first, that an exclusive control 
over such aerodromes acquired by (or transferred to) the 
Commonwealth is not limited to their ’surface' but 
extends to the superincumbent ’airspace' as an inseparable
concomitant of 'aerodrome*. In Commonwealth v. State of
1New South Wales, the Court held that all the lands 
acquired by the Commonwealth in N.S.W. either by the 
transfer of governmental departments under sec.85 or by 
the compulsory process under sec.51(xxxi) of the 
Constitution, including royal metals and other minerals 
therein, vested in the Commonwealth freed and discharged 
from all reservations, rights, royalties, conditions and 
obligations of any kind whatsoever to the State of N.S.W., 
subject to compensation provided pursuant to sec.85 of 
_
(1920-23) 33 C.L.R.1.
14o
1the Constitution and by the Land Acquisition Act 1919j
respectively. As against the view that the royal metals
in the subjacent strata were not used in connection with
the Departments, Knox C.J. and Starke J., in their joint
judgment, said that the strata in which the royal metals
were alleged to exist were not segregated from the rest
of land, and, in the absence of any allegation that any of
the subjacent strata had been used for any other purpose,
the land usque ad coelum et ad inferos was used exclusively
2in connection with the Departments. In another passage 
dealing with lands alienated by the Crown, they construed 
the word 'land’ defined in the Lands Acquisition Act in a 
wider sense, viz., ’that in respect of which you have a 
right from the centre of the earth to the heaven above.’ 
Isaacs J. expressed a similar view, and said that no 
implied limitation could be placed on the fullest meaning 
that could be given to the word ’property’ in secs.51(xxxi) 
and 85 of the Constitution and that the power of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to carry out ’public purposes’ 
could not be effectively exercised unless the amplest
_
1906 (No .13)-1912 (No.39).
2
33 C.L.R. at p.20.
33 C.L.R. at p.23.
3
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connotation were attached to the word 'property1 23.
Higgins J. dissented as to the inclusion of royal metals,
basing his opinion on the principle of the Crown1s
prerogative privilege, but he agreed that the other
minerals in the land passed with the land as 'incident1 
2to the land. In any case, arguments relating to the
Crown privilege of royal metals are irrelevant to our
present purpose, because there has been no such a privilege
3in the airspace,
A question has arisen as to whether sec.52(l) of the 
Constitution confers a power to legislate generally for 
the government and administration of land within State 
boundaries acquired under sec.51(xxxi) or sec.85 by the 
Commonwealth, and as to the character of a State power 
over such places so acquired. Although little has been 
said authoritatively as to the nature of the Commonwealth 
power over such places, we eliminate the argument, from 
the beginning, that the legislation must be on the subject
1
33 C.L.R. at P.37.
2
33 C.L.R. at pp.56-7.
3
The Commonwealth's acquisition of land in a State for 
the purpose of aerodrome excludes therefore any State law 
vesting in the Crown or in the State under the Crown's 
authority the ownership of airspace above a certain 
height from the surface of all lands including aerodromes 
within the State, even if the State should enact 
legislation purporting to retain such control.
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of such acquired places as ’p l a c e s ’; if so, the
Commonwealth can legislate with respect to the ’seat of
government’ (contained also as a subject of Commonwealth
legislative power in sec.52(l)) - the Australian Capital
Territory - only as a geographical portion of land.
Though subject to the Constitution, sec.52(i) is a power
for the peace, order and good government of the
Commonwealth, and is supplemented by the incidental
powers (at common law or under sec.5 1 (x xxix)) to carry
out everything incidental to the ends of the power.
That sec.52(i) confers a general legislative power on the
2Commonwealth is beyond doubt. However, as Professor
Cowen observes, there are two differing views on the
character of State power over such places, between which,
he thinks, appropriate choice lies; one is the view of
the majority of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in
3R. v. Bamford that exclusiveness of Commonwealth power 
allows State legislation to operate only within the
1
E.g., Wynes, op.cit., p.159*
2
As to a comment against such a limited view, see Z. Cowen, 
Alsatias For Jack Sheppards?: The Law in Federal 
Enclaves in Australia, 2 Melbourne University Law Review 
(formerly Les Judicatae) N o . 4, pp.469-71•
3
(1901) 1 N . S . W . R . 3 3 7 5 18 W.N. 294; 7 A.L.R. (C.N.) 89; 
see also, R. v. Thomson (1913) Q.S.R. 246; 7 Q.J.P.R. 154.
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limits of sec.108 of the Constitution. On this view, 
only the Commonwealth can make new law for such places.
The other is the view that the exclusiveness of Commonwealth 
power under sec.52(i) depends upon the classification of 
the law as one made specifically with respect to that 
place, thus saving the validity of State laws operating 
generally throughout the geographical area of the State
even though made after the federal acquisition, which are
1not bad for inconsistency under sec.109* In Kingsford
2Smith Air Services Ltd, v. Garrison, an action for 
damages was brought in the State Metropolitan District 
Court at Sydney based on the negligence of the defendant 
in the management and control of an aeroplane on the 
Kingsford Smith Aerodrome at Mascot, New South Wales, 
which had been acquired by the Commonwealth under the 
Land Acquisition Act 1906-34, pursuant to the authority 
of sec.51(xxxi) of the Constitution; the area was within 
the geographical boundaries of the jurisdiction of that 
Court as defined in State legislation. The defendant 
argued that the acquisition of the land by the Commonwealth 
removed it from the jurisdiction of the New South Wales
1
Cowen, op.cit., p.471*
(1938) 55 W .N . (N.S.W.) 122.
2
Court. The District Court held that Bamford1s Case
1 44
was binding authority for the proposition that the 
Metropolitan District Court was a court of competent 
jurisdiction. The question of importance underlying that 
case was whether an aerodrome acquired by the Commonwealth 
became territory of the Commonwealth so as to exclude the 
operation of State laws; in other words, whether the 
Commonwealth obtained, not only proprietary but 
territorial rights in property acquired by it for public 
purposes. Commonwealth v . State of N.S.W. was 
distinguished on the ground that all that the High Court 
was considering in that case was the nature of the title
and the extent of the estate which the Commonwealth had
1taken in the land in question. Although the power to
legislate conferred by sec. 122 (Commonwealth Territories)
does not operate on land acquired under sec.51(xxxi) or 
2sec.85j and even if the Commonwealth power over places 
acquired for the public purposes does not of itself 
have the territorial exclusiveness (as suggested by 
Bamford1s Case and Kingsford^ Case), the plenary nature 
and scope of the Commonwealth legislative power, as
1
55 W.N. (N.S.W.) at p . 123.
Cowen, op.cit., pp.456-7»
2
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distinct from its territorial effect, over the
Commonwealth aerodromes so acquired will not be much different 
from its power over the Commonwealth Territories; State 
laws on any subject dealing with matters relating to such 
places will be over-ridden by the exercise of the 
Commonwealth’s exclusive power under sec.52(i). Even if 
Professor Cowen’s second proposition were accepted, the 
determination of the validity of a State law in the light 
of sec.109 must always depend upon the nature of the place 
acquired by the Commonwealth for the public purposes and 
the Commonwealth’s intention in enacting its laws over 
such a place.
In the second Henry Case, Dixon J. (as then he was) 
held valid under the commerce power the Commonwealth 
regulations concerning flights on aerodromes which
otherwise other members of the Court upheld under the
1external affairs power. He said:
But, in relation to aerodromes licensed for the 
landing and departure of aeroplanes upon journeys 
to other countries and among the States, there 
seems to be no reason why, independently of the 
Air Convention, a Commonwealth law should not 
validly be made forbidding flying at a low 
altitude over any part of the aerodrome. To 
fly low cross wind above the neutral zone is 
obviously dangerous to aeroplanes taking off
61 C.L.R. at p.650.
1
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or landing. In my opinion Commonwealth law 
may keep an aerodrome in use for inter-State 
and oversea flying free of such dangers.
Once an aerodrome is licensed for or otherwise 
devoted to the purposes of air navigation with 
other countries and among the States, the safety 
of the aerodrome becomes, I think, a matter 
falling within the Federal power.
It will be seen that he was referring to aerodromes
generally irrespective of whether they were Commonwealth
aerodromes or those merely licensed or authorized.
In the A.N.A. Case, Williams J., after having affirmed
the sovereign rights of the States to co-ordinate traffic
by rail or road without infringing sec.92 of the
1Constitution, expressed an important dictum:
So a State could, I should think, build a 
number of aerodromes, and provide that only 
aeroplanes which fulfilled certain conditions 
could use such aerodromes, or it could confine 
their use to aeroplanes owned by itself.
Provided the conditions of use were non- 
discriminatory and were unrelated to flying 
across the border, the legislation would not 
infringe s.92. It would be legislation 
regulating the use of a further facility for 
all trade and commerce provided by the State.
And it would seem to follow that if the 
Commonwealth built aerodromes it could also 
pass non-discriminatory legislation regulating 
the use of such aerodromes, or confining their 
use to its own p u r p o s e s • • . (italicsadded)
This raised an important question, viz., 'to what extent 
does the Commonwealth ownership of aerodromes (and
71 C.L.R. at pp.109-10.
1
facilities) enable the Commonwealth to control economic 
aspects of the operation of aircraft insofar as the 
operators use these facilities?1 2 According to him, the 
Commonwealth could exercise reasonable control over those
facilities which it could itself provide to increase the
1flow of inter—State traffic by air. He did not mention
sec.52(i), and moreover his remark might have been
criticized as an argument based upon early transport
2cases, such as Vizzard’s Case and analogous cases.
The decision in the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2) 
disclosed the Court’s opinions in respect of some aspects 
of the extent of Commonwealth economic control over 
aircraft operations using the Commonwealth aerodromes 
and other facilities, since a question was directly raised 
as to the validity of the new federal regulations 
(reg.320A) requiring all aircraft operators including 
intra-State ones to hold federal permission if they 
wished to use Commonwealth aerodromes. Reg.320A reads:
1
71 C.L.R. at p.110.
2
See Chapter II, ante
148
(l) On and after such date as is fixed by the 
Minister for the purposes of this regulation by 
notice in the Gazette,1 an aircraft shall not 
land at or take-off from any place, being a 
place acquired by the Commonwealth for public 
purposes, except under the authority of, and 
in accordance with, a permit issued under this 
regulation by the Director-General. (2) The 
application of the last preceding sub-regulation 
is not limited by the operation of sub-regulation 
(l) of regulation 6 of these Regulations.
Barwick C.J., and Kitto and Windeyer JJ., categorized
2reg.320A as an exercise of the power under sec.32(i) of
the Constitution, ’if for no other reason than that the
Convention imposes upon the Commonwealth an obligation to
create and maintain aerodromes,’ as provided for in Art.28
3of the Chicago Convention. Hence, ’the Commonwealth is 
both able to determine as a legislator and not merely as 
an owner of the land on which the aerodrome is located 
who shall and who shall not land or take-off so that no
4State law may prevent such landing or taking off.’
However, the Chief Justice could not find any inconsistency
1
The date fixed was 10th October, 1964. See Commonwealth 
Gazette 1964, p.4003A.
2
This section was described in the Chief Justice’s judgment 
as ’s.5l(i)’ by mistake, 38 A.L.J.R. at p.394.
3
Art.28 provides for ’air navigation facilities and 
standard systems’.
4
38 A.L.J.R. at p.394.
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between the Commonwealth regulation and the Air Transport 
Act (N.S.W.) forbidding the carriage of passengers and 
goods by aircraft between places within the State, ’even 
though the Commonwealth-owned aerodromes may be the sole 
means of the taking off and the landing of commercial 
flights at these places,1 because ’the State Act does not 
purport to prevent permitted take-off or landing of 
aircraft but only the commercial carriage of passengers
or goods by aircraft between places within New South
1Wales.’ Kitto and Windeyer JJ. also rejected the
inconsistency argument on the same ground as the Chief 
2Justice’s. Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ. did not mention
the legislative source of reg.320A but flatly asserted its
3validity and non-inconsistency with the State Act. 
McTiernan J. based the legislative source of regs.320A and 
320B (controlled airspace) solely upon the provisions of
1
Ibid.
2
38 A.L.J.R. at p.410, per Kitto J.; at p.424, per 
Windeyer J .
3
Menzies J. expressed the same opinion as Barwick C.J.,
Kitto and Windeyer JJ. as to the inconsistency question,
38 A.L.J.R.' at p.421 .
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the Convention, viz., Arts. 12 and 37(b) and (c),
Annexes 2 (Rules of the Air) and 14 (Aerodromes), and
therefore regarded reg.320A as a valid exercise of the
Commonwealth power conferred by sec.26(l)(b) (and sec.
26(2)(c)) of the Air Navigation Act under the external
affairs power. In this case, however, where the external
affairs power was applied in a limited scope, the State
Act was, according to him, not inconsistent with the
federal regulation because the State Act was confined to
carriage of persons or goods between terminals, whereas
3reg.320A related to the mere flight of aircraft.
It is not clear from those judgments whether 
Barwick C.J. and Windeyer J. considered the possibility 
that Commonwealth control over Commonwealth aerodromes 
would be exercised on economic or political as distinct 
from safety grounds. Some of their dicta suggest that the 
Commonwealth’s power is limited to safety considerations 
of aircraft operations in or around the vicinity of such
1
Art.12 (Rules of the Air), Art.37 (Adoption of 
international Standards and Procedures) - (b) (characteristics 
of airports and landing areas) (c) (rules of the air and 
air traffic control).
2
He referred this Annex as 'Annex 1’ by mistake, 38 A.L.J.R.
at p.4o4.
3
38 A.L.J.R. at p.405«
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aerodromes in the same manner as with respect to controlled 
airspace. Surely, however, the Commonwealth has an 
exclusive right to say that any one who enters the 
Commonwealth-owned aerodromes for whatever reasons must get 
permission from the Commonwealth authority. Perhaps these 
Justices would require, differing from Williams J. in the 
A *N.A , Case, that the observance of sec.92 must be 
guaranteed with respect to ’inter-State* aviation. But 
if reg.320A is validly based upon sec.52(i) and on such a 
base is interpreted as involving the economic aspects as 
well as safety control of aircraft operations, then the 
State Act should have treated as pro tanto inconsistent 
with the Commonwealth regulation; thus even upon the 
second proposition set out by Professor Cowen, the State 
law could not be saved insofar as it purported to 
authorize the carriage of passengers or goods on an 
intra—State route in which a Commonwealth aerodrome was 
to be used. If the Chief Justice and some other Judges 
admitted the relevance of sec.52(i) and yet did not find 
inconsistency between the two sets of law, they would have 
been playing with a ’theory1, because, in view of the 
fact that every intra-State service in New South Wales
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commences and terminates in Sydney, the whole scheme of 
co-ordination and rationalisation of intra-State air 
services, as embodied in the State Act, would be nullified 
if interfered with by the Commonwealth economic control 
over Commonwealth aerodromes. Apart from such an ambiguity 
of the Court’s attitude, the counsel for the plaintiff 
could also have relied upon this constitutional clause as 
a substantive and enabling legislative source, instead of 
invoking it merely for the purpose of reinforcing his 
contention on the necessity of one authority of the whole 
aviation in Australia in general. Perhaps, the drafting 
of reg.320A might have provided a better foundation for 
this argument if the Commonwealth had expressed an 
intention to exclude the operation of any inconsistent 
State law, by prohibiting the use of such aerodromes not 
merely as a temporary permission or authorization but as 
a licensing condition of air transport operations in their 
use thereof.
What is the scope of, or incidental to, the exercise 
of the power over such Commonwealth aerodromes is to be
_
The fact was presented before the Court by the plaintiff’s 
counsel as evidence showing that a substantial portion of 
controlled airspace within New South Wales was used by 
intra-State flights.
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decided upon considerations of the facts and the nature 
of an ’aerodrome’, which involves complex technological 
factors. For effective control, the power must further 
be extended to adjoining airspace designated as 
’controlled airspace’.
Commonwealth Controlled Airspace
The Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations apply 
to and in relation to ’(a) international air navigation 
within Australian territory; (b) air navigation in 
relation to trade and commerce with other countries and 
among the States; (c) air navigation within the 
Territories; (d) air navigation to or from the Territories; 
(da) air navigation in which a Commonwealth aircraft is 
engaged; (e) air navigation in controlled air space that 
is of a kind not specified in a preceding paragraph but 
directly affects, or may endanger, the safety of persons 
or aircraft engaged in - (i) air navigation of a kind 
specified in paragraph (a), (b), (d) or (da); or (ii)
air navigation in which a military aircraft is engaged; 
and (f) on and after 10th October, 1964, all air navigation 
within Australian territory of a kind not specified in
-Jparagraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (da).’ According to
Reg.6(1).
1
154
reS*5(l)j 'controlled airspace' means 'a control area 
or a control zone'; 'control area' and 'control zone’ 
are defined respectively as 'an airspace designated as a 
control area' and 'an airspace designated as a control 
zone’ by the Director-General in pursuance of reg.95 of 
the Regulations. Reg»95(l) provides that the Director-
General may designate - (a) an aerodrome at which
1aerodrome control service is provided as a controlled
aerodrome; (b) airspace that is within defined horizontal
and vertical limits as a control area or a control zone;
(c) airspace in respect of which flight information and
alerting services are available as a flight information
region; and (d) airspace in respect of which operational
control service is provided as an operational control 
2area. It should be noted, however, that the notion of 
'controlled airspace* is not a recent one, and, before 
the amendment of the Regulations in 1964 by which reg.6(l) 
(da), (e)(ii) and (f) was inserted and reg.95 substituted,
1
'Aerodrome control service’ means 'an air traffic control 
service for aerodrome traffic’; 'aerodrome traffic* is 
defined as 'all traffic on the manoeuvring area of an 
aerodrome and all aircraft flying in the vicinity of an 
aerodrome.’ Reg.5(l)*
2
Reg.95(2) imposes upon the Director-General an obligation 
to cause a notification of such designation to be 
published in a prescribed way.
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the Regulations defined ’controlled airspace’ as ’an 
airspace or an aerodrome and the airspace in its vicinity 
designated by the Director-General’, in pursuance of 
reg.95 of the Regulations. Reg.95 provided then that 
’the Director-General may designate - (a) airspace 
extending upwards from a specified height above the 
surface of the earth, as a control area; (b) airspace 
extending upwards from the surface of the earth as a 
control zone; and (c) an aerodrome and the airspace in its 
vicinity as a controlled aerodrome, and a control area, 
control zone or controlled aerodrome so designated is a 
controlled airspace.’ Therefore, as compared with the 
previous concept of ’controlled airspace’, the present 
definition does rot necessarily include ’controlled 
aerodrome’ which may, or may not, be designated as 
’control area’ or ’control zone’. In practice, however, 
’controlled airspace’ is a strip of airspace, stretched 
from and linking with important aerodromes designated 
as ’controlled aerodromes’ where various control 
facilities (e.g., approach facilities, communication units, 
etc.) are provided. Reg.320B, which was newly inserted by 
the 19^4 amendment, provides:
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On and after such date as is fixed by the 
Minister for the purpose of this regulation 
by notice in the Gazette,^ an aircraft shall 
not be flown in controlled airspace in the 
course of air navigation of a kind specified 
in paragraph (e) of sub—regulation (l) of 
regulation 6 of these Regulations except under 
the authority of, and in accordance with, a 
permit issued under this regulation by the 
Director-General.
In the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.1), it was pointed 
out by the Court that, under the existing provisions of 
application of the Regulations (before 10th October, 1964), 
air navigation within a State ’but outside controlled 
airspace’ which was in the course of intra-State trade was 
not governed by the Regulations except to the extent 
provided expressly or by necessary implication in particular 
regulations. In the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2), the 
validity of reg.320B was raised in the pleadings, but no 
doubt as to its validity, nor as to the validity of reg.6 
and reg.320A, was raised by the defendant in the course 
of arguments before the Court; Barwick C.J., and Windeyer 
and McTiernan JJ. specifically asserted its validity;
Barwick C.J. said that ’the need for total and
1
The date fixed was 10th October, 1964; see Commonwealth Gazette 1964, p.4003A.
2
Cf. e.g., 37 A.L.J.R. at p.403> per Dixon C.J.; at p.407j per Taylor J.; at p.410, per Menzies J.
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undifferentiated control of this airspace was not, and
1indeed in my opinion could not be challenged;’
McTiernan J. said that reg.320B (and reg.320A) could be
supported in relation to intra-State flying by sec.26(l)(b)
of the Air Navigation Act, i.e., the regulation-making
power under the external affairs power to carry out the
2Chicago Convention and its Annexes. It would follow 
that the Court found constitutional basis for reg.6(l)(e) 
and reg.320B in the federal commerce power, external 
affairs power or other legislative powers affecting 
aviation (e.g., defence power), as aided by incidental 
powers. Although some Judges (including the Chief Justice) 
thought that the Commonwealth could determine who should
3use controlled airspace in Australia, the Court found 
that reg.320B was not inconsistent with the State Air 
Transport Act which was confined in its application to 
carriage of persons or goods between terminals - the same 
ground as it relied on when denying inconsistency 
between reg.320A and the State Act. As with the 
_
38 A.L.J.R. at p .394, per Barwick C.J.
2
38 A.L.J.R. at p.4o4, per McTiernan J.
3
38 A.L.J.R. at p.39^ +> per Barwick C.J.; at p.424, per 
Windeyer J.
158
Commonwealth, aerodromes, there remains a doubt as to 
whether the Director-General may apply economic policies 
in issuing a permit for the use of such controlled airspace. 
But, judging from the Court's view based upon the limited 
application of the commerce power and external affairs 
power, it seems unlikely that it would regard reg.320B 
as having any stronger application than the other control 
provisions.
In the United States, an argument favoring
exclusive federal sovereignty of navigable airspace which
1 2was akin to the 'zone theory' was once advanced. It 
was in summary based upon the following reasons: As
neither air navigation nor radio communication made 
substantial and continual use of airspace until the 
present century, no nation anywhere in the world had 
either by occupation or by need of protection acquired any 
domain in the upper airspace prior thereto. Accordingly, 
the United States did not acquire sovereignty in the 
upper airspace until long after the adoption of the 
Federal Constitution. The original colonies had no
1
The theory had been considered at one time in the 
international law aspect of the problem of sovereignty by 
Bluntschli, Holzendorff, Merignhac, Rivier, etc. , until the 
theory of an unlimited height of sovereignty in the air 
prevailed.
2
Cf. F.P. Lee, The Air Domain of the United States, reprinted 
in Legislative History of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 
prepared by the office of the legislative counsel and 
issued by the government, at 104.
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domain in the upper airspace and it was not part of 
their territory when the Constitution was adopted.
Moreover, after the adoption of the Constitution, no 
State could acquire territory in the airspace as this 
would amount to the acquisition of new or additional 
domain, a function vested solely in the Federal Government. 
The navigable airspace is hence the exclusive territory 
of the Federal Government, which thus has exclusive 
sovereignty (both external and internal) except as to an 
airspace sttatum close to the surface. This stratum 
may be considered as that part of the airspace which 
since earliest times has been used by mankind in the 
construction of buildings and other such similar uses as 
are required by human dwellers on the earth’s surface.
It was part of the territory of the several States, subject 
to the same constitutional control by the Federal 
Government as exists over the lands and waters of State
1territory. But all other airspace is Federal territory.
Various criticisms were raised against this view; the 
view is apparently based upon the premise that airspace 
is a domain separate and distinct from the land beneath
1
J.C. Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty 
of Navigable Airspace, J.A.L.C., vol.15, 1948, pp.27-38.
l6o
1it, which is doubtful; it is also fairly obvious that
the precise boundary between the surface airspace and the
2upper air strata will be difficult to determine. In
result, this view based upon the historical argument
denying State power has been disregarded, and it is
established that the question how far the federal
Government can exercise its jurisdiction within all strata
of airspace depends wholly upon the scope of the enumerated
legislative powers in the Constitution. In the Australian
setting, as we see in more detail when we discuss the legal
3status of the Australian airspace elsewhere, the physical 
boundaries of States have been more strongly stressed in 
relation to their respective legal powers in the airspace. 
However, the relation between Federal and State 
sovereignty in the airspace in Australia puts, as in the 
United States, the airspace over a State in the same legal 
and constitutional status as the lands and waters of that 
State; the countries differ in that the balance between 
_
A.L. Newman II, opcit., pp.1121-2.
2
Ibid. rNavigable airspace* was defined as the space above 
the minimum heights prescribed by regulations under the 
Civil Aeronautics A c t , 1938, c.601.52, Stat.977, 49U.S.C.401 
et seq. See now the Federal Aviation A ct, 1958, Aug.23j 
Public Law 85-726, 72 Stat.731.
3
See Chapter VI, post.
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federal and State sovereignty in the airspace has 
undergone a change in the course of the constitutional 
interpretation of federal powers. In the United States, 
the federal Act early in 1938 broadened the term ’air 
commerce’ to include ’any operation or navigation of 
aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger
safety in, inter-State, overseas, or foreign air
1commerce.’ This in turn has been interpreted in 
accordance with the expansive and practical approaches 
to ’commerce’ problems adopted by the Supreme Court since 
then. Hence the American position of aviation control in 
airspace stands in sharp contrast to the Australian one, 
where the commingling of international and inter-State 
flights with intra-State flights has been recognized in 
the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2) only with respect to 
safety matters affecting aircraft operations. Hence, the 
scope of the Commonwealth power over controlled airspace 
is largely prescribed by those main powers, and therefore 
depends finally upon what one finds in such powers as those 
with respect to overseas and inter-State ’commerce1 or 
international ’obligation’ in external relations.
However, as shown above the approach to reg.320A
Sec.1 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, supra.
1
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(aerodromes) is not the same as the approach to reg.320B 
(airspace), for the regulations rest on different 
legislative sources in the Constitution. But the two 
topics have a clear practical interrelation; it merits 
attention whether or how far the exclusive power over 
Commonwealth aerodromes can be extended to the use of 
controlled airspace adjoining the controlled aerodromes, 
and how far the area of this airspace may be extended.
Commonwealth Aircraft
The Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations apply to
air navigation in which a ’Commonwealth aircraft’ is 
1engaged. For the purpose of the Regulations, ’Commonwealth
aircraft’ is defined as ’an aircraft, other than military 
2aircraft, that is in the possession or under the control
of the Commonwealth or an authority of the Commonwealth
(other than the Australian National Airlines Commission)
or is being used wholly or principally for a purpose of
3the Commonwealth.’ The constitutional basis of such
_
Reg. 6 ( 1 ) , ( da) .
2
’Military aircraft’, in relation to Australian aircraft, 
means the aircraft of any part of the Defence Force, and 
includes any aircraft commanded by a member of that Force 
who is detailed for the purpose, and any aircraft being 
constructed for any part of the Defence Force (reg.5(l)).
3
Reg.5(1)
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regulation of ’Commonwealth aircraft’ is to be found in 
sec.51(xxxix) of the Constitution empowering the Commonwealth 
Parliament to make laws with respect to ’matters incidental 
to the execution of any power vested by this Constitution 
in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the
Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature,
1or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth.’
The definition of ’Commonwealth aircraft’ is twofold; 
it is either (a) an aircraft in the possession or under 
the control of the Commonwealth or an authority of the 
Commonwealth, or (b) an aircraft being used wholly or 
principally for a purpose of the Commonwealth. The Chicago 
Convention on international civil aviation does not apply 
to ’State aircraft’ which are defined as limited to 
aircraft engaged in military, police and customs services.
In Australia, however, ’State aircraft’ are defined only 
as ’military aircraft’ and there appear to be as yet no 
Australian aircraft used in customs or police services.
Prior to the express inclusion of ’Commonwealth aircraft’ 
in the application of the Air Navigation Regulations in 
1964, aircraft owned by the departments of Commonwealth
_
Under this constitutional power, sec.26(l)(e) of the Air 
Navigation Act 1920-19^3 authorizes the making of 
regulations with respect to any other matter with respect 
to which the Parliament has power to make laws.
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Government, such, as, the Bureau of Mineral Resources,
the Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research
Organization (C.S.I.R.O.) and the Department of Civil
Aviation, had been registered as ordinary civil aircraft
and the provisions of the Chicago Convention and the Air
Navigation Regulations applied to them within the scope
1of application of the Regulations. The present
Regulations separate ’Commonwealth aircraft1 2 from
ordinary civil aircraft, and apply to any kind of air
navigation in which 'Commonwealth aircraft1 are engaged
irrespective of whether it be international, inter-State,
Territorial, or intra-State.
The definition of Commonwealth aircraft probably
enables us to neglect a problem which might otherwise
arise, namely whether the authority operating an aircraft
2is ‘under the shield of the Crown1. The tests for that
1
The information was obtained from Dr Poulton, then 
Assistant Director-General of the Commonwealth Department 
of Civil Aviation.
2
As to the meaning of the expression * shield of the Crown1 , 
see G. Sawer, Shield of the Crown Revisited, 1 M.U.L.R.2, 
p .137. Crown privileges at common law include, immunity 
from the operation of statutes, immunity from taxation, 
immunity from suit in the courts save with the Monarch1s 
consent, special advantages in litigation such as immunity 
from discovery and interrogatories, advantages in style 
and order of pleading and immunity from execution of 
judgments, etc. (ibid.)
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relationship have been much disputed, and indeed the
whole concept has been criticised as inappropriate to
2the circumstances of modern government. But the numerous 
and conflicting cases agree on one point; if a particular 
statute adopts a particular conception of the type of 
governmental authority or organization with which it is 
concerned, then the general concept of 'shield of the 
Crown', depending on implications drawn mainly from the 
degree of Ministerial control over an authority, has no 
application. If the definition had stopped at 'possession 
or . . . control of the Commonwealth’ , then we might have 
been involved in deciding whether possession or control by 
a particular authority (e.g. the Snowy Mountains Authority)
1
As to discussions on the decided cases, see, e.g.
W. Friedmann and D.G. Benjafield, Principles of Australian 
Administrative Law, second ed.,pp.76, et seq.; Sawer, 
op.cit., pp .137, et seq.
2
Professor Sawer in his work, supra, advances his arguments 
on the application of ’the shield of the Crown’ as 
restricted as possible, and considers that incorporation 
of an authority should be sufficient to remove it for 
all purposes from ’under the shield’.
3
The Commonwealth Government established the Snowy Mountains 
Authority, and empowered it to generate and supply 
electricity by means of hydroelectric works in the Snowy 
Mountain Area. The Snowy Mouriains Council, established 
under the terms of the Agreement (between the States of 
New South Wales and Victoria and the Commonwealth) and 
consisting of representatives of the Commonwealth, the 
Authority and the two States, directs and controls the 
operation and maintenance of the permanent works of the 
Authority and the allocation of loads to generating stations.
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was such control and this might in turn have involved 
1 shield of the Crown’ difficulties. Actually most of the 
Commonwealth authorities which do possess or control 
aircraft are beyond question departments of the central 
government under Ministerial control and clearly under 
the shield of the Crown, such as the Department of Supply 
and the Department of Civil Aviation. But in any event the 
definition refers also to possession etc. by ’an authority 
of the Commonwealth*, and this would probably include any 
authority set up under federal legislation such as the 
Snowy Mountains Authority, and the Reserve Bank, even if 
not in other respects ’under the shield’. Finally the 
definition even more widely includes ’used wholly or 
principally for the purpose of the Commonwealth.’ This
phrase is likely, as in the case of the ’purposes of the
-|Commonwealth’ under sec.81 of the Constitution to apply 
to any use deriving constitutional validity from the 
Constitution or from laws made thereunder.
1
See, Attorney-General (Viet.) v . Commonwealth (1945)
71 C.L.R. 237* Sec.81 of the Constitution provides:
’All revenues or moneys raised or received by the Executive 
Government of the Commonwealth shall form one Consolidated 
Revenue Fund, to be appropriated for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth in the manner and subject to the charges and 
liabilities imposed by this Constitution.’
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It should be remarked in passing that we are 
concerned with the conception of »Commonwealth aircraft» 
only in so far as this concept affects the ambit of 
Commonwealth power to regulate aviation matters. Quite 
different considerations arise if it is sought to make the 
Commonwealth a defendant in an action arising out of the 
navigation of a »Commonwealth aircraft* as above defined, 
at the suit of some person injured in consequence of that 
navigation. Sec.56 of the Commonwealth Judiciary Act 
makes the Commonwealth liable in tort, and probably this 
would extend to claims for damage by aircraft even though 
the basis of such a claim should be one of the statutes 
now governing such claims in Australia. In this context, 
however, the question whether the Commonwealth aircraft was 
operated by the Crown or by an authority under the shield 
of the Crown would arise, because unless such operation 
could be established, the »Commonwealth», i.e. the Crown 
in right of the Commonwealth, would not be an appropriate 
defendant. Furthermore, in such an action, whether against 
the Commonwealth or against a Commonwealth authority not 
under the schield of the Crown, the further question could 
arise whether the person operating the aircraft was doing
_
No.6 of 1903, as amended.
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so in the exercise of an independent discretion. But 
these questions do not enter into the consideration of the 
scope of the legislative power over 'Commonwealth 
aircraf t’ •
What, then, is the extent to which Commonwealth 
legislative power may support the regulation of various 
aviation matters arising from operations by such aircraft?
This is mainly a matter of constitutional interpretation of 
sec.51(xxxix), combined with various legislative powers 
(e.g. posts, external affairs) and/or with the general 
executive power in sec.6l of the Constitution. The 
express omission of the Australian National Airlines 
Commission from 1 an authority of the Commonwealth* in 
respect of the application of the Regulations to ’Commonwealth 
aircraft’ raises a special problem. At present the Air 
Navigation Regulations, so far as applicable, apply to 
and in relation to the Commission in the same manner as
2they apply to ordinary civil aircraft and their operations.
It is doubtful whether the Commission shares in the benefit
3of ’the shield of the Crown’, but it is certainly an
1
Cf. Friedmann and Benjafield, op.cit., pp.105-6.
2
Sec.29 of the Australian National Airlines Act 1945-61.
3
As to the organization and constitution of the Commission, 
see Appendix III, post.
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‘authority1 of the Commonwealth as its instrumentality
or agent, and aircraft owned and operated by the Commission
are under the same authority. Hence, a question arises as
to whether the Commonwealth is competent to authorise
Commission activities within a purely intra-State field,
without relying on the State*s permission, by virtue of a
claimed plenary power over ‘Commonwealth aircraft*.
Windeyer J .* s dieturn in the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (N o .2)
1deserves citation here:
Whether on some other ground than the supposed 
integration of inter-State and intra-State 
commerce the Commonwealth could directly or by 
an agent of its creation enter the field of 
intra-State air navigation is a matter on which 
I express no opinion.
The dictum does not give any clue to answer the question,
but it may suggest that, if the Commission is reorganized
so as to put it under a sufficient authority or control of
the Government of the Commonwealth, the establishment
and operation of such a Commonwealth instrumentality may
well be justified under the incidental power of the
executive Government, as distinct from the federal commerce
power. In Helicopter Utilities Pty. Ltd, v. Australian
2National Airlines Commission, the plaintiff company
_
38 A.L.J.R. at p.422.
(1962) N.S.W.R. 7^7.
2
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moved for an interlocutory injunction restraining 
defendant from chartering to the Commonwealth certain 
helicopters and crews for about eighty days for use by a 
research expedition to the Antarctic conducted under the 
control of the Department of External Affairs. The 
ground for the relief claimed by the plaintiff was that 
the Commission1s proposed conduct was ultra vires the powers 
it possessed under the Australian National Airlines Act 
1945-59> which were to do all that was necessary or 
convenient to be done for, or incidental to, or in
connection with...operation by it of airline services for
1the transport of passengers and goods by air. The Supreme 
Court of New South Wales held that the chartering of 
helicopters for an expedition of eighty days’ duration was 
not part of the conduct of an airline service within the 
meaning of the Act, because the phrase ’airline service’ 
where used in that Act connoted scheduled airline service. 
The Commission was set up under the commerce power, and 
its powers and functions are largely prescribed by that 
power. The decision implied that Commonwealth could have 
vested in the Commission a general power and function to 
provide services for the Government of the Commonwealth,
_
Sec.19(1).
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but had not in fact done so. The only question was as to
the scope of the Act, not of the Constitutional power.
Probably, however, the answer to this problem would turn
on more general questions as to the scope of federal
power. It is reasonably well settled, at least by
implication, that the Commonwealth has no general power
to engage in trades or businesses, and this would include
1an airline business. Probably the appropriation power 
(sec.8l) provides no basis for first setting up an intra­
state air service and then claiming a power to regulate it. 
Hence the Commonwealth would be driven to seeking some more 
specific basis for its activity, and this brings us back to 
inter-State and foreign commerce, convention obligations, 
defence &c. On this reasoning, it is also possible that 
the definition of ’Commonwealth aircraft’ results in a 
claim to greater power than the Commonwealth has, unless
1
It is unlikely that tfindeyer J. in his dictum, mentioned 
above, considered that the Commonwealth could generally 
do this, but there are some border-line cases, such as, 
Attorney-General for Victoria v. The Commonwealth 
(Clothing Factory Case) (1934-35) 52 C.L.R. 533» If, for 
instance, the Commonwealth runs a special air transport 
operation in accordance with the Commonwealth’s time 
schedules between places within Australia originally for 
the purpose of carrying governmental officers who are 
engaged in the Commonwealth businesses, and, in the 
course of such transport practices, offers vacant seats 
to ordinary civilians on reasonable fares, the Court may 
regard it as incidental to the administrative functions of 
the Executive.
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it is ’read down’ by inserting ’in pursuance of a 
constitutional power of the Commonwealth’ before ’or’ at 
the end of (a). In other words, mere de facto possession 
or control by Commonwealth officers will not be sufficient.
The Commonwealth has enacted the Air Accidents 
(Commonwealth Liability) Act 1963 establishing a 
legislative scheme for payments to the dependants of a 
person who is killed or injured in an air accident while 
travelling as a passenger on Commonwealth business or at 
Commonwealth expense, either in carriage in ’aircraft 
operated by the Commonwealth or Commonwealth authority’, 
or in carriage in aircraft not so operated (e.g., private 
airlines)• As the Commission’s liability is regulated 
under the Commonwealth Civil Aviation (Carriers’
pLiability) Act 1959-62, the Air Accidents Act 1963 does
not apply to the carriage in aircraft operated by the
3C ommis sion.
With respect to the question of the third party ground 
damages caused by Commonwealth aircraft, the subject may 
not be regarded as being within the powers conferred to
1
No. of 1963.
2
No.2 of 1959 - No.38 of 1962.
See Chapter VIII, post.
3
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the Commonwealth Parliament, for it involves the third 
party within the jurisdiction of States. However, for 
the effective exercise of the Commonwealth governmental 
functions, the subject should fall within sec.51(xxxix) 
of the Constitution. Crown immunity problems are relevant 
to this legal relation.
1In the Commonwealth Crimes (Aircraft) Act 1963
providing in effect that any act, which would be an
offence against the laws of the Australian Capital
Territory if it took place there, is an offence against
the Act if committed on board an aircraft to which the 
2Act applies, ’Commonwealth aircraft* is defined in the 
similar terms as in the Air Navigation Regulations, but 
not specifically excluding the Commission’s aircraft.
The Act applies generally to such Commonwealth aircraft 
when engaged in any flight.
1
No.64 of 1 9 6 3 .
See Chapter X, post.
2
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CHAPTER V
Aviation and Miscellaneous Constitutional Powers
There are many other constitutional powers allowing 
the Commonwealth Parliament to enact legislation for the 
purpose of controlling aviation; most, if not all, powers 
enumerated in sec. 51 of the Constitution other than those 
discussed above relate indirectly to aviation, e.g., 
postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services; 
lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys; astronomical 
and meteorological observations; quarantine; etc. Among 
them we shall briefly discuss below the following four 
subjects of importance: defence, recognition and
enforcement of laws, &c. of States (full faith and credit), 
reference to State (aviation) powers to the Commonwealth, 
and incidental matters.
Def ence
By sec. 5l(vi) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth 
Parliament has power to make laws for the peace, order, 
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to
1 the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and 
of the several States, and the control of the forces to 
execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth* 1.
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With this section should be read many other constitutional
clauses relating to defence, but, for the present purpose,
it is enough to say that sec.ll4 forbidding a State to
raise or maintain any naval or military force without
the consent of the Commonwealth Parliament, together
with sec* 52(ii) empowering the Parliament to make laws
exclusively with respect to matters relating to
transferred departments, makes the defence power of the
2Commonwealth exclusive.
1
Sec. 5l(xxxii) authorizes the Parliament to make laws 
with respect to the control of railways with respect to 
transport for the naval and military purposes of the 
Commonwealth. Sec. 69 transfers the department of 1 2naval 
and military defence1 to the Commonwealth. Sec. 70 transfers 
from the States to the Commonwealth Executive Government 
all powers and functions relating to matters passing to 
the latter under the Constitution. Sec. 119 imposes upon 
the Commonwealth an obligation to protect the States 
against invasion and, on the application of the Executive 
Government of a State, against domestic violence.
2
Cf. Joseph v. Colonial Treasurer (N.S.W.) (1918) 25
C.L.R. 46. But, in Carter v» Egg & Egg Pulp Marketing 
Board (1942) 66 C.L.R. 557* it was held that the power was 
not necessarily exclusive. The ’non-exclusiveness1 becomes 
relevant when, in time of war or in time towards war, 
Commonwealth defence laws affect various aspects of State 
laws. It is argued that the defence power is not exclusive 
of the States’ power, in respect of subjects not of 
themselves within the matters which ‘because of their 
nature’ are within the power, and that in respect of laws 
with the direct and immediate object of naval and military 
defence, the Commonwealth power is in virtue of its nature 
exclusive (Wynes, op.cit., pp.255-56). But, in the above- 
mentioned ’situation’, it is extremely hard to judge what 
is by its nature within the power.
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It is not a primary object here to discuss in detail 
the nature and scope of the defence power in the 
Constitution, as our subject is not ’military* aviation 
but limited to ’civil1 aviation. But there are problems 
as to how far the Commonwealth can extend its legislative 
and executive powers to the field of civil aviation in 
connection with and through its regulation of defence 
matters. Intermingling phases of civil aviation and 
military activities exist in a number of cases, as for 
example, in the use of airspace where some military 
training is to be performed, or in the regulation of 
flight rules or communication systems in airspace over 
or around an aerodrome used both for civil aviation and 
for military purposes.
It was once asked whether the power to make laws
for the naval and military defence included defence by air,
but any such doubt has been ignored in practice, and, in
1 2Farey v. Burvett and Pirrie v. McFarlane, the existence
of the legislative power in respect of air navigation for
3purposes of defence was assumed by the Court. Unlike
1
(1916) 21 C.L.R. 433.
2
(1923) 36 C.L.R. 170.
3
Cf. Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution 
(1929); Comments in the Public Acts of Queensland (Reprint), 
1828-1936, vol.l, P.350.
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most other powers conferred by sec. 51 of the Constitution,
a law with respect to the defence of the Commonwealth is,
on the authorities, an expression which seems rather to
treat defence or war as the purpose to which the
legislation must be addressed.^ In times of peace,
however, the address of the legislation is not conspicuous
enough to make it easy to measure the practical effect of
its operation for aiding defence. Itfhat a particular
defence law should effect in times of peace may well be
summarized by Fullagar J.'s remark in the Australian
2Communist Party Case, viz., the 'primary aspect' of
3defence - direct and immediate naval and military defence. 
This 'primary aspect' of defence will certainly include 
various aspects of military aviation, and these cannot 
be segregated from those of civil aviation, owing to the 
very nature of 'aviation'. Many aspects of the Air Forces 
are now regulated by the Air Force Regulations made under 
the Air Force Act 1923-56.^ The Air Force Regulations
1
See, Stenhouse v. Coleman (1945) 69 C.L.R. 457? per
Dixon J •
2
Australian Communist Party v . Commonwealth (l95l)
83 C.L.R. 1.
3
83 C.L.R. at pp.253-54, per Fullagar J.
4
The Air Force (Canteens) Regulations, Air Force Courts 
of Inquiry Regulations and Air Force (Women's Services) 
Regulations are also set up under the Act.
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deal with various aspects of the Air Forces; general 
powers for air defence purposes vested in the Governor- 
General are defined,"^ and these empower him to do all 
matters and things deemed by him to be necessary or 
desirable for the efficient defence and protection of the 
Commonwealth or of any State. Taking as an example the 
regulation of Air Force flying, it is to be observed that 
the regulations are expressed in more general terms than 
are used in relation to civil aviation, because of the 
essential nature of military operations which requires 
freedom of movement and system flexibility; hence, the 
flight rules are governed by two different sources of 
legislative power, and consequently there is much 
duplication of provisions on similar subjects as between 
civil aviation legislation and military aviation 
legislation. Obviously, it goes too far to say that most, 
if not all, features of civil aviation should be regarded 
as being * with respect to1 defence because the same air 
is used by the same type of traffic means or because 
civil aviation provides a potential source of wartime air 
power. Therefore, in practice, co-ordination between 
military and civil aviation authorities is important.
The Air Navigation Regulations (reg. 7(2)) provide that
Reg. 11.
1
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the Director-General shall maintain close liaison with 
the Department of Air in matters of common interest. In 
the 1 Joint Aviation Standards and Procedures1, all 
portions of airspace are recorded, and a set of common 
or compatible operating procedures for the integration of 
military and civil air activities is prescribed. Such 
co-ordination is also extended to navigational aids and 
communication systems.^
The activities of 1 space exploitation1 deserve 
special mention. There is no specific power conferred 
upon the Commonwealth Parliament in respect of 1 space 
exploitation1 by the Constitution, but, as in the case of 
1 air navigation1, there are several constitutional powers 
relating to the subject, e.g., the external affairs power 
(exercised in agreements between Australia and U.S.A. 
for a co-operative programme of space vehicle tracking
1
As to the relation between civil aviation and military 
aviation, the First Civil Aviation Report I96O-6I (prepared 
by the Minister for Civil Aviation) says: 'The need for
expanding volume of controlled airspace to accommodate 
growing civil aviation traffic and the types of aircraft 
now operating is often in direct conflict with the training 
and other requirements of defence....If the defence forces 
are to discharge their responsibilities in war they must, 
in peace time, have airspace available in which they can 
carry out random operations and move freely about the 
country. Sections must be set aside for air firing, 
weapons experiments, aerial research, explosives 
manufacture and such like. On the other hand, civil 
aviation requires airspace for the safe and orderly 
movement of aircraft, and in addition for civil flying 
training and for light aircraft operations1. (At p .65)»
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and space communications).1 Also, the Commonwealth
Parliament has exclusive legislative power in respect of
space activities specifically related to defence. The
Governor-General as the Queen1s representative is
commander in chief of the naval and military forces of
the Commonwealth; the Minister for Supply administers the
Department of Supply which, as one of its functions, is
responsible for the defence research and development.
The Research and Development Branch under the control of
the Chief Scientist is responsible for research and
scientific development in relation to war materiel. The
Weapons Research Establishment, one of the establishments
2in the Branch, deals with ’space exploitation’. Airspace 
may be reserved permanently or intermittently, not only 
for military or civil flight control or for weapons and 
missile testing, etc., but also for flight of such space 
vehicles. Therefore, representatives of the principal 
users of airspace, the Department of Civil Aviation and 
Supply and the Defence group of Departments have
3established ’Air Co-ordinating Committee’ for this purpose.
1
Cf. Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, no.47?
1961, pp.1101-2.
2
Ibid.
First Civil Aviation Report, supra, p .65»3
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The determination of the ambit of the defence 
power at a given point of time is the situation, however 
it may have been brought about, in which Australia finds 
itself at that time.^“ As a transition of the situation 
towards war occurs, the 1 purpose1 approach results in 
more and more activities coming within the scope of the 
defence power until the power reaches its maximum extent 
in time of active war. There seems to be an inverse 
proportion relation between * substance' and ’purpose* 
approaches - that is, 1 substance’ becomes vague according 
to the change of situation towards war and ’purpose1 
becomes less important in peace situation. The difficulty 
in ascertaining the possibility of aiding defence is 
reflected in the phrases which occur in the cases - 
’real connection’, ’directness’, ’reasonableness’, 
’nebulosity’, ’substance’. This is at the same time the 
process of expansion of the concept of ’purpose’, from 
the slightest possibility to the greatest of aiding 
defence. The Court has taken judicial notice of current 
international situations and by reference to them it 
examines the constitutionality of a defence law. But, 
in view of the intricately ’purposive’ nature of the 
power, it would be more desirable if, in time of war or
83 C.L.R. at P.274, per Kitto J.
I
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in situation towards war, a judgment on the Australian 
position in international affairs and the estimation of 
possibility of aiding defence of Australia based upon that 
very judgment were left in greater degree to the Parliament. 
It is likely that as war approaches, 1 inescapable military 
implications in civil aviation1^ might well lead the 
Commonwealth, for practical purposes, to a unified 
government in respect of its control over aviation 
industry in Australia.
Full Faith and Credit
Aviation raises many difficult problems of private 
international law, because aircraft traverse national 
borders at extremely high speed and in a short time have 
a relation with many different countries and legal systems. 
Hence it is often difficult to determine applicable law 
or jurisdiction to govern crimes, torts or other wrongs 
on board, or connected with, aircraft or collisions 
between different aircraft, and between aircraft and 
other objects or legal transactions, births, deaths and
1
As to this point, and various aspects of the defence power, 
see G. Sawer, The Defence Power of the Commonwealth in 
Time of War, 20 A.L.J. at p.269s et seq.
2
J.P. Van Zandt, Civil Aviation and Peace, Volume II of 
a series under the general title: America faces the air 
age; 1944, p p .1-5.
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marriages, which may take place in aircraft or legal 
transactions concerning aircraft as such or carriers* 
liability to damages to passengers or goods, and so on.
As in the United States, problems of private 
international law arise in Australia at two levels, inter­
state and international, and it is on their inter-State 
aspects that the Constitution confers upon the 
Commonwealth Parliament powers which may help to solve 
these problems. So far as matters within Australia are 
concerned, private international law problems will 
disappear in matters governed by uniform federal law 
enacted under specific legislative powers (e.g., inter­
state commerce)• But where State laws apply, the 
Commonwealth may still be able to exercise some control 
under sec. 5l(xxiv), sec. 5l(xxv) and sec. 118, known 
as * full faith and credit* powers. Sec. 5l(xxiv) empowers 
the Parliament to make laws with respect to * the service 
and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil 
and criminal process and the judgments of the Courts of 
the States*, and sec. 5l(xxv) with respect to * the 
recognition of the laws, the public Acts and records, 
and the judicial proceedings of the States*. They are 
the implementing powers of a general constitutional 
obligation set out in sec. 118 which provides that * full 
faith and credit shall be given, throughout the
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Commonwealth, to the laws, the public Acts and records,
and the judicial proceedings of every State1 23. In the
United States Constitution from which the Australian
»full faith and credit1 provisions are derived, both the
constitutional mandate and the powers implementing it are
given in the same clause."*' The Australian provisions are
separated, and they are more explicit as to what federal
legislature may do by way of prescribing the effect in
2other States of judgments, laws, etc. of a State.
However, the operative scope and effect of these
constitutional powers has not been fully discussed in
3Australia, and it is pointed out that there is a 
’disappointing lack of awareness* that the particular 
problem has an inter-State rather than an international
1
Art.IV, sec. 1; the section reads: ’Full faith and credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, records 
and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the 
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which 
such Acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and 
the effect thereof’.
2
W.W. Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, 1919* 28 Y.L.J. p.426.
3Major works on this subject are Z. Cowen, Full Faith and 
Credit: the Australian Experience, Essays on the Australian
Constitution, second ed., p.293 (the same article is 
published in Res Judicatae (now Melbourne University Law 
Review), 1952, p . 2 7 ) • See also Cowen, American-Australian 
Private International Law, 1957* E.I. Sykes, Full Faith 
and Credit - Further Reflections, 6 Res Judicatae, 195^* 
p.353. As to the other works on specific subjects, see 
Wynes, op.cit., p.227n.
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character, due largely to the fact that Australian courts
have followed English authority even to the extent of
overlooking the constitutional obligation to accord full
faith and credit.'^ Therefore, it is necessary for us to
review the problems involved in the 1 full faith and credit1
powers in order to find guiding principles for the
solution of various private international law questions
arising from aviation activities within Australia.
However, in the absence of direct authorities on this
problem, our discussion will necessarily be speculative.
2In Harris v. Harris, the Supreme Court of Victoria 
held that a decree of divorce pronounced by the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales ad having final and conclusive 
force in New South Wales would be recognized as valid in 
Victoria and could not be challenged in Victoria on the 
ground that it had been pronounced without jurisdiction, 
by virtue of sec. 18 of the State and Territorial Laws 
and Record Recognition Act (C’th) 1901-28.^ It was 
mentioned by the Court (Fullagar J. sitting alone) that 
a judgment of an inferior Court of a State, having been
1
Cowen, American-Australian Private International Law,
p. 10 •
2
(1947) V.L.R. 44.
No.11 of 1901.3
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open to challenge 1 at home1 for want of jurisdiction,
would seem to be equally open to challenge on that ground
in a sister-State. That the implied prohibitions in
Commonwealth-State relations had been rejected since the
decision of Engineers1 Case^ was mentioned as a ground
of denial of reliance on American cases. In the United
States, some exceptions (e.g., jurisdiction) to the
operation of full faith and credit are permitted insofar
as they are based upon the States1 reserved sovereignties.
Apparently, the Judge took a fairly literal approach to
the construction of sec. 18 of the Act, which read:
All public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of any State or Territory, if 
proved or authenticated as required by 
this Act, shall have such faith and 
credit given to them in every Court and 
public office as they have by law or 
usage in the Courts and public offices 
of the State or Territory from whence 
they are taken.
1
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide 
Steamship Co. Ltcü (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129«
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This literal approach is also a wider approach to the 
ratio decidendi of Engineers* Case/  and, in the absence 
of such a constitutional restrictions as the due process 
clause in the U.S. Constitution, the full faith and credit 
clause in the Australian Constitution may dictate that a 
judgment having final and conclusive force in the original
1
In a narrow approach to the ratio decidendi of Engineers1 
Case, it was concerned solely upon the question of the 
distribution of powers between Commonwealth and States; on 
that question, the case decided that no assumption about 
the area of State power should be made before construing 
the express grants of the Commonwealth, The same approach 
can be made to constitutional guarantees and prohibitions. 
For example, it could be said that when interpreting 
sec, 92, no assumptions should be made about the likely 
area of control over trade and commerce which governments, 
whether federal or State, were intended to retain. 
Similarly, it could be said that sec. 118 should be 
interpreted without any assumption about the extent to 
which Commonwealth or States should be free to qualify 
within their respective powers. But Engineers1 Case did 
not in terms deal with any guarantee or prohibition 
question and in fact when dealing with such questions the 
Courts have tended to make assumptions about the kind of 
powers intended to be left unaffected - a balancing 
operation. To that extent, Fullagar J.*s references to 
Engineers1 Case in Harris Case are open to criticism. 
However, there was a wider premise in the reasoning in 
Engineers1 Case, to the effect that the Court should go 
as far as it can with literal interpretation, before 
resorting to assumptions or material outside the text of 
the Constitution. This wider doctrine certainly does not 
have the force of the narrower rule about Commonwealth- 
State powers, but it does have some force; the literal 
approach has been adopted fairly consistently by many if 
not most of the Justices - e.g., Latham C.J. To that 
extent, Fullagar J. was justified in saying that a fairly 
literal approach to sec. 118 is more consistent with
Engineers1_Case than an approach which depends on
assumptions about the area of State sovereignty.
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State should be recognized and cannot be challenged in
other States on the ground that it had been pronounced
without jurisdiction, if that objection was no longer
open in the State or origin.
However, it is not clear whether and how far
exceptions to this constitutional requirement are to be
admitted to various kinds of judgments of sister-States.
In the Service and Execution of Process Act (C’th),"^
provisions are set out in Part IV for the registration
and enforcement of judgments of courts of record. In
view of the wide meaning of ’judgment1 2 therein defined,
it may be that there are few exceptions to the operation
of the constitutional clause in respect of judgments.
In the United States, exceptions are admitted in accordance
2with the nature and kinds of judgments. It is contended 
that the structure of the Commonwealth Act is built on 
the assumption that full faith and credit does not compel
or authorize the direct execution of a sister-State
3judgment. Part V of the Act deals with a power to make
1
No.5 of 1901.
2
For example, judgments of a penal nature or not final 
are generally regarded as exceptions. Judgments on 
taxation liability or not for a sum of money are not 
exceptions thereto. Cf. Sykes, op.cit., p.35^> et seq., 
and cases there cited.
Sykes, op.cit.,
3 p.367
189
rules of court to carry into effect the provisions of 
the Act, both as to the service of process and as to the 
enforcement of judgments, and this rule-making power is 
vested in the Supreme Court of each State, or such of 
the judges as may make rules of court in other cases. 
Therefore, there may be varying procedural requirements 
as between the States. In addition to this, the Act 
expressly requires that the practice and procedure of the 
State in which the process is issued or in which the 
service is effected or the execution is enforced 
respectively shall apply as far as practicable, tuntil 
such rules have been made, and as far as any made do not 
provide for the circumstances of any particular case1 
It is a matter for consideration whether a federal law can 
deal with a State power to make rules of court in the 
light of the decision rendered in Le Mesurier v. Conner,2 
its constitutionality depending necessarily upon the 
nature and scope of the incidental powers of the 
Commonwealth powers. But, if it is the intention of the 
federal statute based upon sec. 5l(xxiv) of the 
Constitution that a judgment duly rendered in one State 
may be enforced in other States without suing on it and
1
Sec. 27(2).
(1920) 42 C.L.R. 481.
2
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obtaining a new judgment, the forum's procedure for
giving effect to judgments from another State would surely
be within Commonwealth incidental power; otherwise, rules
imposed by the forum may create such burdens as to
1nullify the objects of the federal statute.
More difficult problems arise in cases relating to
the conflict of laws as to rights not based on judgments,
i.e., rights which have not matured into final judgments.
In Merwin Pastoral Co. Pty, Ltd, v. Moolpa Pastoral Co.
2Pty._Ltd., the High Court held that the constitutional
mandate to accord full faith and credit would, in 
appropriate cases, deny power to a forum to refuse to 
give effect to the statutory law of another State on
1
In McNamara v. Miller (1902) 28 V.L.R. 327j the Supreme
Court of Victoria held that where a judgment had been 
obtained in another State of the Commonwealth (i.e., 
Tasmania) and had been registered in Victoria under Part IV 
of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901 (c'th), 
the judgment creditor could not proceed by summons under 
the Imprisonment of Fraudulent Debtors Act I89O (S.A.) to 
have the debtor examined under that Act, nor had the Court 
any jurisdiction to entertain such a summons. It was 
contended that the power given by the Commonwealth 
Constitution (sec.5l(xxiv)) only had relation to the service 
and execution of judgments, and under the constitutional 
section the Parliament had only made provision for 
enforcing judgments. The Court (Hodges J. sitting alone) 
upheld this contention, and said that 1 2it certainly would 
be a curious thing if this Court had jurisdiction to punish 
for a criminal or quasi-criminal offence committed in 
Tasmania or in any other State of the Commonwealth*.
(28 V.L.R. 331)* Factual backgrounds of this case are not 
clear from the Case Report, but a question remains as to 
whether the Commonwealth Parliament can give such a 
jurisdiction to State Coixts.
2
(1933) 48 C.L.R. 565.
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‘public policy1 reasons. The question before the Court
was whether, notwithstanding the provisions of the
Moratorium Act 1930-31 (N.S.W.), the liability of the
purchaser for instalments of purchase money and interest
payable under a contract for the sale of a pastoral
property, together with the livestock thereon, situated
in New South Wales remains enforceable in the Supreme
Court of Victoria. The decision of the Court was mainly
concerned with the question which law was the governing
or proper law of the contract sued upon - the law of New
South Wales or the law of Victoria - in accordance with
the common law rules of private international law. The
Court incidentally invoked sec. 118 as prohibiting a
refusal by the courts of one State to give effect to a
substantive defence under the applicable law of another
State.^ It is submitted, however, that the discussion in
that case was too brief to justify a general proposition
that the doctrine of public policy could never be invoked
within the area in which the Australian full faith and
2credit clause operated.
1
48 C.L.R. at p.577, per Rich and Dixon JJ., in a joint 
judgment; at p.588, per Evatt J., citing Bradford Electric 
Light Co. v. Clapper (1932) 286 U.S. 145? at p.l60. 
Obviously, those Judges considered the full faith and credit 
clause not merely as an evidential clause but also as a 
substantive clause.
2
Cowen, Full Faith and Credit, supra, p.305-
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Questions as to full faith and credit for ‘foreign
law* may arise in two forms: one arises when an occurrence
has taken place in one State, and in a second State an
action is brought to enforce the resulting cause of
action, or legal interests other than cause of action.
In various cases, such as, cases on tort, stockholders,
statutory successors or mortgage, the Supreme Court of
the United States, applying the full faith and credit
clause, held that the law of another state should be given
effect by the forum.^ The test applied there in such
cases is the principle of balancing the governmental
interests of the two competing States in the subject of
2the litigation. However, the general principle that
some aspects of foreign cases are to be governed by the
local law of the forum, as when it would be impracticable
or seriously inconvenient to use the foreign law, is not
3destroyed by the full faith and credit clause. But
1
As to these American cases, see E.E. Cheatham, Federal 
Control of Conflicts of Law, Selected Readings on Conflict 
of Laws, Association of American Law Schools, p.26l, et seq. 
For example, in a tort case (Hughes v. Fetter (l95l) 341
U.S. 609)t the majority of the Supreme Court held that 
the State A* s statutory policy prohibiting the enforcement 
of death claims under the statutes of State B where the 
actual death occurred was contrary to the national policy 
of the full faith and credit clause.
2
Cf. 134 A.L.R. 1472, and cases there cited.
Cheatham, op.cit., pp.264-5»
3
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grievous misapplication of the law of the forum may be 
prevented, and the assertion by the forum that a particular 
aspect of a case is a matter of procedure or remedy to be 
governed by the law of the forum is not conclusive; the 
classification is subject to review, and a seriously 
erroneous classification by the forum may be violation of 
the Constitution.^ It is pointed out, therefore, that the
1
Ibid. An Australian case on this point is In re 
Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd. (1927-28) 
S.A.S.R. 3^2. The facts of the case so far as pertinent 
for the present purpose were as follows: C.A.S.E. Ltd., a 
company incorporated in South Australia, went into voluntary 
liquidation in South Australia; the Company had given a 
debenture over its assets, including property situated in 
Queensland; the debenture was registered in accordance with 
South Australian law, but was not registered in Queensland; 
the effect of the Queensland law was to invalidate 
unregistered debentures as a security against the liquidator 
and creditors. It was contended on behalf of the Queensland 
creditors that the Bank1s charge was invalid under 
Queensland law, and the Queensland creditors had priority 
against the local assets; that the debenture was never 
registered in Queensland, and if the Queensland law was 
not complied with the debenture was void against them; and 
that the rights given under the Queensland Acts were 
substantive, not procedural, and therefore the Court was 
bound to give full effect to Queensland law. Napier J. 
delivered the following judgment: *1 am unable to follow
this argument. The effect of sec. 118 has yet to be 
determined. It may well be that this Court is required to 
take judicial notice of the Statute law of Queensland, and 
that the principles upon which that law is to be recognized 
and applied are to be regarded as binding, not merely as 
a matter of comity, but as the law of this State prescribed 
for that purpose by the Constitution. But the section has 
no further application for the purpose of this case. In 
distributing the fund which has been placed under our 
control, we are bound to apply the law in force in this
(cont. next page)
English common law rule of tort in the conflict of laws 
cannot be reconciled with the obligations of full faith 
and credit, because the English law admits the notion of 
an entirely free and unrestricted competence for the 
forum.^ Again, upon Fullagar J.’s standpoint, the 
Australian clause may impose upon the forum a more rigid 
adherence to the constitutional mandate to give effect to 
foreign law, but in the case of the conflict of laws as 
to rights, as distinct from judgments, a rigid and literal 
enforcement of the clause without regard to the forum’s 
laws would lead to the absurd result that wherever a 
conflict arises the law of each State must be enforced in 
its own courts. The second question arises when a choice 
of the applicable law must be made in an ambiguous
1 ( cont.)
State. The Statute law of Queensland has to be recognized 
and applied where it is relevant. It may be relevant for 
the purpose of ascertaining the state of the property 
available for distribution, but it cannot affect the process 
of distribution. Subject to the Constitution, the 
Parliament of each State has plenary power over all persons 
and things within its territory and over the actions of its 
Court and officers. If any substantive right of interest 
has been created, or property has been held or applied 
under the authority of the Queensland Statute law, we should 
recognize the accomplished fact, and distribute what 
remains; but otherwise the Queensland Statute is not 
addressed to this Court, and is irrelevant for the present 
purpose’, (at p.346). In Napier J ’s opinion, the Queensland 
Statute, which merely invalidated the debenture as ’against 
the liquidator and any creditor’, did not create any 
substantive interest in the property of the Company. The 
rest of the Court members agreed with this view.
1
Cowen, op.cit., p.325
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situation, as when an occurrence sued on has elements 
in two or more States - the most complex field in the 
federal control of conflict of laws. Does the 
constitutional requirement of full faith and credit 
extend to the further question, 1 to which laws shall full 
faith and credit be given? * From the viewpoint of the 
Commonwealth legislative power, with which we are concerned 
here, the question is whether the Parliament can designate 
under sec. 5l(xxv) a certain State law, which has been 
duly authenticated and conforms to conditions prescribed 
by the Parliament, as a proper law or governing law in 
appropriate conflictual cases and direct that it be 
recognized in preference to other States laws.
It has been argued that the mandate of full faith 
and credit must be subject to one important limiting 
implication, viz., that full faith and credit is given 
only to a judgment or Act which conforms to the common 
law categories of private international law whether these 
be choice of law categories or jurisdictional ones."*- 
Merwin1s Case does not go beyond this proposition. There 
is theoretical and practical uniformity in the six State 
sets of rules of private international law as well as in
This view is maintained by Dr Syke s (op.cit., p.3^3)»
I
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their substantive bodies of common law; controversies as 
to these common law rules can be finally settled in the 
High Court - a single rational court of general appeal from 
the States courts in all cases and in all fields.
'Common law1 is included within the operative scope of 
the full faith and credit clause,'*' and this leads us to 
a paradoxical position where such identical conflict of 
law rules themselves are also a part of 'laws' of the 
States to which the constitutional mandate is addressed; 
hence, mere solution by the usual rules of conflict of 
laws irrespective of the interests of the Federation may 
be quite in accord with the constitutional mandate. 
Moreover, a State A may be required by the constitutional 
clause to recognize the law of State B, which nevertheless
1
In the United States where the constitutional clause refers 
only to public acts, records and judicial proceedings, it 
is not clear whether there existed an obligation to accord 
Bill faith and credit to common law rules. Professor Cook 
considered it negatively in 1919) but Jackson and Cheatham 
consider affirmatively. Cheatham has declined to accept 
the view that federal control extends only to statutues 
but not to common law and administrative regulation, on 
the ground that it would be a serious breach in the 
constitutional system of the United States if the protection 
given in inter-State matters were wholly dependent on the 
formal nature of the State law involved. (Cook, op.cit., 
p.43‘4n; R.H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's 
Clause of the Constitution, Selected Readings of Conflict 
of Laws, Association of American Law Schools, 1956, p.238; 
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Law, supra^ The 
position in Australia is more certain, because the express 
reference to 'laws* in sec. 118 and sec. 5l(xxv) imposes 
an obligation to accord full faith and credit to common 
law rules.
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transfers the case to the law of State A - renvoi. But 
the argument based on the existence of identical common 
law rules among the States has a fatal defect - that it 
ignores the true requirement of the constitutional mandate 
to require the forum to recognize the proper law of the 
sister-States only after full consideration of the 
competing interests and factual relations. If the 
selection of proper law in common law rules precedes the 
constitutional mandate, then it makes the constitutional 
requirement in the Federation subject to principles adopted 
by State sovereignty. Those principles may at a particular 
time be uniform common law, but there is always a 
possibility that a State will alter its domestic laws 
(including rules of the conflict of laws) by legislative 
act and adopt a new basis of choice or jurisdiction, 
insofar as such alteration is not contrary to the 
Constitution.^ Differences between the substantive laws
1
The degree of connection with the territory of a State 
which a statute must have in order to make it a law for 
the peace, welfare and good government of the State has 
not been finally decided, and the mere presence of one 
extra-territorial element in a statute does not lead to 
invalidity if other elements in the statute are related 
to the territory of the State. For example, with respect 
to acts performed abroad, a State legislature can penalize 
entry into the territory after the commission of an act 
abroad and by this technique of draftmanship overcome the 
obstacle presented by Macleod v, Attorney-General for N.S.U.
(cont. next page)
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as well as rules of the conflict of laws of the competing 
States also may increase, and the recourse to public 
policies or State interests by the forum become more 
frequent. Mr Justice Jackson1 2s words’*” remind us that 
there is a fundamental difference between common law rules 
and the constitutional requirement in their solution of 
conflictual cases.
Sec. 5l(xxv) is an implementing legislative power
of the constitutional obligation of sec. 118, as the U.S#
Constitution provides together the obligation of
recognition of States’ Acts, records, etc., and the
effect thereof. It is said that the Commonwealth power
under sec. 5l(xxv), being limited to ’recognition’, can
do no more than prescribe the manner of proof and effect
of recognition, defining how far such recognition shall
2be effective, subject to sec. 118. However, in spite
1 (cont.)
(1891, A.C. 455)) in which it was held by the Privy Council 
that a bigamy provision of a New South Wales statute did 
not extend to marriages contracted by residents of the 
colony while abroad. Moreover, the Imperial Parliament 
can confer power of an extra-territorial nature (cf. R.D. 
Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States, Univ. of 
Q ’ld. Press, pp*77“8).
1
’While common law rules may provide analogies, they do not 
always point the answer to full faith and credit problem, 
and indeed proceed on contrary basic assumptions’ (Columbia 
Law Review, vol.45j p.23)»
2
Wynes, op.cit., p . 223
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of no judicial authority and such narrow approaches taken 
by commentators, it would follow from the foregoing 
discussion that the Parliament can in principle exercise 
its legislative control over any subject in the choice- 
of-law fields as a policy-maker in weighing the interests 
of competing States; the real requirement of 'full faith 
and credit* under the Constitution extends to a question,
* how (or, to which statute, etc.) shall full faith and 
credit be given?* The Commonwealth Parliament is 
empowered to make laws 'with respect to* the enumerated 
powers including sec. 5l(xxv) (and sec. 5l(xxiv)), and is 
armed with all necessary powers to most effectively carry 
out those main powers. The term 'with respect to' should 
not be underestimated,^ and the Commonwealth 'full faith 
and credit' powers would have much wider application than 
the similar clause in the United States Constitution. 
Although our conclusion may bring about a very sweeping 
effect to Commonwealth-State relations, it is a possible 
meaning and quite in accord with the nature of the full 
faith and credit clause in the Australian Constitution.
I
The interpretation of the term has been a subject of 
various judicial opinions in the High Court. But, see 
Higgins J's wide interpretation in McArthur* s Case (l920) 
28 C.L.R., at p.564.
200
However, precise limits of the power have not been 
made clear; even in the United States, only judicial 
interferences with the choice-of-law problems have so 
far thrown light upon some aspects of such a federal 
control, leaving in most cases a wide area of freedom to 
States in choice of law.^ Probably, the full faith and 
credit clause can be more adequately invoked to prevent 
judicial interferences where the precise factual situation 
is evident, than in the case of legislative activity which 
is inevitably in the form of general provisions without 
clear factual reference. In any case, federal legislation 
cannot be exercised in a broad way as now provided for in 
sec. 18 of the State and Territorial Laws and Record
1
See, Cheatham, op.cit., pp.266-70. For example, in a 
fraternal insurance certificate case (e,g., Modern Woodmen 
of America v. Mixer (1925) 267 U.S. 544, 551; 45 Sup. Ct., 
389; 69 L.Ed., 783)s when a provision of the association's
constitution and by-laws was valid under the law of the 
home State of the association but was invalid under the 
law of the second State where the certificate was issued 
and the beneficiary resided, the beneficiary claimed that 
his rights should be determined by the law of his State 
where the certificate was issued. The Supreme Court held 
that the use of the law of the home State was compelled 
by the full faith and credit clause. In several workmen's 
compensation cases, the Supreme Court of the U.S.A. faced 
the necessity of some accommodation of the conflictual 
interests of the two States and used the test of 
'governmental interests' in making the adjustment. The 
important point is that, in so doing, not the technical 
conflict of laws concepts but sociological considerations 
of threatened poverty and public support were stressed.
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Recognition Act. The Commonwealth legislative control in 
this field must deal with ’conflict of laws’ as distinct 
from interference with substantive laws; accordingly, the 
power can direct a State law to be recognized and adopted 
but cannot prescribe the contents of the law so adopted - 
a point of great nicety, because it is not always obvious 
how far such a federal designation of the proper law or 
governing law affects the substantive aspects of the 
State laws. There is some room for the operation of 
sec. 109 of the Constitution. When or in what subjects 
such a legislative interference should be made is a matter 
entirely depending upon the discretion of the Parliament, 
but prompt action by the Parliament will be necessary in 
the field of ’aviation’ where a State may have a sufficient 
nexus to provide a constitutional basis for the application 
of its law not only within that State but also in other 
Stat e s.
It will be sufficient to illustrate below one 
possible legislative control involving conflict of laws 
arising from aviation.
In the ordinary common law rules of private 
international law, the ascertainment of the conflictual 
rule governing the validity of a transfer of movables 
(including aircraft) is not beyond dispute. Even though 
lex situs be adopted as governing aircraft conveyances,
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its application is difficult when the aircraft is 
physically in motion in the air as means of transport at 
extremely high speed.'*' Apart from the selection of proper 
law of contract to govern such transactions, it is 
desirable to assimilate the status of aircraft in 
conflictual cases to that of ships in private international 
law; on this view, the law of the domicile of the airline, 
or the law of the State where the principal business place 
of the airline or aircraft-owner exists, should have 
preference. While using these terminologies and 
technicalities of the common law rules, the federal control 
may settle the issue by giving preference to the State 
law of domicile or principal place of business as governing 
the nature and effect of conveyances of aircraft rights 
inrem. This federal legislative control can go to such 
an extent as to prescribe what is meant by the 1 principal 
business place of airline or aircraft-owner’ or how it 
shall be notified and acknowledged in registration. Any 
rules of private international law or statutory laws of 
States, contrary to this federal exercise, will be
1
There are some reasons for the application of lex situs 
in cases where aircraft stop at a specified place for a 
sufficient period, thus creating a connecting factor 
between the chattel and the place of its location, but it 
is not always clear what precise period of time a chattel 
must be present in a particular place in order to acquire 
more than a ’temporary’ situs.
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superseded or invalidated pro tanto. The Courts might 
well uphold the validity of such legislation, unless 
perhaps the Commonwealth defining provisions are so 
completely unreasonable or unrelated to accepted concepts 
in the field as not to amount to a genuine exercise of 
the relevant power.
However, the Commonwealth has never exercised this 
legislative power on any subject of conflict of laws on 
the line as suggested above. There are some discussions 
among experts in the Australian aviation industry with 
respect to the recording of aircraft title of every 
national aircraft, and, in the present writer’s opinion, 
the problem cannot be solved satisfactorily without 
references to the ’full faith and credit’ powers.'*'
Reference of Aviation Powers by States to the Commonwealth
By sec. 5l(xxxvii) of the Constitution, the 
Commonwealth has power to make laws with respect to 
’matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth 
by the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, 
but so that the law shall extend only to States by whose 
Parliaments the matter is referred, or which afterwards
I
Problems arising from ’rights in aircraft’ in relation to 
the possibility of the Commonwealth’s ratification of the 
Geneva Convention are summarised and discussed in 
Appendix I of this thesis.
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adopt the law1 2• As has been mentioned at the beginning 
of this Part, attempts for requiring the States to refer 
under this section the power to make laws with respect 
to aviation were made on several occasions in the 
Australian constitutional history, but none of thanhas 
been fully successful. There are unsettled questions in 
the interpretation of the constitutional clause, and the 
High Court had to deal with some of them in recent aviation 
cases•
In the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.l), two Judges 
only referred to this section, both agreeing with the 
general proposition decided in Graham v. Paterson'*' that 
the reference by a State Parliament of a matter to the 
Commonwealth Parliament under sec. 5l(xxvii) does not 
deprive the State Parliament of the power of making laws 
with respect to that matter. In the present case, New 
South Wales (and four other States ) had passed the 
Commonwealth Powers Act, 19^3j to refer certain matters 
(including ’ air transport1) to the Commonwealth Parliament; 
the reference was to continue in force for a period ending 
at the expiration of five years ’after Australia ceases
1
(1930) 81 C.L.R. 1.
2
Victoria (which Act did not come into force), South 
Australia, Western Australia and Queensland. See the 
introductory part of this Part.
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to be engaged in hostilities in the present war1.1
Graham1s Case was cited to meet an argument that the
continuance in force of the Commonwealth Powers Act until
1950 deprived the Parliament of the State of New South
Wales of power to pass the State Transport (Co-ordination)
Amendment Act, 1947 ? which dealt with air transport.
However, it was further contended by the plaintiff that
'matters’ once referred to the Parliament of the
Commonwealth by the parliament of a State were irrevocably
committed as subject matters with respect to which the
Commonwealth Parliament could make laws. This contention
had no bearing on the case, because, as Taylor J. said,
either the Commonwealth Powers Act, if operative according
to its tenor, expired in September 1950 or, on the other
view, it was invalid and did not operate effectually to
'refer1 any legislative subject matter to the Commonwealth.
Taylor J. expressed a die turn that the power could be
3referred for a fixed period. Windeyer J. expressed also
the view that a reference could be for a limited time 
only, but entertained a serious doubt whether a reference
1
Sec. 4.
2
(1963-64) 37 A.L.J.R. at p .406.
Ibid.
3
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could be for an indefinite period terminable by the State
legislature. He said:^
If a matter be referred by a State parliament, 
that matter becomes, either permanently or 
pro tempore, one with respect to which the 
Commonwealth Parliament may under the 
Constitution make laws. If the Commonwealth 
Parliament then avails itself of the power, 
it does so by virtue of the Constitution, not 
by delegation from, or on behalf of the State 
parliament. It is not exercising a legislative 
power of the State conferred by a State 
parliament and revocable by that parliament.
It is exercising the legislative power of the 
Commonwealth Parliament conferred by s. 51 of 
the Constitution.
In R. v. Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal of
Tasmania and Others; Ex parte Australian National Airways 
2Pty. Ltd., which was decided shortly after the Airlines 
of N.S.W. Case (No.l), the interpretation of sec. 5l(xxxvii) 
was directly in issue before the High Court. The factual 
background of the case is not entirely relevant to the 
present issue, but it is included here to give the entire 
picture of the case.
The State of Tasmania passed a Commonwealth Powers 
(Air Transport) Act in 1952."^ Sec. l(2) provides that 
the Act shall commence on a date to be fixed by
1
37 A.L.J.R. at pp.412-13.
2
(1963-64) 37 A.L.J.R. 503; A.L.R. 918- 
3
No.46 of 1952.
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proclamation, and 2 April 1959? was in fact so fixed.
Sec. 2 provides: 1 The matter of air transport is referred
to the Parliament of the Commonwealth for a period
commencing on the date on which this Act commences and
ending on the date fixed, pursuant to section three, as
the date on which this Act shall cease to be in force,
but no longer*. Sec. 3 provides: * The Governor may
at any time, by proclamation, fix a date on which this
Act shall cease to be in force, and this Act shall cease
to be in force accordingly on the date so fixed*. In
pursuance of this reference, sec. 19A of the Commonwealth
Australian National Airlines Act 1945-61 (after sec. 19
dealing with the general functions and duties of the
Commission operating Trans-Australia Airlines) provides
in its sub-section (l);
Where the Parliament of any State has, prior 
to the commencement of section 10 of the 
Australian National Airlines Act 1959? by any 
State Act, referred to the Parliament of the 
Commonwealth the matter of air transport, 
the Commission may, subject to this section, 
during the period of operation of that State 
Act, or during any extension of that period - 
(a) establish airline services for the 
transport for reward of passengers and goods 
within that State; and (b) maintain and 
operate airline services for any such 
transport, and shall have, in relation to
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any such service, the like powers as it has 
in relation to airline services specified 
in subsection (l) of the last preceding 
section.^
The Traffic Act 1925-61 (Tas.),^ as amended or as affected 
by the Transport Act 1938 (Tas.), provides in sec. 30A for 
the constitution of the Public Vehicles Licensing Appeal 
Tribunal. Sec. 30B provides, inter alia, that any person 
who being the holder of any licence is... aggrieved by the 
grant of any such licence to any other person may appeal
Otherefrom to the abovementioned tribunal. Sec. 24(l) III 
provides that no person shall drive or use or cause or 
permit to be driven or used as a public vehicle any 
vehicle in respect of which a licence is not in force;
4lpublic vehicle* is defined to include * aircraft*, The 
Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd. (i.e., Ansett-A.N•A.) 
regarded itself as aggrieved by the decision of the
1
Sub-section (2) of sec. 19A provides for the Commission*s 
operation by the consent of the Premier (to the Prime 
Minister) of a State; Sub-section (3) provides for the 
payment of licence fees (if any) by the Commission 
operating in pursuance of such State * consent*.
2
N o .38 of 1925 - No.31 of 1961.
3By sub-section (12), every determination or order of the 
Tribunal on the hearing of any appeal under this section 
is made final and without appeal.
4
See sec.3; Act N0.3I of I96I, sec.23(c); sec.l4AB(4), 
as inserted by Act No.31> sec.11.
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Transport Commission granting to T.A.A. an aircraft 
licence to be operated on a certain route within Tasmania, 
and caused an appeal to be instituted to the Public 
Vehicles Licensing Appeal Tribunal against that decision. 
The company stated several grounds of appeal, most of 
which concerned policy questions, but the main argument 
related to the constitutional problem of reference of 
State power to the Commonwealth. The Tribunal, upholding 
the validity of the Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport)
Act 1952, disposed of the appeal by deciding that a 
licence for T.A.A. was unnecessary, having regard to 
sec. 19A of the Australian National Airlines Act 1945-61 
which was a valid exercise by the Commonwealth Parliament 
of its legislative powers and over-rode the State licensing 
requirements by reason of Constitution sec.109- Then, 
the case came up before the High Court.
Discussion before the Court centered around the 
problem of the validity of sec.l9A of the Commonwealth Act, 
as depending on the meaning and operation of sec.5 1 (xxxvii) 
of the Constitution. The Court in a joint judgment 
(Dixon C.J., Kit to , Tay 1 or, Menzie s, tifindeyer and Owen JJ.) 
held the Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act and 
sec.l9A of the Australian National Airlines Act valid, and
disclosed its opinions on the following points:
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The argument that the matter referred to the
Commonwealth Parliament by a State parliament must itself
be a law because sec. 5l(xxvii) lays down the words * which
afterwards adopt the law1, is an entirely erronous
inference; the *law* referred to by the last words is
that denoted by the initial words of sec.51 - 1 The
Parliament shall...have power to make laws for the peace,
order and good government of the Commonwealth1, thus
referring to the law made by the Commonwealth Parliament
in pursuance of a reference of a matter.^ With respect to
the chief question as to whether such a reference must
be once for all, the Court, maintaining the interpretative
approach of construing the Constitution with all the
generality which the words used admitted, rejected the
view attaching to it any implications concerning the
2period of reference, and said:
There is no reason to suppose that the words 
‘matters referred* cannot cover matters 
referred for a time which is specified or 
which may depend on a future event even if 
that event involves the will of the State 
Governor in Council and consists in the 
fixing of a date by proclamation.
Although the Court reserved any final opinion upon the
question whether, when the Parliament of a State has made
1
37 A.L.J.R. at p.507.
37 A.L.J.R. at pp.507-08.
2
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a reference, it may repeal the reference, which (though
forming a subsidiary matter in this case) if decided
might throw light on the whole ambit or operation of the
paragraph, it expressed the dictum that, the reference
being the one by the Parliament or Parliaments of a State
or States, the will of a parliament is expressed in a
statute or Act of Parliament and it is the general conception
of English law that what parliament may enact it may
repeal.1 234 It seems that Windeyer J. withdrew his doubt as
to the possibility of a reference for an indefinite period
2terminable by the State legislature. Although the
judicial authorities thus establish the rule that a
reference can be for a limited time, the question of
revocability at any time at the discretion of a State is
undesirable because ’revocation is an unpredictable
occurrence, likely to be resorted to for irrelevant
3political reasons1. In many fields of legislative subjects
1
37 A.L.J.R. at p .508.
2
37 A.L.J.R. at pp.412-13*
3
G. Sawer, Some Legal Assumptions of Constitutional Change,
4 U.W.A. Ann. L.R.l, p.12. Cf. also, Anderson, Reference 
of Powers by the States to the Commonwealth, 2 U.W.A.
Ann. L.R.l.
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and in the field of aviation in particular, revocation of 
a reference of legislative powers by States at any time 
will cause a great deal of confusion and inefficiency of 
federal control which has been exercised in sole reliance 
upon that reference. It is desirable, therefore, to 
return to Windeyer J.’s remark in an earlier case that such 
a reference adds a further subject of concurrent 
Commonwealth legislative power to the existing list in 
sec. 51 of the Constitution, but, if the Commonwealth 
Parliament then avails itself of the power, it does so by 
virtue of the Constitution, not by delegation from, or on 
behalf of the State parliament.
Incidental Matters
The rule of construction of the Constitution expressed 
in an early American case, McCullock v. Maryland,^ has been
1
(I8I9) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed., 379« The Congressional 
power to incorporate a bank (i.e., the United States 
National Bank) under an Act of Congress in the absence of 
any express word 'bank* (unlike the Australian Constitution) 
among the enumerated powers of the ’Legislature1 was held 
as a valid means whereby the powers to levy and collect 
taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to declare 
and conduct a war, to raise and support armies, could be 
more effectively exercised. As regards the significance 
of the existence of the ’necessary and proper’ clause, 
Marshall C.J. said: ’The result of the most careful and
attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is, that 
if it does not enlarge, it cannot be considered to restrain 
the powers of Congress, or to impair the right of the 
legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection
(cont. next page)
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accepted as a general authority in the Australian Courts, 
but there have been divergencies of opinions as to the 
nature and scope of sec. 5l(xxxix) of the Constitution, 
which is similar to the ‘necessary and proper* 1 clause of 
the United States Constitution.^ Sec. 5l(xxxix) confers 
upon the Parliament legislative power with respect to 
‘matters incidental to the execution of any power vested 
by this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House 
thereof, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in 
the Federal Judicature, or in any department or officer 
of the Commonwealth1. Various aviation powers conferred 
by the Constitution, discussed above, must always be read 
together with this placiturn, for, whenever the legislative 
reach of a federal power is in question, the extent of 
its 1 incidental!ty‘, whether it be regarded as included 
in the grant of power itself or conferred expressly 
under the placiturn, becomes a vital issue.
T (cont.)
of measures to carry into execution the constitutional 
powers of the government. If no other motive for its 
insertion can be suggested a sufficient one is found in 
the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to 
legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which 
must be involved in the Constitution, if that instrument 
be not a splendid bauble1.
1
Art.l, sec.8(xviii): ‘The Congress shall have power
“to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all 
other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government 
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof"*•
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Probably, the Jumbunna Coal Mine Case'*' marked the
high-water mark of this incidental power*, where a
flexible and wide interpretation comparable to that of
the United States was adopted by the Court. In order to
carry into effect the Commonwealth power with respect to
2’arbitration and conciliation’, an Act providing for 
registration of associations, together with meticulously 
detailed conditions for it, was held valid as properly 
conducive or necessary for the objects of the Commonwealth 
power with respect to prevention and settlement of a 
’two-State dispute’ - or as helpful to the President of 
the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
when he proceeds to prevent a two-State dispute before it 
occurs, or to settle it after it has occurred - even if 
such an industrial dispute might or might not occur in 
future, and, even if such an association was in one State.
A strong objection was put forward on behalf of the 
appellant that, if the mere possibility of an association 
becoming involved in a dispute extending beyond the limits 
of one State were to give the right to be registered,
1
Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability v. Victorian Coal Miners’ 
Association (1908) 6 C.L.R. 309«
2
Sec•5l(xxxv): ’Conciliation and arbitration for the
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one State’.
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the ancillary power would exceed the principal power 
which was confined to ‘industrial disputes extending 
beyond the limits of any one State1; hence, to become 
one of the parties to a two-State dispute, every disputant 
must have a sphere of operations extending beyond a single 
State. As Barton J. said, however, ‘that does not follow 
from the fact that the subject matter of the dispute 
permeates or may permeate the whole extent of such 
operations, of which the disputant occupies only a pa.rtial 
area1, and ‘the power granted is wide enough to enable 
the legislature to make a body like the respondent 
association registrable as, under circumstances which may 
arise, though not perhaps in all events, a competent 
participator in a dispute extending beyond State limits
where its industrial interests are wholly or in part at
1 2 stake1. On the contrary, the Royal Commission Case
would probably be the low-water mark of the ‘incidental
power1, where the High Court held that a power to enact
a law compelling persons to give evidence on matters as
to which the Executive Government of the Commonwealth
thought it desirable to collect information to be made
T
6 C.L.R. at p.342.
2
Attorney-General for the Commonwealth v. Colonial Sugar 
Refining Co. Ltd. (1914) A.C. 237; 17 C.L.R. 644.
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use of in exercising any existing power of the Commonwealth 
Parliament was 1 incidental’ to the execution of that power 
within sec.5l(xxxix), but such an incidental power did not 
extend to enacting a law compelling persons to give 
evidence on matters, information as to which was relevant 
only to a possible amendment of the Constitution under 
sec.128 thereof. Upon appeal to the Privy Council, it 
was held that the Royal Commissions Act 1902-12 was 
ultra vires the Commonwealth Parliament and void so far 
as it purported to enable a Royal Commission to compel 
answers generally to questions or to order the production 
of documents, or otherwise to enforce compliance by the 
members of the public with its requisition.^ The Privy 
Council seems to have been compelled to declare the Act 
itself invalid, for otherwise it was impossible to 
pronounce in advance that the questions sought to be might 
not prove relevant to matters which were held by all 
Judges to be proper subjects of inquiry. There exists 
a striking difference in the interpretative approach to 
the exercise of 'incidental powers* between these two 
cases; one purports to justify a Commonwealth law in 
anticipation of a possible fact in the future by reason 
of its conduciveness to the objects of the main power, and
17 C.L.R. at pp.655-56.
1
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the other requires a rigid adherence to the exis ting 
powers on the assumption that the 1 2incidentality1 can 
only be workable within the predetermined limits thereof.
The decision of the Royal Commission Case is open to
criticism if it does indeed support the proposition that
it was not sufficient for a Commonwealth Act to be intra
vires the Parliament that it should be ‘ancillary to a
possible subject of legislative capacity, as distinguished
from being an incident in actual legislation about such
subjects’.^ There is no reason why the actual existence
of some legislation relating to a subject should be
required before any matter can be called incidental to
its execution, for, otherwise, the Parliament will have
to pass numerous enactments in order to authorize the
incidental matters through the whole range of legislative
2powers confided to the Parliament. The legislative 
powers may be addressed to more than one of the substantive 
powers, and the Parliament, as it does normally, can at 
one and the same time, in the same Act, pass a law which 
contains both main provisions and incidental ones, although
1
Cf. R. V. Kidman (1915) 20 C.L.R. 425, per Griffith C.J.; 
Walsh and Johnson; In re Yates (1925) 37 C.L.R. 36, per 
Knox C .J.
2
Cf. Quick, Legislative Powers of the Commonwealth and 
the States of Australia, 1919* pp.604-05*
Hno Act on the topic previously existed. The question in
the determination of the constitutionality of a law is
always whether it is competent under any of the powers
from whatever source derived, not merely from any actual
existence of statutes or common law on the topic. This
is particularly so in the exercise of the executive power
of the Commonwealth (sec. 6l) to justify a Commonwealth
law for its self-existence and self-preservation;
1 2R. v. Kidman and R. v. Sharkey are examples thereof.
2 1 8
1
(l915) 20 C.L.R. 425» In this case Kidman and others 
were charged on conspiracy to defraud the Commonwealth.
A question before the Court was whether the retroactive 
provision of the Crimes Act (c*th) (No.6 of 1915 ) making 
such conspiracies punishable was valid. The opinion of 
1saacs J. was based on the view that punishment was not 
included in the implied executive powers and the validity 
of the Act was justified solely upon the placitum for 
legislative purposes. He conferred upon the placiturn
1 an independent power of legislation as high as any of 
the preceding thirty—eight in s.51* and therefore did
not agree that it added nothing to the Parliamentary powers 
which would not have been implied if it had been omitted 
(at pp.440-4l). Higgins J*s view was that frauds on the 
Commonwealth, and the punishment of such frauds, as well 
as protection from such frauds, were 'matters incidental 
to the execution* of the powers vested by the Constitution 
in the Government of the Commonwealth, as well as those 
vested in the Parliament (at pp.448-50). Semble, Higgins 
J* s construction is more natural. Both Judges upheld the 
validity of the retroactive law in view of the plenary 
nature of the Commonwealth Parliamentary powers, aided by 
the express provision of the incidental power, so long as 
the Parliament kept within the ambit of the subjects of 
legislation specifically assigned to it.
2
(1949) 79 C.L.R. 121. See, Chapter III, ant e
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However, the trend of judicial opinions as to the 
incidental power, as affected by the decision in the 
Royal Commission Case, has tended to put great emphasis 
on the term 1 execution1 of some existing power. In 
Le Mesurier v. Conner/  the Court drawing a distinction 
between a matter incidental to the execution of a power, 
something which attends or arises in its exercise, and a 
matter incidental to a subject to which the power is 
addressed, declared the departure of the Australian 
placiturn from the doctrine contained in the similar 
provision in the U.S. Constitution.^ However, in spite
aof some semantic difficulties arising from sec.51(xxxix) ,J
1
(1929) 42 C.L.R. 481. It was decided that neither the 
general powers of the Commonwealth Parliament with respect 
to the subjects confided to it, nor the specific power 
conferred by sec.77(üi) to make laws investing State 
Courts with federal jurisdiction, enabled the Parliament 
to deal with the organization of such Courts and to act 
on its behalf and administer part of its jurisdiction, 
because they were not matters incidental to the execution 
of a power vested by the Constitution in the Federal 
Judicature.
2
42 C.L.R. at p.487 (a joint judgment).
3
1 Any power vested by this Constitution1 has already 
included, on a general rule of construction of the 
constitutional powers, the whole of the governmental 
capacity over all of the subject matter to legitimately 
carry out the objects. But the phrases of the placiturn 
do not stop there, and add the words ’matters incidental 
for the execution of’ those powers. However, the view 
attaching some special meaning to this placiturn by
(cont. next page)
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it appears that the Court admitted in later cases that 
the said distinction was immaterial at least for the 
legislative purpose of the Parliament, as distinct from 
the Executive and the Judicature.’*'
The real reason why the Court has been inclined to 
think that there must be in existence some substantive 
legislation to support the incidental provisions or that 
there must be a distinction between matters incidental to 
the subjects placed under the legislative power of the
T (cont.)
emphasizing the term ‘execution1 would be insignificant, 
so far as concerns the legislative power. Considering 
that the essential function of the Parliament as an 
independent department of the government is to make laws, 
namely, to enact ’legislation*, the ’execution* of the 
power vested in the Parliament means nothing but the 
enactment of legislation to realize the ends of those 
legislative powers most effectively. If the placiturn 
confers upon the Parliament a legislative power over 
something which arises in a legislative act itself, it 
will mean but some ’procedural matters’, e.g., rules and 
orders of the Parliament, which are to be regulated by 
each House of the Parliament as its autonomous regulations 
under sec.50 of the Constitution. However, in the case of 
the Executive and the Judicature, which is independent 
of the other branches of government respectively, the 
insertion of the term ’execution’ means something, for 
otherwise the power to encroach upon the substance of the 
other powers vested in the Executive or in the Judicature 
might be implied as belonging to the Parliament, as against 
the distribution of the powers in the government of the 
Commonwealth, on the one hand, and the power to make laws 
might be implied as belonging to a respective organ (of 
the government) other than the Parliament, as against the 
preponderance of the Parliciment, on the other.
1
See, e.g., Burton v. Honan (1952) 86 C.L.R. 169 at 
pp.177-78, per Dixon C.J.
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Commonwealth and matters which arise in the execution of 
the various powers reposed in the Legislature, the 
Judiciary and the Executive, lies in the apprehension that 
the Parliamentary powers might otherwise transcend, under 
the name of ’incidentals*, the limit s of Commonwealth 
power under a federal Constitution, For example, as in 
the Royal Commission Case, the enactment of a law 
compelling persons to give evidence on matters, information 
as to which was relevant only to a possible amendment of 
the Constitution, or, as in the Communist Party Case,^  
the enactment of a law dissolving the Australian Communist 
Party, the provisions of which operated upon Parliament1s 
or the Governor-General * s opinion, including an opinion 
as to matters on which the validity of those provisions 
depended. Thus, the problem takes on a character touching 
the core of ’federalism1, ’ incidental!ty* being evaluated 
in accordance with the individuals’ ideals or convictions 
as to a desirable political, economic and social order 
in the ’Federation1,
The Court does not grudge due regard for the 
Commonwealth plenary powers in pursuing the ends of any 
power vested under the Constitution, and admits that once
I
Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R.
1; see, espe., at p.266, per Fullagar J.
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the subject matter is fairly within the province of the
federal legislature the justice and wisdom of the
provisions which it makes in the exercise of its powers
over the matter are matters entirely for the Legislature
and not for the Judiciary: Cf. Burton v, Honan'*' and
2Huddart Parker Ltd._v. the Commonwealth. However, this
proper attitude has been taken only within the restricted
area where a law said to be incidental to the main power
could not, under the guise of 1 incidental powers1, intrude
into the exercise of the constitutional powers of the
3States: Cf. the Second Uniform Tax Case and Wragg v. New 
4South Wales. It is no easy task to draw a clear line 
between 'main* subjects and ’incidentals1 thereto. The 
word ’incidental* is one of ’relativity’ as well as of 
’degree’; incidentals spring from the general language of 
the subject matter of a legislative power, and by causality 
are connected in all directions with other incidentals.
They are necessary components of the whole content of the 
power itself as well as ’incidentals’ for the execution
T
(1952) 86 C.L.R. 169, at p.179, per Dixon C.J.
2
(l93l) 44 C.L.R. 492, at p p .514-15, per Dixon J.
3
State of Victoria v. Commonwealth (1957) 99 C.L.R. 575# 
at p.6l4, Dixon C.J.
4
(1953) 88 C.L.R. 353, at pp.385-86, per Dixon C.J.
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of the power. Strictly speaking, only ’common sense1 23
based upon the Reality1 of the subject can decide a
1 reasonable connection1 between the subject to which the
power is addressed and its incidentals. The self-
righteous view that a law said to be incidental to the
main power cannot intrude into the exercise of the
constitutional power is no more than to put an a priori
limitation upon the granted power itself, presuming the
existence of what is prima facie the province of the States
into which the Parliament cannot invade. It is to be
observed that such a use of federal implications seems
closer to the old doctrine of 1 implied prohibitions1 than
to the doctrine of the State Banking Case/  and it seems
to involve an assumption about the minimum extent of
2'reserved1 State powers. It is desirable, therefore, to 
discard this narrow approach to constitutional 
interpretation. The possible reach of a granted power 
should be measured by first giving to the Commonwealth 
Parliament ’every power and every control the denial of
3which would render the grant itself ineffective’. The
1
Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (19^7) 7^ C.L.R. 31.
2
G. Sawer, The Second Uniform Tax Case, A.L.J. vol.31j 
P* 350.
3
Cf. D ’Emden v. Pedder (1904) 1 C.L.R. at p.110;
Noarlunga Case 92 C.L.R. at pp.597-98} per Fullagar J,
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discretion of the legislature to adopt ‘incidental1 
measures is not free from any restraint, but the limits 
should be sought only when the measures thus adopted are 
expressly prohibited by the Constitution, or tend to a 
serious distortion of the Constitution - ‘serious 
distortion1 in the sense that, despite a standpoint based 
upon a broad perspective of accommodating the Australian 
constitutionalism to the nation’s requirements and keeping 
pace with the times, one might insist that the matter in 
question cannot possibly be understood as within federal 
power.
The extent of the ‘incidental powers1 relates to 
the scope of the subjects of a power as well as to the 
relation of the division of powers as between Commonwealth 
and States. The foregoing discussion has centered much 
around the latter aspects. ‘Aviation’ is one of the 
fields in law where various aspects of legal relations 
are intricately inter-related, and so the determination of 
their ‘incidentals’ must be made in the light of such 
‘actuality’ of the industry. The two aspects of the 
operation of surface damage caused by aircraft is 
illustrative. It may be argued that the States should 
retain their jurisdictional exclusiveness in regulating 
the legal relations of liability for surface damage as
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between aircraft operators or owners and third parties 
resident in their respective territory. This argument is 
open to criticism of being one-sided; the clarification 
of liability principles, standardization of extent of 
damages, promotion and security of fair compensation 
therefor, etc. are not only advantageous for both operators 
and victims but also essential for the control of normal 
and regular flow of aircraft operation which would 
ultimately be conducive to the development of domestic 
aviation. For the purpose of attaining these objectives, 
no important discrimination can be drawn between the 
regulation of carriers1 liability and that of operators1 
liability, although the former arises out of the 
contractual relationships of people involved in an accident 
in the course of transport activities and the latter arises 
irrespective of the will of the third party on the ground. 
They are all 'incidentals* of aircraft operations. The 
question whether a compulsory insurance system should be 
introduced so as to require the aircraft owners to be 
satisfactorily insured before flying, persons capable of 
issuing policies or giving securities to be sufficiently 
responsible, and requiring aircraft operators to bring or 
submit a copy of the insurance certificate to the authority,
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&c. are of the same order. If the Courts acted fully 
on the rules adjudicated in the Jumbunna Case, then the 
Commonwealth powers in respect of aviation will contain 
a wide variety of 1 incidentals1 and will be more flexibly 
applied to the actual conditions of the industry.
Whatever may be the merits and demerits of the 
Australian ’federalism* in respect of the ’aviation’ 
industry, there is now wide agreement between authorities 
on civil aviation that most governmental control thereof 
should be exercised by one authority, which in Australia 
must mean the Commonwealth. By virtue of the nature of 
activity in the air and the necessary implication of 
uniform control of aviation, an independent ’sovereignty* 
and a residuary ’autonomy’ of the local interests become 
unsuitable. Probably, various factors in the Australian 
history, geography, economics, &c., have weakened 
awareness of the need for central control; a long-pending 
co-operative regime as between Commonwealth and States 
since late 1930’s, together with comparative absence 
of litigation pertaining to the constitutional issues 
involved (whether or not due to such a regime), may also 
have caused considerable indifference to the necessity
See Chapter IX, post.
1
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for central control except among a few aviation-experts. 
However, when the issue was again raised before the 
Court in 1960’s, with the background of the contemporary 
industry, it was a disappointing surprise that the Court 
adhered to the conceptional rules which had been 
adjudicated as a matter of principle thirty years ago; 
’commerce by air’ has since attained tremendous changes 
in quality as well as in quantity, and the predominant 
position of international aviation legislation has since 
gained in importance in the domestic legal system. Wken 
the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.2) was disputed, the Court 
was expected by many to strike out a new line for the 
interpretation of relevant constitutional powers, while 
the State Governments were worried about the implications 
of a Commonwealth win because of its impacts upon their 
control over other forms of transport. Foregoing 
examinations of each aviation power in the Australian 
Constitution point to a positive suggestion that there 
should be much wider areas for the Commonwealth control. 
Our conclusion goes a step further in saying that, 
combining those predominant powers together, the 
constitutional basis for ’aviation’ should be extensively 
entrusted in the Commonwealth Parliament. The conclusion
is supported by the practical fact that the overwhelming
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control has so far been exercised upon every aspect of 
the industry by the central Government. It may hardly 
be accepted by the judicial minds of the present High 
Court whose approach has been to reduce the Reality1 
to its components under each head of the granted powers. 
It is quite doubtful if any dynamic application of the 
Constitution to the 1 social demands* in this promising 
industry, which has and will have a great influence on 
the nation’s economic structure and social development, 
can be expected therefrom. The amendment of the 
Constitution may be difficult, but the adaptation of the 
Constitution to aviation is not impossible.
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PART II
Liberty to Fly
No man can be made to suffer punishment or to pay 
damages for any conduct not definitely forbidden by law:
As Dicey says, this is a characteristic in the English
constitutional system guaranteeing human freedoms under
1the 'rule of law1 2. This rule would probably apply to 
2man* s liberty to fly as in the case of freedoms of 
speech, association, &c.; his liberty to fly is guaranteed 
except when his flight activity constitutes a breach of 
law.
It is in the legal relation between aviators and 
landowners that law has prohibited or restricted a person 
to fly. The common law, whether modified by statutory 
rules or not, recognizes rights or interests of landowners
1
A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, ninth ed., p.183, et seq.
2
The word 1 liberty* is used here in the sense of 
’privilege1 defined by Hohfeld as the opposite of ’duty* 
that one can do for himself, free of the possibility of 
legal interference by others, but not in the sense of 
’right* in a narrow meaning presuming the existence of 
’duty’ on the part of other parties. Cf. Paton, 
Jurisprudence, second ed., p.224, et seq.
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(including the Crown in respect of the Crown land) in 
superincumbent airspace, and authorizes them to claim 
for prohibition of, or for damages resulting from, the 
flight in airspace. In international law, it is doubtful 
that there has existed any such positive guarantee of 
liberty to fly over the State's territory in the absence 
of any forbidding law; liberty to fly flows only when a 
State restricts its sovereignty in airspace by the 
exercise of its sovereign authority in relation to other 
States and their nationals, and to that extent only. 
'Liberty* is synonymous with 'right*in this field. Hence, 
similarly to the relation between aviators and landowners 
in private law, jurisdictional rights possessed by a 
subjacent State in the airspace territory prescribe 
largely other States* or nationals’ liberty to fly. In 
the case of Australia, by virtue of the federal 
Constitution, jurisdictional rights in airspace of 
several sovereign Governments function as sources of 
power to condition liberty to fly. Accordingly, we shall 
examine in Chapter VI the legal status of airspace, namely, 
the nature of rights or interests of subjacent States, 
Governments or persons in airspace, and then their 
effects upon liberty to fly (or vice versa).
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However, a person is now largely controlled in his 
use of aircraft or in his qualifications to engage in 
aviation by detailed governmental regulations designed 
both for the purpose of the protection of the public and 
for the purpose of regular development of civil aviation, 
which may amount in effect to prohibition of liberty to 
fly. The system, in which liberty to fly is guaranteed 
by balancing the conflicting interests in airspace of 
the public demand for aviation and the landowners’ claims 
for their uninterrupted use of land, has been replaced by 
such a governmental controlling system, especially 
through the licensing regulations. These conditions 
limiting liberty to fly have also been established in 
international legislation, but no governmental system to 
enforce effectively punishment for breach of regulations 
exists in the present international society, the task 
being largely entrusted to the member-States. Those 
matters will be discussed in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VI
Legal Status of Airspace and Liberty to Fly
1 • St a t e d  Sovereignty in Airspace and Freedom of the Air
The importance of State territory lies in the fact 
that it is the space within which the State exercises its 
supreme authority over persons and property and over which
no foreign authority has any power unless recognized by
1international customary law or treaties. Largely because
of the experience of many States in World War I of danger
from the air, the principle that every State has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
2territory was laid down in the Paris Convention as early 
as in 1919» putting an end to the pre-war academic 
disputes as to the nature of State1 2s rights in airspace
1
Lauterpacht, Oppenheim*s International Law, seventh ed., 
vol.1, p.4o8; eighth ed., p.452.
2
Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 
signed on October 13 1919s at Paris, Art.1.
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which have now become only of historical interest. The
2principle is reaffirmed in Art.1 of the Chicago Convention 
of 1944, to which Australia is a party. The question 
whether the principle had already been in existence even
1
Major opinions were in summary as follows: (1) Free
airspace (Grotius, De Jure Belli Et Pacis, 1625» II, c.2, 
sec.3; N y s (astatement to the Institute de Driot 
International)), (2) Free airspace with State’s reserved 
right for its own safety (Fauchilie, Le domaine aerien et 
le regime juridique des aerostates Annuaire de 1*Institut 
de driot internationale, XIX, 1902, 32; La circulation 
aerienne et les droits des Etats en temps de paix, 1910; 
opinions of the Institute of International Air Law 
(1906), Institute of International Law (19II) and 
International Air Navigation Conference (Paris) ( 1 9 1 0) ,
(3) Territorial and free airspace - a lower zone of 
territorial airspace with a higher zoning of free airspace 
(Leech, Von Holzendorf, Rivier, Hetri, Hilti), (4) Cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, (5 ) State sovereignty 
in the atmosphere or airspace, but restricted by a 
servitude of innocent passage for foreign non-military 
aircraft (Westlake (a statement at the meeting of the 
Institute of International Law at Ghent in 1906)), (6)
State sovereignty in the atmosphere or airspace 
(Nijeholt, Sovereignty of the Air, 1910; Hazeltine, The 
Law of the Air, 1911)•
2
Convention for the Regulation of International Air 
Navigation, signed on Dec.7» 1944, at Chicago, Art.1.
3
The approval of ratification of the Chicago Convention 
on behalf of Australia was effected by No.6, 1947» sec.3»
of the Air Navigation Act (C’th) 1920-63«
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before the Paris Convention is not beyond argument, 
but the principle of absolute sovereignty is a definite 
declaration of established international customary law 
and is widely regarded as binding all member-States in 
the present family of nations, even though not parties 
to that or similar conventions. The airspace above the 
high seas and unoccupied territory, however, is treated 
as having a position comparable to the status of the 
high seas, and so is open to all States and persons.
The sovereignty of airspace is dependent upon the 
horizontal extent of territorial land and sea (or other 
waters); hence, the necessity of ascertaining the geographical 
scope of the Australian territory, to begin with. By 
Art.2 of the Chicago Convention, the territory of a State 
is deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters 
adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, 
protection or mandate of such State. The Air Navigation
1
Professor Cooper comments on Art.1 of the Paris 
Convention: ’It is not an exchange of rights or privileges
between the nations signing the Convention. It is 
drafted as the recognition of a basic principle already 
in existence that every Power, great or small, friend or 
enemy, throughout the world, controls the airspace over 
its territory (defined later to include territorial 
waters and colonies) to the exclusion of all others’
(j.C. Cooper, The Right to Fly, p.32).
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Act (C'th) 1920—63 defines ’Australian territory1 as 
1 the territory of the Commonwealth and of every Territory 
of the Commonwealth including the territorial waters of 
the Commonwealth and of every such Territory and the 
airspace over any such territory or territorial waters.1 
The following three points appear to warrant special 
mention with respect to the concept of ’Australian 
territory1. First, Australia accepted a mandate in 
pursuance of the League Covenant in respect of the 
Territory of New Guinea and later entered into a 
trusteeship agreement in respect of New Guinea in 
pursuance of Chapter XII (international Trusteeship 
System) of the United Nations Charter. It is argued that, 
in view of the differences between territories held under 
mandate and trust territories (i.e., the Trusteeship 
Council as a political body and the Mandate Commission 
with a mainly technical character), sovereignty over trust 
territories vests in principle in the United Nations, 
and therefore a definition of ’territory' in bilateral 
aviation agreements, whereby trust territories are 
included in the territory of the contracting States,
_
Sec.3(3)« See also Reg.5(l) of the Air Navigation 
Regulations.
I
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fails to recognize the international status of such.
1territories. However, in view of the two other aviation 
2conventions, wherein * territory* is defined as comprising
all the territory for the international relations of which
the respective contracting States are responsible, it is
submitted that the meaning of Art.2 of the Chicago
3Convention would be construed in the same way. Secondly, 
the extent of the territorial sea has not been defined in 
general international law while there is international 
recognition of a belt not less than three miles seaward 
from the coasts. This ambiguity applies also to the 
airspace above the sea. A more complex problem arises as 
to States1 23 claims of rights over the continental shelf 
surrounding their land territories. In 1953» Australia 
made declarations of sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf contiguous to its coasts and to the 
coasts of territories under its authority, but the 
sovereign rights asserted in the Prerogative Proclamations
_
H.A. Wassenbergh, Post-War International Civil Aviation 
Policy and the Law of the Air, second ed., p.99n.
2
Cf. the Geneva Convention on the International Recognition 
of Rights in Aircraft, 19^8, Art.23; the Rome Convention 
on Ground Damage, 1952 , Art.36.
3
Bin Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport, p.109*
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are limited by the concluding words 'for the purpose of
1exploring and exploiting the natural resources.1 234 In the
present international law, such rights will not affect
the legal status of the superincumbent sea or of the
2airspace above it. Thirdly, Australian Antarctic 
Territory, to which Australia made a formal claim in 1933» 
when a United Kingdom Order in Council laid claim to such 
area and placed it under the Commonwealth of Australia, 
extends to a certain area, amounting to about a third of 
the continent. The Antarctic Treaty, which was signed 
on December 1, 1959» at Washington by 12 original States
including Australia and came into force in 1 9 6 1,^ aims at 
inter alia nonmilitarization of Antarctica (Art.1),
1
The Declaration was made on 11 September 1953» Cf» 
Australia and the Continental Shelf, 1953» A.L.J., vol.27» 
p p .4 5 8 -6 0 .
2
Cf. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim1s International Law, eighth ed., 
p.6 3 2 . See also the Draft Articles adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 1953» laying down a 
principle that such rights do not affect the legal status 
of the superincumbent sea or of the airspace above it.
3
Cf. P.C. Jessup & H.J. Taubenfeld, Controls for Outer 
Space and the Antarctic Analogy, 1959» p.152. The 
Australian Antarctic Territory extends to the areas south 
of the sixtieth parallel and between 160°E and 45°E 
(except for Adelie Land between 136°E and 142°E).
4
As for the text of the Antarctic Treaty, see Official 
Documents Conference on Antarctica, A.J.I.L., i9 6 0 ,
pp.4 7 6-8 3 ; see also R.D. Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement 
of 1959, A.J.I.L., 1960, pp.3^9-71.
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freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation 
toward that end (Art.2) and ’freezing of territorial 
claims* (Art.4). Australia may still maintain its claim 
to sovereignty in Antarctica, but the legal status of 
the airspace above that territory will be quite different 
from the 'complete and exclusive1 2 sovereignty which it 
enjoys in the airspace above other territories.
The upper limit of ’territorial airspace’ has not
been defined yet. None of the aviation conventions
including the Paris and Chicago Conventions defines the
2altitude of ’airspace*, and a number of theories and 
opinions have so far been advocated as to what height 
limit, if any, should be accepted. We can eliminate at 
the outset the old theory of the simplest assertion of 
unlimited height; this fails to take into account the 
physical nature of space, and of astronomical and cosmic
1
Art.4(2) provides: ’No acts or activities taking place
while the present treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any 
rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or 
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the 
present treaty is in force.’
2
At the time of the Paris Convention in 1919, no State 
paid any attention in this respect, for no need for 
fixing the upper limit of airspace was then felt. The 
drafters of the Chicago Convention have also left the 
question open.
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phenomena, as now disclosed by scientific knowledge and
the development of flight instrumentalities. The view
that sovereignty may be extended as far into space as
human endeavour may reach, or, as a corollary to it, as
far as the State1s rcoercive power1 extends, is in the
same category. Many commentators now advocate the
establishment of a dividing line between airspace and
1outer space on various grounds. The theory based on 
the characteristics of the ’atmosphere1 has received wide 
support, but there are two different approaches. It was 
suggested that the present Art.1 of the Chicago Convention 
should be affirmed but limited vertically to the height to 
which aircraft as defined in the Annex 6 can operate, and 
that above that altitude there should still be a 
’contiguous zone1 of sovereignty, through which there
1
The following views have so far been advocated: that the term 
’airspace1 used in the air conventions is construed as 
’atmospheric space1, that physical boundaries are created 
by the natural law of gravity and centrifugal force, that 
an upper limit to State sovereignty is determined by the 
lower boundary of outer space at the lowest height at 
which an artificial satellite may be put in orbit, that 
an upper limit is determined by the law applicable to a 
flight according to the intentions of its directors, and 
not on the locus of the flight-path, and so on. As to 
these commentators’ opinions, see J.T. Lyon, Space 
Vehicles, Satellites and the Law, 7 McGill Law Journal 271 
(1961), reprinted as Publication No.7 of the Institute of 
Air and Space Law, McGill University (1961), p.65*
2kO
would be a right of transit for ’all non-military flight
instrumentalities when ascending or descending’, and above
1that there was to be freedom from sovereignty. ’Draft
Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space’
prepared by the Study Group on the Law of the Outer Space
adopts in principle a similar approach by defining
’airspace’ as the volume of space between the surface of
the earth at sea level and an altitude of 80,000 metres
above it, ’as far as the performance of existing
conventional aircraft is a guide to the definition of 
2airspace.’ Any such view inferred from the performing 
ability of ordinary aircraft fails to cope with the 
development of modern aeronautical technology (e.g. X-15 
type aircraft), and any attempt to demarcate a dividing 
line upon that assumption cannot escape from the criticism 
that it is arbitrary. Another approach in the ’atmospheric’ 
arguments which receives much wider acceptance is to look 
upon the term ’airspace’ in Art.1 in accordance with its 
literal meaning. For example, Dr Goedhuis considers it 
_
Cooper, Legal Problems of Upper Space, 23 J.A.L.C. 1956, 
311, et seq.
2
Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer 
Space, by the study group on the law of the outer space, 
the David Davies Memorial Institute of International 
Studies, a comment on Art.1.
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not beyond the bounds of expectation that, aided by 
the information gleaned by the satellites, a ’communis 
opinio on this point may be formed.1 Above all, he disagrees 
that the connection between Art.1 of the Chicago Convention 
and Annex 6 defining aircraft exists; Art.1 acknowledges 
a general principle of law, which exists irrespective of 
the Conventions, but the provisions defining aircraft are 
of no more than a technical nature, not binding upon
1States whether they are parties to the Conventions or not. 
This view begs the question on the hypothesis that the 
upper limit of the location of 'air' can be definitely 
drawn which is quite doubtful in the present state of 
geophysical knowledge. Perhaps, it will be necessary to 
approach this complex problem by seeking for an appropriate 
community policy in space as a whole of ’accommodation 
between inclusive and exclusive interests of States’ - a 
functional approach based upon multifactoral analysis of
1
Goedhuis, Rapporteur on Air Sovereignty and the Legal 
Status of Outer Space, International Law Association, New 
York University Conference, 1958, cited from Lyon, op.cit.
Dr Cheng’s view is on the same line; he says that the 
natural meaning of the term ’airspace’ in the Paris and 
Chicago Conventions should be its geophysical meaning, 
denoting space where air is to be found. Bin Cheng, op.cit., 
pp.121-22. See also the same writer’s articles, 
’International Law and High Altitude Flights; Balloons, 
Rockets and Man-Made Satellites’, 6 I.C.L.Q. (1957)» p.487 
at P.492 et seq.; ’From Air Law to Space Law’, 13 C.L.P. 
(1980), p.228; ’The United Nations and Outer Space’,
14 C.L.P. (1961).
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various relevant factors for achieving a mode of
balancing inclusive and exclusive interests in particular
instances in a way which conforms to overriding community 
1policies. Similarly, there may be some profit in 
considering downward extension of a freedom of outer
2space rather than an upward extension of State space: 
this approach has a great potentiality to become a decisive 
test in the light of the increasing cooperation among 
States in the use of outer space but is apt to neglect or 
deny the firmly established principle of the ’airspace 
sovereignty* as a fundamental basis of the present air 
law system. None of the aforesaid proposals can escape 
from criticism, and none has been unanimously accepted as
1
McDougal, Lasswell, Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space, 
Yale University Press, 1963, p.320, et seq. The work 
contains a comprehensive analysis of numerous and varying 
proposals for establishing boundaries between airspace 
and outer space. According to the writers’ opinion, 
none of these previously surveyed proposals can meet the 
need of community policy. The balancing factors to be 
taken into account are, e.g., the nature, duration, 
magnitude, and intensity of the threat from space; the 
location of the activity; the kinds of interests of the 
subjacent States which are menaced; the characteristics of 
interests that have been asserted in the name of inclusive 
and exclusive use; alternative modes for protecting both 
sets of interests, and so on. Although they suggest a 
transitional arrangement of artificial boundary, the 
writers prefer a customary development of accommodation 
between inclusive and exclusive interests.
2
Lyon, supra; see also F. Ikeda, The Law of the Outer 
Space (Uchu-Ho), 1961» pp.206-8.
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a decisive test. All one can say is, therefore, that the 
State1s sovereignty to an infinite height has been 
rejected, and the solution of setting up the exact upper 
limit of ’territorial airspace’ will ultimately be left 
to decision among States either by some multilateral 
treaty or by customary development.
What, then, is the nature and scope of States’
’sovereignty’ in airspace? A claim to sovereignty based
not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty
of cession, but merely upon some particular display of
authority, involves two elements each of which must be
shown to exist; the intention and will to act as a
sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such 
1authority. The territorial sovereignty over areas in 
thinly populated or unsettled countries may provide 
some analogies for airspace sovereignty, for the full 
and constant possession of airspace is difficult owing to 
its physical attributes. Hence, ’actual exercise or 
display of State's authority’ over airspace is cognizable 
if there be any possibility on the part of the subjacent
1
Cf. the decision rendered by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the case concerning ’the legal 
status of Eastern Greenland* (1933» Series A/D No .33)*
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State to exclude infringement by other sovereign powers
1in that area.
1 Complete and exclusive1 sovereignty means that
sovereignty over airspace of a State is not restricted in
any way by general international law; for example, the
right of innocent passage by foreign ships in territorial
seas which has been recognised in general international
law (provided that such foreign ships do not harm the
interests of the coastal State) is not applicable to
territorial airspace. However, various international
conventions on air law have had the effect of limiting
such a general status of State*s territorial airspace.
Among the contracting parties to the Chicago Convention,
all civil aircraft of contracting States have the right to
make non-scheduled flights into or in transit non-stop
across the territory of each contracting State and to
make stops for non-traffic purposes without necessity of
2obtaining prior permission, and, among those of various 
air transport agreements, multilateral or bilateral, 
rights of commercial operation by scheduled air services 
are mutually secured on certain conditions. If a foreign
1
Ikeda, op.cit., p.86.
Art.5 •
2
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aircraft enters the airspace above a State’s territory
without any such permission, then, as a corollary to the
general status of airspace in international law, the
subjacent State may force the aircraft to land or, as the
case may be, may shoot it down. This is expressly embodied
in some States’ national regulations; for example, the
Air Navigation Order (U.K.) 19^9 provides that, when
signals requiring aircraft to land have been given and the
aircraft fails to comply, a commissioned officer of His
Majesty’s naval, military or airforce may order fire to
be opened on the aircraft and use any other means to
compel compliance therewith. No Australian civil aviation
2legislation contains such provisions. But there will be 
various causes or reasons for such intrusions which are 
not necessarily attributable to hostile and unjustifiable 
activities. It is submitted that, according to the 
practice of States, a subjacent State usually gives a 
warning, in the first place, to the intruding aircraft in 
order to ascertain the real intention or cause of the 
intrusion, and if the subjacent State uses force without 
_
Schedule II, sec.II, 9(4).
2
But, see reg.175 of the Air Navigation Regulations, 
providing for visual signals between State aircraft and 
other aircraft in flight.
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giving such wanning, the State whose nationality the
aircraft possesses is entitled to protest against the
incident. It is doubtful, however, whether this practice
constitutes an established rule of international customary
law, because situations may vary from case to case, as for
example, the case of a sudden attack or intrusion by
supersonic planes. In view of the extraordinary speed of
modern aircraft and their dangerous potentialities to the
subjacent State’s security, the exclusiveness of the
State’s sovereignty in airspace would be accentuated by
the overriding necessity of ’self-defence’, but the
practical attitudes of States will depend largely upon
the political relationship, changing from time to time,
between the subjacent State and the State whose nationality
2the intruding aircraft possesses. Here again the 
international conventions interfere with and impose 
limitations upon the legal status of airspace; for example, 
the Chicago Convention expressly provides for an obligation
1
Ikeda, op.cit., p.6 5 s et seq.
2
Ibid. Reflecting the political relationship of States 
in the world, there have been a number of aerial incidents 
between the West and the East blocks; for example, see 
International Court of Justice (C.I.J.) Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents, concerning aerial Incident of 
October 7 1952 (U.S.A. v. U.S.S.R.), 1956 issue, Aerial
Incident of March 10 1953 (U.S.aT v . Czechoslovakia),
1956 issue.
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to provide measures of assistance to aircraft in distress
1in its territory, so that aircraft in distress will
probably be exempt from the charge of illegality of
intrusion of airspace as between the contracting States.
Special considerations also arise in relation to intrusion
by ’State* aircraft; the Chicago Convention provides that
no State aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over
the territory of another State or land thereon without
authorisation by special agreement or otherwise, and in
2accordance with the terms thereof. Such and other 
limitations imposed upon the general status of airspace 
which are provided for in various aviation treaties will 
be discussed in more detail at a later stage.
We are not concerned here with legal problems arising 
from outer space activities (e.g., legal status of 
satellites or stellar bodies, collisions between space 
vehicles in outer space), but, as airspace and outer space 
locate in the same column of vertical continuance and 
every aircraft and spacecraft must first penetrate 
_
Art.25•
2
Art.3(c). See also Art.32 of the Paris Convention.
’State aircraft’ is a term used in air law conventions 
(e.g. Art.3(b) of the Chicago Convention) to denote 
normally ’aircraft used in military, customs and police 
services.’
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airspace, some aspects of current space activities 
affect State's sovereignty in airspace. These problems 
will include operations of observation satellites to
gain intelligence as to surface conditions in foreign
1territory, consultation with other States concerned for
2a new use of outer space, assistance to astronauts and
1
The problems of observation satellites involves ’primary 
questions of international law as well as of international 
politics’. The U.S.S.R., together with the Soviet group, 
take the view that the use of artificial satellites for 
the collection of intelligence information in the territory 
of a foreign State is incompatible with the objectives of 
mankind in its conquest of outer space, and constitutes 
espionage. The Soviet standpoint, as against the U.S.’s 
view, is maintained irrespective of whether such a 
surveillance or reconnaissance is made from the upper part 
of airspace or from outer space, and it is in all cases an 
intrusion into something guarded by a sovereign State in 
conformity with its sovereign prerogative (j.C. Cooper,
Current Developments in Space Law, a paper prepared for 
presentation at the 1963 Southeastern Regional meeting of 
the American Society of International Law, held February 
19^3} at the University of North Carolina Law School).
The Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of 
Outer Space, supra, suggests the prohibition of placing in 
orbit around the earth or celestial body spacecraft designed 
as weapons, but states that such a prohibition does not 
extend to surveillance or reconnaissance satellites, which 
may primarily serve military purposes, yet have the 
advantage that they contribute to an ’open world’ and so 
increase rather than diminish security (Arts.2, 5> comment
(xviii)).
2
There are different States’ attitudes as to the question 
whether a State, about to embark on a new use of outer 
space, must consult in advance with every other State 
concerned, but except in cases involving observation no 
State including U.S.S.R. has protested against the passage 
of spacecraft in space even when such spacecraft pass 
through the airspace at the time of launching and landing.
See the Draft Code, supra, Art.4.1, establishing a controlled 
right of passage for spacecraft through the airspace of States.
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spacecraft landing in foreign territory and their return,
liability arising from space-vehicles accidents to persons
or property on the surface, and so on. Want of space does
not allow us to dwell upon these problems; suffice it to
say that the ’outer-space law’ is now on the way of its
formation, and it is still too early for the accumulation
of States’ practices, in which States’ political decisions
affected by the current world situations predominantly
prevail. Truly, States should not rely on sovereignty
in outer space because sovereignty is neither necessary
nor sufficient for solving problems created by the space 
1age, but States are likely to resort to ’absolute’ 
sovereignty in airspace whenever activities in outer space 
might threaten their national security, safety or prestige.
Turning to the question of freedom of the air as 
against State’s sovereignty in airspace, it seems 
desirable to outline at this stage the background of 
international legislation not only relating to liberty to 
fly but designed generally for the development of civil 
aviation. The first attempt at international regulation 
of air navigation in public law on a world-wide scale was
1
S.M. Beresford, The Future of National Sovereignty, 
second colloquium on the law of outer space, London 1959, 
proceedings, ed. by A .G. Haley and W.H. Prince of 
Hanover, i960.
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the 'Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation1 1
which was signed on October 13» 1919» at Paris, the
Convention being generally known as the ’Paris Convention.1 
The Convention provided, inter alia, for 'complete and 
exclusive' sovereignty in national airspace, for a right 
of innocent passage over the contracting State's 
territory with the exception of prohibited areas, for 
freedom of access to contracting States' aerodromes, and 
for uniformity in technical matters of air navigation. 
However, the parties thereto were constituted mainly by 
European countries and several important aviation 
countries, e.g. U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Germany, were not 
included. In 1926, the 'Ibero-American Convention on
1
11 League of Nations Treaty Series 173» The Convention 
entered into force on July 11, 1922. Art.34 of the
Convention provided that each State represented on the 
International Commission for Air Navigation (i.C.A.N.) 
shall have one vote. By a protocol of 1923, it was 
amended to read, that 'each State represented on the 
Commission (Great Britain, the British Dominions and India 
counting for this purpose as one State) shall have one 
vote.' An important alteration was further made by a 
Protocol of 1929» by which each of the Dominions and 
India acquired equal voting rights with the other States. 
This in effect was a ready recognition of the fundamental 
change which had taken place in the constitutional structure 
of the Empire at this time. Though, in point of fact, 
the declaration and resolutions which had been concurred in 
by the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions 
had not as yet been formally embodied in the Statute of 
Westminster 1932 (22 Geo., c.44) by the Imperial 
Legislature. Cf. N.H. Möller, Law of Civil Aviation, 1936, 
p . 1 0 .
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Aerial Navigation1, which reproduced the text of the
Paris Convention with certain modifications, was signed
at Madrid by 21 signatory nations, but the Convention did
not come into force. With the growth of the Carribbean
air service in the late twenties, the ‘Pan-American
Convention on Commercial Aviation1 was signed by 21
signatory nations at Havana in 1928, in order to facilitate
commercial air transport in such areas. The ‘Havana
Convention1 was ratified by 9 countries including U.S.A.,
but its scope was distinctly regional. Because it was
necessary to formulate a more world-wide convention on
international public air law, because the operation of
the Paris and Havana Conventions was interrupted by the
World War 2, and because the extraordinary progress of
aeronautical techniques during the War had made it
difficult for these previous conventions to fit the new
situations of modern aviation, the ‘Convention on
International Civil Aviation1 was signed as a result of
the International Civil Aviation Conference held at
1Chicago, November 1 - December 7, 1944. The Convention,
generally known as the ‘Chicago Convention1, was signed by 
38 nations out of 52 allied and neutral nations which
United Nations Treaty Series 15, 102.
1
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attended the Conference. Pending the entry into force 
of the principal convention, the ’Interim Agreement on 
International Civil Aviation’ was adopted; it ceased to
exist on April 4, 1947» when the principal convention
1came into force. At the same Conference, the 
’International Air Transport Agreement’, known as ’Five 
Freedoms Agreement’, and the ’International Air Services 
Transit Agreement’, known as ’Two Freedoms Agreement’, 
were also adopted to fill with regard to scheduled 
international air services the gap left by the Chicago 
Convention. They entered into force on February 8, 1945»
and on January 30, 1945, respectively.
The Chicago Convention is applicable only to ’civil’ 
aircraft and not to ’State’ aircraft (Art.3(a)). Aircraft 
used in military, customs and police services are to be 
deemed to be State aircraft (Art.3(b)). It has been
1
Immediately upon the coming into force of the Chicago 
Convention on April 4, 1947» each contracting State was
to give notice of denunciation of the Paris Convention 
and the Havana Convention, if it was a party to either, 
and as between contracting States, the Chicago Convention 
superseded these previous conventions (Art.8o). As at 
June 30, 1964, the number of the member States of the
Convention amounted to 105, comprising almost every 
country in the world except U.S.S.R. and a few other 
countries. Australia was an original signatory State and, 
since the inception of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (i.C.A.O.) established under the Convention, 
has been represented on the Council, a permanent body 
responsible to the Assembly of the Organization.
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argued whether all aircraft other than those enumerated 
in Art.3(b) are deemed not to be State aircraft, and 
whether the Convention applies to all aircraft which are
not State aircraft. It is sufficient here to say that,
1in the light of relevant sources, the Convention should 
be interpreted as applicable to all aircraft other than 
aircraft used in military, customs and police services;
1
The Paris Convention (Art*30) was more clear on this 
point: ’The following shall be deemed to be State aircraft:
(a) Military aircraft; (b) Aircraft exclusively employed in 
State service, such as posts, customs, police; (c) Every 
other aircraft shall be deemed to be a private aircraft.
All State aircraft other than military, customs and police 
aircraft shall be treated as private aircraft and as such 
shall be subject to all the provisions of the present 
Convention.* Cooper, as a chairman of the drafting 
Committee in the Chicago Conference, says: ’The Convention
is... applicable to all aircraft, whether owned and 
operated by a State, unless such aircraft are actually 
used in military, customs and police services by a 
contracting State....The determining factor under the 
Chicago Convention is whether a particular aircraft is, 
at a particular time, actually used in one of the three 
special types of services. If so, it is a State aircraft. 
Otherwise, it is a civil aircraft.’ Cf. J.C. Cooper, A 
Study on the Legal Status of Aircraft, 1949, pp.47, 52.
See also Art.26 of the Rome Convention 1952; Art.16 of 
the Brussels Convention 1938 5 the Rules of Air Warfare 
drafted by a Commission of Jurists at the Hague, 1923 
(cf. J.M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights, third ed., 
pp.42-43, and Appendix to the book which contains the 
text of the Rules); Art.7l(l) of the Air Navigation 
Order of the U.K., 19^9» But, see Schleicher, Reymann,
Abraham, Das Recht der Luftfahrt, 1960, p.31, saying that 
Art.3(b) is not an exhaustive definition of ’State 
aircraft’ and they, being only examples of important State 
services, should include aircraft engaged in wider State 
objects. As to the definition of ’State aircraft* in the 
Australian national law, see p.255, post.
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the latter alone are denoted by the terra *State aircraft’. 
In case of war the provisions of the Convention do not 
affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting 
State affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.
The same rule applies in the case of any contracting 
State which declares a state of national emergency and 
notifies the fact to the Council of the I.C.A.O. (Art.89).
We are concerned here only with fundamental 
principles and rules governing liberty to fly in the 
international sky which result from the State*s 
restriction of its sovereign right in airspace under the 
Chicago Convention or other international air traffic 
agreements; the detailed regulatory rules of international 
flight-activities will be discussed in the next Chapter.
(1) Flights by State Aircraft:
The Chicago Convention does not provide for liberty 
to fly by State aircraft, except that no State aircraft 
of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of 
another State or land thereon without authorization by 
special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with 
the terms thereof (Art.3(c)), and that the contracting 
State undertakes, when issuing regulations for their 
State aircraft that they will have due regard for the
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safety of navigation of civil aircraft (Art.3(c))» In
1the Australian legislation, tState aircraft1 2 is defined
as (a) in the case of Australian aircraft, a military
aircraft, or (b) in the case of the aircraft of a
country other than Australia, an aircraft used in the
military, customs or police services of that country.
There are no aircraft engaged in customs or police
services in Australia. The non-freedom of the flight by
State aircraft in the present international air law is
clearly defined in Art.3(c) above, to which the
3Australian legislation gives effect:
A State aircraft other than an Australian 
military aircraft shall not fly over or land 
on Australian territory except on the express 
invitation or with the express permission of 
the Minister, but any aircraft so flying or 
landing on such invitation or with such 
permission shall be exempt from the provisions 
of these Regulations except to such extent as 
is specified in the invitation or permission.
The Chicago Convention is silent as to privileges to
be enjoyed by State aircraft in the foreign territory,
1
Reg»5(l) of the Air Navigation Regulations.
2
*Military aircraft* in relation to Australian aircraft is 
defined as the aircraft of any part of the Defence Force, 
and including any aircraft commanded by a member of that 
Force who is detailed for the purpose, and any aircraft 
being constructed for any part of the Defence Force 
(reg.5(1)) .
Reg. 111.
3
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but the Paris Convention provided expressly that the
military aircraft should enjoy in principle in the
absence of special stipulation the privileges which are
1customarily accorded to foreign ships of war. It is
submitted that the rule stated there is sound and may
be considered as still part of international air law
2even though not restated in the Chicago Convention.
3However the analogy between public ships and State
aircraft other than military aircraft is doubtful;
special arrangements between the States concerned will
determine in what cases police and customs aircraft may
be authorized to cross the frontier, and they are in no
case entitled to the privileges accorded to military 
4aircraft. The argument that all State aircraft ought to
1
Art.32. The military aircraft may enjoy such privileges 
only in the case where special authorization is given by 
the State flown over with respect to their flight over 
the territory of the State and their landing thereon.
2
Cooper, A Study on the Legal Status of Aircraft, 19^9j p.53*
31 Public ships’ other than war-ships are such as those 
engaged in police, posts, customs and scientific services 
for the purpose of State, which are directly administered 
by the State authority and exercise the public authority. 
They may not enjoy so much inviolability as war-ships do, 
and although they may enjoy extraterritoriality in most 
cases, the rule is not established yet in international law, 
most States admitting it merely as a practice.
4
Cf. Art.33 of the Paris Convention.
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enjoy the same exemptions when in foreign territory is 
not correct, since ’no such principle has as yet been
accepted into either conventional or customary international
1air law,1 2 and the rule is not established yet in the 
maritime law.
( 2) Flights by Civil Aircraft:
There would be various ways of classifying civil 
flights, such as, routine, charter, contract-service, 
business, pleasure, aerial-work, etc., but, in the 
international air law, civil aviation is broadly classified 
into two types of aircraft operations: 1 scheduled* and
'non-scheduled'. The definition of ’scheduled 
international air services* was adopted by the Council 
of the I.C.A.O. in 1952; it is defined as a series of
2flights that possess all the following characteristics:
(a) It passes through the airspace over the 
territory of more than one State;
(b) It is performed by aircraft for the 
transport of passengers, mail or cargo 
for remuneration, in such a manner that 
each flight is open to use by members of 
the public;
1
Cooper, op.cit., pp.52-3*
2
Cf. D. Goedhuis, Questions of Public International Air 
Law, Recueil des Cours, 1952, II, Academie de droit 
International, pp.257j 259-60.
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(c) It is operated, so as to serve traffic 
between the same two or more points, 
either (i) according to a published 
time-table, or (ii) with flights so regular 
or frequent that they constitute a 
recognizably systematic series.
Hence, neither flights to carry pilgrims nor emigrant
flights are generally Scheduled1 air services. However,
the definition was advanced merely to serve as a basis
1for the comments of contracting States, and therefore it 
seems quite likely that all countries would accept as 
f scheduled* or *non-scheduled1 respectively clear examples 
such as regular 'Qantas1 services to London (scheduled) 
or an exploratory flight over new territory (non-scheduled), 
while the border-line cases between them would have to be 
categorized by decision of national law of each 
contracting State. In the Australian legislation,
1non-scheduled* flight, in relation to an aircraft that 
possesses the nationality of a contracting State of the 
Chicago Convention, is defined as * a flight by that 
aircraft over or into Australian territory otherwise than 
under the authority of an international airline licence 
issued by the Director-General (of Civil Aviation) in 
pursuance of the regulations’. It is also provided that 
_
Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, second ed., pp.267-8.
Sec.3» sub-sec.3(l) of the Air Navigation Act 1920-63.
2
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an aircraft shall not be used in regular public transport
operations except under the authority of and in accordance
with a licence (in the Regulations referred to as an
1T airline licence*) issued by the Director-General. It 
would follow that, in Australia, the presence of 
'international airline licence* is a practical standard,
2and the concept of ’regular public transport’, as defined, 
is a substantial standard, for determining whether a 
certain flight should be categorized as ’scheduled’ or 
’non—scheduled’.
(i) Scheduled Flights
By Art.6 of the Chicago Convention,
No scheduled international air service may be 
operated over or into the territory of a 
contracting State, except with the special 
permission or other authorization of that State, 
and in accordance with the terms of such 
permission or authorization.
Although the mutual right of flight by civil aviation under 
the Chicago Convention is thus applicable only to ’aircraft 
not engaged in scheduled international air services’, it is 
submitted that, besides observing the terms and conditions
1
Reg.198.
2
’Regular public transport operations’ are all air service 
operations in which aircraft are available for the transport 
of members of the public, or for use by members of the public 
for the transport of cargo, for hire or reward and which are 
conducted in accordance with fixed schedules to and from 
fixed terminals over specific routes with or without 
intermediate stopping places between terminals (reg.191(d))•
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contained in the ’permission or authorization*, a 
* scheduled* air carrier would also have to observe the 
general conditions and limitations imposed by the
Convention on * non-scheduled * flight, unless exempted
1from them by the terms of the ‘authorization.*
The Chicago Conference was unsuccessful in finding
an acceptable formula to secure by means of the Convention
a certain freedom of traffic for ‘scheduled air service*
mainly because of an acute confrontation of interests
among the contracting States, particularly between the two
major aviation countries - U.S.A. and U.K.; the former
espoused the case of complete freedom and the latter
insisted on protectionism in exchange of traffic rights,
which was supported by the Commonwealth countries
2including Australia. The Australia-New Zealand proposal 
which was not adopted at the Chicago Conference was based 
on the joint affirmation by Australia and New Zealand in 
January 19^ that full control of international air trunk 
routes and ownership of all aircraft and auxiliary 
equipment should be vested in an international air
1
Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., p.268.
2
D.G. Anderson, Australia*s Contribution to International 
Civil Aviation, the second Sir Ross and Sir Keith Smith 
Memorial Lecture, April i960.
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1authority. As a result of the Conference, only the 
following methods have been available for securing rights 
of commercial operations among States: (a) the »Two
Freedoms Agreement», (b) the »Five Freedoms Agreement*,
(c) bilateral treaties between the States concerned, and
(d) other agreements on air services of less complete and 
usually a more temporary nature contained in an Exchange 
of Notes at the diplomatic level, and temporary permits 
which may or may not involve the exchange of reciprocal 
rights which are usually issued, and renewed from time to 
time at the diplomatic level.
By the International Air Services Transit Agreement 
(»Two Freedoms Agreement*), each contracting State, a 
member of the I.C.A.O., grants to the other contracting 
States the following freedoms of the air in respect of 
scheduled international air services:
1
It was stated by the Minister, Mr Drakeford, in his 
statement on 22 January '\ykh, that international ownership 
of airlines would prevent a ruinous scramble for business 
by competitive nations in the post-war future. It is 
worthy of note that such a proposal of »ownership, 
operation and control of international airways by an 
international air authority* was launched by the Labor 
Governments of Australia and New Zealand, when various 
projects of »nationalization* schemes were attempted in 
their respective national economics. As to the drawbacks 
of this plan, and various standpoints of major aviation 
countries including Australia at the Conference with 
respect to the matter of a scheme for postwar international 
civil aviation control, see J.C. Cooper, The Right to Fly, 
pp.161-2.
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(a) privilege to fly across its territory 
without landing, and
(b) privilege to land for non-traffic purposes.
Those privileges are subject to the various conditions:
they are not applicable with respect to airports utilized
for military purposes to the exclusion of any scheduled
international air services; aircraft making stops for
non-traffic purposes may be required to offer reasonable
commercial service at the stopping places; each contracting
State may designate the route and airports and other
facilities; each contracting State reserves the right to
withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an air
transport enterprise of another State if it is not
satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control
1are vested in nationals of a contracting State, or in 
case of failure of such air transport enterprise to comply 
with the laws of the State flown over to perform its
1
It is pointed out that with the development of aviation 
necessitating important capital investments this condition 
of substantial ownership, as it appears in many bilateral 
agreements (e.g* Australia - U.S.A.), may involve the air 
companies in great difficulties. There are two possible 
ways for the interpretation of the words ’nationals of a 
contracting State1; one is to regard them as !nationals 
of the other State party to the Agreement* and the other 
as ’nationals of other than non-contracting States to the 
Agreement.’ (Goedhuis, ibid.). In most States, the 
national law prohibits the registration of an aircraft 
owned by a foreigner. See, reg.322 of the Australian 
Air Navigation Regulations.
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obligations under the Agreement; and those privileges 
must be in accordance with the provisions of the Chicago 
Convention concerning air navigation (e.g. documents to 
be carried in aircraft). The Agreement provides further 
for proceedings of the Agreement, and the methods to 
settle disputes and disagreement among contracting States. 
As at June 1964, there were 6 7 contracting States 
including all the principal aviation countries parties to 
the Chicago Convention. Australia, together with U.S.A., 
U.K. and Canada, is a party to the Agreement.
By the International Air Transport Agreement (’Five 
Freedoms Agreement1) to which Australia, like many other 
countries, is not a party, each contracting State grants 
to the other contracting States the following further 
freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international 
air services in addition to the ’Two Freedoms’:
(c) privilege to put down passengers, mail and 
cargo taken on in the territory of the 
State whose nationality the aircraft 
possesses,
(d) privilege to take on passengers, mail and 
cargo destined for the territory of the 
State whose nationality the aircraft 
possesses, and
(e) privilege to take on passengers, mail and 
cargo destined for the territory of any 
other contracting State and the privilege 
to put down passengers, mail and cargo 
coming from any such territory.
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The Agreement contains similar provisions as to various 
conditions to the granted privileges as those in the Two 
Freedoms Agreement. The fifth freedom may be reserved, 
and each contracting State retains the right of cabotage, 
viz. carriage of traffic between two points in the 
territory of the same foreign State. Twenty States 
signed the Agreement at Chicago, including the U.S.A., but 
not all subsequently accepted it. None of the British 
Commonwealth countries signed or have since adhered to it.
By i960, a total cf 18 countries had at one time or another 
adhered to the Agreement but of these 7 had since withdrawn 
or denounced it, including the U.S.A. The Agreement is now, 
therefore, of little significance.
Possible additional freedoms will include (a) carriage
of traffic between two foreign States, via the home State
of the airline (a combination of Third and Fourth Freedom
activity, sometimes referred to as the Sixth Freedom),
(b) carriage of international traffic by an airline
operating entirely outside its home State, or (c) cabotage;
the latter two freedoms are often called the Seventh and
1Eighth Freedoms.
1
Bin Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport, 1962, 
PP.13-17.
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The first two Freedoms were reciprocally accepted 
at a multilateral level at the Chicago Conference, but 
beyond that main reliance has been on bilateral agreements.
A model type of such bilateral agreements was formulated in 
1964 between U.S.A. and U.K. at Bermuda, the pattern of 
which has been followed thereafter by many States1 bilateral 
agreements (e.g. U.S.A. - Australia). The general effect 
of this Bermuda Agreement is that, for the purpose of 
operating air services over a number of routes specified 
in the Annex, each party grants to the * designated air 
carriers1 of the other the use of airports and facilities 
on these routes, and rights of transit, of stops for non­
traffic purposes, and of ’commercial entry and departure 
for international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail’; 
the exercise of these rights is to be subject to a 
number of general principles laid down in the Final Act, 
of which the object is to exclude unfair competition, and
the effect is to limit considerably the full ’Five
3Freedoms’ rights. A detailed survey of legal and policy
1
11 February 1946, at Bermuda. Treaty Series No.3(1946),
Cmd. 6747.
2
United Nations Treaty Series vol.7 (1947)» No.100.
Cf. Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., pp.276-81.
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problems involved in such commercial arrangements would
be beyond the scope of this thesis, but, from the Australian
point of view, the following points should be noted.
First, the general Australian standpoint in respect of
international liberty to fly on which the Director-General
of Civil Aviation made a comment in his lecture is as 
1f ollows:
It is interesting to speculate what the effects of 
a free exchange of freedoms might have had upon 
the development of Qantas, remembering in particular 
that its major growth occurred after Chicago.
Qantas owes its commercial existence to the large 
volume of long haul third and fourth freedom 
traffic which flows between the United Kingdom and 
Australia. Unrestricted competition on this route 
in the post war years by large foreign carriers, 
few of which would have originated much long haul 
traffic of their own, could clearly have prevented 
the subsequent growth of Qantas into a world air 
carrier. The judgement of history must then be 
that a multilateral exchange of traffic freedoms, 
no matter how fine an ideal it may have been, was 
clearly inconsistent with our best aviation 
interests in and our representatives at
Chicago acted prudently in rejecting it....
The post war policy of Australia in dealing with 
other countries on this traffic rights question 
remained for more than a decade predominantly 
protectionist - and thus in line with the 
'Commonwealth’ principles espoused at Chicago in 
1944. However, political developments of the 
1950’s which threatened the security of our 
Middle East route to the United Kingdom, together 
with the growth of Qantas into a world carrier
1
D.G. Anderson, Australia’s Contribution to International 
Civil Aviation.
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able to withstand fair and reasonable competition 
from any foreign carrier, caused a shift of 
policy to the Bermuda type agreement. We now 
stand prepared to negotiate an agreement of this 
type with other aviation countries.
Secondly, the co-operation system among the British
Commonwealth countries is a characteristic feature of the
international air transport network. As an alternative
to their internationalization plan, Australia and New
Zealand supported a system of air trunk routes controlled
and operated by the British Commonwealth under Government
ownership. This has been realized in a more moderate form
of partnership, pooling or other co-operative arrangements
1among the British Commonwealth countries. Australia has 
now pooling or partnership arrangements with the United 
Kingdom, India, South Africa and New Zealand, while other 
countries have also entered such arrangements in their 
respective regional areas (e.g. !Air Union1 between the 
airlines of France, Italy, West Germany and Belgium). 
Thirdly, bilateral air transport agreements involve such 
main problems as following: because of the possibility of
unequal economic strength in two competitors there is some
1
Art.77 of the Chicago Convention provides that nothing in 
the Convention shall prevent two or more contracting States 
from constituting joint air transport operating 
organizations or international operating agencies and from 
pooling their air services on any routes or in any regions.
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need for the regulation of competition even in the exchange 
of common Third and Fourth Freedoms rights (e.g. the 
predetermination of the total capacity, or some statement 
of principle urging a fair and equal opportunity to the 
carriers of the two nations.) With respect to the Fifth 
Freedom, it is generally recognized that international 
operators on long routes cannot operate economically 
without rights to Fifth Freedom traffic; hence, the 
necessity to find a compromise between this need and the
principle that every State has a primary right to its own
1Third and Fourth Freedom traffic. For example, the
Final Act of the Bermuda Conference, which is reproduced
2in the Australia-U•S .A . agreement, reads as follows:
The right to embark or disembark on such services 
international traffic destined for and coming 
from third countries at a point or points on the 
routes specified in the Annex to the Agreement 
shall be applied in accordance with the general 
principles of orderly development to which both 
Governments subscribe and shall be subject to 
the general principle that capacity should be 
related (a) to traffic requirements between the 
country of origin and the country of destination;
(b) to the requirements of through airline 
operation; and (c) to the traffic requirements of 
the area through which the airline passes after 
taking account of local and regional services.
1
Cf. Poulton, Notes on Lectures in Air Law 1955, pp.19-21.
U.N. Treaty Series, 1947, vol.7, No.100, Annex Sec.IIl(E).
2
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Other problems arising from bilateral agreements relate 
to routes and customs duties, etc., on which we will not 
make any further comment.
Australia now has in force bilateral air services
arrangements with 26 other countries exchanging traffic
rights for scheduled international air services. Nineteen
1of these are Air Services Agreements and the remaining 
7 are provisional arrangements. It has been already 
mentioned that an international airline of a country other 
than Australia shall not operate a scheduled international 
air service over or into Australian territory except in 
accordance with an international airline licence issued by 
the Director-General in accordance with the regulations.
It is further provided that an international airline 
licence shall not be granted to an international airline 
of a country other than Australia unless that country and 
Australia are parties to the Air Transit Agreement, or to 
some other agreement or arrangement, whether bilateral 
or multilateral, under which scheduled international air 
services of that other country may, subject to the
1
Civil Aviation Annual Report (1963-64) at pp.19-21. As to 
such air service agreements, see Australian Treaty Series 
published by the Department of External Affairs. The 
countries and dates of these agreements (until 1961) are 
listed in Civil Aviation Annual Report (1960-61) at 
Appendix 1.
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agreement or arrangement, be operated over or into
1Australian territory.
(ii) Non-Scheduled Flights:
By Art.5 of the Chicago Convention,
Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft 
of the other contracting States, being aircraft 
not engaged in scheduled international air 
services shall have the right, subject to the 
observance of the terms of this Convention, to 
make flights into or in transit non-stop across 
its territory and to make stops for non-traffic 
purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior 
permission, and subject to the right of the State 
flown over to require landing. Each contracting 
State nevertheless reserves the right, for 
reasons of safety of flight, to require aircraft 
desiring to proceed over regions which are 
inaccessible or without adequate air navigation 
facilities to follow prescribed routes, or to 
obtain special permission for such flights. Such 
aircraft, if engaged in the carriage of passengers, 
cargo, or mail for remuneration or hire on other 
than scheduled international air services, shall 
also, subject to the provisions of Art.7} have 
the privilege of taking on or discharging 
passengers, cargo, or mail, subject to the right 
of any State where such embarkation or discharge 
takes place to impose such regulations, conditions 
or limitations as it may consider desirable.
Art.7 provides for cabotage - the contracting State*s
right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other
contracting States to take on in its territory passengers,
mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire and
destined for another point within its territory. The
Sec.12(l) of the Air Navigation Act.
1
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term ’ cabotage* is an analogy from maritime law which, as 
an exception to the principle of the freedom of the seas, 
reserves national control over sea traffic along the 
coast-line; but cabotage in air law (generally called 
’air-cabotage’) , being read together with the definition 
of ’territory' in Art.2, is an affirmation of the principle 
of national sovereignty over airspace, and is of much 
wider application, covering distant points in metropolitan 
territory and also places between the latter and the 
colonies of the State concerned, even though the passage 
may cross other countries or the high seas.
Although the contracting States seem to have granted 
each other the right to perform non-scheduled air transport 
for commercial purpose as well as for non-commercial 
purpose regardless of prior permission, the States1 
practice has shown that many of the contracting States 
(including Australia) require ’prior permission* for non-
scheduled flights performed for commercial purposes with
1traffic stops. In the case of Australia, an aircraft of 
a contracting State may fly in transit non-stop across 
Australian territory, or land in Australian territory for
_
Goedhuis, op.cit., pp.269-70, referring to a Report of 
the Council of I.C.A.O. of July 21, 1949 (Do c.6850 C/797).
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non-traffic purposes, in the course of non-scheduled 
flight, without the necessity of obtaining prior 
permission, but it shall not take on or discharge 
passengers, cargo or mail (being passengers, cargo or 
mail that has been, or is to be, carried for reward)
except with the permission of the Director-General and
1in accordance with that permission. Those States
following such a practice are of opinion that in the
absence of a definition of ’scheduled services’ which is
universally acceptable, insistence upon prior permission
forms the only guarantee against the risk that non-
scheduled air transport of other States from and to their
territory will be developing into a disguised scheduled 
2service. The most practical excuse for requiring such 
prior permission is that ’prior permission’ is one of the 
’regulations, conditions or limitations’ envisaged in the 
second paragraph of Art.5 of the Convention. Those 
conditions, &c. of granting the permission will vary from 
State to State in accordance with its political and/or 
economic policies; for example, in Australia the 
Director-General of Civil Aviation, in considering an
1
Sec.l4(l) & (2) of the Air Navigation Act.
Goedhuis, ibid.
2
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application for permission, is required to have regard
to (a) the public interest, (b) the need to provide
reasonable protection for the operators of scheduled
international air services, and (c) any relevant decision
of I.C.A.O. or I.A.T.A. (international Air Transport
Association). However, the lack of a communis opinio
with respect to the concept of ’non-scheduled flight1 may
not be a legal excuse for requiring a prior permission;
such requirement may be a breach of international law.
2Pacta sunt servanda. Hence, as Dr Goedhuis suggests, 
the solution of this matter might be an appeal to the 
Council of I.C.A.O., or to an ad hoc Court of Arbitration 
or to the International Court of Justice.
A foreign aircraft not possessing the nationality of 
a contracting State of the Chicago Convention (e.g. 
aircraft of U.S.S.R.) shall not make a non-scheduled 
flight over or into Australian territory unless the 
Minister of Civil Aviation has approved the flight. The 
Minister may, in giving such an approval, impose such 
conditions and requirements as to the flight as he thinks 
fit, including such conditions and requirements as he
7
Sec.14(4).
2
Ibid.
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considers necessary to ensure compliance with the general 
principles contained in the Chicago Convention, and the 
aircraft shall comply with them. If the foreign 
aircraft makes a flight over or into Australian territory 
without such permission, this will be an illegal invasion 
of the sovereignty of the Australian airspace under the 
present international law. No liberty to fly is 
established for such aircraft, and the aircraft must be 
subject to the ’absolute1 sovereignty of airspace enjoyed 
by the subjacent State.
The subject of law is a sovereign •State1 incurring 
rights and obligations under international law, but once 
the right to fly is given by a State to other States, the 
nationals of the latter acquire liberty to fly over that 
State’s territory under national law incorporating 
international law rules by some means varying from State 
to State. On the other hand, the State which restricts 
its airspace sovereignty under Chicago Convention or 
other international air traffic agreements must secure
1
For example, two Russian civil aircraft traversed Australia 
southbound from Djakarta via Darwin and Sydney to New 
Zealand and to Antarctica in December, 1961, and returned 
along the same route northbound in January, 1962. As the 
U.S.S.R. was not a party to the Chicago Convention, the 
Minister for Civil Aviation gave approval for the flight, 
subject to appropriate conditions, in accordance with 
sec.15 of the Air Navigation Act. Cf. Second Civil 
Aviation Annual Report (1961-62), p.10.
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liberty to fly accorded to other contracting States or 
their nationals in its national law so as to implement 
faithfully the international obligation. Hence, by the 
mutual exchange of the right of innocent passage in the 
international agreements, the legal status of airspace 
in national law as well as in international law is 
affected pro tanto; the mode of such influences by 
international law depends on the national legal system, 
as we will see next.
2. Federal and State Jurisdictions in Airspace and
Public Right of Transit across States* Boundaries:
Art.1 of the Chicago Convention is an international 
recognition of * complete and exclusive* sovereignty of 
Australia in the airspace above the Commonwealth territory. 
However, this principle does not of itself authorize the 
Commonwealth Government to override the States’ sovereign 
or jurisdictional rights in the airspace above their 
respective territories, since the question how Australia 
exercises its internal sovereign power within its 
territorial domain depends upon what the federal 
Constitution prescribes. ’Supreme power* is embodied in 
the principle of ’parliamentary sovereignty’ in the 
Australian context, and is divided between seven 
Parliaments (Commonwealth and six States), each being
27 6
sovereign within its constitutional powers. The extent 
to which the Commonwealth Parliament has constitutional 
powers in respect of aviation control has already been 
discussed, and we need only add the following points 
relating to the special status of airspace in 
constitutional law.
It was once argued in the United States that, until
the advent of air navigation, the original colonies did
not acquire sovereignty in the upper airspace, as distinct
from the strata close to the surface which had been used
since earliest times by mankind, and, after the adoption
of the Constitution, no State could acquire territory in
the airspace as this would amount to the acquirement of
new or additional domain, a function vested solely in the
1Federal Government. Professor Cooper is inclined to 
dismiss this historical argument denying State 
sovereignty:^
1
F.P. Lee, The Air Domain of the United States, Civil 
Aeronautics Legislative History of the Air Commerce Act 
of 1962, corrected to Aug. 1 , 1928, U.S. Governments
Printing Office (19^-3)» As to this theory, mention has 
already been made in Chapter IV, ante.
2
J.C. Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty 
of Navigable Airspace, 15 J.A.L.C. 1948, p.37.
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I have always felt that the airspace over a 
nation was an integral part of the nation* s 
territory. I have never been impressed with 
the argument that such airspace did not become 
part of national territory until nations had 
the physical ability to fly in that territory 
and thus to control and occupy it. It has always 
seemed to me that the airspace in the early days 
was in exactly the same status as those mountain 
peaks which mankind could not scale or the dense 
jungles which he could not penetrate. The lack 
of physical ability to reach and control such 
parts of a nation* s territory can hardly be 
urged as a reason for denying that such mountains 
and jungles are under the sovereign domain of a 
nation if found within its recognized boundaries.
The obvious need of a nation to control its own 
airspace existed from the earliest days when 
mankind first envisaged the possibility of flight.
The same holds good in the Australian position, or
perhaps with more cogency by reason of the difference of
the time of federation in the United States (1787) and in
Australia (1901). The Government of each original colony
as an organ of His Majesty*s Government had full Imperium
and dominium over land ultimately held by the Crown
within its boundaries. The customary international law
of a State’s territorial rights in the three-mile marginal
ocean belt had been generally recognised at the beginning
of the twentieth century, and the original colonies had
their sovereign powers in their respective territorial
waters. At the time of federation, or since then, they
have never surrendered their territorial rights to the
Commonwealth, except as expressly provided by the
Constitution
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Professor Cooper cites two comparatively recent U.S. 
decisions bringing out a new question on this subject so 
as to require a reconsideration of the respective 
sovereign rights of States Government and the Federal
1Government in the airspace: U.S. v. State of California
2and U.S. v. Causby. To state his conclusions first, he 
sees in the California Oil Case a possible, but not 
certain, basis for denying State power; but he regards 
the commerce clause in its wide, modern interpretation 
as aided by the * commingling doctrine* and as applied in 
the Causby Case as giving Federal authorities substantially 
overriding authority.
In the California Oil Case, a suit was brought before 
the Supreme Court of the United States to determine the 
ownership of and paramount rights over the submerged land 
and the oil and gas thereunder off the coast of 
California between the low-water mark and the three-mile 
limit. The court held that the State of California was 
not the owner of the marginal belt along its coast, and 
that the Federal Government rather than the State had 
paramount rights in and power over that belt, on the
_
( 1 9 4 7 )  3 3 2  U . S .  1 9 ,  91 L . E d .  1 8 8 9 .
( 1 9 4 6 )  3 2 8  U . S .  2 3 6 ,  9 0  L . E d .  1 2 0 6 .
2
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grounds that the thirteen original colonies did not 
acquire from the Crown of England title to the three-mile 
marginal ocean belt nor the land underlying it, and, 
after the United States became a nation, statesmen became 
interested in establishing national dominion over a 
definite marginal zone to protect the neutrality of the 
United States, a protection and control of which is a 
function of national external sovereignty. The historical 
argument will be readily dismissed in the Australian 
setting, where, as we have seen before, the original 
(and present) six States formed the federation in 1901,
and no such problems as experienced in the United States
1cases would arise as to whether a New State had 
surrendered its dominion and sovereignty over the soil 
under the three-mile belt, upon entering the federation 
on terms of equality with the existing States. A more 
persuasive argument lies in the Supreme Court’s rulings 
based upon the idea that the responsibility for the
1
See, e.g. United States v. Louisiana, (1950) 339 U.S. 699; 
United States v. Texas, (1950) 339 u*s• 707. It was held 
in the latter case that since the original States had been 
found not to own the soil under the three-mile belt, Texas, 
which concededly did own this soil before its annexation 
to the United States, was held to have surrendered its 
dominion and sovereignty over it, upon entering the Union 
on terms of equality with the existing States.
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conduct of foreign relations rests exclusively with the
1Federal Government:
What this Government does, or even what the States 
do, anywhere in the ocean, is a subject upon which 
the nation may enter into and assume treaty or 
similar international obligations. The very oil 
about which the State and nation here contend 
might well become the subject of international 
dispute and settlement. The ocean, even its 
three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to 
the nation in its desire to engage in commerce and 
to live in peace with the world; it also becomes 
of crucial importance should it ever again become 
impossible to preserve that peace. And as peace 
and world commerce are the paramount responsibilities 
of the nation rather than an individual State, so, 
if wars come, they must be fought by the nation.
The State is not equipped in our constitutional 
system with the powers or the facilities for 
exercising the responsibilities which would be 
concomitant with the dominion which it seeks. 
Conceding that the State has been authorized to 
exercise local police power functions in the part 
of the marginal belt within its declared boundaries, 
these do not detract from the Federal Government’s 
paramount rights in and power over this area.
This view is analogous to the argument that complete
and exclusive national control of navigable airspace is
necessary to the nation as a single member of the family
of nations, which may be criticized on the ground that the
mere fact that the doctrine of exclusive national
sovereignty has been adopted and declared does not
necessarily mean that the several States are without
sovereign rights in the airspace above their territories
332 U.S. 35-6, 91 L.Ed., 1897-8.
1
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so far as the exercise of internal regulatory and police 
powers are concerned; it in nowise affects the 
apportionment of sovereignty as between the several
States and the United States, but only as between the
1United States and the rest of the world. However, apart 
from such an argument for an a priori authority of the 
Federal Government in airspace or waters, the balance of 
sovereign rights as between the Commonwealth and the States 
will certainly be affected by international legislation 
imposing obligations upon Australia, for which the 
Commonwealth is a responsible Government. We have already 
discussed the nature and scope of ’external affairs* 
power in the Australian Constitution.
In the Causby Case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
at common law the landowner also owned airspace above his 
land to the extent he made use of it, and, where the noise 
and glaring lights of planes landing at or leaving an 
airport leased to the United States, flying below the 
navigable airspace as defined by Congress, interfered 
with the normal use of neighbouring farm as a chicken farm, 
there was such a taking as to give the owner a 
constitutional right to compensation under the Fifth
Cooper, op.cit.,
1
PP-33, 38
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Amendment to the Constitution. Various problems relating 
to private property rights in airspace and the ’ taking1 
theory will be discussed later in detail. For the 
present purpose, we are concerned only with the 
constitutional status of the ’navigable airspace’ placed 
by the Congress in the ’public domain’, not in respect of 
the relation between aviators and landowners but in respect 
of the relation between the Federal Government and State 
Governments in their jurisdictional rights in airspace.
-jUnder the Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the
2Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938? which are now consolidated
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,^ the United States
has ’complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the
4airspace’ over the United States. The Acts grant any
citizen of the United States ’a public right of freedom
of transit in air commerce through the navigable airspace
5of the United States.* ’Air commerce’ is defined as 
including ’any operation or navigation of aircraft which
1
44
2
S tat • 5 6 8  , 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq. , 49 U.S.C.A. 171 et seq.
52
3
724
S tat • 973, 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 401 e t seq.
Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. , 49 U.S.C.A. 1301 e t seq
49e; U.S.C. 17 6( a), 49 U.S.C.A. 176(a) •
49 U.S.C. ^0 3 , 49 U.S.C.A. 403.
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directly affects, or which may endanger safety in,
1interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce,* and
* navigable airspace* as * airspace above the minimum safe
altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics 
2Authority*. The authority had prescribed minimum safe 
altitudes of flight varying from 300 to 1,000 feet and 
also angles of glide. According to the Court’s opinion, 
the path of glide was not the minimum safe altitude of 
flight within the meaning of the statute, and the flights 
in question were not within the navigable airspace.
However, the Court said that the airspace, apart from the 
immediate reaches above the land, was part of the public 
domain, and the Congress had properly placed certain parts 
of the airspace within the public domain to be used 
freely by United States citizens. Thus, Congress had 
established highways through the air just as it has 
established water highways in navigable streams. It 
should not be thought, however, that, by establishing 
the national highway in the air, the Federal Government
_
49 u . s . c .  4 0 1 ( 3 ) ,  49 u . s . c . A .  4o i ( 3 ) .
2
49 U.S.C. 180, 49 U.S.C.A. 180.
3
Note on Griggs v. County of Allegheny, (1962) 28 J. Air L. 
311,  314.
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appropriated the navigable airspace as new Federal 
territories. Sovereignty in the airspace rests also 
in the State ’except where granted to and assumed by the 
United States.’ But, once the ’navigable airspace’ is 
declared to be the ’public domain’, the State powers 
become restricted in that area to a large extent, and 
practically overriden by the Federal authority. The State 
cannot interfere with the free passage of flights by the 
public in the use of the highway.
Probably, any Commonwealth’s exclusive territorial 
claim to the airspace above the State’s territory will 
fail except where the Commonwealth acquires part of the 
State’s lands for the public purposes or on some other 
grounds under the Constitution (e.g. , sec.51(xxxi) , sec. 
52(i) or sec.85)« Accordingly, the relation between 
federal and State sovereign rights in the Australian 
airspace puts, as in the United States, the airspace over 
a State in the similar legal and constitutional status as 
the lands and waters of that State, thus bringing us back 
to the proposition that the question how far the federal 
Government can exercise its jurisdictional rights within 
all strata of airspace depends entirely upon the scope 
of the enumerated legislative powers in the Constitution.
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The Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations now
applicable to every civil flight set up minimum low
1flying altitudes, but no concept of 'navigable airspace1 
and 'public right of freedom of transit* has been embodied 
in any federal legislation. The ’controlled airspace* 
set up by the Commonwealth Government is no more than the 
place where the federal safety regulations operate.
However, liberty to fly across the States* boundaries is 
perhaps guaranteed to every Australian citizen under sec.92 
of the Constitution, and, more generally, by the common 
law in the absence of any prohibition by statutory rules 
of the Commonwealth or of the States. The States refrain 
in practice from attempting to prohibit or interfere with 
flights of aircraft through their territorial airspace; 
they tacitly recognize Commonwealth authority over such 
flight activities, which may be inferrable from relevant 
statutes or implied constitutional powers. This is also 
the case with foreign aviators flying over a State’s 
territory in accordance with the terms of an international 
agreement concluded with Australia; any State’s 
interference based upon its territorial sovereignty will 
be prevented, expressly or impliedly, by virtue of
Reg.133.
1
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Commonwealth, law giving effect to their liberty to fly 
in Australia.
Probably, the Australian judicial trend has 
discouraged introduction of the concepts of the ’nature 
of air1 or the ’interests of the public’ into constitutional 
interpretation. However, these American concepts are 
equally applicable to the Australian ’commerce’ clause in 
respect of aviation. At least, there is no reason why 
the Commonwealth cannot define the airspace above 
reasonable height from the ground as a national highway so 
as to confer every citizen of Australia a public right 
of innocent passage in commerce by air, insofar as it is 
necessary for securing proper conduct of inter-State and 
foreign trade and commerce by air or of international 
intercourse by air. It may not be necessary for the 
Commonwealth to introduce the American concept of ’public 
domain’, but it is sufficient here to say that the 
establishment of the right to fly throughout Australia 
to the exclusion of any possible hindrance on the part 
of the State Governments is a legitimate exercise of the 
federal ’commerce’ power, and is consistent with sec. 92 
of the Constitution. However, a discussion concerning 
liberty to fly through the ’navigable airspace’ is not 
complete without referring to its relation to private 
property rights in airspace.
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3• Private Property Rights in Airspace and Right of 
Innocent Passage:
In Australia as in England, there is no judicial
authority at common law directly bearing on the question
of property rights in airspace in relation to aircraft
flights above landowners* property. There are several
reported cases in the Australian courts about a stretched
electric cable for lighting purposes across another*s 
1land, erection of ventilating pipes overhung the
2neighbour's land, or firing of bullet from a rifle at a
neighbour's cat on a shed on the adjoining property
3occupied by the neighbour. In every case, it was held
that those acts constituted trespass per se. Among
4them, Davies v . Bennison is worthy of special mention 
here, for the decision, relating to trespass by shooting 
into the plaintiff's land, has a dictum concerning 
aircraft activity. The court said that the ownership of 
land, part of the earth*s surface, was necessarily
Barker v . The Corporation of the City of Adelaide (1900) 
S.A.L.R. 29.
2
Lawlor v . Johnston (1903) V.L.R. 714.
3
Davies v. Bennison (1927) 22 Tas. L.R. 32. See al so
Williamson v. Friend (1901) 1 S.R. (N.S.W.) (Eq. ) 23, 2 7 ;
Evans v. Finn ( 1904) 4 S.R. (N.S.W.) 297."4
(1927) 22 Tas. L.R. 32.
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different from that of movables, and was generally
described by the application of the maxim *Cujus est solum
est usque ad coelum*. The words of Lord Bllenborough in
1Pickering v . Rudd were cited as the only direct dicta
upon the point; there it was suggested that there is a
distinction between a shot which struck the soil and one
fired in vacuo without touching anything, the former
being trespass, the latter not actionable unless it
constituted a nuisance. However, referring to Blackburn* s
2and Pollock1 2s views against Lord Ellenborough1s dieturn,
the Tasmanian Supreme Court said:
It seems an absurdity to say that if I fire at 
another1s animal on his land, hit it, kill it, 
and so leave the bullet in it, I have committed 
no trespass, and yet, if I miss the animal and 
so let the bullet fall into the ground, have 
committed a trespass. Such distinctions have 
no place in the science of the Common Law. If 
the hovering aeroplane is perfected the logical 
outcome of Lord ELLENBOROUGH1S dictum would be 
that a man might hover as long as he pleased to 
a yard, or a foot, or an inch, above his 
neighbour*s soil, and not be a trespasser, yet 
if he should touch it for one second he would 
be.
A man has the undoubted right to build a 
high tower on his land, and the space above the
1
(1815) 4 Campbell 219 .
2
Kenyon v. Hart, 6 E. & B. 252, per Lord Blackburn:
*1 understand the good sense of that doubt, though not 
the legal reason of it*. F. Pollock, Law of Torts, 
eighth ed. , p.3^-7*
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land is exclusively his for that purpose. Then 
why not for any other legal purpose? It seems 
to me that the only real difficulty is in saying 
(what I need not say here), viz., how far the 
rights of a landowner ’ad coelum1 2 will have to be 
reduced to permit the free use of beneficial 
inventions, such as flying machines, etc.
So far as the ability to use land, and the 
air above it, exists, mechanically speaking, to 
my mind any intrusion above land is a direct 
physical breach of the negative duty not to 
interfere with the owner’s use of his land, and 
is in principle a trespass. At any rate, I can 
see no doubt whatever that an owner’s rights 
extend to a height sufficient to cover the 
facts of this case (italics ours.)
1But, as in numerous English cases, the Australian cases
are confined to examples of intrusion into or interference
with airspace by things other than aircraft. Many English
writers on air law or law of tort rely on these analogies
so as to make a prediction of the lines upon which the
2Courts will treat the activities of aircraft. Even in 
the United States whose common law is now an abundant 
source of decisions relating to the subject, various 
analogies from similar circumstances were formerly 
attempted by writers to explain this new experience of law; 
for example, analogies of wires stretched across land,
1
As to these English cases, see McNair, The Law of the Air, 
third ed., by M.R.E. Kerr and A.H.M. Evans, p.32, et seq.
2
Cf. Winfield, Textbook of the Law of Tort, fourth ed., 
p.321.
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cattle roaming, easement of air and light, bullets or 
projectiles fired across land, baseballs thrown across
land, radio wabes passing over land, carrier pigeons and
1other birds, etc. None of these analogies was found 
conclusive and appropriate for the new conflict of rights 
between landowner and airman. Although a study of the 
historical development is important for the proper 
understanding of common law rules, it is sufficient for 
our present purposes to start from the conclusions of 
writers as to the present state of English law.
Professor Richardson* s surveys are in summary as 
follows: It has not been necessary for an English Court
to give literal effect to the maxim cujus est solum, ejus 
est usque ad coelum ('whose is the his it is up to the sky*), 
and no court has done so. English courts have always 
accepted the general right of the landowner to the 
uninterrupted use and enjoyment of his property, and, as 
a corollary of the owner*s right of full enjoyment, no one 
has the right in normal circumstances to prevent him 
building upwards from his land. There is an underlying 
assumption in the cases that use and enjoyment of land 
are meaningless without the ability to use the space above,
_
See, e.g. C. Zollmann, Law of the Air, 1927» p.16, et seq.
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but the courts have not pronounced upon ownership of
space. The decisions do not inhibit persons from making
transient use of airspace above private property in
circumstances having no bearing on an occupier’s use and
enjoyment of the subjacent soil. Hence, it is generally
recognized that the mere flight of an aircraft over
privately held land does not of itself give a right of
action to the owner below.
In earlier days, writers on air law had difficulty
in establishing a reasonable construction of the cujus
maxim to meet the aviation age, but it is now widely
understood that the maxim establishes no wider proposition
than that the air above the surface is subject to
dominion insofar as the use of space is necessary for the
2proper enjoyment of the surface. Apart from juristic
writers’ opinions, judicial cases concerned with the maxim
directly involving aircraft flights are provided not in
the English and Australian cases but in the North American
3cases. The U.S. Supreme Court said:
_
J.E. Richardson, Private Property Rights in the Air Space 
at Common Law, 31 Canadian Bar Review (No .2), 1953»
2
Cf. J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, second ed., p.46.
3
328 U.S. 256, at 261; 90 L.Ed. 1210 (Causby Case). See 
also Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp. (1932) 55 F. 2nd 201.
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It is ancient doctrine that at common law 
ownership of the land extended to the 
periphery of the universe.... But that 
doctrine has no place in the modern world.
The air is a public highway, as Congress has 
declared. Were that not true, every trans­
continental flight would subject the operator 
to countless trespass suits. Common sense 
revolts at the idea. To recognize such private 
claims to the airspace would clog these highways, 
seriously interfere with their control and 
development in the public interest, and transfer 
into private ownership that to which only the 
public has a just claim.
1Similarly, the Exchequer Court of Canada said:
This principle was admitted at a time when 
nobody could foresee our modern inventions and 
developments. It would be difficult to apply 
rules of law of a past period which had no idea 
of the sets of facts and circumstances that exist 
at the present time. So in France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States the tendency has 
been to restrict the interpretation of the above 
maxim and rule of law, always keeping in mind 
that the owner is entitled to full enjoyment of 
his property.
Probably, the most debatable point in English law is the 
nature of the landowner's interest in airspace, or, to 
put it in a more simple question, 'can airspace be owned?' 
McNair suggested two theories - (i) that prima facie a 
surface—owner has ownership of the fixed contents of the 
airspace and the exclusive right of filling the airspace 
with contents, and alternatively, (ii) the same as (i)
1
Jean Lacroix v. the Queen (1953) 195^ U.S. and
Aviation Reports(September No.3)» p.259»
Canadian
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with the addition of ownership of the airspace within 
the limits of an 1 2area of ordinary user* surrounding and 
attendant upon the surface and any erections on it.
McNair prefers the first theory, and considers it doubtful 
that the common law is committed to the view that mere
abstract space can be the subject of ownership apart from
1its contents. Winfield ventures to take the second
theory, considering that it is not clear why space, if
its common meaning of *extent of length, breadth and
thickness, irrespective of its contents* be taken, should
be incapable of ownership; a vacuum in an exhausted
receiver is just as capable of ownership as air in a 
2bottle. Professor Richardson avoids any conclusive 
opinion about space ownership, in the present state of 
the English authorities, either separately or as a 
consequence of the enjoyment of land, but is inclined to
1
McNair, op.cit., pp.48-9.
2
Winfield, op.cit., fifth ed., at p«323> seventh ed., 
at p.374.
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put more stress on possession than on ownership. In 
the present writer*s opinion, the air may be distinguished 
from the airspace, because the air is a floating, drifting 
and shifting substance while the airspace is a geographical 
area, capable of being reduced to occupation or possession 
if enveloped by fixed contents or even by fictitious 
lines; what matters is not whether airspace is physically 
occupiable or possessable but how it has been regarded in 
law.
The United States courts have taken the view that a 
landowner owns space up to a height which is necessary for 
his full and complete enjoyment of the land itself, or 
(particularly at the place near to an airport) to the 
minimum altitude of flight prescribed by the Civil Aviation 
Authority, and flight below those heights therefore 
constitutes a trespass. Through early aircraft cases in
1
Richardson, op.cit., pp*135-6. He says: *It seems that
there can be actual occupation of space, at any rate in 
connection with the use of land. The law is silent on 
the circumstances in which possession can ripen, if at 
all, into ownership. But the cases dealing with rateable 
occupation are authorities supporting possession. So 
far as the ownership of land is concerned, it does not 
much matter whether the occupation of space is considered 
to be possession or ownership, although possession is a 
more realistic and much tidier concept. Buildings upon 
land form part of the land itself and pass with it; as 
such they have no bearing on space rights.f
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11920fs upholding right of flight and later cases since
19301s relating to the conflict between the owner and
operator of an airport, and the owner and dweller on land 
2nearby, this zone theory has been a main trend in the
American judicial cases. The Causby Case firmly established
3ownership of space of landowners:
The landowner owns at least as much of the space 
above the ground as he can occupy or use in 
connection with the land....The fact that he 
does not occupy it in any physical sense - by 
the erection of buildings and the like - is not 
material....While the owner does not in physical 
manner occupy that stratum of airspace or make 
use of it in the conventional sense, he does use 
it in somewhat the same sense that space left 
between buildings for the purpose of light and 
air is used. The superadjacent airspace at 
this low altitude is so close to the land that 
continuous invasions of it affect the use of 
the surface of the land itself. We think that 
the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, 
has a claim to it and that invasions of it are 
in the same category as invasions of the surface.
Although the course of decision favours partial ownership,
there are some differences among U.S. cases in the court1s
As to those cases, see Hotchkiss, The Law of Aviation, 
second ed., pp.20-3 (esp. Johnson v. Curtis Northwest 
Airplane Co. et al. (not officially reported - 1924)).
2
See, Hotchkiss, op.cit., p.23, et seq. (esp. Smith v .
New England Aircraft Co., Inc. (1930) 270 Mass. 511;
170 N.E. 385; 1930 U.S.Av.R.1: Swetland v. Curtiss Airports
Corporation, U.S.D.C.N.D. Ohio, 1930» ^1 Fed.(2d) 929 »
1930 U.S.Av.R. 21.)
(19^6) U.S.Av.R. at pp.241-2; 382 U.S. at pp.264-5.
3
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approach to the problem. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport
would be an interesting exception, where it was held that
there was no trespass unless the flight occurred within
the zone of the landowner’s actual use; on this view, in
ordinary cases remedy will lie not in trespass but in
nuisance only. It would follow from the requirement of
actual, rather than potential, user that by raising the
height to which he actually uses the airspace above his
land (e.g. by erecting buildings) the landowner can
increase the minimum height below which flights will be a 
2trespass. It is submitted that the United States courts
now face a logical dilemma; they say that there is
ownership of airspace up to a certain height, yet they
refuse to enjoin flights unless the landowner’s interest
is adversely affected or threatened, although theoretically
the Court should grant a remedy in trespass for any
flight which involves an intrusion through airspace which
3is the subject of ownership.
1
U.S.Av.R. 1; 1 Av.640; 84 F.2d. 755 5 300 U.S.654.
2
McNair, op.cit., p.55* But, in view of the Causby Case 
and Griggs Case, infra, it is doubtful that, as McNair,says, 
the ’actual* theory has prevailed in the American 
judicial cases.
3
Cf. Poulton, Notes on Lectures in Air Law, 1955 3 pp.28-9*
297
ln the United States, there is the special constitutional 
problem of the guarantee of compensation for 1 taking* 
private property in the Fifth Amendment (or Fourteenth 
Amendment) to the Constitution. It has already been 
mentioned that the U.S. Supreme Court in the Causby Case 
held that, where the noise and glaring lights of military 
planes landing at or leaving an airport leased to the 
United States, flying below the navigable airspace as 
defined by Congress, interfered with the normal use of a 
neighbouring farm as a chicken farm, there was such a 
taking of an easement of flight as to give the owner a 
constitutional right to compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment. The provisions of the Fifth Amendment, so far 
as relevant, read: ’No person shall...be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.* Under sec.51(xxxi) of the Constitution, 
the Commonwealth Parliament may make laws with respect to 
* the acquisition of property on just terms from any State 
or person for any purpose in respect of which the 
Parliament has power to make laws*. It should be noted, 
first, that at the time of the Causby Case the Federal 
Claims Act of 1946 had not been enacted; in order to
60 Stat. 428 (1946).
1
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give the landowner a remedy in that case it was 
necessary to work out the taking* theory. It was 
otherwise an action in tort, and the similar solution 
is unlikely to be adopted in Australia where there is 
no such governmental immunity from suit for torts.
However, once successful in the Causby Case, this method 
of bringing damage actions against the Federal Government 
(under the Fifth Amendment) or the local Government (under 
the Fourteenth Amendment) could be used in similar 
circumstances, as this decision has recently been applied 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. County of Allegheny. 
The second point of importance is that at the time of the
1
369 U.S. 8k (1962), 7 L.Ed., 2d, 585-92. The defendant 
county designed the plan for its airport, including the 
arrangement of its take-off and approach areas, in compliance 
with federal requirements and under the supervision of and 
subject to the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator 
of the United States. Allowable costs payable by the federal 
government included costs of acquiring land or easements 
through airspace. The noise, vibrations, and fear caused 
to the occupants of plaintiff’s residential property 
located near a runway of the airport by constant and 
extremely low overflights interfered with the use of the 
owner’s property. In Common Pleas of Allegheny County, the 
Court held that there had been a ’taking’ by defendant of 
an air easement over plaintiff’s property and fixed 
compensation. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - two of 
the justices dissenting - held that if there was a ’taking’ 
in the constitutional sense, the county was not liable. On 
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed.
It was held that (l) the interference with the plaintiff’s 
property amounted to a ’taking’, in the constitutional 
sense, of an air easement for which compensation must be 
made; and (2) the defendant county, and not the United 
States, was the ’taker* liable to pay the compensation.
Two justices dissented from the ruling under (2).
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Causby Case Congress did not place the path of glide or 
flight in question within the 1 navigable airspace1 , which
was later redefined as including 1 airspace needed to
1insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft.1 It 
is to be observed, therefore, that, in order to invoke 
the ‘taking* theory, it was irrelevant whether the flight 
causing damage was performed within the ‘navigable 
airspace* or not. In the Griggs Case, no flights were in 
violation of the regulations of the Federal authority; 
nor were any flights lower than necessary for a safe 
landing or taking-off. Yet, there was held to be a 
‘taking*, where the noise, vibrations, and fear caused to 
the occupants of plaintiff*s residential property located 
near a runway of the airport by constant and extremely low 
overflights interfered with the use of the owner*s property. 
The third point is that the similar situations are confined 
to cases of damage caused by the Government-owned or 
Government-operated aircraft (as in the Causby Case) or 
by the owner or operator of Government-owned aerodromes 
(as in the Griggs Case), for private owners of aircraft 
and private airports have no power of * eminent domain*.
72 stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. 1301(24), 49 U.S.C.A. 1301(24).
1
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A philosophy underlying the * taking1 theory is based 
on the !ownership* theory of the landowner1s interest in 
airspace that he owns at least as much of the space above 
the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with 
land. An invasion of this *superadjacent airspace1 
affects directly the use of the surface of the land itself. 
If by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, 
the landowner could not use the land for any purpose, 
his loss is as complete as if the invader had entered upon 
the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of 
it. Although it will be only an easement of flight which 
is taken, this easement, if permanent and not merely 
temporary, normally would be equivalent of a fee interest. 
Hence, if the flight was not a direct invasion of 
1superadjacent airspace* to which the landowner*s 
ownership extended, then the remedy would have been in 
tort (trespass, nuisance or negligence.) Where as in 
English law the nature of the landowner* s interest in 
airspace is not entirely clear, it may be that the 
landowner does not own any more of the space above the 
ground than he can occupy or use in connection with the 
contents on the land (which is a possible prediction of 
the line upon which the Australian court will proceed), 
then the mere establishment of flightway and flying of
301
aircraft in ordinary cases cannot be regarded as 
’taking’ or ’expropriating1 any ’property* belonging 
to the landowner or interfering with his rights of 
ownership. In such a case, a direct invasion of 
*superadjacent airspace* owned by the landowner is 
unlikely to happen (except, perhaps, when aircraft fly 
in the airspace between the contents on the surface), and 
there is less opportunity to establish a flight easement. 
However, apart from such an invasion of the ’landowner’s 
airspace*, the complete destruction of the enjoyment and 
uninterrupted use of land may be caused by frequent and 
extremely low flights (not necessarily trespassing), 
particularly at the places near airports where it is 
inevitable for aircraft taking off from or landing at 
runways to cause a certain amount of noise, vibration, 
etc., within approach areas. If, on the contrary, the 
Australian law adopts the ’ownership’ theory, circumstances 
more similar to the United States position will arise in 
Australia. In either of the situations, the ’taking* 
concept may be invoked, if the damage caused is so serious 
and frequent (not merely temporary or casual) as to 
amount to the deprivation of the subjacent landowner’s
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"1property right. Under the Australian Constitution,
prima facie there is no reason why the right in airspace
of the landowner in using his land should be excluded
from the concept of ’property1 2, for ’property’ as a
subject of compulsory taking would cover ’not only
specific estates and interests in land recognized in law
and equity and specific forms of property in chattels
and choses in action similarly recognized, but also
2innominate and anomalous interests.’ The Commonwealth 
Parliament has exclusive legislative power with respect 
to ’all places acquired by the Commonwealth for public 
purposes’ (sec.52(i)), under which the Commonwealth 
controls the Commonwealth-owned aerodromes. Hence, the
1
Spater says that there can be no ’taking’ of tangible 
property under the U.S. federal Constitution unless two 
conditions exist: First, there must be a physical or 
direct ’invasion’ of the property and, second, the invasion 
must be of a type which results in ’exclusive’ appropriation. 
Applying this test to aviation cases, he asserts that only 
the landowner over whose property the flight path has been 
laid has lost the use of that airspace, and a neighbouring 
landowner may not recover for damage arising from the same 
objectionable activity (G.A. Spater, Noise and the Law,
63 Michigan Law Review (No.8), 1965» P*1373» esp. p.1385j
et seq.) However, in view of the high-speed mobility of 
aircraft and extensive scope of the resulting damage area, 
there is no reason why the ’taking* theory, if invoked, 
should be limited to the landowner’s property directly 
beneath the flight path. American cases seem to support 
Spater’s view, but the application of the taking theory to 
aviation damage cases will need more clarification by 
judicial thinking.
2
Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in 
Australia, third ed., pp.455-6, and see cases there cited.
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reason for invoking the protection of sec.51(xxxi) will 
be that, since an adequate approach way is a necessary 
part of an airport, the Commonwealth could and should have 
acquired private property near the Commonwealth-owned 
aerodromes for the purpose of operating them. But, it 
seems to be a matter of degree whether an Australian 
court will deal with this problem on the constitutional 
level of acquisition or on a tort basis. In Australia, 
there is authority for the view that sec.51(xxxi) is a 
protection to property and is not intended as a guarantee
against damage and interference for which the normal
1remedy is an action in negligence or nuisance. In the
Causby Case, Black J. whose dissenting opinion was joined
by Burton J. raised a serious doubt as to whether the
concept of taking property as used in the Constitution
had been given so sweeping a meaning and, having put an
emphasis upon the paramount authority of Congress in the
2navigable airspace, he rejected the taking* theory:
No greater confusion could be brought about in 
the coming age of air transportation than that 
which would result were courts by Constitutional
1
R.W. Baker, The Compulsory Acquisition Powers of the 
Commonwealth, Essays on the Australian Constitution, 
second ed., p.193* et seq. at p.204.
2
328 U.S. 273-5, 90 L.Ed. 1217-8.
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interpretation to hamper Congress in its efforts 
to keep the air free. Old concepts of private 
ownership of land should not be introduced into 
the field of air regulation. I have no doubt 
that Congress will, if not handicapped by 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution, 
preserve the freedom of the air, and at the same 
time, satisfy the just claims of aggrieved 
persons. The noise of newer, larger, and more 
powerful planes may grow louder and louder and 
disturb people more and more. But the solution of 
the problems precipitated by these technological 
advances and new ways of living cannot come about 
through the application of rigid Constitutional 
restraints formulated and enforced by the courts. 
What adjustments may have to be made, only the 
future can reveal. It seems certain, however, 
that courts do not possess the techniques or the 
personnel to consider and act upon the complex 
combinations of factors entering into the problems. 
The contribution of courts must be made through the 
awarding of damages for injuries suffered from the 
flying of planes, or by the granting of 
injunctions to prohibit their flying. When these 
two simple remedial devices are elevated to a 
Constitutional level under the Fifth Amendment, as 
the Court today seems to have done, they can stand 
as obstacles to better adapted techniques that 
might be offered by experienced experts and accepted 
by Congress. Today!s opinion is, I fear, an opening 
wedge for an unwarranted judicial interference with 
the power of Congress to develop solutions for new 
and vital and national problems. In my opinion 
this case should be reversed on the ground that 
there has been no 1 taking* in the Constitutional 
sense.
However, in the Griggs Case, the majority opinion in the
Causby Case was followed, and Black J. agreed with the
1* taking* theory:
369 U.S. 91, 7 L.Ed. 2d, 590.
1
305
Although I dissented in Causby because I did not 
believe that the individual aircraft flights 1 took1 
property in the constitutional sense merely by 
going over it and because I believed that the 
complexities of adjusting atmospheric property 
rights to the air age could best be handled by 
Congress, I agree with the Court that the noise, 
vibrations and fear caused by constant and extremely 
low overflights in this case have so interfered 
with the use and an enjoyment of petitioner* s 
property as to amount to a * taking* of it under the 
Causby holding.
Probably, the establishment of ’navigable airspace (or 
public domain)* would imply that no trespass suit lies 
against flight which takes place above the safe altitude 
fixed by the Federal authority, but the flight is not 
entirely exempt from nuisance, which may occur above (as 
well as below) the safe altitude. If the Commonwealth 
ventures to adopt the ’navigable airspace* system, and if 
the Court admits the ownership of superadjacent airspace 
above the land, then the Causby Case and Griggs ^ase may 
be inferred by the Court. The Commonwealth will suffer 
from numerous suits for ’taking* which may be brought by 
landowners below flightways near the Commonwealth-owned 
aerodromes, because theoretically the Court should 
otherwise grant a remedy at least in trespass for any 
flight invading airspace owned by them. If the Court 
interprets the nature of the landowner* s property right 
in airspace in a limited way, there still exists a
30 6
possibility of nuisance, a remedy for which is a suit 
for injunctive relief or damages or both against the 
flight taking place within the 'navigable airspace*.
Ttiether the suit lies in tort or on an acquisition basis 
will be a matter of degree, depending largely upon the 
factual circumstances.
1The Canadian Case, Jean Lacroix v, the Queen, stands 
in a sharp contrast with the American * ownership* 
arguments. The Crown expropriated an easement for on the 
suppliant's land and on adjoining properties for a 
lighting system to guide aircraft into and from an airport. 
The Crown accepted without question its liability to pay 
compensation for the actual use of the surface for 
lighting equipment, but suppliant also claimed compensation 
for the * flightway* established by the regular passage of 
the planes over his land; the establishment of this 
flightway and the flying of planes over his land was, 
according to the suppliant's claim, an interference with 
his rights of ownership and a disturbance of his full 
enjoyment of his property, and the Crown, having 
established this flightway and interfered with his rights
7“(1 9 5 3) Exchequer Court of Canada (December 2 9 , 1 9 5 3); 1 9 5 +^
U.S. and Canadian Aviation Reports (September No.3 ), p.2 5 9, 
et seq.
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of ownership, was liable for the damages claimed.
Fournier J., after having rejected the application of the
cujus maxim, disclosed his opinion as to the nature of the
landowner’s rights in airspace:
To agree with the position taken by the suppliant 
that the Crown, by expropriating an easement for 
a lighting system, had created a flightway and 
appropriated airspace over his land would be 
admitting that air and space may be appropriated 
or possessed. In my view, air and space are not 
susceptible of ownership and fall in the category 
of res omnium communis, which does not mean that 
the owner of the soil is deprived of the right 
of using his land for plantations and constructions 
or in any way which is not prohibited by law or 
against the public interest. It seems to me that 
the owner of land has a limited right in the 
airspace over his property; it is limited by what 
he can possess or occupy for the use and enjoyment 
of his land. By putting up buildings or other 
constructions the owner does not take possession 
of the air but unites or incorporates something to 
the surface of his land. This which is annexed or 
incorporated to his land becomes part and parcel 
of the property. The Crown could not expropriate 
that which is not susceptible of possession. It 
is contrary to fact to say that by the so-called 
establishment of a flightway and flying of planes 
it had taken any property belonging to the 
suppliant or interfered with his rights of 
ownership•
For these reasons the suppliant’s claim for damages by 
reason of the establishment of a flightway over his land 
failed, but the suppliant was held to be entitled to 
compensation for the value of the easement taken on the 
actual land surface and the injurious affection of his 
remaining land. Although, in view of the physical natures
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of air and space, our common sense should perhaps be 
impressed by the idea of res omnium communis rather than 
by other fictitious arguments setting up arbitrary 
boundaries in the air, nevertheless it is difficult to 
square the literal application of the idea with long 
established landowner’s rights in airspace. If, however, 
the concept does not derogate from the owner1s or 
occupier’s full enjoyment of his property, then it is
similar to McNair’s first theory and in accord with some
1English cases.
Whatever the nature of the landowner’s interest in
airspace, the courts in England and in the United States
fully recognize the right of the owner to the
uninterrupted use and enjoyment of his land, and such a
right carries with it a right to use the airspace above
the land as an incident to the enjoyment of the land 
2itself. Hence, if the aircraft or anything from it falls 
or descends upon the land, it will certainly be a trespass. 
If the aircraft passage interferes with the reasonable use 
and enjoyment of land, that will be a nuisance. If the 
aircraft fly so low as to come within the ’area of
1
The view then becomes akin to Lord Ellenborough’s dicta, 
supra.
2
Richardson, op.cit., p.l48.
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ordinary user’ which, varies in almost every case, then 
either a trespass or nuisance suit will probably lie at 
the present common law. The Australian courts are likely 
to treat the activities of aircraft on these general 
lines. But, in view of the indispensable importance and 
increasing popularization of aviation, it seems desirable 
if the Court would reject the fictitious zone theory or 
similar views allowing the landowner to own or possess 
airspace up to a certain height, and give him a remedy 
only in nuisance upon proof of damage. Liability problems 
arising from ground damage caused by aircraft will be 
examined in detail in Chapter IX and it is sufficient 
here to mention that ordinary principles of 'nuisance1 
apply to such cases - that is, in order to merit legal 
intervention as nuisance the annoyance or discomfort must 
be substantial and unreasonable; in determining 
'substantiality* and 'unreasonableness* we must have 
regard to 'an inconvenience materially interfering with 
the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not 
merely according to elegant and dainty modes and habits of 
living, but according to plain and sober notions among 
our people*, 'reactions of normal persons in the particular
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locality, not to the idiosyncrasies of the particular 
plaintiff’ or ’the social value which the law attaches
1to the object the defendant is pursuing by his activity’.
Undoubtedly, in many cases, continuance or recurrence is
necessary to cause substantial harm, and the courts are
particularly reluctant to grant an injunction where the
nuisance is only temporary or occasional. But if the claim is
for damages, the duration of the interference must be
weighed together with all other relevant factors. In cases
of actual injury to persons or property, as distinct from
mere comfort, the fact that the occurrence was momentary
and unlikely to recur is ordinarily irrelevant.
Shawcross and Beaumont say that to constitute a nuisance by
flight, there must be considerable repetition of the act 
2complained of. But McNair seems to support the view that 
circumstances might arise in which the court would hold 
that a single flight interfered with the reasonable use 
and enjoyment of the land so as to constitute a nuisance, 
although he admits that the disturbance caused by a single 
flight is so trivial as to attract to itself the protection 
_
Fleming, op.cit., pp.3^1—70.
Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., p.4l8.
2
Probably, whenof the maxim de minimis non curat lex, 
those writers expressed such opinions in the early 
1950*s, they may not have considered the enormous noise 
caused by jet-aircraft.
The common law rules of the legal status of airspace
in relation to the landowner*s interest and aircraft
flight are now modified by statutes in four States of 
2Australia. In New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and
Western Australia, statutory enactments in almost
identical terms with sec.40 of the Civil Aviation Act
(u.K.), 1949, govern the basic principles of aircraft
flights above subjacent lands and of liability for ground
3damage caused by aircraft. The provisions of those 
enactments, establish, firstly, no liability for technical 
legal injury, viz. mere invasion of legal title (trespass 
or nuisance), and, secondly, absolute liability for 
material loss or damage caused by aircraft on the surface.
1
McNair, op.cit., (2nd ed.) p.45»
2
New South Wales: Damage by Aircraft A ct, 1952.
Victoria: Wrongs (Damage by Aircraft) Act, 1953» as repealed 
by Wrongs Act, 1 9 5 8 (Part V I - Damage by Aircraft).
Tasmania: Damage by Aircraft Act, 1963«
Western Australia: Damage by Aircraft A c t , 1964.
3
The provisions of the statute do not cover other relevant 
liability problems, e.g. limitation of liability, insurance 
system, actions for damages, etc.
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The provisions common to four States1 statutes read as 
follows:
No action shall lie in respect of trespass or 
in respect of nuisance, by reason only of the 
flight of an aircraft over any property at a 
height above the ground, which, having regard 
to wind, weather, and all the circumstances of 
the case is reasonable, or the ordinary 
incidents of such flight so long as the 
provisions of the Air Navigation Regulations 
are duly complied with.
This gives a right of innocent passage to aviators 
insofar as they comply with the stated conditions. To 
this extent, private property rights in airspace at 
common law are modified, and possible trespass or nuisance 
suits at common law are denied. However, since even a 
flight in conformity with this sub-section may be liable 
under sub-section (2) establishing absolute liability in 
the case of material loss or damage on the surface, the 
landowner1s interest is not obliterated by the legislation. 
It is submitted that 1 all the circumstances of the case1 
includes the fact that the aircraft has recently taken 
off or is preparing to land, and ’ordinary incidents of 
such flights1 is construed as ordinary consequences of 
the normal behaviour of an aircraft; for example, a
certain amount of noise and a certain invasion of privacy
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are inevitable. It should be observed, however, that 
in certain circumstances^ the statutory rule does not 
apply and the common law rules do. In the two other 
States (i.e., Queensland and South Australia) and in 
Commonwealth Territories, the matter is still governed by 
common law.
No such federal legislation has so far been enacted
in Australia; note however reg.90 of the Air Navigation
Regulations providing that:
Nothing in these Regulations shall be construed 
as conferring on any aircraft, as against the 
owner of any land or any person interested 
therein, the right to alight on that land, or 
as prejudicing the rights or remedies of any 
person in respect of any injury to persons or 
property caused by the aircraft.
Accordingly, even if an aircraft complies with rules of
the Regulations (e.g. low flying), rights of the landowner
of the person interested in that land are protected in any
1
McNair, op.cit., p.109* See also Halsbury's Laws of 
England, third ed., vol.5} p.246. It is submitted that 
the word ’of’ seems to have been omitted before the words
1 the ordinary incidents of such flight’.
2
According to McNair, the cases in which the statutory 
provisions do not apply are, for example, when the air 
traffic regulations have not been complied with (then the 
immunity ceases to apply) or when the flight does not take 
place ’at a height above the ground, which having regard 
to wind, weather and all the circumstances of the case is 
reasonable’, &c. Cf. McNair, op.cit., pp.99-100.
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case. It is not clear, however, whether any »injury* 
means only »material (or physical) injury* or includes 
* technical legal injury* , but at any rate it would include 
»injury* by nuisance. While any flight complying with 
rules of the present Commonwealth Regulations is generally 
lawful in other respects, the effect of reg.90 is to declare 
that liberty to fly in relation to the legal status of 
airspace in private law is left to the State statutory 
rules or common law.
As the foregoing discussions disclose, there are two 
types of solutions to be adopted by the Commonwealth: one
is to set up »navigable airspace* by declaring airspace 
above a certain safety altitude uniformly as the »public 
domain* wherein every citizen enjoys the right of freedom 
of transit, as has been firmly established in the U.S., and 
the other is to establish the right of innocent passage to 
the exclusion of the landowner* s action for trespass or 
nuisance »by reason only of the mere flight*, as has been 
adopted by the four States* statutes modelled after the 
U.K. legislation. The practical effects of the two 
solutions are similar; any flight taking place within the 
‘navigable airspace* will be exempt from trespass suit 
(but not necessarily from nuisance suit), while the 
establishment of »innocent passage* only is a manifestation
315
of the implied Commonwealth authority in upper airspace.
It should be observed, however, that the concept of 
’public domain’ is less favoured in Australia, partly 
because the nature of the landowner’s property right 
in airspace is not entirely clear, partly because a formal 
interpretation of legislative power rather than the idea 
of ’public use’ is emphasized in Australia, and perhaps 
because a public domain theory may lead to numerous 
suits for compensation by reason of ’taking* in the 
constitutional sense, which will be brought by private 
landowners and the State Governments in respect of Crown 
land, particularly at places near the Commonwealth-owned 
aerodromes. The Commonwealth cannot under any of its 
powers arbitrarily declare all of the airspace over a 
State’s territory or a person’s land to be in the ’public 
domain’ and then give absdLute immunity against claims for 
damages, excepting in federal territories; only the States 
can adopt such a drastic policy in their territorial 
limits under the full power of ’eminent domain’, but they 
are not likely to do so. On the other hand, the 
establishment of innocent passage is merely to authorize 
the flight free from trespass or nuisance, depending on 
whether the conditions of weather, height or flight rules 
are duly complied with; it does not establish a national
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highway in a true sense. Moreover, it is doubtful that 
the Commonwealth * commerce' power can regulate the 
damage relations between aviators and landowners in 
general, to any greater extent than prescribing the 
innocent passage of aircraft flights. Probably, the 
best Commonwealth solution in the Australian setting will 
be to combine the effects of the above two solutions - 
that is to say, to provide that no action shall lie in 
respect of trespass or nuisance by reason only of the 
flight of aircraft over any property at a height fixed 
by the Commonwealth. Such a provision could certainly 
be enacted as incidental to federal authority to regulate 
flight under the various heads previously discussed.
The Commonwealth may apply the present regulation of low 
flying to the safe altitude in this highway, including 
the path of glide needed for taking off from or landing 
at aerodromes. The Commonwealth may also provide that no 
action shall lie in respect of nuisance by reason only 
of the noise and vibration caused by aircraft on or near 
a Commonwealth aerodrome, so long as the Air Navigation 
Regulations are duly complied with. The task of 
interpreting what constitutes 'nuisance' by reason only 
of the noise and vibration in the normal operation around 
aerodromes will be entrusted to the Courts. But, in any
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case, it must be distinguished from mere discomfort or 
annoyance. Perhaps such a system will primarily confined 
to aircraft engaged in international, inter-State,
Territory, etc. ’commerce1 by air, but it is not 
inconceivable that intra-state flights could eventually be 
authorised as well by judicial extension of the doctrine 
of Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.2).^~ By such a system, 
any doubt of foreign aviators flying in accordance with 
an international agreement to which Australia is a party 
that they might be sued in trespass or nuisance while 
in Australian territory will also be removed.
To summarize then, the position in Australia with 
respect to the legal status of airspace and liberty to 
fly is as follows:
International flight activities are largely 
conditioned by the State’s ’complete and exclusive’ 
sovereignty in airspace above the State’s territory;
’freedom of the air’ in the international sky, in contrast 
with the doctrine of ’freedom of the seas’, is secured 
only when some States agree to restrict airspace sovereignty 
by international conventions or treaties concluded with
38 A.L.J.R. 388.
1
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other States* However, the Chicago Convention, now 
accepted by more than 100 countries, including Australia, 
imposes upon a contracting State an obligation to give 
freedom of the air in respect of non-scheduled air 
services of the other contracting States (or vice versa), 
and the Two Freedoms Agreement and bilateral air transport 
agreements exchange among the contracting States freedom of 
the air in respect of scheduled international air services. 
By these international agreements, which are given the 
force of law in national law in the respective contracting 
States, foreign aviators or specified airlines acquire the 
right to fly within Australia and reciprocally Australian 
aviators or a designated airline (Qantas) acquire the right 
to fly in other contracting States.
In the case of Australia, such an international 
exchange of liberty to fly will have effect both upon the 
constituent State1s jurisdictional rights in airspace 
within its territorial boundaries and upon the landowner*s 
private property rights in airspace above his land.
Suppose a constituent State takes a measure to prevent or 
obstruct the passage of foreign aviators flying through 
that particular State*s airspace in accordance with the 
terms of international agreements. The air safety 
regulations including flight and maneouvre of aircraft are
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now wholly entrusted to the Commonwealth, but, in the 
absence of any Commonwealth law to the contrary, the State 
might take such a step within its some constitutional 
power for some reasons other than air safety matters. 
Similarly, if the Australian national law does not 
guarantee or fails to authorize the innocent passage of 
foreign aviators as against the landowner* s interests in 
airspace, their right to fly over Australian territory 
would be subject to potential claims for trespass or 
nuisance at common law or under several States* statutory 
rules. Since an individual observes only applicable 
Commonwealth or State laws, and the immediate effect of 
the breach of international obligations produces only a 
liability of the responsible Government to the other 
sovereign States concerned, it would be desirable for the 
Commonwealth to regulate expressly the relation between 
landowners and foreign aviators in private law within 
Australia, insofar as necessary for securing the terms of 
international obligations. Perhaps, such protection 
would be inferred by the Courts from the present 
statutory law, but it is unsatisfactory that the position
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is left to implication. From the Australian point of 
view, it would have been most convenient if some 
international legislation were introduced on this subject 
so as to enable the Commonwealth Parliament to enact a 
substantially uniform law concerning trespass or nuisance 
by all kinds of aircraft.
One other consideration will be necessary for foreign 
aviators of countries other than contracting parties to 
any of such international agreements involving Australia. 
They are subject to the Australian 'exclusive and complete* 
sovereignty, and can fly within Australian territory only 
in accordance with the authority or permission issued by 
the Commonwealth Government. The Commonwealth has assumed 
no international obligation to ensure the innocent passage 
of such foreign aviators, but, once it authorizes or permits 
them to fly, any interference with such flights upon the
1
It is to be remembered that the principal reason why 
sec.4o of the Civil Aviation Act 19^9 (formerly sec.9 of 
the 1920 Act) were considered necessary in the United 
Kingdom was the adoption of the principle of a mutual 
right of innocent passage for civil aircraft by the Chicago 
Convention (previously the Paris Convention). In the case 
of England, possessing a unitary form of government, such 
an implementation of international law could be achieved by 
a single statute, which dealt not only with international 
flights but with all flight. Different considerations will 
be necessary in the case of Australia by virtue of its 
Constitution, but the international exchange of the right 
of flight with other countries (even though they are of 
the nature of public law) must affect the relation between 
Australian landowners and foreign aircraft.
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grounds other than the conditions prescribed in the 
temporary permission or authorization will cause an 
international illegal act for which the Commonwealth 
Government is liable, so that here again more explicit 
provision as to the private law position is desirable.
The sovereign rights of the Commonwealth and the 
States in the 'Australian1 airspace are in principle 
co-existent; their respective scope is defined by the 
Constitution. However, owing to the increasing importance 
of the federal authority in aviation matters, the balance 
of jurisdictional rights in airspace is now changing in 
favour of the Commonwealth. Although the Commonwealth 
has not introduced in its legislation the idea of 'every 
citizen's right of freedom of transit’ through the 
'navigable airspace', liberty to fly across the State 
airspace barriers is implied either by the practically 
overwhelming Commonwealth authority over every aircraft 
flight or by the Constitution. It may not be necessary 
to introduce the American concept of 'public domain’, but 
it is desirable for the- Commonwealth to establish a 
national highway linking the domestic free air-corridor 
with the international sky, and remove remaining doubts 
as to aviators* right of flight over the State territories. 
Eventually, this will also exclude the State's interference
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based upon its property claims for the Government-owned 
land and airspace above it in right of the Crown.
The Australian legislation need not necessarily follow 
American judicial theories in respect of the nature of the 
private landowners* interest in superincumbent airspace 
at common law. The Australian courts may well take 
their own views, differing from the American examples by 
balancing the landowner*s interests, the aviation interests 
and the public needs in a different way. At present, the 
law is divided into several jurisdictions in Australia; 
statutory rules govern in four States and common law 
rules in the remaining two States and the Commonwealth 
Territories. However, international legislation 
reciprocally exchanges the right to fly among the 
contracting States, and implicitly requires the changing 
of national private law in respect of the legal status of 
airspace, and the Commonwealth commerce power may well 
establish by implication the right of innocent passage 
of Australian aviators. Hence, it may be given as a 
conclusion that the Commonwealth could and should 
incorporate * liberty to fly* in an Australia-wide code 
on the lines suggested already.
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CHAPTER VII
Regulations of Air Navigation and Liberty to Fly
With the appearance of aviation age, Governments have 
been deeply concerned about the safety of the public and 
the development of the industry. Liberty to fly both in 
international and in domestic aviation is largely 
conditioned by various regulatory rules designed for the 
purpose that aviation be conducted in a safe, regular 
and efficient manner. Even if flight over others1 lands 
does not constitute any legal interference with those 
owners* property rights in airspace, the aviator may be 
in fact prohibited to fly unless he complies with these 
administrative rules concerning aircraft, flight, licences, 
etc. In outlining these rules and administrative machineries 
to enforce them, special notice should be taken of the 
strong influence of international legislation upon 
national law, and of the fact that, under various 
legislative heads and particularly under international 
influences, the Commonwealth Government is (as it should 
be) entrusted with legislation and administration of 
almost every aspect of aviation regulations in Australia. 
However, it is not intended here to go into details of
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these innumerable and mostly technical rules; our 
present survey is confined to outline the international 
and Australian regulatory systems of air navigation.
I International Law
As declared in the Preamble, the professed object 
of the Chicago Convention is to lay down principles and 
make arrangements in order that international civil 
aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner 
and international air transport services may be established 
on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated 
soundly and economically. The Chicago Convention follows 
as a whole the general lines of the Paris Convention.
It recognizes again that every State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory; 
it provides for freedom of the air (though only in respect 
of non-scheduled civil air services), for nationality and 
registration of aircraft, for conditions to be fulfilled 
with respect to aircraft, and for adoption of measures to 
facilitate aviation. The Convention established the 
I.C.A.O. to develop the principles and techniques of 
international air navigation and to foster the planning 
and development of international air transport.
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1. Limitations to Freedom of the Air
The general principles of freedom of the air in the 
international sky have been discussed in the previous 
Chapter in relation to the legal status of airspace. The 
mutual flight guaranteed by the Chicago Convention to 
aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air 
services is subject to various limitations expressly laid 
down in the Convention: designation of routes and 
airports (Arts. 5 and 68), cabotage (Art. 7)» prohibition 
of flight by pilotless aircraft (Art. 8), restriction or 
prohibition of flight over prohibited areas (Art. 9)> 
landing at or departure from an airport for the purpose 
of customs and other examination (Art. 10), restrictions 
on articles carried in aircraft (i.e. aircraft radio 
equipment (Art.30), cargo restrictions (e.g. munitions of 
war (Art.35) j and photographic apparatus (Art.36)). The 
Air Navigation Act and Regulations of the Commonwealth 
give effect to those provisions; for example, with respect 
to designation of airports, the Minister may designate 
as an international airport an aerodrome at which 
facilities are available for the formalities incident to 
customs, immigration, quarantine and other requirements 
in connection with arrival in or departure from Australian 
territory of aircraft, and international aircraft must
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land at and take off from the international airports so
1designated. Mention has already been made as to these
limitations attached to freedoms of the air in respect of
2scheduled international air services.
2 o Conditions to be fulfilled with respect to Aircraft 
Aircraft have the nationality of the State in which 
they are registered. An aircraft cannot be validly 
registered in more than one State, but its registration 
or transfer of registration of aircraft is left to the 
laws and regulations of the State. Every aircraft 
engaged in international air navigation must bear its 
appropriate nationality and registration marks; the method 
of doing this is specified in Annex 7 of the Chicago 
Convention. The contracting States have an obligation (a) 
to supply to any other contracting State or to the I.C.A.O., 
on demand, information concerning the registration and 
ownership of any particular aircraft on its register, and 
(b) to furnish the l.C.A.O. with such pertinent data as
can be made available as to the ownership and control of✓
aircraft on its register which are habitually engaged in
_
Secs. 9 and 10 of the Act.
See Chapter VI, ante.
2
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international air navigation. These matters relating 
to nationality of aircraft are prescribed in Chapter III 
(Arts. 17-21) of the Chicago Convention.
The Convention lays down conditions which must be 
complied with by aircraft in respect of their documents. 
By Art.29j every aircraft of a contracting State, engaged 
in international air navigation, must carry the following 
do cuments:
its certificate of registration, 
its certificate of airworthiness,
the appropriate licences for each member of the 
crew,
its journey log book,
if it is equipped with radio apparatus, the 
aircraft radio station licence, 
if it carries passengers, a list of their names 
and places of embarkation, 
if it carries cargo, a manifest and detailed 
declaration of the cargo.
Conditions as to certificate of airworthiness, licences
of personnel, recognition of certificates and licences,
and journey log books are respectively prescribed in the
Convention (Arts. 3*1-3^) * Mention has already been made
as to the restrictions on aircraft radio equipment, cargo
restrictions, and photographic apparatus.
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3• Unification of Rules, Regulations and Practices of 
Air Navigation
The provisions of the Chicago Convention requiring 
unification of rules, etc. of air navigation are particularly 
important, for they set out the obligations to be 
implemented by Australia not only as to international 
aircraft and aviation, whether 1 schedules1 or ’non-scheduled’, 
but also as to air navigation in general.
(1) Rules of Flight and Manoeuvre:
Each contracting State undertakes to adopt measures to 
insure that every aircraft flying over or manoeuvring 
within its territory and that every aircraft carrying its 
nationality mark, wherever such aircraft may be, shall 
comply with the rules and regulations relating to the flight 
and manoeuvre of aircraft there in force (Art.12, first 
paragraph). This obligation is thus applicable to ’every1 
aircraft, irrespective of whether it is engaged in 
’domestic* (in the case of Australia, ’inter-State’ or 
’intra-State) or ’international’ aviation. However, the 
expression ’rules and regulations... there in force’ may 
give rise to a difficult problem in a federal country 
like Australia, because it might be argued that the 
Commonwealth assumed an international obligation only to 
make every aircraft comply with the rules it can make
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under its domestic distribution of powers - not an 
obligation to regulate the whole field of the flight and 
manoeuvre of aircraft. However, each contracting State 
must undertake to keep its own regulations in these 
respects uniform, to the greatest possible extent, with
1those established from time to time under the Convention 
(Art. 12, second paragraph). Accordingly, under the 
*external affairs* power as properly construed, the 
Commonwealth could have acquired the power from this 
paragraph to regulate the flight and manoeuvre of all 
aircraft flying within the Australian territory. This 
could also have allowed the Commonwealth to implement 
effectively another international obligation that each 
contracting State undertakes to insure the prosecution of 
all persons violating the regulation applicable (Art.12, 
fourth paragraph). However, now that the Commonwealth 
constitutional competence to regulate air safety matters 
(including flight and manoeuvre of aircraft) in respect 
of every aircraft flying within the Australian territory
2has been established in the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2),
1
Cf. Annex 2 of the Convention (Rules of the Air).
2
38 A.L.J.R. 388.
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it is not necessary for us to develop this suggestion 
further. Over the high seas, the rules in force shall be 
those established under the Chicago Convention, namely, 
the standards and practices recommended or established 
from time to time by the Council of I.C.A.O. (Art.12, 
third paragraph).
(2) International Standards and Recommended Practices:
A more comprehensive obligation for the unification 
of rules, &c. of air navigation is provided in Art.37} 
which reads as follows:
Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate 
in securing the highest practicable degree of 
uniformity in regulations, standards, proceedings, 
and organization in relation to aircraft, personnel, 
airways and auxiliary services in all matters in 
which such uniformity will facilitate and improve 
air navigation. To this end the International 
Civil Aviation Organization shall adopt and amend 
from time to time, as may be necessary, international 
standards and recommended practices and procedures 
dealing with [l1 items or topics]^ and such other 
matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and 
efficiency of air navigation as may from time to 
time appear appropriate.
1
They are: (a) communications systems and air navigation
aids, including ground marking; (b) characteristics of 
airports and landing areas; (c) rules of the air and air 
traffic control practices; (d) licensing of operating and 
mechanical personnel; (e) airworthiness of aircraft; (f) 
registration and identification of aircraft; (g) collection 
and exchange of meteorological information; (h) log books; 
(i) aeronautical maps and charts; (j) customs and 
immigration procedures; (k) aircraft in distress and 
investigation of accident.
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Fifteen Annexes have so far been adopted by the I.C.A.O.: 
Annex 1 (Personal Licensing), Annex 2 (Rules of the Air), 
Annex 3 (Meteorology), Annex 4 (Aeronautical Charts),
Annex 5 (Units of Measurement to be used in Air-Ground 
Communications), Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft - 
International Commercial Air Transport), Annex 7 (Aircraft 
Nationality and Registration Marks), Annex 8 (Airworthiness 
of Aircraft), Annex 9 (Facilitation), Annex 10 
(Aeronautical Telecommunications), Annex 11 (Air Traffic 
Services - Air Traffic Control Service, Flight Information 
Service and Alerting Service), Annex 12 (Search and 
Rescue), Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident Inquiry), Annex 14 
(Aerodromes), and Annex 15 (Aeronautical Information 
Services). In each Annex, the attention of contracting 
States is drawn to the desirability of using in their own 
national regulations, as far as practicable, the precise 
language of those I.C.A.O. standards that are of a 
regulatory character and also of indicating departures 
from the standards, including any additional national 
regulations that are important for the safety or 
regularity of air navigation. For this purpose, wherever 
possible, the provisions of the Annexes have been 
deliberately written in such a way as would facilitate 
incorporation, without major textual changes, into
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national legislation. Mention has already been made
of the constitutional obstacle to Australian implementation
of those requirements which, in contrast with the similar
provisions of Annexes of the Paris Convention, may be
2regarded as non-obligatory. It is therefore sufficient 
to add a few more comments on the nature of the 
international legislation. First, as the Convention was 
primarily drawn up for the development of international 
air navigation, most provisions of the Annexes are 
necessarily concerned with international aviation and 
aircraft; for example, Annex 6 is applicable to the 
operation of aircraft in scheduled international air 
services and in non-scheduled international air transport
1
’Standards' is defined as ’any specification for physical 
characteristics, configuration, materiel, performance, 
personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which 
is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of 
international air navigation and to which Contracting 
States will conform in accordance with the Convention; in 
the event of impossibility of compliance, notification to 
the Council is compulsory under Art.38.’ ’Recommended 
practice’ is defined as ’any specification for physical 
characteristics, configuration, materiel, performance, 
personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which 
is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, 
regularity or efficiency of international air navigation, 
and to which Contracting States will endeavour to conform 
in accordance with the Convention.’ Cf. the ’Forward’ of 
each Annex.
2
See Chapter III, ante.
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operations for renumeration or hire. Theoretically, 
such international requirements may be directed to that
portion of national legislation relating only to 
international operations or aircraft. But some other 
Annexes are not so limited, and indeed the true intent 
of Art.37 5 requiring the States* collaboration in securing 
the uniformity in 1 all matters in which such uniformity 
will facilitate and improve air navigation* and * such other 
matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and 
efficiency of air navigation*, is to obligate each 
contracting State to adopt the standards and practices in 
its national regulations which should be observed as 
nearly as possible by aircraft engaged either in 
international or in domestic aviation. Secondly, such 
international standards and recommended practices might 
relate only to regulatory aspects of air navigation of the 
technical nature without affecting a State*s economic 
or political interest. The 13 Annexes deal with technical 
and operational aspects of civil aviation and it is 
unlikely that the I.C.A.O. would adopt henceforth Annexes 
affecting directly any national policy of co-ordination 
or rationalization. However, this has nothing to do with 
the question how the Government of a contracting State 
should implement them (even if they are of a regulatory
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nature) to the fullest extent within its constitutional 
framework. The whole objective of Art.37 is directed to 
the achievement of the * safety, regularity, and efficiency 
of air navigation’ which may not be attained unless the 
responsible Government of a contracting State exercises 
economic control over the national industry as a whole; 
the situation would vary from State to State in accordance 
with the State’s development of civil aviation at a 
particular stage. Thirdly, any State which finds it 
impracticable to comply with any such international 
standards or procedures, or which deems it necessary to 
adopt regulations differing from them, must immediately 
notify the I.C.A.O., and, in such cases, the Council of 
I.C.A.O. shall make immediate notification to all other 
States of such differences (Art.38). In the case of 
Australia, this gives also rise to a constitutional question 
as to how far the Commonwealth can deviate from those 
standards, etc. It might be argued that the Commonwealth 
cannot deviate whether by way of a supplementary requirement 
(unless incidental) or a different regulation covering the 
same subject, unless supported by other heads of 
legislative power. However, now that the Commonwealth has 
comprehensive constitutional power to control air safety 
matters, no such problem would arise, and in any case the
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’ external affairs’ power is likely to be construed by 
the Court today in a flexible way. Moreover, the power 
to deviate in a prescribed manner recognized under Art.38 
of the Convention limits the relevance of the rigid test 
adopted by the High Court in considering the Paris
Convention, viz. ’the regulation must be stamped with
1the purpose of carrying out the Convention’• There are 
two more subordinate pieces of international legislation. 
The ’Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS)’, 
approved by the Council for world-wide application, 
comprises for the most part, operating procedures regarded 
as not yet having attained as a sufficient degree of 
maturity for adoption as International Standards and 
Recommended Practices, as well as material of a more 
permanent character which is considered too detailed for 
incorporation in an Annex, or is susceptible to frequent 
amendment, for which the processes of the Convention 
would be too cumbersome. As in the case of Recommended 
Practices, the Council has invited contracting States to 
notify any differences between their national practices 
and the PANS when the knowledge of such differences is 
_
R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry (first Henry Case) 55 C.L.R. 
608; cf. Poulton, op.cit., p.7.
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important for the safety of air navigation. 1Regional 
Supplementary Procedures (Supps)1 have a status similar 
to that of PANS in that they are approved by the Council, 
but only for application in their respective regions.
They are prepared in consolidated form, since certain of 
the procedures apply to overlapping regions or are common 
to two or more regions.
4. Measures to facilitate Air Navigation:
The contracting States undertake the following 
obligations intended to facilitate air navigation in 
general: adoption of all practicable measures to facilitate
and expedite international air navigation and to prevent 
unnecessary delays to aircraft, crews, passengers, and 
cargo (especially in the administration of the laws relating 
to immigration, quarantine, customs and clearances) (Art.22); 
establishment of customs and immigration procedures (Art.23); 
freedoms from customs duty of aircraft engaged in 
international air navigation, of fuel, lubricating oils, 
spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores, and 
of spare parts and equipment imported into a contracting 
State for use in such aircraft (Art.24); assistance to 
aircraft in distress and collaboration with other States 
in such measures and in the search for missing aircraft
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(Art.25); investigation of accidents (Art.26); exemption 
from seizure or detention of aircraft, equipment and 
spares on claims for infringement of patents (Art.27); 
provision of airports and air navigation facilities 
(Art.28); adoption of effective measures to prevent the 
spread by means of air navigation of various diseases 
(Art.14); prohibition of imposing fees, dues or other 
charges in respect solely of the right of transit over or 
entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft 
of a contracting State or persons or property thereon 
(Art.15)« These obligations are primarily intended for 
the facilitation of international* 1 air navigation in which 
considerable administrative discretion of the contracting 
State concerned will be allowed, but some of them (e.g.
Art.23) explicitly impose upon the contracting States an 
obligation to accord their regulations to the standards 
and recommended practices adopted by the I.C.A.O.
1
Cf. The Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, signed 
on 12 April 1933} at The Hague, entered into force on
1 August 1935» Until this Convention was formulated, 
measures of protection against the spread of disease by 
aircraft had been included in the municipal law of several 
countries, and in certain bilateral agreements. The 
Convention was modified by the International Sanitary 
Convention for Aerial Navigation, 19^, signed at 
Washington. Australia is a party, and gives effect to the 
Convention in the Quarantine (Air Navigation) Regulations 
(S.R. 19^ -8, No. 91j as amended by S.R. 1950, No. 42) .
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5. International Civil Aviation Organization (i.C.A.O.)
Part II (chapters 7“ 13 (Arts.43-66)) of the Chicago 
Convention deals with the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (i.C.A.O.), which resulted from the Chicago 
Conference. The aims and objectives of I.C.A.O. are to 
develop the principles and techniques of international 
air navigation and to foster the planning and development 
of international air transport. Art.44 states these 
objectives in more detail:
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of 
international civil aviation throughout the 
world;
(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and 
operation for peaceful purposes;
(c) Encourage the development of airways, 
airports, and air navigation facilities for 
international civil aviation;
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world 
for safe, regular, efficient and economic 
air transport;
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable 
compe tition;
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States 
are fully respected and that every contracting 
State has a fair opportunity to operate 
international airlines;
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting 
States;
(h) Promote safety of flight in international 
air navigation;
(i) Promote generally the development of all 
aspects of international civil aeronautics.
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The Organization enjoys in the territory of each
contracting State such legal capacity as may be necessary
1for the performance of its functions. It is a specialized
agency in relationship with the United Nations, and
maintains close liaison with certain of the specialized
agencies such as International Telecommunications Union,
the World Meteorological Organization, etc. Its finance
is borne by the member States, in accordance with a scale
of contributions laid down by the Assembly, which is based
upon the interest and importance in international civil
aviation of the various States, their national incomes and
2various other relevant factors. Officials of the ICAO
1
Art.47« By sec.6 of the Commonwealth Air Navigation A c t , 
Australia gives effect to it:
(1) The International Civil Aviation Organization 
possesses such legal capacity and is entitled
to such privileges and immunities as are necessary 
for the independent exercise of its powers and 
performance of its function in Australian territory.
(2) Without limiting the generality of the last 
preceding sub-section the ICAO has in Australian 
territory judicial personality and the capacity - 
(a) to contract; (b) to acquire and dispose of 
real and personal property; and (c) to institute 
legal proceedings.
(3) The archives and other documents of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization kept in Australian 
territory are inviolable.
2
Australia contributes to ICAO approximately £48,000 per 
year (June 1964 at present) (cf. rThe International Civil 
Aviation Organization* 1 23 prepared by the International 
Relations Branch, Department of Civil Aviation, 1964).
3^0
are entitled, in the territories of States who are 
parties to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the Specialized Agencies, to privileges and immunities.
Art.59 of the Chicago Convention emphasises their
11 international' character.
I.C.A.O. is made up of an Assembly, a Council, other
subsidiary bodies (i.e. Air Navigation Commission, Air
Transport Committee, Committee on Joint Support of Air
Navigation Services, Legal Committee, Finance Committee,
Regional Air Transport Committee) and a Secretariat.
The Assembly, a governing body, meets not less than once 
2in three years and is convened by the Council. Each 
contracting State is entitled to one vote and decisions 
of the Assembly are taken by a majority of the votes cast 
except when otherwise provided in the Convention. The 
Council, an executive body, is a permanent body 
responsible for the Assembly and is composed of
1
Art.59» The Council determines the method of appointment 
and of termination of appointment, the training, and the 
salaries, allowances, and conditions of service of the 
Seeretary—General and other personnel of the Organization, 
and may employ or make use of the services of nationals 
of any contracting State, subject to any rules laid down 
by the Assembly and to the provisions of the Convention.
2
Cf. The Protocol, signed at Rome, on 15 September 1962, 
amending Art.48(a) of the Chicago Convention in respect 
of an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly.
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representatives of twenty-seven contracting States
2elected by each major session of the Assembly. Many
administrative matters of international civil aviation
are dealt with by this body; one of the major duties of
the Council is to adopt international standards and
recommended practices and to incorporate them as Annexes
to the Convention. It may investigate, and give financial
assistance for, any situation which presents avoidable
obstacles to the development of international air
navigation. In general, it may take whatever steps
necessary to maintain the safety and regularity of
operation of international air transport. The Air
Navigation Commission is composed of twelve members
appointed by the Council from among persons nominated by
3contracting States. These persons shall have suitable
1
In an Extraordinary Session (13th) held in Montreal, the 
Assembly resolved unanimously that the increasing of the 
size of the Council was necessary and approved a Protocol 
amending the Chicago Convention so as to authorize an 
increase in the size of the Council from twenty-one to 
twenty-seven members.
2
At the 12th Session of the Assembly held in San Diego, 
U.S.A. in 1959» Australia was elected to the Council of 
I.C.A.O. in the category which includes States of chief 
importance in air transport. Australia has been a member 
of the Council of I.C.A.O. since the Organization came 
into existence in 19^7»
Arts. 67, 69-76.
3
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qualifications and experience in the science and 
practice of aeronautics, and the President of the 
Commission is appointed by the Council. Among other 
bodies, special mention must be made about the Legal 
Committee, which is a permanent committee constituted by 
the Assembly. Since its institution by the First session 
of the I.C.A.O. in 1947» the Legal Committee has prepared 
a number of draft conventions relating to recognition of 
rights in aircraft, damage caused by aircraft to third 
parties on the surface, aerial collisions, carriers* 
liability, crimes in aircraft, & c . The Committee advises 
the Council on matters relating to interpretation and 
amendment of the Chicago Convention. It makes 
recommendation on matters relating to public international 
law referred to it by the Council or Assembly, and studies 
problems relating to private air law affecting international 
civil aviation and prepares draft conventions and reports 
thereon. Any draft convention which the Legal Committee 
considers as ready for presentation to the State as a 
final draft is transmitted to the Council, together with 
a report thereon, and the Council may take such action as 
it deems fit, including the circulation of the draft.
In doing so, the Council may add comments and afford 
States and organizations an opportunity to submit comments
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to the Organization within a period of not less than four 
months. Such draft convention shall be considered, with 
a view to its approval, by a conference which may be
1convened in conjunction with a session of the Assembly.
6. Disputes and Default
If any disagreement between two or more contracting
States relating to the interpretation or application of
the Chicago Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled
by negotiation, it shall, on the application of any State
concerned in the disagreemat, be decided by the Council.
No member of the Council shall vote in the consideration
2by the Council of any dispute to which it is a party.
This is a matter within the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the Council. Any contracting State may appeal from a 
decision of the Council to (i) an ad hoc arbitral tribunal 
agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute; or
o(ii) the International Court of Justice. The decisions
1
There is another large-scale international organization 
of non-governmental character. The International Air 
Transport Association (iATA), a world-wide association of 
eighty-nine airlines from fifty-six countries, has 
developed special administrative machinery under which all 
international tariffs and associated matters are fixed by 
a * unanimity* rule, but its recommendations or resultions 
are subject to Government approval.
2
Art.84.
Arts. 84-5»
3
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of the International Court of Justice and of an arbitral 
tribunal are final and binding. The Chicago Convention 
provides for sanctions: each contracting State undertakes
not to allow the operation of an airline of a contracting 
State through the airspace above its territory if the 
Council has decided that the airline concerned is not 
conforming to the above final decision. The Assembly shall 
suspend the voting power in the Assembly and in the Council 
of any contracting State that is found in default under 
such decisions.
In the case of disputes and disagreements arising 
from the Two Freedoms Agreement (and the Five Freedoms 
Agreement), the Council of the I.C.A.O. inquires into the 
matter upon request of a contracting State concerned, and 
calls the States concerned into consultation. If it 
fails to resolve the difficulty, the Council may make 
appropriate findings and recommendations to those States. 
If thereafter a contracting State concerned unreasonably 
fails to take suitable corrective action, the Council may 
recommend to the Assembly of the I.C.A.O. that the State 
be suspended from its rights and privileges under the 
Agreement until such action has been taken. The Assembly
_
Arts. 87-8.
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by a two-thirds vote may so suspend the State for such 
period of time as it may deem proper or until the Council 
finds that corrective action has been taken by such State. 
If any disagreement between two or more contracting States 
relating to the interpretation or application of the 
Agreement cannot be settled by negotiation, the provisions 
of Chapter XVIII (Disputes and Default) of the Chicago 
Convention, discussed above, are applicable mutatis 
mutandis.^
Bilateral agreements set out also provisions
concerning settlement of disputes among the States
concerned; for example, the Bermuda Agreement provides
for reference to the Council of the I.C.A.O. for an
2advisory report.
II Australian Law
1. Commonwealth Legislation 
(1) Air Navigation Act 1920-63
The history of Commonwealth legislation concerning 
the administrative control of aircraft and their flight
1
Art.II of the Two Freedoms Agreement; Art.IV (secs. 2 and 
3) of the Five Freedoms Agreement.
2
Agreement, Art. 9»
3 46
activities is a reflection of a series of constitutional
struggles between the Commonwealth and the States, which
we have already discussed in Part I. We shall therefore
summarize briefly the major statutory developments of the
Commonwealth Act, without touching the constitutional
problems involved. The first Commonwealth statute applying
1to civil aviation was the Air Navigation Act 1920 which
authorized regulations to give effect to the Paris
Convention and for the control of air navigation in the
Commonwealth and the Territories. Shortly after the
validity of the Act and the Regulations made thereunder
in respect of the scope of their application was successfully
2challenged in the High Court in 1936, the Act was amended
3by the Air Navigation Act 1936 in which the Commonwealth 
regulation-making power was considerably limited. The 
latter Act was amended by the Air Navigation Act 1947^ in 
which the ratification of the Chicago Convention was 
approved. The Act of 1947 provided also for such changes 
in the previous Act as would become necessary by reason
1
No. 50 of 1920.
2
The first Henry Case. 55 C.L.R. 6o8.
3
No.93 of 1936.
4
N o .6 of 1947.
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of the coming into force of the Convention, and the
continuous development of civil aviation. It placed the
regulation-making power upon a broader basis than that
specified in the earlier legislation. The 1920-47 Act
was amended by the Air Navigation Act 1947 (No .2), and
2later by the Statute Law Revision Act 1950 which merely 
omitted the definition of ‘Territory1 234 in sec,3 of the
Qformer Act. The Air Navigation Act 196Cr was enacted
primarily for the purpose of carrying out the recommendation
by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts that the existing
regulation-making power over civil aviation should be
amended so as to incorporate the basic principles in
4legislation enacted by the Parliament; as a result of 
this amendment, certain important provisions were 
transferred from the Regulations to the Act, and 
consequently the number of provisions in the Act increased 
from five to thirty-one, with additional Schedules. The
_
No. 89 of 1947.
2
No. 80 of 1950.
3
No. 39 of i960.
4
Cf. Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. 27, p .1763 
(17 May i960).
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Act 1920-60 was further amended in 1961 and in 1 9 6 3  
respectively to incorporate the Protocols relating to 
amendments to the Chicago Convention.
The Chicago Convention, the Air Transit Agreement
(Two Freedoms Agreement) and the Protocols amending
certain Articles of the Convention are set out
respectively in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Schedules to the present Air Navigation Act
1920-63* The Act places upon the Minister for Civil
Aviation a statutory obligation to report annually to
Parliament (after 30 June 19 6 1) on the administration and
working of the Act and the regulations and on other matters
concerning civil aviation which should be brought to the
3attention of the Commonwealth Parliament. This section 
was inserted to ensure that each year Parliament has the 
opportunity of reviewing the relatively wide Executive 
powers.
1
No. 72 of 1 9 6 1 . The amendment related to Art.50(a) of 
the Chicago Convention by increasing the number of 
members of the Council from twenty-one to twenty-seven.
2
No. 8 of 1 9 6 3 * The amendment related to the Protocol 
(signed at Rome, on 15 September 1 9 6 2 ) amending Art.48(a) 
of the Chicago Convention in respect of an extraordinary 
meeting of the Assembly.
Sec.29 *
3
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Sec.26(l) defining the scope of the regulation-making 
power reads as follows:
The Governor-General may make regulations, not 
inconsistent with this Act -
(a) prescribing all matters which by this Act are 
required or permitted to be prescribed or 
which are necessary or convenient to be 
prescribed for carrying out or giving effect 
to this Act;
(b) for the purpose of carrying out and giving 
effect to the Chicago Convention, as amended 
by the Protocols referred to in sub-section (2) 
of section three A of this Act, any Annex to 
the Convention relating to international 
standards and recommended practices (being 
Annex adopted in accordance with the Convention) 
and the Air Transit Agreement;
(c) in relation to air navigation within a 
Territory of the Commonwealth or to or from a 
Territory of the Commonwealth;
(d) in relation to air navigation, being 
regulations with respect to trade and commerce 
with other countries and among the States; and
(e) in relation to air navigation, being regulations 
with respect to any other matters with respect 
to which the Parliament has power to make laws.
Sec.26(2) enumerates the detailed subject matters to be
included in the regulations:
Without limiting the generality of the preceding 
provisions of this section, the regulations that 
may be made under the powers conferred by those 
provisions include regulations for or in relation 
to -
(a) the registration, marking and airworthiness 
of aircraft;
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(b) requiring persons performing special 
functions in relation to the operation or 
maintenance of aircraft to be the holders 
of licences or certificates of specified 
kinds, and providing for the grant, 
cancellation, suspension or variation of 
such licences and certificates;
(c) the licensing of air transport operations;
(d) controlling the provision for reward of air 
transport within a Territory of the 
Commonwealth or to or from a Territory of 
the Commonwealth;
(e) the establishment, maintenance, operation and 
use of aerodromes and air route and airway 
facilities and the licensing of aerodromes 
other than aerodromes maintained by the 
Commonwealth;
(f) hygiene, sanitation and public health at 
aerodrome s;
(g) the prohibition of the construction of 
buildings or structures, the restriction of
the dimensions of biiildings or other structures, 
and the removal in whole or in part or the 
marking of buildings, other structures, trees 
or other natural obstacles, that constitute or 
may constitute obstructions, hazards or 
potential hazards to aircraft flying in the 
vicinity of an aerodrome, and such other 
measures as are necessary to ensure the safety 
of aircraft using an aerodrome or flying in 
the vicinity of an aerodrome;
(h) empowering the Director-General, or an officer 
thereunto authorized by the Director-General, 
to give or issue directions or instructions
to all or any of the persons holding licences 
or certificates under this Act or the 
regulations, being directions or instructions 
with respect to matters affecting the safe 
navigation and operation, or the maintenance, 
of aircraft, and providing for the manner in 
which such directions and instructions are to 
be notified;
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(i) the formal proof and authentication of 
instruments made or issued under this Act 
or the regulations;
(j) the powers (including powers of arrest) that 
may be exercised by members of the crew of an 
aircraft, in relation to persons on board the 
aircraft, for the purpose of ensuring the 
safety of the aircraft or of its passengers, 
crew or cargo or otherwise for the purposes of 
this Act or the Regulations; and
(k) the imposition of penalties not exceeding a 
fine of Five hundred pounds or imprisonment 
for a term of two years, or both, for a 
contravention of, or failure to comply with,
a provision of the regulations or a direction, 
instruction or condition issued, given, made 
or imposed under, or in force by virtue of, 
the regulations.
(2) Air Navigation Regulations 19^7-65
The Air Navigation Act 19^7 (No.2) placed the 
regulation-making power upon a broader basis, and, as a 
result of the repeal of the provision concerning the 
regulation-making power, the Air Navigation Regulations 
under the Act 1920-36 ceased to be in force. The present 
Regulations has resulted from the Regulations newly made 
in 1947. Although the amended Regulation-making power 
was again repealed in the same year and a new section 
was inserted by the Air Navigation Act (No. 2) 19^ -7» 'the
regulations made under the 19^ -7 (No.l) Act were made
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continued. The Regulations have been amended from
time to time on various dates,'*'
In pursuance of the power contained in sec.26 of the
Air Navigation Act 1920-63, more than 300 regulations
have been promulgated covering a wide and complex range
of safety and technical matters affecting almost every
phase of civil aviation. By the amendment of the Act
in i960, some provisions of important principles have
been transferred from the Regulations to the Act, but,
in view of the highly technical nature of aviation control,
the exercise of wide Executive powers seems to be
2unavoidable as it was stated in the Parliament:
Australia by becoming a party to the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation, has undertaken 
the obligation of bringing its law into line with 
the international standards and practices as 
altered and added to from time to time in the 
technical annexes to the Convention. These 
annexes have been amended on more than sixty 
occasions and this explains why the Air Navigation 
Regulations have been amended so frequently and 
extensively. If the safety and technical 
provisions of the regulations were to be transferred
1
S.R. 1947, No.112, as amended by S.R. 1947, No.l62; 1948, 
No.69; 1949, Nos.6 and 70; 1950, No.69; 1952; Nos.30, 46 
and 87; 1953* No.44* 1954, Nos.26, 32 and 119; 1955; No.29; 
1956, No.16; 1957? No.12; 1958, No.77; i960, Nos.21, 96 and 
995 1961, No.102; and 1964, Nos.6l and 128.
2
Parliamentary Debates, op.cit., p.1765*
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to the Act, it might prove difficult in 
practice to amend the Act as frequently and 
as quickly as our international obligations 
require, and certainly of no less importance, 
the safety of air navigation demands. It is 
interesting to note, in passing, that all 
countries adopt the procedure of giving effect 
to the annexes to the Chicago Convention by 
means of subordinate legislation.
Reg.6(l) defining the scope of application of the
Regulations, which has been drastically expended by the
recent amendment in 1964, reads as follows:
Subject to these Regulations, these Regulations 
apply to and in relation to -
(a) international air navigation within Australian 
territory;
(b) air navigation in relation to trade and 
commerce with other countries and among the 
states;
(c) air navigation within the Territories;
(d) air navigation to or from the Territories;
(da) air navigation in which a Commonwealth 
aircraft is engaged;
(e) air navigation in controlled air space that 
is of a kind not specified in a preceding 
paragraph of this sub-section but directly 
affects, or may endanger, the safety of 
persons or aircraft engaged in -
(i) air navigation of a kind specified in
paragraph (a), (b), (d) or (da) of this
sub-regulation; or
(ii) air navigation which a military aircraft 
is engaged; and
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(f) on and after such date as is fixed by the
Minister for the purposes of this paragraph 
by notice in the Gazette, all air navigation 
within Australian territory of a kind not 
specified in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or
(da) of this sub-regulation.
Main provisions and problems of these governmental
regulations relating to aircraft (nationality, registration,
import, &c.), licences (licensing of operating crew and
other personnels; licensing of flying schools, training
organizations and of their activities; licensing of air
service operations; refusal to grant, and suspension and
cancellation of, licences and certificates), flights (logs
and log books, rules of flight and manoeuvre), accidents,
aerodromes, facilities and services, and enforcement of
governmental regulations of air navigation, are summarized
and discussed in Appendix II of this thesis.
(3) Other Subordinate Legislation
In pursuance of reg.8(l) of the Air Navigation 
Regulations, the Director-General may issue the direction 
or notification or give the permission, approval or 
authority provided for in Air Navigation Orders (A.N.O.) 
which are not Statutory Rules within the meaning of the
1
The date fixed was 10 October 1964. See Commonwealth 
Gazette, 1964, p.4003A.
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1Rules Publication Act 1903» as amended. The Director-
General is empowered to issue directions, notify
requirements, or attach conditions to an authorization or
2approval given or required under the Regulations. Where 
the direction, requirement, or condition is of general 
application, it is usual for the Director-General to issue
it in the form of an A.N.O., and in many cases it is
3mandatory for him to do so.
The Minister for Civil Aviation may establish
Aeronautical Information Services, the functions of which
4are prescribed in sec.7 of the Air Navigation Act. The 
Aeronautical Information shall establish Aeronautical 
Information Publications (AIPs) and Notices to Airmen
1
No.18 of 1903» as amended by No.l6 of 1916 and No.55 of 
1939.2
As to examples of those regulations, see Halsbury*s Laws 
of England, third, ed., Australian Pilot, 5» p.436.
3
Ibid.
4
The functions are to collect and disseminate aeronautical 
information and instructions relating to the safety, 
regularity and efficiency of air navigation, being 
information and instructions with respect to aerodromes, 
air traffic control services and facilities, communication 
and air navigation services and facilities, meteorological 
services and facilities, search and rescue services and 
facilities, procedures and regulatory requirements connected 
with air navigation, and hazards to air navigation.
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(NOTAMs), the former being the aeronautical information
and instructions essential to the safety and efficiency of
air navigation, and the latter being those of a temporary
nature or which cannot be made available with sufficient
expedition by publication in Aeronautical Information 
1Publications.
(4) Special Legislation
Besides those Commonwealth enactments of the
administrative control over aircraft and flight activities,
there are a number of federal Acts concerning special
subject matters, such as, quarantine, customs, air
2navigation charges, airports, &c. In particular,
Commonwealth legislation concerning air corporations and 
economic control and policy of such air transport undertakings 
will be summarized in Appendix III of this thesis.
2. State Legislation 
(1) Air Navigation Acts
Subsequent to the aviation conference of Commonwealth 
and State Ministers in April, 1937» all States enacted 
uniform legislation adopting the Commonwealth Air Navigation
1
Sec.8.
See Appendix II, post.
2
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Regulations as State law in 1937-38, whereby the
Commonwealth Regulations have applied practically to all
1air navigation within Australia. All State Air Navigation
2Acts have a Preamble in the identical terms, stressing
the necessity of uniform rules throughout the Commonwealth
applying to air navigation and aircraft, the licensing
and competence of pilots, air traffic rules, and the
regulation of aerodromes. Those States1 2 uniform Acts
set up the following common provisions:
The regulations from time to time in force 
applicable to and in relation to air navigation 
within the Territories shall (except so far as 
those regulations are by virtue of the Commonwealth
1
N.S.W.: Air Navigation Act 1938 (No .9)*
Vic.: Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.4502), as repealed and 
substituted by the Air Navigation Act 1958 (No .6197) 
Q ‘ld.: Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.8).
S.A. : Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.2352).
W.A. : Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.6).
Tas. : Air Navigation Act 1937 (No.l4).
2
The Preamble reads: ‘Whereas at the conference of
representatives of the Governments of the Commonwealth and 
of the States held in April 1937» it was resolved that there 
should be uniform rules throughout the Commonwealth 
applying to air navigation and aircraft, the licensing and 
competence of pilots, air traffic rules, and the regulation 
of aerodromes, and it was agreed that legislation should 
be introduced in the Parliament of each State to make 
provision for the application of the Commonwealth Air 
Navigation Regulations, as in force from time to time, to 
air navigation and aircraft within the jurisdiction of 
the State:...‘.
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Act and the regulations applicable to and in 
relation to air navigation within (New South 
Wales)) apply, mutatis mutandis, to and in 
relation to air navigation within (New South 
Wales) as if those regulations as so applied 
were incorporated in this Act and for the 
purposes of this Act those regulations shall 
be read and construed and hake effect 
accordingly.
However, the areas where the federal regulations were 
regarded as not applying in the matters of States* 
jurisdictions have been to a great extent narrowed by the 
recent High Court decision which recognized that the 
Federal Government need no longer depend on constitutional
authority, ceded by the States to enforce air safety
1regulations on intra-State aviation. Hence most, if not
all, of the Commonwealth Regulations apply to all types
of air navigation within Australia. Provisions are also
set up in those States* uniform Acts in identical terms
for certain powers or functions vested in Commonwealth 
2authorities, for the effect of Commonwealth regulations 
of certificates, licences, &c. within a State, and for
1
Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.2), 1964-65, 38 A.L.J.R. 388.
2
See sec.30 of the Commonwealth Air Navigation Act, 
declaring it to be the intention of the Parliament that 
an officer, authority or person having powers or functions 
under the Act or the regulations may also have, exercise 
and perform similar powers or functions conferred by the 
law of a State relating to air navigation.
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the payment of fees payable under the Commonwealth 
regulations to the Commonwealth.
(2) State Transport Legislation
However, the Commonwealth Regulations do not apply 
to every aircraft with respect to matters other than those 
relating to aircraft safety regulations (unless supported 
by some heads of legislative powers), and, because of the 
economic effect of air services on road and rail transport, 
most States have amended the uniform Acts or related 
transport legislation so as to retain a measure of control
over intra-State operations by means of licensing
1requirements, which differ from State to State. In New 
South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, new 
provisions were inserted in their respective Air Navigation 
Acts (in different terms) to the effect that the provisions 
of the Act shall not affect the operation of State 
transport legislation governing intra-State air transport.^
1
As to these State legislation, see AppendixH, post.
2
In Western Australia, sec. 8 was added by 1945 (No.2l) 
which reads that 1 2the provisions of this Act shall not 
affect in any way, and shall be deemed not to have affected 
in any way the operation of secs. 45, 46 and 47 of the 
State Transport Co-ordination Act, 1933-40.* Similarly, 
in New South Wales, a proviso was added to sec.4 by the 
Act of 1947 (N0.32), and in Queensland, sec.10 was added 
by the Act of 1947 (No.5)»
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In Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, no additional 
provisions have been inserted in their Air Navigation 
Acts, but Tasmania retains economic control of air 
transport operations within the State under its general 
transport legislation. Mention has already been made 
elsewhere of the Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Acts 
of Queensland and Tasmania, which refer the matter of 
air transport to the Commonwealth Parliament under sec.31
-j(xxxvii) of the Constitution.
3. Administration of Civil Aviation
The Air Navigation Act 1920 became law in December
1920, and the Civil Aviation Branch of the Department of
Defence was formed under a Controller of Civil Aviation to
administer the Act and the Regulations made thereunder on 
. 216 December 1920. In 1936, the organisation was changed
and the responsibility of regulating and controlling
civil aviation in the Commonwealth was entrusted to a Board,
1
Q'ld.s Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act 1950 (No .2). 
Tas. : Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act 1952 (No.46).
2
The functions of defence and civil aviation were not 
clearly divided at this stage; the Minister for Defence was 
assisted by representatives of the Navy and Army, by the 
Air Board, and an independent Controller of Civil Aviation. 
The Controller took also a seat on the Air Council in which 
officers of the Navy, Army and Air Force were included.
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consisting of four members and a secretary. The Chairman 
was the Controller-General of Civil Aviation, while the 
other three members were the Controller of Operations, the 
Controller of Ground Organization and the Finance Member. 
The Board was responsible to the Minister for Defence and 
continued to function as a unit of the Defence Department 
organization until November 1938. In January, 1939 the 
Civil Aviation Board was abolished and the Civil Aviation 
Administration was made a separate Department under the 
Minister for Civil Aviation. The Department has twelve 
Divisions - Air Transport, International Relations,
Aviation Medicine, Flying Operations, Airworthiness,
Airways Operations, Communications and Air Traffic Control, 
Aircraft Engineering, Finance Management, Air Safety 
Investigation, Navigational Aids, Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineering, and Administrative Management.
Neither in the Act nor in the Regulations is there any 
provision equivalent to sec.1(1) of the U.K. Civil Aviation 
Act 1949, which defines the general administrative duty of 
the Minister of Civil Aviation for the development of civil 
aviation, the promotion of safety and efficiency in the use 
thereof, &c. But his specific duties and functions are 
prescribed in a number of provisions both in the Act and 
the Regulations. The Director-General who is permanent
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head of the Department of Civil Aviation (D.C.A.), subject 
to the directions of the Minister, is charged with 
administration of the Regulations and must maintain close 
liaison with the Department of Air. Numerous regulations 
empower the Director-General to issue directions, 
notify requirements, or attach conditions to an 
authorisation or approval given or required under the 
Regulations. It is specifically provided that the Minister 
and the Director-General may delegate powers and functions.
The general principles as to discretion given by statute
1were stated by the Court in the IPEC-Air Case:
A discretion allowed by statute to the holder of 
an office is intended to be exercised according 
to the rules of reason and justice, not according 
to private opinion; according to law, and not 
humour, and within those limits within which an 
honest man competent to discharge the duties of 
his office, ought to confine himself: The courts,
while claiming no authority in themselves to 
dictate the decision that ought to be made in the 
exercise of such a discretion in a given case, are
1
(1 9 6 5) 39 A.L.J.R. at p.6 9 , per Kitto J., citing the 
following cases: Sharp v. Wakefield (1891) A.C. 173, at 
p.179; Cuming Campbell Investments Pty, Ltd, v. Collector 
of Imposts (Vic.) O 9 3 8 ) 60 C.L.R. 741. at pp.7'50. 751. 7 55. 
758; R. v. Cotham (1 8 9 8) 1 Q.B. 802, at p.8 0 6 ; Randall v .
Northcote Corporation (1 9 1 0) 11 C.L.R. 100, at pp.109, 110;
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission v. Browning 
(1 9 4 7) 74 C.L.R. 492, at pp7496, 4 9 8 , 499-500, 504;
R. v. Stephney Corporation (1902) 1 K.B. 317; Simms Motor
Units Ltd, v . Minister for Labour and National Service 
(1946) 2 All E.R. 201; Evans v. Donaldson (1909) 9 C.L.R. 
1 4 0 .
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yet in duty bound to declare invalid a purported 
exercise of the discretion where the proper 
limits have not been observed; even then a court 
does not direct that the discretion be exercised 
in a particular manner not expressly required by 
law, but confines itself to commanding the 
officer by writ of mandamus to perform his duty 
by exercising the discretion according to law:
A case for the granting of mandamus on this 
principle exists where the officer has taken 
into account matters ’absolutely apart from the 
matters which by law ought to be taken into 
consideration’, or has acted for a purpose other 
than that for which the discretion exists, or has 
accepted another’s discretion as to the way in 
which the discretion should be exercised.
In the above case, the company contended inter alia that
the Director-General’s refusal (under the Customs
(Prohibited Imports) Regulations) of the importation of
five aircraft applied by the company was not in fact the
decision of the Director-General but that of the government,
and that if it was his determination the extent to which
he was influenced in making it by the views expressed to
him as to government policy made it invalid. Two Judges
accepted the company’s contention: Kitto J. took the
view that to hold valid a decision given at a political
level instead of at the permanent administrative level
would be to contradict the Customs (Prohibited Imports)
Regulations which committed the power of decision to the
364
Director-General only. But the majority of the Court
took a wider view as to the scope of the Director-
General’s exercise of discretion. In the joint opinion
of two other Judges, the discretion of the Director-General
under reg.4(2) and the Third Schedule of the Regulations
was to be exercised in accordance with his views as to
what would best serve the interests of civil aviation
within the Commonwealth; they said that no implication
could be made that there was reposed in the Director-
General any public duty, or any legal right created -
other than a right to have an application for permission
honestly considered - which was capable of enforcement by 
2mandamus. Windeyer J . ’s view was more to the point;
3upon the examinations of the terms of the Regulations,
1
39 A.L.J.R. at p.70. As to Menzies J . ’s view that there 
is a significant difference between a discretion given to 
a Minister and one given to a departmental head (the 
latter must arrive at his own decision upon the merits of 
the application and must not merely express a decision 
made by the government), see 39 A.L.J.R. at p.74.
2
39 A.L.J.R. at p p .73-4, per Taylor and Owen JJ., citing 
Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v . Finlayson (1916)
22 C.L.R. 340.
3
C f . Shrimpton v . Commonwealth (1944) 69 C.L.R. 6 13 at 
P.620, per Latham C.J.; Swan Hill Corporation v . Bradbury 
(1937) 56 C.L.R. at P.758, per Dixon J.; Water Conservation 
and Irrigation Commission v. Browning (1947) 74 C.L.R. 492, 
at p.505, per Dixon J.
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he considered that the Director-General must have regard
to the policy of the Government and must exercise his
1functions accordingly. He said:
In considering whether to allow aircraft to be 
imported it is not only the quality and 
characteristics of particular aircraft that 
are in question. The Department of Civil 
Aviation is concerned with more things than 
ensuring the airworthiness of aircraft. And 
the Parliament can if it wishes use its 
constitutional power of customs control of 
exports and imports to enable the Executive 
to pursue economic policies that it considers 
conduce to the welfare of the Commonwealth.•.
The constitutional responsibility for the 
decision to permit or refuse entry of a 
conditionally prohibited import, aircraft or 
whatever it be, rests ultimately in every case 
with some responsible Minister....Indeed, as 
I read the decisions of this Court, it is on 
this proposition that the constitutional validity 
of the Regulations dealing with prohibited 
imports and exports mainly depends. The 
Director-General is the officer whose written 
permission must be produced to the customs. But 
in my opinion that does not mean that he is to 
grant or refuse permission according to some 
view of his own, giving weight or no weight as 
he chooses to the policy of the Crown. On the 
contrary, I think his duty is to obey all lawful 
directions of the Minister under whom he serves 
the Crown. The Minister is answerable before 
Parliament.
, 2Under the Acts Interpretation Act 1901-63 it is 
required that such regulations be notified in the Gazette,
1
39 A.L.J.R. at p.76.
2
No.2 of 1901 - No.19 of 1963« Similar provisions of the 
Rules Publication Act 1903-39 were repealed in 1916.
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setting out their date of operation, which must not 
retrospectively prejudice a person’s right or expose him 
to new liabilities, and that regulation issued by the 
Governor-General-in-Council have to be tabled, within 
fifteen sitting days, in both Houses, and are subject to 
disallowance upon notice given within fifteen days in 
either House. This is not applicable to air navigation 
orders issued by the Director-General. In the case of 
Australia, in addition to the danger that the delegated 
legislation does not come properly within the field and 
extent of delegation provided under the Act, there is the 
additional contingency that the Act itself may be ultra 
vires the written Constitution.^ Any Act, regulation or 
order must therefore be subject to judicial review of 
its constitutionality.
To sum up: Liberty to fly in international aviation
must be enjoyed by a contracting State (or its nationals) 
in accordance with the terms of the Chicago Convention or 
air transport agreements, or in accordance with applicable 
rules of national law of the subjacent State. Some 
provisions of the Commonwealth regulations (e.g. carriage of
I
Cf. L.F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, third ed., p.251*
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dangerous goods, or documents to be carried by aircraft) 
may have extraterritorial operation in respect of 
Australian aircraft outside Australian territory; on the 
other hand, Australian aircraft must comply with the 
local law (applying to foreign aircraft) of the country in 
which they are flying, and will be liable while in the 
foreign country to any penalties or other sanctions 
provided by the local law. In practice, a breach of foreign 
law will often also constitute a breach of Australian law, 
since the law of all countries which are parties to the 
Chicago Convention is largely based on the Convention and 
on the decisions of the I.C.A.O. of which they are all 
members.^
It should be noted that, in establishing the 
administrative system of international civil aviation, 
the Chicago Convention aims both at * equal opportunity1 
and at ’uniform national laws* of air navigation; the 
former objective is realized, for example, in provisions 
prohibiting discriminatory treatment as to cabotage, 
prohibited areas, laws and regulations relating to the 
admission to or departure from the territory, airport and 
_
Cf. Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, second ed., pp.218, 
225.
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similar charges, or cargo restrictions. The latter 
objective is to be found in provisions or administrative 
machineries relating to the unification of rules, 
regulations and practices, or facilitation of measures, 
of air navigation; they extend every detail to the wide 
field of aviation matters, which, by virtue of the very 
nature of aviation, relate not only to international 
aviation but also to air navigation in general. How far 
and in what manner the Commonwealth as a responsible 
Government should have regulatory power on the domestic 
aviation matters in implementing such and other 
international requirements is a constitutional problem 
relating to the scope of the ’external affairs’ power.
To add one point; Art.3(d) of the Convention is an 
important international obligation imposed upon Australia 
which would directly affect the national regulations of 
State aircraft (i.e. military aircraft only in the case of 
Australia)• In most countries including Australia, 
regulation of air navigation is divided into civil aviation 
and aviation conducted by State aircraft, and close 
liaison is maintained between the two authorities.
1
See Arts. 7» 9» 11, 15 and 35» Cf. Ikeda, The Outline of 
International Air Law (Kokusai-Koku-Ho Gairon), pp.48-9*
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While the Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations do not 
apply generally to or in relation to State aircraft or 
military aerodromes, there are by necessity some cases 
where State aircraft are not outside the scope of the 
regulations for civil aircraft, such as those concerning 
visual signals between State aircraft and other aircraft
in flight, or search and rescue services for or by State
1aircraft as well as civil aircraft. In regulating such 
and other matters, so far as they are concerned with the 
relationship between military aviation and civil aviation, 
the Commonwealth has assumed a comprehensive obligation 
not to hamper the safety of civil aviation in Australia.
In the case of Australia, the sources of power for 
the governmental control of air navigation are prescribed 
in the Constitution. However, the earlier view that the 
Commonwealth authority can only be maintained by uniform 
legislation of the States has been substantially modified 
by the High Court*s ruling placing safety regulations 
altogether within the Commonwealth legislative competence. 
In order to justify the Commonwealth regulations, it will 
no longer be necessary in these matters to apply a narrow 
test as to whether activities in the course of intra-State
C f .  r e g s .  1 7 5 ,  1 0 1 - 1 0 3 A .
1
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aviation interfere with, the operation of inter-State 
(or international) aircraft. For example, a question 
may have arisen as to whether the federal regulation
prohibiting intoxicated persons from piloting or being
1carried on any aircraft was sufficiently related to the 
protection of inter-State operations, so far as its 
application to intra-State flights was concerned. Although 
such a fine application of the Constitution is now untenable 
in relation to the Australian safety regulations, it is 
still applicable in areas outside safety matters of 
aviation, viz., licensing based on politico-economic 
controls of intra-State air transport services.
Almost complete responsibility for the control (and 
financing) of aviation rests with the Commonwealth, and, 
in view of the high technicality of subject matters and 
the need for flexibility in the aviation control, wide 
delegated legislative or administrative power is inevitably 
conferred upon the Commonwealth Executive. In licensing 
controls over man's liberty to fly, for example, the 
Director-General’s functions extend to aircraft 
maintenance engineer, flight crew (pilot, navigator, 
radio operator and flight engineer), air service operations,
Reg.247.
1
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flying school, ground instructor, air traffic controller, 
and aerodrome licences. In addition, he is empowered to 
issue numerous certificates and authorizations. Some 
criticisms have been raised against such a wide delegation 
of legislative power and administrative discretion in 
aviation matters, particularly in matters touching personal 
liberties of using aircraft, or obtaining access to the 
Commonwealth facilities or engaging in commerce by air. 
While it is true that the Parliamentary supremacy must 
always be maintained, it must at all times be remembered 
that an excessive requirement of formality and dispersion 
of administrative functions might impair unnecessarily the 
safety, regularity and efficiency of aviation in Australia.
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PART III
Contractual, delictual and Criminal Responsibilities
In the following Chapters, the civil liabilities of 
the owner or operator of aircraft to persons who are, or 
whose goods are, carried in aircraft (chapter VIIl), or to 
persons and/or property on the ground (Chapter IX), and 
criminal responsibilities for aircraft crimes (Chapter X) 
will be examined respectively. The regulations of carriage 
by air or operation of aircraft in public law aspects both 
in international law and in national law, such as rights of 
air traffic, or conditions and restrictions of flight 
activities, breaches of which amount to offences and 
penalties, have been discussed in the previous Part of this 
thesis•
Has the Legislature in creating statutory duties by 
the provisions of the Air Navigation Regulations given to 
any person who suffers damage in consequence of a breach 
of the Regulations, a right of action against a person 
guilty of the breach of duty to recover compensation for 
the damage resulting from the breach, or is the recovery of 
the statutory penalty provided for a breach of the
373
Regulations the only remedy available? This was the
1question in Martin v. Queensland Airlines Pty. Ltd«,
where the plaintiff* s husband was killed while a passenger
for reward in an aircraft operated and controlled by the
defendant; the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
been guilty of breaches of statutory duty in operating
aircraft contrary to the provisions of the Air Navigation
Regulations, and that the defendant could not contract out
of his liability for breach of statutory duty. It was
argued for the defendant that breach of statutory duty
under the Regulations gave rise to no absolute liability
in a civil action, that it was only evidence of negligence,
and that the company could contract itself out of civil
liability in respect thereof. Having referred to the
2authoritative cases establishing or supporting the general
1
(1 9 5 6 ) Q.S.R. 3^2. An appeal to the High Court was 
dismissed for want of prosecution.
2
Doe d. Murray, Lord Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges, (1831)
1 B. & Ad. 847, at p.859; 109 E.rY  1001, at p.1006;
Pasmore v. Oswaldtwistie Urban District Council (1 8 9 8 ) A.C. 
3 8 7 , at pp. 394-5, 397-8; Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic 
Laundry Co. Ltd. (1 9 2 3 ) 2 K.B. 8 3 2 , at pp.840, 841-2;
Badham v. Lambs, Ltd. (1946) 1 K.B. 45, at p.47; Biddle v .
Truvox Engineering Co., Ltd.; Greenwood and Batley, Ltd. 
(Third Party) (1952) 1 K.B. 101; Clarke and Wife v. Brims
(1947) s at PP»505“6; Square v. Model Farm Dairies 
(Bournemouth), Ltd. (1939) 2 K.B. 3^5? Cutler v. Wandsworth 
Stadium, Ltd!. (1949) A.C. 398, at pp. 407-8.
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rule that, when an Act imposed a duty of commission or 
omission, the question whether a person aggrieved by a 
breach of the duty had a right of action depended on the 
intention and circumstances of the Act, the Court 
(Macrossan C.J.) held that the duties imposed by the 
Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations were not duties 
enforceable by individuals injured through a breach of 
them, but public duties only, the sole remedy for which 
was the remedy provided by the Regulations themselves by 
way of fine or imprisonment. Hence, it became unnecessary 
to determine whether it would have been competent for the 
passenger to exempt the defendant from liability to him
for damage caused to the passenger through a breach of
1the Regulations. Two aviation cases which were relied on 
by the plaintiff are worthy of note here. In Dominion Air 
Lines, Ltd, (in Liquidation) v. Strand,~ a decision of the 
Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 
which a majority of the Court of Appeal of three judges 
to two, held that the breach of a regulation requiring the 
pilot of an aircraft carrying passengers for reward to
1
The Court held that the contract relieved the carrier from 
all liability for the death of the passenger.
2
(1933) N.Z.L.R. 1.
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hold a * B* licence would confer a right of action on a 
passenger injured thereby. According to Myers C.J., who 
was one of the majority, a great majority of the Regulations 
(made under the Aviation Act, 1918) were to be regarded as 
merely police regulations, the breach of which would 
confer no right of action upon a person injured, but the 
New Zealand legislation was dealing with a new class of 
transport which at the time the Act was passed was regarded 
generally as involving special danger to passengers and 
risk of loss to owners of goods carried. He also relied 
upon an express power conferred by the Act on the 
Governor-General to make regulations 1 as to the carriage 
of passengers and goods*, and held that the regulation in 
question must be regarded as made for the special 
protection of a class, that is, the passengers and owners 
of goods carried in an aircraft. However, Macrossan C.J. 
in Martin* s Case distinguished the case on the ground 
that there was nothing in the provisions of the 
Commonwealth Air Navigation Act 1920-19^7 conferring 
power on the Governor-General to make regulations which 
made any specific reference to the carriage of passengers 
or goods, and there was also nothing in the subject 
Regulations which should lead to the conclusion that they 
were made for the special protection of any class of the
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public. Another case was Hesketh v. Liverpool Corporation, 
where the plaintiff was injured through striking some 
trees when landing an aeroplane at night on an aerodrome 
in respect of which a licence had been granted to the 
defendant under the Air Navigation (Consolidation) Order, 
1923« The trees in question were sited in breach of the 
condition of the licence and they were not indicated by 
fixed red lights as required by the Order. Stable J. held 
that the presence of the trees constituted a breach of the 
statutory conditions and that on this ground the plaintiff 
was entitled to succeed. He also held that he was entitled 
to succeed at common law on the ground that the trees 
constituted a trap. Again, Macrossan C.J. in Martin* s Case 
distinguished this case on the ground that there was no 
specific consideration in the reasons for judgment of the 
point whether a breach of statutory condition gave a civil 
right of action, and the judgment could clearly be 
supported on the second ground.
Another aspect of aviation accident liabilities, 
namely, damage liabilities of bailees of aircraft to the
1
(1956) Q.S.R. at P.377.
2
(19^0) k All E.R. 429.
(1956) Q.S.R. at p.377.
3
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owner or operator of the aircraft, is outside the scope 
of the present study; suffice it to mention here a single
Australian case relating to the subject. In Hughes and
1Bremerman v. Rooke, the defendant hired a small aircraft 
from the plaintiffs for a non-stop flight with one 
passenger from an aerodrome at Brisbane (Queensland) to a 
coastal town and back. The defendant was given a compass 
course to reach the coast at a point north of the town, 
from which he would follow the coast to the town of 
destination. On his return journey, instead of leaving the 
coast at the prescribed point, he left it at a nearer 
point, and flew on the reverse of the compass course set 
for the outward flight. Smoke from bush fires prevented 
him from seeing landmarks, and he decided that he was off 
his course and landed in a paddock. Having ascertained 
his position, he took off again. However, after a 
successful take-off, the engine failed because of some 
unexpected and unforeseeable cause and the plane crashed 
and became a total loss. The plaintiffs then sued the 
defendant for damage occasioned by the loss of the 
aircraft. It was held by the Supreme Court of Queensland 
that there was to be implied in the contract the terms
(195*0 Q.s .r . 45; 48 q .j .p .r . 138.
1
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that the hirer might land en route if it became 
reasonably necessary to do so, and that the hirer would 
not deviate from the course normally taken on the flight 
agreed upon unless such a deviation was reasonably 
necessary to avoid some danger such as stress of weather 
or was brought about by some circumstances over which he 
had no control. The defendant was also under an 
obligation to exercise reasonable care in the operation 
of flying the aircraft and in navigating it; where the 
hirer of an aircraft returns it in a damaged condition or 
fails to return it at all, it is incumbent upon him to 
show that the damage or loss has not arisen from any want 
of reasonable care on his part. It was found that there was 
no negligence by the defendant in the operation of the 
aircraft and that the crash was not due to such negligence.
It was held, however, that his deviation from the journey 
agreed upon in his contract resulted from his negligent 
navigation. Then, the following questions of law were 
considered by the Court. First, with respect to the 
question whether a distinction could be drawn between 
intentional and negligent deviation, the Court found no 
judicial authority to decide that, where a person chartered 
a vessel and also acted as master, he could successfully 
say that a departure from the contract route, which would
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amount to a deviation if it were intentional, was not 
a deviation because it bad arisen from his own negligence. 
Secondly, according to the Court*s opinion, the real 
question was whether there was any legal nexus between 
the defendant’s negligent deviation in breach of the 
contract and the plaintiff’s loss. The plaintiffs’ 
reliance was placed upon the proposition that, where there 
is a bailment of a chattel for valuable consideration, 
the bailee is responsible for any damage to the chattel 
which happens, however occasioned, during an unauthorized 
use of the chattel unless he can show that such damage 
was inevitable. Was the event causing loss to the 
plaintiffs one which might not have occurred had the 
contract not been broken? The Court answered that it 
could not be said that the engine failure or the crash 
and consequent loss of the aircraft would inevitably have 
occurred even if the contract had not been broken; had 
the defendant not negligently navigated the aircraft he 
would have had to fly only to the aerodrome of departure, 
a substantially lesser distance than that which he did
_
The Court referred to shipping cases suggesting a 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary departure 
from an agreed route: Rio Tinto Co. Ltd, v. Seed Shipping 
Co. (1926) 134 L.T. 764; Tait v. Levi (1811) 14 East 481;
104 E.R. 686.
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fly before landing in tbe paddock; he would have had to
make a landing on that aerodrome but would not have had
1to take-off again. Hence, the defendant was held liable
for loss with which his negligence and breach of contract
2had no direct causal connection. There are in the United 
States and in England a few reported cases concerning 
liabilities of bailees of aircraft (e.g., repairers,
oairport-owners, &c.), but the Australian case seems to 
deal with a unique aspect of the subject, viz., legal 
nexus between bailee1 23s negligent deviation and plaintiffs 
loss, establishing a rule as to remoteness of damage in 
the case of contract of aircraft bailment. The liabilities 
arising from aerial colliaons between two or more aircraft 
are also outside the scope of the present study. These 
matters become only relevant when they relate to 
carriers’ liabilities to persons or goods carried in aircraft 
or operators’ liabilities for ground damage caused by aircraft.
1
Davies v. Garrett (1830) 6 Bing. 7 1 6 ; 130 E.R. 1436;
Lilley v. Doubleday (l88l) 7 Q.B.D. 310; James Morrison &
Co., Ltd, v. Shaw Savill and Albion Co. , L t d . (191(3) 2 K.B. 
783; A/S Rendal v. Arcos, L t d . ( 1937) 53 T.L.R. 953 I 
Vesojuznoje Objedheni Sovfracht of Moscow v. Temple 
S t e am ship C o . L t d . ( 1 943) 6>2 T.L.R. 43, followed and applied.
2
Cf. 28 A.L.J. 139 (notes and comments on this case).
3
As to American cases, see, e.g., C.S. Rhyne, Aviation 
Accident Law, 1947 5 p.106, et seq.; as to English cases, 
see, e.g., Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, second ed., 
p p . 4-76-8.
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CHAPTER VIII 
Carriage by Air
I General Background of the Law
1. International Legislation: Warsaw Convention
Earlier conventions including Paris, Madrid and 
Havana did not deal primarily with questions of private 
air law. As early as 1928 Comite International Technique 
d*Experts Juridiques Aeriens (C .I .T.E.J.A.) prepared a 
draft convention concerning air carrier*s liability in 
relation to passengers and shippers at its meeting in 
Madrid. The draft was adopted by the Second International 
Diplomatic Conference on Air Law, held at Warsaw on 
4-12 October 1929» The Convention, generally known as 
the Warsaw Convention, was entitled * Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air*•
Since it entered into force on 3 February 1933» the
Convention has made a great contribution for the
\
development of international air transport, but aviation 
was in an early stage of development when the Convention 
was formulated. After the study of the Legal Committee
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of I.C.A.O. which inherited from C.I.T.E.J.A. the task of
revising it, the Warsaw Convention was amended by the
1Protocol signed at The Hague on 28 September 1955} so as 
to meet the rapid growth of international carriage by air, 
particularly after World War 2. The original Convention 
of 1929 and- the Protocol of 1955 are deemed to be a 
single document called fthe Warsaw Convention as amended 
at The Hague, 1955*•
Supplementing the Warsaw Convention, the 'Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air performed by a Person other 
than the Contracting Carrier*, commonly known as the 
Guadalajara Convention, was adopted at the International 
Diplomatic Conference under the auspices of I.C.A.O. on 
18 September 1961, at Guadalajara, Mexico.
In the original Convention of 1929} Australia, like 
other Commonwealth dominions, was not treated as an 
independent 'High Contracting Party’ but merely as a 
territory of 'His Majesty, the King of Great Britain, 
Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas,
1
The revision was undertaken by C.I.T.E.J.A. in 1935} but 
the study was interrupted by World War 2. A final draft 
of the amendment had been prepared at Rio de Janeiro in 
1953» The Paris draft of 1952 which aimed at a drastic 
revision of the 1929 original Convention became therefore 
a skeleton draft.
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Emperor of India1. However, when the domestic legislation
1to give effect to it was introduced in Australia in 1935} 
Australia became an independent acceding State to the 
Convention. Until then, a flight direct from Australia to 
New Zealand (or other Dominions) was not covered by the 
Convention. As of 1 April 1961, the Convstion was in 
force in 57 contracting States including most of the 
Commonwealth countries.
The Hague Protocol was adopted unanimously by the 
representatives of 44 States including Australia who 
signed it in 1956 and introduced domestic legislation to 
give effect thereto in 1959« With the deposit of the 
necessary 30 ratifications, the Protocol came into force 
between the ratifying States on 1 August 19^3» To date 
the Convention as affected by the Hague Protocol has been 
ratified by 37 States.
The Guadalajara Convention has been ratified to date
2by 7 States including Australia and came into force as 
between the ratifying States on 1 May 1964, ninety days 
after the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification.
1
Carriage by Air A ct, 1935 (No.18).
2
The Parties are Australia, Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom.
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In proportion to the increase in volume of passengers
and goods carried by air, the regulation of carriage by
1air in its private law aspects has likewise grown in
importance. The national law governing or affecting this
legal relation may differ from State to State, and, owing
to its trans-national character, carriage by air would
suffer many difficult problems of conflict of laws unless
2there be a uniformity of rules regulating it. While some
aspects of carrier*s liabilities had been regulated by a 
set of uniform ’Conditions of Carriage’ which were adopted 
by the air transport companies members of the I.A.T.A.
3even before the Warsaw Convention of 1929 was formulated,
1
The public law aspects of international carriage by air 
have been regulated by the Chicago Convention (formerly, 
the Paris convention), other Conventions and bilateral 
treaties. The Air Navigation Act 1920-63 and the Air 
Navigation Regulations govern international and domestic 
carriage by air in public law aspects in Australia.
2
As to the difficulties arising from, and the desirability 
of uniformity of rules in, this field of international 
flight, see P. Reiber, Ratification of the Hague Protocol; 
Its Relation to the Uniform International Air Carrier 
Liability Law achieved by the Warsaw Convention, 23 J.A.L.C. 
(1956), p.272, et seq.
3
The uniform ’Conditions of Contract’ issued in 1927 by the 
Vienna Conference of the I.A.T.A. contained sweeping 
exonerations from liability. The Warsaw Convention forced 
the Association to modify its uniform contract form in 1930 
(Antwerp Conference). Cf. P.H. Sand, Limitation of 
Liability and Passengers’ Accident Compensation under the 
Warsaw Convention, 11 A.J.C.L. 1, p.24; see also Shawcross 
and Beaumont, op.cit., p.62, et seq.
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the main purpose of the Convention was to establish, on 
the scale of a multilateral treaty, uniform rules of civil 
liability of air carriers engaged in an international 
carriage in respect of injury or death of passengers, loss 
or damage to goods, and other matters incidental thereto. 
Among other things, it has established uniform documentation 
rules, a system of liability based on negligence coupled 
with a transfer of the burden of proof to the carrier, and, 
most important, a limitation of liability in the case of 
passenger injury or death, occurring during the period of 
international carriage. Those liability principles have 
not drastically been changed by the Hague Protocol, 
because, in order to minimize the danger of losing adherents 
to the Convention, only those amendments which were 
generally considered to be essential have been included 
in the form of a Protocol; nevertheless, the Protocol is 
in effect a new treaty incorporating important amendments 
to the original Convention. With or without modifications, 
the rules of the international legislation have been 
applied to non-international carriage in national laws in 
many countries including Australia.
The main purpose of the Guadalajara Convention is to 
fill the gap in the Warsaw Convention and the Hague 
Protocol created by the absence of any rules relating to
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international carriage by air performed by a person who
is not a party to the agreement for carriage, to the
effect that both the actual carrier and the contracting
carrier are to be subject to the rules of the Warsaw
Convention relating to liability, limitation of the
damages recoverable and the venue of actions against the
carrier. Accordingly, the term ’Convention1 is used here
to denote the international legislation comprised in the
Warsaw System as a whole; where distinction is necessary,
the terms ’the original Convention’, ’the Hague Protocol*
and the ’Guadalajara Convention’ will be used respectively.
Following is the scope of application of the Convention.
(i) Concept of ’International’ Carriage: The
Convention applies only to ’international’ carriage of
persons, baggage or cargo. For the purposes of the
Convention, ’international carriage’ is defined as,
any carriage in which, according to the agreement 
between the parties, the place of departure and 
the place of destination, whether or not there 
be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, 
are situated either within the territories of 
two High Contracting Parties^ or within the
1
As to the questin whether the expression ’High Contracting 
Party’ means the ’signatory State’ or ’ratified (or 
adhered) State’, the Hague Protocol defines it clearly as 
’a State whose ratification of or adherence to the 
Convention has become effective and whose denunciation 
thereof has not become effective’ (Art.XVIl). Semble, 
this definition is in accord with the established judicial 
(continued on p.387)
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1territory of a single High Contracting Party 
if there is an agreed stopping place within 
the territory of another State, even if that 
State is not a High Contracting Party 
(Art.1(2)).
As will be seen in the above definition, the scope of 
application of the Convention is limited to certain, 
geographically restricted, categories of carriage - that 
is, the so-called ’Warsaw carriage*; some carriages which 
are international in the ordinary sense of being from one 
country to another may not be governed by the Convention, 
thus giving rise to complex problems of choice of law. 
Various proposals to expand the application of the original 
Convention had been put forward, but no substantial 
amendment was made in the Hague Protocol.
1 (continued from 386)
precedents and theories. But as a contrary view, see the 
opinion of the House of Lords in Phillippson et al. v . 
Imperial Airways (1939) A.C. 332. The expression was 
also defined, in relation to Arts. 37(2) (ratification) and 4o(1) (declaration of non-application of the Convention to 
the State’s territories, &c.), as merely meaning ’State’. 
This was inserted to solve the special situation of the 
Commonwealth countries, for in the original Convention 
the Dominions in the British Commonwealth had been 
represented by a single High Contracting Party, viz., U.K.
1
For the purposes of the Convention the word ’territory’ 
means not only the metropolitan territory of a State but 
also all other territories for the foreign relation of 
which that State is responsible (Art. XVII of the Protocol, 
inserted as Art.4-0A of the original Convention).
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(ii) Agreement1 for Carriage: The Convention applies
1only when there is an agreement for carriage between the 
parties; hence, the intention of the parties is decisive 
for the application of the Convention; it does not apply 
primarily to a stowaway or members of the crew, 
regulation of whom is left to the national law of each 
State concerned. A State or ’legally constituted public 
bodies’ can be a party or parties to the agreement 
(Art.2(1)).
(iii) Nature of ’Carriage’: The Convention applies to
2international carriage by air ’for reward’, and also to
3’gratuitous carriage’ if performed by an air transport 
undertaking (Art.1(1)).
Carriage to be performed by several successive air 
carriers is deemed to be one undivided carriage if it has 
been regarded by the parties as a single operation, 
whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single 
contract or of a series of contracts, and it does not lose
1
This is an interpretation of the French text ’stipulation* 
which is a less formal notion than ’contract*.
2
As to the meaning of this expression, see Shawcross and 
Beaumont, op.cit., p.339(f)•
3
Ibid., at p.339(g)* ’Gratuitous carriage’ is the carriage 
not performed ’for reward’ (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 
third ed., vol.5» p.227-9)»
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its 1 2international' character merely because one contract
or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely
within the territory of the same State (Art.l(3))« By
Art.2 of the Guadalajara Convention, if an actual carrier,
2as distinct from a contracting carrier, performs the 
whole or part of carriage governed by the Convention, both 
the contracting carrier and the actual carrier are subject 
to the rules of the Warsaw Convention, the former for the 
whole of the carriage contemplated in the agreement, the 
latter solely for the carriage which he performs. In the 
case of ‘combined carriage* performed partly by air and 
partly by any other mode of carriage, the Convention 
applies only to the carriage by air, provided that the 
carriage by air falls within the terms of Art.1 of the
1
‘Actual carrier* means a person, other than the contracting 
carrier, who, by virtue of authority from the contracting 
carrier, performs the whole or part of the carriage 
contemplated by the contract made by the contracting 
carrier but who is not with respect to such part a 
successive carrier within the meaning of the Warsaw 
Convention (Art.1(c) of the Guadalajara Convention). For 
example, cases of charter and hire of aircraft (e.g. the 
operation by the Italian airline, Alitalia, of services 
between Italy and Australia with aircraft owned by the 
French airline, T.A.I., and flown by T.A.I. crews).
2
There is no definition of ‘carrier* in the original 
Convention nor in the Hague Protocol. However, the 
Guadalajara Convention (Art.l) defines ‘contracting 
carrier* as *a person who as a principal makes an agreement 
for carriage governed by the Warsaw Convention with a 
passenger or consignor or with a person acting on behalf 
of the passenger or consignor’.
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Convention. A ’double-trip carriage’ between a contracting
State and non-contracting State seems to be within the
1scope of application of the Convention.
The Convention does not apply to carriage of mail and 
postal packages (Art.2(2)). A State may at any time 
declare by a notification addressed to the Polish 
Government that the Convention as amended does not apply 
to the carriage of persons, cargo and baggage for its 
military authorities on aircraft, registered in that State, 
the whole capacity of which has been reserved by or on 
behalf of such authorities (Art.XXVI of the Convention 
as amended). Therefore, unless there is any such
2declaration, the Convention applies to military transport. 
There is no provision excluding carriage by aircraft for 
customs or police services from its application when the 
carriage falls within the conditions of application as 
laid down in Art.1.
1
F. Ikeda, Outline of International Aviation Law 
(Kokusai-Kokuho-Gairon) p p . 9 8 - 9 «  Cf. Garcia v. Pan- 
American Airways (19^ 5) U . S . A v . R . 3 9 ;  ( 19^ 6) U . S .Av.R.4 9 6 , 
and Grein v. Imperial Airways Ltd. ( 1 9 3 7 )  1 K.B. 5 0 ;  ( 1 9 3 6 )
2 All E.R. 1 2 5 8 ;  U . S .Av.R.2 1 1 .
2
Carriage on aircraft registered in one State and chartered 
by the military authorities of another would come under 
the provisions of the Convention notwithstanding the 
reservation - Cf. Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and The 
Hague Protocol, 2 3  J.A.L.C. ( 1 9 5 6 )  p . 269.
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2. Australian Legislation
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 has been accepted by
1Australia by virtue of the Carriage by Air Act 1935*
When the Bill was introduced in the Commonwealth
2Parliament, its object was stated:
With the growth of civil aviation in Australia, 
and as between England and Australia, it 
becomes increasingly important that proper 
provision should be made for regulating the 
matters which necessarily arise in relation to 
the carriage of persons and goods by air.
Carriage by air has for several years been a 
feature of interstate transport, between Sydney 
and Brisbane and between Adelaide and Perth.
More recently, the establishment of the England 
to Australia air services has brought Australia 
into the sphere of international air transport, 
and it is essential for the proper conduct of 
that service that people utilizing it should 
know the conditions under which they do so....
I need not emphasize the desirableness of early 
steps being taken to ratify this convention.
The ramification of modern international air 
travel make it essential that the rights and 
obligations of carriers by air should be clearly 
delimited. The bill provides the solution, and 
marks an important stage in the development of 
the law with regard to aviation.
The Act was primarily applicable only with respect to
'international carriage* as defined. The First Schedule
to the Act contained the text of the 1929 Convention, and
1
No.18 of 1935.
2
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 25 Geo. 
V. vol.146. First Session of the Fourteenth Parliament 
(Second Period), p.717*
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the Second Schedule the provisions having effect with 
respect to the persons by and for whose benefit the 
liability imposed by the Convention on a carrier was 
enforceable and with respect to the manner in which it 
might be enforced. It is worthy of note that the Act 
empowered the Governor-General to make regulations applying, 
with such exceptions, adaptations and modifications (if any) 
as he thought fit, the provisions of the Convention to 
non-international carriage (sec.5(l))» This section was 
of doubtful constitutionality, in view of the decision of 
the High Court in the first Henry Case in 1936 but no 
such regulations were made pursuant to it. Accordingly, 
non-international carriage of goods and passengers by 
air within Australia had been governed by the rules of 
common law, by the terms of special contracts, and by 
statutes enacted independently of the Warsaw Convention.
The Carriage by Air Act 1935 was repealed by the 
Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959^ in which 
approval was given to ratification by Australia of the 
Hague Protocol of 1955» However, Australia has continued 
to be a party to the unamended Convention in relation to
1
R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry, 1936, 55 C.L.R. 6o8.
2
No.2 of 1959.
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the States which delay or fail to adopt the Protocol, 
until a date to be fixed by Proclamation (which has not 
yet been made). The Act of 1959 consists of Part I 
(Preliminary), Part II (Carriage to which the Warsaw 
Convention and the Hague Protocol apply), Part III 
(Carriage to which the Warsaw Convention without the Hague 
Protocol applies), Part IV (other Carriage to which this 
Act applies) and Part V (Miscellaneous), with the First 
Schedule (Warsaw Convention) and Second Schedule (Hague 
Protocol). Part IV deals mainly with domestic carriage 
but also with some categories of international carriage 
to which the Convention is not applicable. This Part is 
an extension of rules of the Convention, with certain 
modifications which are considered more appropriate for 
domestic purposes, into the area of domestic carriage 
within Federal legislative competence.
The Act of 1959 was amended by the Civil Aviation
■j(Carriers1 Liability) Act 1962 in order to introduce the 
provisions of the Guadalajara Convention. This was done 
by inserting Part IIIA (Carriage to which the Guadalajara 
Convention applies) in the principal Act to which Third 
Schedule (Guadalajara Convention) was further added.
_
No.38 of 1962.
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In 1963, the Air Accidents (Commonwealth Liability)
1Act was enacted. This Act provides Tor the payment oT 
damages by the Commonwealth and authorities oT the 
Commonwealth in respect of the death of, or personal 
injury to, persons carried in aircraft operated by the 
Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority and to certain 
persons carried in other aircraft.
The view has so far prevailed that the constitutional 
powers of the Commonwealth Parliament to regulate 
carriage by air are limited to international and inter­
state operation, and to carriage in, to or from Commonwealth 
Territories; hence purely intra-State carriage by air has 
been regarded as exclusively within the legislative domain 
of the States. In order to achieve uniformity of 
legislation in this field, the Commonwealth Government 
took an initiative by preparing a draft Model Bill as a 
guide to assist in achieving uniform State legislation.
The Parliaments of all States except New South Wales have 
passed Acts in almost identical terms with the draft Model 
Bill, which extends the principles of the Commonwealth 
legislation on carriers’ liability to air transport 
_
No.74 of 1963.
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within their respective States1 territory. A similar
statute is expected to be enacted by New South Wales in
2the near future.
(i) Commonwealth Legislation: There is no doubt that 
the Commonwealth had constitutional power to enact Parts II, 
III and IIIA of the Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability)
Act 1959-62, under the external affairs power (sec.51(xxix) 
of the Constitution) and/or foreign and interstate 
commerce power (sec.51(i)). The rules of the Warsaw 
Convention, Hague Protocol and Guadalajara Convention are 
given respectively the force of law in Australia by the 
Act (secs. 21, 11 and 25A, respectively) and only the
question of implementation is, as a constitutional problem, 
left to be considered. Although very few provisions of 
the Convention require in express terms the adjustment or 
change of domestic legislation in accordance with rules 
of the Convention, as the scope of its application is 
limited to the 'Warsaw carriage*, there is no reason why 
the federal Act cannot supplement them by inserting any
1
Vic. : Civil Aviation (Carriers * Liability) Act 1961 .
W.A. : Civil Aviation (Carriers * Liability) Act 1961 .
S.A. : Civil Aviation (Carriers 1 Liability) Act 1962.
Tas. : Civil Aviation (Carriers * Liability) Act 1963.Q * Id.: Civil Aviation (Carriers * Liability) Act 1964.
Annual Civil Aviation Report 1963-64, at p.23.
2
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matter necessary for giving the fullest effect to the
Convention. Moreover, insofar as the international
carriage is concerned, the Commonwealth Parliament is
competent to enact matters which are independent of the
Convention but fall within the scope of 1 2trade and
commerce with other countries1.
The Commonwealth Parliament has extended the rules of
the Convention to domestic carriage, with certain
modifications, upon the basis of its other constitutional
powers. Part IV, headed as ’Other carriage to which this
Act applies’, applies to the carriage of a passenger where
the passenger is or is to be carried in an aircraft being
1operated by the holder of an airline licence in the
2course of commercial transport operations, or in an
aircraft being operated in the course of trade and commerce
between Australia and another country, under a contract
for the carriage of the passenger -
(a) between a place in a State and a place in 
another State;
1
’Airline licence’ means an airline licence in force under 
the Air Navigation Regulations (sec.26(l)). See Appendix II, 
post.
2
’Commercial transport operations’ means ’operations in 
which an aircraft is used, for hire or reward, for the 
carriage of passengers or cargo (sec.26(l)).
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(b) between a place in a Territory of the 
Commonwealth and a place in Australia 
outside that Territory;
(c) between a place in a Territory of the 
Commonwealth and another place in that 
Territory; or
(d) between a place in Australia and a place 
outside Australia, not being carriage to 
which the Warsaw Convention, or the Hague 
Protocol or the Guadalajara Convention 
applies (sec.27(l) as amended by sec.8 of 
the 1962 Act)•
The constitutional basis for this provision is the 
!foreign and inter-State trade and commerce’ power or 
’Commonwealth Territory* power (sec.122), with (if 
necessary) the ’incidental* power of the Constitution 
(sec,51(xxxix)). Accordingly, Part IV does not in terms 
apply to purely intra-State carriage, but there are several 
exceptions to this limited application of the federal 
legislation. Firstly, where the carrier is the Australian 
National Airlines Commission who operates T.A.A. (Trans- 
Australia Airlines), the Part applies in relation to 
carriage between a place in a State and a place in the 
same State in like manner as it applies in relation to 
carriage between a place in a State and a place in another 
State (sec.27(2)). The powers, functions and duties of 
the Commission for the operation of airline services are 
summarized in Appendix I F  of this thesis; it is sufficient
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to say that the Commission cannot operate intra-State 
services unless enabled to do so by an Act of the 
Parliament of the particular State or as incidental to 
authorized services (i.e. airline services for the transport, 
for reward, of passengers and goods by air between States 
and between a place in a Territory and another place 
inside or outside that Territory). Mention has already 
been made as to the legislation of this kind which has so 
far been passed by the Queensland and Tasmanian Parliaments/ 
Hence, the Commonwealth Parliament is competent to apply 
the federal Act concerning carriage by air to the 
Commission1s operation in those particular States under 
sec.51(xxxvii) and sec.51(xxxix) of the Constitution.
Unless these background facts are noted, the wording of 
sec.27(2) of the Act 1959-1962 concerning the Commission*s 
activity could mislead; Part IV of the Act might be read 
without any such conditions. Secondly, where, under a 
contract of carriage, the carriage is to begin and end 
in the one State or Territory of the Commonwealth 
(whether at the one place or not) but is to include a 
landing or landings at a place or places outside that
1
Arts.19-29 of the Australian National Airlines Act 19^5 
(No.31)-1961 (No.71T  
2
See Part I, ante.
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State or Territory, the carriage is deemed to be carriage 
between the place where the carriage begins and that 
landing place, or such one of those landing places as 
is most distant from the place where the carriage begins, 
as the case may be (sec.27(3))» This implies in turn 
that Part IV of the Act does not apply to the carriage 
which has the place of departure and the place of 
destination in the same State but merely passes over the 
other State’s or Territory’s land. The question how far 
the Commonwealth’s power can be extended to such cases has 
already been discussed in relation to the constitutional 
problem of ’border-hopping’ cases. Thirdly, where (a) 
the carriage of a passenger between two places is to be 
performed by two or more carriers in successive stages, (b) 
the carriage has been regarded by the parties as a single 
operation, whether it has been agreed upon by a single 
contract or by two or more contracts, and (c) Part IV 
would apply to that carriage if it were to be performed by 
a single carrier under a single contract, then Part IV 
applies in relation to a part of that carriage notwithstanding 
that that part consists of carriage between a place in a 
State and a place in the same State (sec.27(^))» By analogy,
_
See Chapter II, ante.
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the Part could also have been applied to carriage by air 
where part of the carriage is connected with other forms 
of transportation, if the whole journey has an 'inter­
state 1 or foreign nature and was regarded by the parties 
as a single operation.
(ii) State Legislation: The Parliaments of all 
States except New South Wales have passed Acts which 
extend the principles of the Commonwealth legislation on 
carriers1 liability to air transport operators within their 
territories. The carriage to which those States’ Acts 
apply is the carriage of a passenger where he is or is to 
be carried in an aircraft being operated by the holder of 
an airline licence in the course of commercial transport 
operations under a contract for the carriage of the 
passenger between a place in the State and another place 
in the State, not being carriage to which Part IV of 
the Commonwealth Act applies or ’to which the Warsaw 
Convention, or the Warsaw Convention as affected by the 
Hague Protocol, and by the Guadalajara Convention, applies’. 
The last condition was inserted because there are some 
instances where the carriage between aerodrome A and 
_
See, e.g., Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) Act 1964 
(No .24) (Q’Id.), sec.4. The other States’ Acts also set 
out the same provision.
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aerodrome B (both, being situated not only in Australia 
but also in a single State of the Commonwealth) may fall 
within the scope of application of the Convention, for 
example a round trip ticket.
In determining the respective scope of application of 
the federal legislation and the State legislation, the 
presumption has been that the Commonwealth Parliament could 
not in general intrude into purely intra-State carriage 
by air. However, when the flow of passengers and goods 
is taken into account, there should be ample constitutional 
basis for the Commonwealth Parliament to enact a federal 
law establishing uniform rules throughout Australia for 
determining liability of air carriers to passengers and 
shippers, under the commerce power.
3• Common Law?
Since the civil liabilities of carriers in respect 
of damage to passengers, luggage or cargo are largely 
governed by statutory rules throughout Australia, the 
scope of application of the common law rules is limited; 
they apply only to some exceptional carriages which are 
not covered by the statutory definition, or supplement 
the gaps in statutory rules. One of the most important 
instances which are not covered by statutory rules is 
gratuitous carriage. In the case of ’international'
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carriage governed by the international legislation, 
gratuitous carriage which is not performed by an air 
transport undertaking is outside the scope of application 
of the Convention; in the case of 1 non-internationalr 
carriage (including purely intra-State carriages), it 
seems that no gratuitous carriage is governed by statute. 
Also, statutory provisions do not apply when there is no 
contract of carriage between the parties (e.g., stowaways 
or crew of aircraft). But, by virtue of the federal Act 
(sec.42), the limitation of liability (if any) of the 
carrier or of his servants or agents is made applicable 
to a person who travels in an aircraft without the consent 
of the carrier, although this does not impose any other 
liability on a carrier or a servant or agent of a carrier 
to which he is not subject. This provision concerning 
stowaways is made applicable to purely intra-State 
carriage, mutatis mutandis, by the States’ Acts. However, 
since the rights and duties of the parties to a contract 
of air carriage is, in nearly every case (except in New 
South Wales), determined in accordance with the 
provisions of one or other of the federal and State 
enactments, it will be sufficient to describe the general 
rules of common law liability in carriage by air. The
common law rules to supplement deficiencies of the
4o3
statutory rules on various subjects which are covered by 
statutory carriage will be mentioned in more detail when 
we deal with main problems of* this branch of law.
Carriers in common law are divided into common and 
private carriers; the definition of these two types of 
carriers is well established in English law, although it 
is always a question of fact whether a person is or is not 
a common carrier. Different rules of liability apply to 
them. A common carrier is bound to answer for the goods 
at all events unless the damage or loss arises from the 
act of God, the Queen*s enemies, or from the fault of 
the consignor, or inherent vice of the thing carried; 
whereas a private carrier (and a common carrier of 
passengers) is not liable for loss or injury unless 
negligence is proved by evidence. We shall not consider 
here the question whether an air carrier should or should 
not be regarded as a common carrier at common law; the 
subject has been discussed elsewhere, and the scope of 
the problem depends in each case upon the contents of the 
contract and applicable legislation. It is sufficient to 
say that if, at the present stage of common law, an air 
_
See Chapter I, ante. See especially Aslan v. Imperial 
Airways Ltd. (1933) 38 Com. Cas. 227 holding that there 
is no good reason why a carrier by air should not be a 
common carrier.
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carrier carries goods for reward, he may in fact be a
common carrier, incurring all the responsibilities and
liabilities of a common carrier. However, carriers may
in general limit or exclude liability at common law by a
special contract, provided that, in case of a common
carrier of goods, the terms of such a contract are
reasonable, and in any case a clause purporting to
exempting a party to a contract from liability for
negligence must contain express language to that effect.
In Martin v, Queensland Airlines Pty. Ltd., where the
plaintiff's husband was killed while he was a passenger
for reward in an aircraft operated and controlled by the
defendant, the Court said:
A carrier of passengers has complete freedom 
at common law to make such contracts as he 
thinks fit, enlarging, diminishing, or 
excluding his common law obligations,
Ludditt V. Ginger Coote Airways, Ltd. (19^7,
A.C.233)....I think it is clear that the 
defendant is relieved of that liability.
By the contract it was provided in express 
terms that the passenger was carried entirely 
at his own risk and that the carrier accepted 
no responsibility for damage, including death, 
arising out of, or incidental to the carriage, 
and that the passenger renounced all claims 
against the carrier in respect thereof whether 
the same may be due to, or alleged to be due to 
negligence or misconduct on the part of the 
carrier, or not. In my opinion this language 
clearly relieves the defendant from all liability 
for the death of the passenger in this case.
1956, Q.S.R., p.378.
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Such, was the situation in domestic carriage before the
enactment of the federal Act of 1959» although most of
the privately-owned companies voluntarily took out
insurance policies providing a limited cover (usually
£2,000)in the event of death or permanent disablement of
a passenger, and lesser amounts for less serious 
1injuries. Even now there is no specific aviation
insurance legislation either of the Commonwealth or of
the States, whether compulsory or not, and aircraft owners
or operators voluntarily take out insurance policies to
which the ordinary law of insurance ascertaining the
rights and liabilities of the parties would be 
2applicable.
1
L.R. Edwards, Some Aspects of the Liabilities of Airline 
Operators in Australia, 34 A.L.J. p.144.
2
Some aspects of the Commonwealth constitutional powers 
for the compulsory insurance legislation will be discussed 
when we deal with the topic in relation to the surface 
damage caused by aircraft. As to the American position, 
see S.G. Tipton and R.S. Bernhard, Compulsory Insurance 
For Air Carriers, 20 J.A.L.C. 1953, p«75, et seq.
According to the writers* view, various reasons in support 
of compulsory insurance (e.g. protection of the public 
with respect to collection of judgments against air 
carriers, protection of the air carriers against the 
effects of excessive losses from accidents, furtherance of 
public safety, enhancement of public acceptance of 
commercial aviation) are not substantial and only 
superficially persuasive. But, in considering the 
justification of compulsory insurance, the differences in 
the economic and social factors affecting air transport 
industry in the United States and Australia must be taken 
into account.
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1The Australian National Airlines Act 1945 had made
the Commission a common carrier of passengers and goods
with the obligations and privileges of common carriers
(sec.24), so that the Commission could not escape by
‘contracting out1 the obligation for the legal liability
for damages for personal injuries suffered through the
negligence of its servants. The provision was repealed by
2the Australian National Airlines Act 1959 and the 
Commission is now governed by the Civil Aviation 
(Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959-62 which expressly nullifies 
and invalidates any provision of an agreement tending to 
relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit 
than the appropriate limit of liability provided by the 
A ct. ^
Negligence on the part of carrier must be proved by 
the plaintiff; the damage suffered must be shown to be 
actionable in accordance with the ordinary rules relating 
to remoteness of damage, causation, etc.,
1
No.31 of 1945 - No.71 of 1961.
2
No.3 of 1959.
Sec.32.
3
but the rule
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res ipsa loquitur would probably apply. In Forsbroke-
Hobbes v. Airworks Ltd, and British.-American Air Services 
2Ltd., it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applied in an action for negligence by a passenger
against an air carrier, and the Court rejected the argument
that the doctrine should not be applied because carriage
by air was comparatively new, on the grounds that
aeroplanes had become a common-place method of travel and
that the courts found no difficulty in applying the
doctrine to railways when they were a new method of travel.
3In Arnold v . Evans where an action under the Fatal 
Accidents Act 1959 (w.A.) was brought by the plaintiff as 
the administratrix of the estate of her late husband 
who was a passenger in an aircraft piloted by the person 
of whose will the defendant was the executor, the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia (Virtue J.) referring to the 
Fosbroke-Hobbes Case entirely disagreed with the application
1
As to the detailed examples of aviation cases where the 
maxim has been applied, see Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., 
pp.320-24.
2
(1937) 1 All E.R. 108; W.N. 48; 53 T.L.R. 254; (1938) 
U.S.Av.R. 194, where the plaintiff was injured in an 
aircraft crash which took place immediately after the 
take-off and before the aircraft had attained the requisite 
height for its journey. See also 10 A.L.J. p.489.
(1952) 54 W.A.L.R. 15.
3
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of the doctrine to aeroplanes generally. He pointed
out that in the Fosbroke-Hobbes Case a positive cause of
negligence had been made out by the plaintiff1s witness
so that the finding that the doctrine applied was
unnecessary for the decision. Referring to the classic
authority on the doctrine in Scott v. London and
1 . 2St. Katherine Docks C o ., the Court said:
Now, in a case where an aircraft simply obeys 
the law of gravity and crashes, I do not consider 
that there is any justification for saying that 
such an occurrence is one which in the ordinary 
course of things only happens through the 
negligence of the pilot or his servants.
Structural and mechanical faults due to defects 
in manufacture or resulting from imperfect 
servicing and maintenance of an aircraft would,
I should imagine, be quite a patent cause of 
air disasters and these in many, if not in most 
cases would not be attributable necessarily to 
the neglect of the pilot. I therefore hold that 
the doctrine does not apply to the circumstances 
of the present case and it is incumbent upon 
the plaintiff to establish his claim by positive 
evidence.
In this case, the Court eventually found the pilot 
negligent upon evidence of the heads of negligence 
particularised by the plaintiff. Virtue J.*s remarks seem
(1865) 3 H. & C. 596.
54 W.A.L.R. at pp.19-20.
2
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to be in accord with, the views taken by the U.S. courts,
but McNair regards such a situation (where the circumstances
of the crash are clearly consistent with due care on the
part of the defendant) as an only exception to the
2general application of the doctrine. Neither the
general application of the doctrine nor the total denial
of the doctrine (i.e., the application of the ordinary
law of negligence) is appropriate in view of the difficulty
in most cases of establishing the cause of aviation
accidents on the part of the claimant, for in any case
the res ipsa loquitur rule cannot, by itself, impute
3liability to an air carrier. A drastical change of
ordinary negligence law will be necessary in air law;
statutory shifting of the burden of proof, as embodied
in international legislation, would be one of such
solutions. The doctrine may be applied more often in the
4future at common law, but the inadequacy of the doctrine
1
E.g., Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation v. Dunlop 
(1933) U.S.Av.R. 311.
2
McNair, op.cit., p.33*
3
Cf. Davis, Surface Damage by Foreign Aircraft: The United 
States and the New Rome Convention, 38 Cornell Law 
Quarterly, 1952-33j p.57^. As to the applicability of 
the doctrine in relation to the operator's liability to 
surface damage, see Chapter IX, post.
k
Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., P.321, p.323n
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is obvious in aerial collision cases where ’human
1experience is powerless to pin point the negligence’.
Whether an action against a carrier is an action of 
contract or tort depends upon whether the plaintiff must 
prove a contract, or whether he can show a good cause of 
action independently of contract. The distinction is
2relevant mainly in relation to the measure of damages 
and choice of law.
IX Main Provisions and Problems of the Law
In the following discussion of main provisions and 
problems of the law concerning carriage by air which is in 
force in Australia, each subject will be classified as 
’international’ carriage which is governed by international 
legislation, and ’non-international’ carriage which is 
carriage other than international carriage, including 
international (in ordinary sense) carriage not governed by 
the Convention, inter-State and intra-State carriage.
1
G.N. Calkins, op.cit., p.255*
2
As to measure of damages by carriers, see Halsbury’s Laws 
of England, vol.4, p.151> p .190, and cases cited there.
As to the Australian legislation and cases, see Halsbury’s 
Laws of England, Australian Pilot, third ed., vols. 1-5» 
Carriers (vol.4), p .382 (ss.399-4o6) and p .387 (s.470).
1. Carriers* Liability
41 1
(1) Principles of Liability
International Carriage: The Convention lays down
the basic principles of civil liability of the carrier 
under a principle of negligence which, by reason of the 
onus it creates, approaches absolute liability; Art.20(l) 
provides that:
The carrier is not liable if he proves he and 
his agents have taken all necessary measures 
to avoid the damage or that it was impossible 
for him or them to take such measures.
Read together with Arts.17» 18 and 19» discussed below,
this shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to
1the carrier. Calkins comments:
Reversal of the burden of proof is fair in the 
same way that res ipsa is fair. If time could 
be reversed and stopped at the first split 
second of impact, the carrier through its 
servants could far better explain the accident 
and how it occurred than could the passenger.
Res ipsa would require such an explanation to 
the then-living passenger. Death of all the 
participants should not deprive the plaintiff’s 
executor of this advantage.
’All necessary measures’ means ’all reasonably necessary 
2measures’ which are required to take at the present stage 
of development of aeronautical techniques. A paradox of
1
Calkins, op.cit., pp.255-56*
I.C.A.O. Doc.7^ -50, vol.1, p.85.
2
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this expression - if all !necessaryf means are proved to
have been taken, the damage could not have occurred - has
been pointed out in the parliamentary debates of the
Commonwealth when the Act of 1959 was introduced in the
form of a bill. A more difficult problem will arise
when the real cause of damage cannot be found; the carrier
seems to be freed from liability if he proves that he
and his agents and servants have taken all necessary
means. Damage caused by force majeure exempts the carrier
from liability, and he is not liable for damage caused by
the third person. Is he liable for the damage caused by
an inherent defect of aircraft? He will be exempted
from liability if he possesses a proper airworthiness
certificate and has paid reasonable care to maintaining 
2the aircraft.
With respect to 1 contributory negligence1, Art.21 
provides that if the carrier proves that the damage was 
caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the 
injured person the Court may, in accordance with the 
provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly
_
Parliamentary Debates, 7 April 1959 (H. of Rep.) p.9l4.
2
Ikeda, op.cit., p.135j citing as authority Goedhuis, La 
situation juridique du commandant de l'aeronef, Revue 
de droit int., p.203»
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or partly from his liability# The exoneration of 
carriers* liability in contributory negligence is thus
left to be decided by lex fori in view of the considerable
1differences of national laws on this matter. Effect is 
given to Art.21 by sec.16 of the Commonwealth legislation: 
it provides that the court shall first determine the 
damages that would have been recoverable if there were no 
limit and there had been no negligence on the part of the 
passenger or consignor; the damages so determined are then 
reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and 
equitable, having regard to the share of the passenger or 
consignor in the responsibility for the damage; if the 
damages so reduced exceed the maximum liability of the 
carrier fixed by or in accordance with the Convention, then 
the court shall further reduce the damages to that maximum 
amount. Under the common law rules of contributory 
negligence, there will be a complete defence to a claim 
even when the loss or damage was merely contributed to by 
the person who has suffered it. However, the legislation 
on apportionment of loss, which gives no longer a complete 
defence to a claim, is now established in all States of
-
Cf. Art.6 of the Rome Convention of 1952 (Art.3 of the 
Rome Convention of 1933) which established a uniform rule 
based upon the offset of negligence.
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Australia except in New South. Wales. Sec.16 of the 
Commonwealth Act establishes a special rule concerning 
apportionment of loss caused by air carriers in 
international carriage. The most likely case of 
contributory negligence would be where a passenger fails 
to fasten his safety belt during turbulent conditions, 
after warning to do so.
The original Convention of 1929 provided in Art.20(2) 
that the carrier is not liable if he proves that the 
damage has been occasioned by negligent pilotage or 
negligence in the handling of the aircraft or in 
navigation and that, in all other respects, he and his 
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the 
damage. This exoneration clause was applicable only with 
respect to the carriage of goods and baggage, but even so 
was regarded as unfair to the consignor. The provision 
was eliminated in the Hague Protocol, and the same rule 
for disproving liability now prevails for cargo and baggage
_
Vic.: Wrongs Act, 1958, sec.26.
Q*ld.: Law Reform (Tortfeasors Contribution, Contributory 
Negligence, and Division of Chattels) A ct, 1952.
S.A.: Wrongs Act, 1936-51> sec.27a.
W.A.: Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Tortfeasors1 
ContributionV Act. 19^7 .
Tas.: Tortfeasors and Contributory Negligence A c t , 195^» 
sec.4.
A.C.T.:Law Reform (m .P.) Ordinance, 1955» sec.15»
as for passengers. It should be remembered, however, that 
the earlier defence available to the carrier is still 
applicable to carriage to which the original Warsaw 
Convention applies (i.e., carriage governed by Part III 
of the Commonwealth Act).
Non-International Carriage: In carriage governed by
Part IV of the Commonwealth Act, which is also extended 
to intra-State carriage by virtue of the State legislation, 
the carrier is liable for damage to passengers and
•jbaggages (sec.28). The carrier1s liability for damage
to cargo, and for delay, is not defined. Defences available
to the carrier are laid down only with respect to liability
for destruction, loss or injury to baggage of the
passenger, as sec.29(l) provides:
the carrier is liable...unless the carrier proves 
that he and his servants and agents took all 
necessary measures to avoid the destruction, loss 
or injury or that it was impossible for him or 
them to take such measures.
In contrast with the carrier1s liability in international 
carriage, this defence is therefore not available in the
1
Sec. 28 reads as follows: 1 Subject to this Part, where this
Part applies to the carriage of a passenger, the carrier 
is liable for damage sustained by reason of the death of 
the passenger or any personal injury suffered by the 
passenger resulting from an accident which took place on 
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations 
of embarking or disembarking*.
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case of injury or death of passengers. The carrier’s 
liability in respect of injury or death of the passenger 
is absolute, while his liability in respect of damage to 
cargo or delay is governed by the common law rules of 
negligence or by the terms of special contracts. Hence, 
in non-international carriage by air, insofar as it is 
governed by the statutory rules, three different sets of 
principles, viz. absolute liability, fault (the onus cast 
upon the carrier), and negligence (at common law), govern 
carriers’ liability in accordance with the nature of the 
claims. The reason why the rule of disproving liability 
was omitted from non-international carrier’s liability 
in respect of passengers is not clear, unless it was that 
such a provision would impair the uniformity of domestic 
law.
With respect to contributory negligence, the court 
may exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his 
liability under the Carriers’ Liability Acts (Commonwealth 
and States), and the principles of exoneration and
assessment of damages recoverable is the same as in the
case of ’international’ carriage. 1
Sec.39»
1
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This statutory liability for damage to passengers is
in substitution for any civil liability for the carrier
under any other law in respect of the death of the
passenger or in respect of the injury that has resulted
in the death of the passenger. The same rule applies to
carriage to which the Warsaw Convention as affected by the
Hague Protocol applies, to carriage to which the original
Warsaw Convention only applies, and to carriage governed
by the States Acts incorporating the provisions of the
1Commonwealth Act. Hence, claims under the State Fatal 
2Accidents Acts or similar legislation are excluded by
the uniform State Acts (in relation to intra-State carriage)
and by the Commonwealth Act (in relation to every other
carriage). A similar rule is provided for injury to 
3passenger. Since the Carriers1 2 Liability Act
1
Secs.12(2), 24 and 35(2).
2
There is no Commonwealth Legislation equivalent to the 
Fatal Accidents Acts, 1846-1908 (u.K.), but each State 
has equivalent legislation:
N.S.W.
Vic.
Q f Id.
S • A •
W . A .
Tas.
A.C.T.
Secs.
3
Compensation to Relatives A ct, 1897-1953 
Wrongs Act 1958, Part III.
Common Law Practice Acts, 1867-1940 
Wrongs A ct, 1936-59» Part I I .
Fatal Accidents Act, 1959 
Fatal Accidents Act, 193^--43
Compensation (Fatal Injuries) Ordinance, 1938
13» 24 and 36
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(Commonwealth, and States) applies to ’passengers1, the
scope of application of the Act for damage incurred by-
workers employed by carriers (e.g., air crew), which is
1usually governed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, is
2apt to be small.
In New South Wales, the law governing the liability 
of intra-State air carriers is common law. The Common 
Carriers Act 1902 defines a common carrier as ’a common 
carrier by land’, which would appear to exclude carriers 
by air, and in any event that Act has no provisions dealing 
with the carriage of passengers. Probably, the rule of 
res ipsa loquitur or ordinary rules of negligence would 
apply to the carriers’ liability for passengers. But, as
1
Commonwealth: Commonwealth Employees Compensation Act,
N.S.W. Workmen’s Compensation Ac t , 1926-59.
Vic. Workmen’s Compensation A c t , 1958.
Q ’ld. Workmen’s Compensation A c t , 1916-59.
S.A. Workmen’s Compensation A c t , 1932-58.
W.A. Workmen* s Compensation A c t , 1912-59.
Tas. Workmen’s Compensation A c t , 1927-59.
A.C.T. Workmen* s Compensation Ordinance, 1931-
2
The application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act will 
cause some difficult problems of jurisdiction. Even when 
the Carriers’ Liability Act applies (e.g. an employee as 
a passenger in the course of his employment by an employer 
other than carriers), it is unlikely that the Carriers’ 
Liability Act excludes the liability under the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, because the relation between employers 
and employees is totally different from the carriers’ 
liability.
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we will see later, the air carriers tend to exempt 
themselves from all liability by the conditions of 
carriage endorsed on their passenger tickets.
(2) Occurrence of Liability and Measure of Damages
International Carriage: (Passenger) The carrier
is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death 
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury 
suffered by a passenger, * if the accident which caused 
the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft 
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking 
or disembarking* (Art.17)« This provision, which was not 
altered by the Hague Protocol, clearly defines the scope 
of the place where the carrier*s liability arises.
*Any other bodily injury* will include physiological shock 
or mal de l*air, but it is not clear whether it includes 
mental damage which ranges from temporary mental 
derangement to permanent one. While a causal relation 
should exist between the accident and the damage, it is
also not clear whether it should exist between the accident
1and the operation of aircraft. Semble, it should. The 
question whether the damage must be that which is directly
_
Ikeda, op.cit., p.121.
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caused by the accident is also to be decided by the 
national law. The * accident* includes an aerial collision, 
and it seems that the word covers such occurrences as loss 
of pressure or bumps. The implementing provisions of the 
Commonwealth Act (Parts XI and III) does not define whether 
the ‘damage sustained* includes ‘moral damage* or ‘remote 
damage1; hence, one must inquire into the ordinary rules 
of the English law. A general rule of remoteness of 
damage is that no damages are recoverable for any loss, 
injury or damage which is not the direct, immediate or 
proximate consequence of the act or omission complained 
of, although it is a question of fact which can in general
only be decided on a review of the circumstances of each
1special case; mere mental pain or anxiety unattended by
2any physical injury is too remote, but there are possible, 
in air travel, injuries which cannot be called bodily 
injuries, the scope of which will depend on medical 
progress in aeronautics. With respect to the measure of 
damages recoverable in action, the Convotion is completely 
silent, and the Commonwealth legislation supplements it
1
Cf. Halsbury‘s Laws of England, third ed., vol.11, p.268, 
et seq.
2
Ibid.
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only with, regard to death of a passenger (including the 
injury that resulted in the death) by providing that the 
damages recoverable in the action include loss of earnings 
or profits up to the date of death and the reasonable 
expenses of the funeral of the passenger and medical and 
hospital expenses reasonably incurred in relation to the 
injury that resulted in the death of the passenger, and 
that in awarding such damages, the court or jury is not 
limited to the financial loss resulting from the death 
of the passenger (sec.12 (7) & (8)). A new paragraph (4) 
of Art.22 of the Convention as amended by the Hague 
Protocol permits the court, in accordance with its own 
law, to award court costs, attorney*s fees and other 
costs incurred, but this does not apply if the carrier had 
made a timely offer to settle the claim at an amount equal 
to or exceeding the amount of judgment. The Commonwealth 
Act does not provide whether the damages recoverable 
include *litigation expenses*, but provides that the 
latter condition, mentioned above, does not apply to an 
action in respect of death of passenger that is wholly 
or partly for the benefit of a person or persons other 
than the plaintiff (sec.12(11)). This means that even if 
the amount of the damages awarded, excluding court costs 
and other expenses of the litigation, exceeds the sum
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timely offered by the carrier, the court may award, in 
addition to the limits prescribed in the Convention, the 
whole or part of the court costs and of the other expenses 
of the litigation. This provision of the Commonwealth 
legislation is carefully removed in Part IV so as not to 
be applicable in international carriage governed by the 
Convention as affected by the Hague Protocol, for, 
otherwise, such an apparent deviation from the Convention 
would be a breach of treaty obligations. It should be 
noted that this measure of damages is provided only with 
respect to death (including injury that has resulted in 
the death) of the passenger, but not with respect to mere 
injury to the passenger. In the latter case, an Australian 
court will measure damages in accordance with the 
ordinary law relating to measure of damages for personal 
injury, which will include the physical injury itself 
and, in case of loss of limb, disfigurement, or disablement, 
its effect upon the physical capacity of the injured person 
to enjoy life, as well as his bodily pain and suffering, 
and shock, or injury to health. Sec.15 of the Act sets 
out a number of items which are not to be taken into 
account in assessing damages in respect of liability.
_
Cf. Halsbury's Laws of England, third ed., vol.11, p.255.
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They are limited to carriers' liability to passengers 
only. They include proceeds of life insurance policies, 
superannuation payments and pensions, and the value of 
the interest in the dwelling house of a person killed in 
an air accident which passes to his spouse or child 
consequent upon his death.
(Goods) The carrier is liable for damage sustained 
in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage 
to, any registered baggage or any cargo, if the 
occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took 
place during the carriage by air (Art.18). The ’carriage 
by air’ is defined as ’the period during which the baggage 
or cargo is in charge of the carrier, whether in an 
aerodrome or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a 
landing outside an aerodrome, in any place whatsoever.’
This period of carriage does not extend to any carriage 
by land, by sea or by river performed outside an aerodrome. 
If, however, such carriage takes place in the performance 
of a contract for carriage by air, for the purpose of 
loading, delivery or transhipment, any damage is 
presumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been 
the result of an event which took place during the carriage 
by air. The concept of ’aerodrome*, particularly of 
’water aerodrome’, is not clear. A question will arise
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as to what is the position of luggage or cargo kept by 
a customs office in or around an ’aerodrome1. A more 
exact definition of the term is therefore desirable.
There is no provision concerning damages to the passenger* s 
personal luggage which is not registered, in which case it 
is in practice quite difficult to prove the damage 
incurred, for the passenger does not receive any check 
to be issued by the carrier. The Commonwealth Act is also 
silent on this matter.
(Delay) The carrier is liable for damage occasioned 
by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or 
cargo (Art.19)* The Convention does not provide any 
standard as to what constitutes delay, and so this must 
be left to the national courts which, in different 
countries, may apply conflicting definitions. The 
carrier will probably be liable for delay when it was 
proved that the arrival of the aircraft was far exceeding 
the time-table. The period of the carriage by air should 
not be interpreted in a narrow sense in such a case, but 
it is controversial whether the period should be construed 
as equivalent to those provided for in Arts. 17 and 18.
The Commonwealth Act does not lay down any definition of 
’delay* nor any provision concerning the damage occasioned
by delay
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Non-International Carriage: (Passenger) The
carrier is liable for damage sustained by reason of the
death of the passenger or any personal injury suffered 
by the passenger resulting from an accident which took 
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of 
the operations of embarking or disembarking (sec.28).
This purely domestic legislation reproduces Art.17 of 
the Convention; by inserting the expression ‘resulting 
from*, the necessity of a causal relation is made clear 
as between the damage and the accident, but remoteness of 
damage is left to be decided by the common law rules. 
Likewise, the meaning of 1 any personal injury* which may 
be a broader concept than * any bodily injury* is not 
defined. With respect to measure of damages, the Act 
lays down the same provisions as those applicable to 
the international carriage except ’litigation expenses*, 
only in respect of death of passenger (including injury 
that has resulted in the death). The items which are not 
to be taken into account in assessing damages in respect 
of liability are also the same as those in the international 
carriage (sec.3 8 ). Mention has already been made that the 
carrier* s defence of disproving liability is not available 
to a carrier engaged in non-international carriage.
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(Goods) Several provisions are set out in Part IV
of the Act with respect to the liability for the
1destruction, loss or injury to baggage of the passenger,
but none with respect to cargo. As to baggage, sec.29
provides that in such cases the carrier is liable, if
the occurrence which causes the destruction, & c . takes
place during the period of the carriage by air 1 2unless
the carrier proves that he and his servants and agents
took all necessary measures to avoid the destruction, &c.
or that it was impossible for him or them to take such
measures’. For this purpose, the Act defines the
expression ’the period of the carriage by air’, as in the
case of international carriage, either in relation to
registered baggage or in relation to baggage other than
registered baggage (sec.29(2)). Although there is no
provision concerning cargo, sec.41 provides:
The regulations to be made by the Governor- 
General may provide for applying, with such 
exceptions, adaptations and modifications as 
are prescribed, the provisions of the Warsaw 
Convention and the Hague Protocol and any of
1
Both registered baggage and baggage other than registered 
one.
2
In the application of contributory negligence in relation 
to an action in respect of baggage other than registered 
baggage, the carrier shall be deemed to have proved that 
the damage was caused by the negligence of the passenger, 
except so far as the passenger proves that he was not 
responsible for the damage (sec.29(4)).
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the provisions of the Act to and in relation 
to which, if it were the carriage of passengers,
Part IV would apply.
Since no such regulation has been made, the occurrence of
the carrier1s liability and measures of damages in respect
of cargo are still governed by the special terms of
contract or by the common law rules.
(Delay) There is no legislative provision concerning
the carrier*s liability for delay whatsoever. Generally
speaking, in the case of carriage of goods, a carrier
(common or private) is only bound to deliver within a
time which is reasonable, having regard to all the
circumstances of the particular case, unless he has
contracted to deliver goods at a particular time. In the
case of carriage of passengers and baggage, the air
carrier's obligation is to use reasonable care to carry
the passenger without unreasonable delay, and in the
absence of negligence he is not as a rule liable for a
mere failure to carry to destination within a reasonable
time. It is submitted that in most cases on claims for
delay in the carriage of passengers and baggage, the
rights and obligations of the parties will depend on the
1terms of special contracts.
_
Cf. Halsbury*s Laws of England, third ed., vol.4, 
pp.l4o-1; Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., p.3^3j and 
cases there cited.
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(3) Limitation and Exclusion of Liability
International Carriage; The carrier* s liability
is limited. Apart from the discussion of the principal
1of limitation of liability in international air law, 
one of the principal changes made by the Hague Protocol 
to the Warsaw Convention was the doubling of the limit 
of liability for death or personal injury from 125,000
1
For full discussion of the principle of limitation of 
liability, see H. Drion, Limitation of Liability in 
International Air Law, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954; 
his points of arguments are summarised in Report on the 
Warsaw Convention as Amended by the Hague Protocol,
J.A.L.C. vol.26, 1959» pp.257-8. This Report comments:
'When the Warsaw Convention was enacted in 1929j 'the 
situation of world aviation was in early stage of 
development, and the principal problem facing the budding 
international airlines was the securing of capital, in 
the face of what appeared to be enormous hazards. In the 
absence of a limitation of liability one disaster might 
sweep away a large capital investment. Hence, the most 
important provision was a limitation of liability.1 
The limitation of carriers* liability was the biggest 
point of argument in the United States when it considered 
whether it should ratify the Hague Protocol - that is to 
say, whether to continue the Warsaw principle or not.
As to the U.S. position, see Sand, Limitation of 
Liability and Passengers* Accident Compensation under 
the Warsaw Convention, 1962, A.J.C.L. winter, vol.11, No.1. 
Calkins seems to support * quid pro quo* argument (see 
also Poulton, Notes on Lectures in Air Law, p.36), and 
the argument based on the possibility for the potential 
claimants to take insurance themselves (Calkins, op.cit., 
P.256).
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gold francs^ (approximately £A7?500) to 250,000 gold 
francs (£A15»000). In the case of registered luggage 
and of goods, the limit is 250 gold francs (£A15) per 
kilogramme, unless the consignor has made a special 
declaration as to value. In the case of loss, damage 
or delay of part of registered baggage or cargo, or of 
any object contained therein, the limit is decided by 
the total weight of the package or packages concerned. 
However, when such a damage affects the value of other 
packages covered by the same baggage check or by the 
same air waybill (as for example, when the packages 
containing trousers were damaged while those containing 
coats were saved), the total weight of such package or 
packages must also be taken into account. As regards 
personal baggages of which the passenger takes charge 
himself, the limit is 5 »000 gold francs (£A300)per 
passenger. There is no separate provision concerning the 
limit of liability for delay, but the above limits will
1
The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to 
the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams gold 
of millesimal finess 900. These sums may be converted 
into any national currency in round figures (Art.22(4) 
of the original Convention). The Hague Protocol adds 
further that conversion of the sums into national 
currencies other than gold shall, in case of judicial 
proceedings, be made according to the gold value of 
such currencies at the date of the judgment (Art.XI of 
the Protocol).
4 3 0
be applicable respectively. But this principle of
limitation of carrier’s liability must be subject to the
following two conditions. Firstly, any provision tending
to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower
limit than that which is laid down in the Convention is
null and void (Art.23)j this provision does not apply to
provisions governing loss or damage resulting from the
inherent defect, quality or vice of the cargo carried
(e.g. alcohol, fresh foods, &c.). Secondly, the limit of
liability does not apply if it is proved that the damage
resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his
servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result, provided that, in the case of such act or omission
of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was
acting within the scope of his employment (Art.25, as
-1amended by the Hague Protocol)• The original Convention 
of 1929 provided:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail 
himself of the provisions of this Convention 
which exclude or limit his liability, if the 
damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or 
by such default on his part as, in accordance 
with the law of the Court seised of the case, 
is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct.
Cf. Art.12 of the Rome Convention of 1952.
1
431
It is worthy of note that the expression 1 2wilful
misconduct' (an English translation of 1dol» in the
French text) was deleted in the amended Convention.
But, as a writer points out, the new formula follows
closely the definition of »wilful misconduct», as laid
down by Courts applying English law, and includes the
notion of recklessness with knowledge that damage would
-1probably result. The authorities on the meaning of
»wilful misconduct» were cited in Royal Victorian Aero
2Club v. The Commonwealth. It was provided under an 
agreement for the training of Air Force personnel by the 
plaintiff club that where damage arose from the »wilful 
misconduct» of such personnel the Commonwealth would 
recompense the club for damage &c. to its property, and 
an aeroplane owned by the club crashed in fact while 
piloted by an Air Force trainee who was practising the 
technique required to make a forced landing. ¥ ebb J. 
said:
1
The new formula is the result of harmonizing the gross 
negligence in the Continental System and wilful misconduct 
in the English System.
2
(1954) 92 c .l .r . 236.
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For the purpose of this agreement I think the 
meaning of 1 wilful misconduct1 is best expressed 
by Brett L.J. in Lewis v. Great Western 
Railway Co.^  as follows:
In a contract where the term misconduct is 
put as something different from and excluding 
negligence of every kind, it seems to me that 
it must mean the doing of something, or the 
omitting to do something, which it is wrong 
to do or to omit, where the person who is 
guilty of the act or the omission knows that 
the act which he is doing, or that which he 
is omitting to do, is a wrong thing to do or 
to omit; and it involves the knowledge of the 
person that the thing which he is doing is 
wrong.... Care must be taken to ascertain that 
it is not only misconduct but wilful misconduct, 
and I think that those two terms together 
import a knowledge of wrong on the part of 
the person who is supposed to be guilty of the 
act or omission.
In the Lewis case Bramwell L.J. made an observation 
referred to by Lindley L.J. in In re Mayor of London 
and Tubb1s Contract^that -
'Wilful misconduct1 means misconduct to which 
the will is a party, something opposed to 
accident or negligence; the misconduct, not 
the conduct, must be wilful....I think it would 
be wilful misconduct if a man did an act not 
knowing whether mischief would or would not 
result from it. I do not mean when in a state 
of ignorance, but after being told, 'Now this 
may or may not be a right thing to do.1 He 
might say, 'Well, I do not know which is right, 
and I do not care; I will do this.1 I am much 
inclined to think that that would be 'wilful 
misconduct1, because he acted under the
(1877) 3 Q.B.D. 195, esp. at pp.210-11.
(1894) 2 Ch. 524; see also 3 Q.B.D. (1877) at p.206.
2
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supposition that it might be mischievous, 
and with an indifference to his duty to 
ascertain whether it was mischievous or not.
I think that would be wilful misconduct.*
In this case, the trainee had been instructed that on
fields on his own selection he was not to come below the
height of 200 feet, but when he was about at that height
he was not absolutely sure whether he would have made
the field had he to come down or whether he was landing
•dead into the wind*; so he came down ‘slightly* further
to check on those two points; one of the wheel strust
hit the wires running across the boundary fence, and the
1plane crashed nose down. Webb J. said further:
He was aware that he was flying below 200 feet; it 
was part of the exercise to be aware of it; but 
he did not think of the instruction about not 
coming below 200 feet. This limit was mentioned... 
in lectures. It was a point, but by no means the 
most important point. It was emphasized but 
perhaps no more than landing into the wind.
The limit did not occur to him during this 
exercise; his concentration was wholly on the 
manoeuvre which required a great deal of 
concentration. Concentration must be wholly on 
it: his concentration was solely on it. At no 
time during the manoeuvre did he remember the 
instruction about the 200 feet limit. He first 
recollected it after the crash...
To employ the language of Johnson J. in Graham v . 
Belfast and Northern Railway Co., ^ the question 
is: did the trainee know and appreciate that it
92 C.L.R. at pp.239-43.
(1901) 2 I.R. 13, at p.19.
2
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was wrong conduct on his part in the existing 
circumstances to do or fail or omit to do a 
particular thing and yet intentionally did or 
failed to do or omitted to do it? Or to employ 
the language of Lord Alverstone in Forder v.
Great Western Railway Co.^  did the trainee act 
with reckless carelessness, not caring what the 
results of his carelessness might be? The 
answer to both questions must be that he did not.
The defendant conceded that the trainee would have been
guilty of wilful misconduct if he had recollected as he
came below 200 feet that he was acting contrary to his
instructions, but still continued to descent instead
of going up again; but, in the Court*s opinion, even if
it should be found that the trainee knew he was disobeying
instructions as he flew below 200 feet, still there is no
evidence to support a finding that he also knew he was
subjecting the aircraft to an actual danger in so doing;
the onus of proof that the limit fixed the actual danger
2point was on the plaintiff and it was not discharged.
3In Horabin v. British Overseas Airways Corporation, 
where the wilful misconduct on the part of defendants
1
(1905) 2 K.B. 532.
2
92 C.L.R. at pp.243-4; cf. also Transport Commission v. 
Neale Edwards Pty. Ltd. (1954) 92 C.L.R. 214, per Kitto J. 
3
(1952) 2 All E.R. 1016.
was alleged in the carriage by air of passengers, Barry J. ’s
direction to the jury contained the following two points:
(a) Even though an act or omission involves the 
breach of some statutory provision designed 
to secure the safety of air carriage or 
contravenes any general rules laid down or 
specific instructions given by the operator 
in relation to a flight or is a departure 
from generally accepted standards or 
aeronautical safety, it does not amount to 
wilful misconduct if the act or omission was 
genuinely, though erroneously, thought to be 
in the interests of all concerned; and
(b) having regard to the dangers inherent in air 
carriage, a comparatively minor breach of 
regulations or instructions or a comparatively 
minor departure from accepted standards of 
safety may be misconduct, but it is not 
possible to prove misconduct by adding 
together a number of acts or omissions which 
individually do not amount to misconduct.
A problem will lie in the extreme difficulty for the court
(or jury) to determine the existence of the carrier1 2s
intention to cause damage or his knowledge that damage
would probably result; it is also an extremely difficult
task for the plaintiff to prove such carrier1s intention
2or knowledge in an aerial accident.
1
See at pp.1020, 1022-4.
2
Executors of William Kapell v. B.C.P.A. is the only 
outstanding claim arising out of an accident on 29 October 
1953» near San Francisco, U.S.A., when an aircraft operated 
by British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines Ltd. (B.C.P.A.) 
crashed into a mountain killing all passengers and crew. 
William Kapell, a well-known concert pianist, was a 
passenger in the aircraft. The hearing of the action was 
heard in March and April of 1961 in the State of New York, 
(Continued on p. 436)
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The Commonwealth Act implementing the provisions of 
the Convention in respect of the limitation and exclusion 
of the carrier's liability provides in sec.14 that nothing 
in the Convention or in Part IX (as extended to apply to 
Parts III and IIIA) shall be deemed to exclude any 
liability of a carrier to indemnify an employer of a 
passenger or to pay contribution to a tort-feasor who is 
liable in respect of death of, or injury to, the 
passenger, but this shall not operate so as to increase 
the limit of liability of a carrier in respect of a 
passenger beyond the amount fixed by or in accordance with 
the Convention. This is because the Convention expressly 
limits the carrier* s liability except in certain 
specified cases, discussed above.
2 ( continued from p.435)
other actions brought by his executors in the courts of 
California sind New South Wales having been discontinued.
The rights of the passengers carried on the flight on 
which the accident occurred were governed by the original 
Warsaw Convention, so that the carrier* s liability and its 
limits were to be determined by the Convention. The legal 
proceedings are still pending before the United States 
court, and we shall refrain here from commenting on the 
case; suffice it to say that, at the conclusion of the 
first trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, 
thus negativing the claim of wilful misconduct on the part 
of the company (whose assets are now transferred to Qantas), 
and that the trial Judge in a new trial reversed the jury 
decision and directed a new trial limited to the issue of 
damages. Appeals have been entered against the decision 
entering judgment for the plaintiff and the amount 
awarded as damages.
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As we have seen already, the implementing provisions 
of the Act with respect to the Warsaw Convention as 
amended by the Hague Protocol (secs.12-17) are also made 
applicable to the carriage to which Part III (the original 
Warsaw Convention only) applies, as if contained in the 
latter Part. But sec.23 is a unique provision to Part III, 
which provides that any sum in francs mentioned in Art.22 
of the Convention shall for the purposes of an action 
against a carrier, be converted into Australian currency 
at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date on which the 
amount of any damages to be paid by the carrier is 
ascertained by the court or jury. This is because there 
were many controversies as to the interpretation of the 
expression ‘these sums may be converted into any national 
currency in round figures’ (Art.22(4)), whereas this was 
solved by the new paragraph in the same Article in the 
Protocol.
Non-International Carriage: In this case also, the
carrier’s liability is limited (sec.3l)« With respect to 
injury or death of each passenger, the limit is £A7,500, 
equivalent to the limit in the international carriage, 
or such higher sum as is specified in the contract of 
carriage. With respect to baggage of any one passenger, 
being baggage that is or includes registered baggage, the
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limit is £A100, and with respect to baggage, other than
registered baggage, of any one passenger, the limit is
£A10, or in either case such higher sum as is specified in
the contract of carriage. No provision has been made
with respect to cargo or delay. In case of non-compliance
with regulations relating to passenger tickets or baggage
checks the limit may not be applicable (sec.4o(c)), but no
such regulations have as yet been made.
Sec.66 of the Australian National Airlines Act 1943-61
limits damages to £A7j300 in any action brought against
the Commission for death or personal injury. Prior to the
1939 amendment to the Act, the maximum limit was fixed as
£A2,000.^ This section which seems to have been
applicable to death or personal injury suffered on the 
2surface in addition to actions in respect of death or 
personal injury of passengers, no longer applies in 
relation to the area of liability of the Commission governed 
by the Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability) Act 1939-62. 
However, since the Carriers* Liability Act does not apply
1
Sec.22 (which was amended in 1939)« This amount was 
equivalent to the limited sum of insurance cover taken out 
by the privately-owned companies in practice before the 
Civil Aviation (Carriers* Liability) Act 1939-61 was 
enacted.
2
See Chapter IX, post.
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to land carriage of passengers (e.g., in the airline’s 
coach between the airport and the city terminal), the 
maximum limit of the Commission’s liability in sec.66 
still applies to such cases.
The prohibition of ’contracting out’ (i.e., exclusion 
or fixing a lower limit) of the carrier’s liability is 
also provided (sec.32), and the exception in the case of 
the inherent defect, quality or vice of goods carried is 
same as in the case of international carriage.
In the case of at least one New South Wales operator, 
namely, Airlines of New South Wales, the description of 
’common carrier’ is expressly rejected by that Company 
in the conditions of carriage endorsed on its passenger 
tickets. By those conditions the Company exempts itself 
from all liability in the carriage of passengers and their 
baggage but stipulates that any liability which it may 
voluntarily assume shall be equivalent to that arising 
under the Commonwealth Civil Aviation (Carriers’ Liability) 
Act and in return for any payment of damages made to him 
the passenger is required to renounce any claim which may 
arise to any sum in excess of the maxima prescribed by 
that Act. In the absence of statutory regulation, a 
carrier may, by the contract of carriage, exclude 
altogether, or limit, his liability for injury to passengers,
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or for loss of or damage to goods. The question whether
liability was excluded by contract containing a condition
endorsed on tickets (ticket cases) or dockets was discussed
2in Swinton Industries Pty. Ltd, v, Rozsasi, where a 
condition contained in the docket handed to R. by S. Ltd. 
for drycleaning and dyeing of R.*s cloti read: ’These
goods are accepted on condition that we are not responsible 
for any damage or loss through any cause whatever. Any 
goods not collected within three months of the date on 
which they are received may be sold by the firm...and 
expenses of sale will be deducted from the proceeds.*
The trial judge, while disbelieving S. Ltd.*s evidence 
made a finding that the goods were lost, but held that the 
condition on the docket did not form part of the contract 
between the parties on the ground that the condition was 
not sufficiently brought to R.*s notice, and returned a 
verdict for R. An appeal was dismissed by the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, on the grounds that there was no 
evidence to establish that the goods had been lost, and that 
it was open to the trial judge to find that S. Ltd. had 
not brought the conditions to R.*s notice. According to 
-
Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., p«331.
(1939) 76 W.N. 442.
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Eise-Mitchell J., the rule laid down in the Railway
Ticket Cases (that a contract made by the issue and
acceptance of a document containing conditions in common
form binds the parties to its terms save in certain
exceptional cases) apply only where there is no room for
any contract other than one constituted by the ticket
itself. The Judge made the following additional remarks:
(T)he trend of modern authorities 'leans 
strongly against exemption clauses and attempts 
to protect the party who is at a disadvantage.1 2
(Dr. C.M, Schmitthoff in 29 Canadian Bar ^eview,
868) and this trend is manifested by a series 
of decisions which establish inter alia that an 
exemption clause must be construed strictly and 
against the person who desires to rely upon it....
It seems to me that a document like the present, 
which is addressed to the defendant and is framed 
in terms designed to suggest that the customer is 
the author of it, will not in general be effective 
to bind the customer unless it is affirmatively 
shown that he has adopted its terms.
However, when the ticket was signed, the terms of the
contract govern the parties and no question of notice
3arises. In Jones v. Aircraft Proprietary Ltd., an 
aeroplane passenger, while being transported to an 
aerodrome in a motor vehicle belonging to the airway
1
See 76 W.N. 446 as to those cases.
2
76 W.N. at pp.446-7»
(1949) Q.S.R. 196.3
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company and driven by its servant, was injured in a 
collision with another vehicle caused by the negligence 
of the company*s servant. The passenger had been given 
a ticket on which were a number of printed conditions, 
one being that the passenger was carried entirely at his 
own risk and the carrier accepted no responsibility for 
injury arising out of or incidental to the carriage or any 
service ancillary thereto, including transport of the 
passenger to and from the aerodrome, and the passenger 
expressly renounced all claims against the carrier. This 
ticket was signed by the passenger and set out in addition 
to the printed conditions that it was issued to and 
accepted by the passenger subject to the conditions printed 
on the front and back, which were approved and agreed to 
by the passenger. It was contended for the defendant 
company that the document was an admitted written contract 
clearly distinguishable from the so called * ticket cases* 
wherein there was no signed acceptance of any terms; 
those cases turned on whether the passenger really knew or 
should have known of the terms, i.e. notice or no notice.
The Court held that, in the absence of any suggestion of
1fraud or misrepresentation, the signed ticket clearly
_
Cf. L*Estrange v ♦ F. Graucob (1934) 2 K.B. 394, at p.398.
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constituted a contract and that the plaintiff was bound
by all conditions printed thereon including the
‘contracting out1 words. However, the plaintiff contended
that the contract was void as being contrary to public
policy, or that it was void as being in conflict with the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Insurance Acts, 1936-45»
so that it had the effect of nullifying the object and
purpose of those Acts. The Court was of opinion that the
contract was not void as being contrary to public policy,
as it did not tend to injure public safety, the
administration of justice, any legislative or executive
function or the economic or social welfare of the State,
or contravene any governing principle adopted by the
community or do substantially incontestable harm to the 
1public. The Court was also of opinion that the contract 
was not void as being contrary to the scope, policy, and 
purpose of the above-mentioned statutes, the benefits 
conferred by them not arising until legal liability 
had been incurred and their purpose being to ensure that
1
For the test of ‘public policy* which a judge is entitled 
and bound to apply to an agreement the validity of which 
is impeached on that ground, the following cases were 
considered and applied by the Court: Janson v . Driefontein
Consolidated Mines Ltd. (1902) A.C. 484; Fender v. St.John- 
Mildmay (1938) A.C. TJ Wilkinson v. Osborne (1915)
15 C.L.R. 89.
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owners of motor vehicles, who became legally liable, 
should so indemnify themselves that the injured party would 
not be uncompensated, and not to confer a right which a
person suffering injury by reason of negligence was unable
1legally to waive. Under the present Civil Aviation 
(Carriers1 Liability) Act, 1964, of Queensland, any 
document contracting out the airway company1s liability for 
passengers’ death or injury resulting from an accident 
which took place on board the aircraft or in the course 
of the operations of embarking or disembarking, will be 
void, but such a contract is still valid in the case of 
land carriage of passengers between an aerodrome and a city 
terminal, as in the present case.
An important point in the statutory provisions of the 
Commonwealth Carriers’ Liability Act and States’ Carriers 
Liability Acts, which apply to the non-international 
carriage, is that there is no equivalent to the ’wilful 
misconduct* provision of the Convention, or its successor 
in the Hague Protocol. Hence, the non-international 
carrier can avail himself of the advantages of the limited 
liability, even when he acts such wilful misconduct (or
“
Cf . Ludditt v. Ginger Coote Airways Ltd. (1947) 1 All. E.R.
328; Hedges y. Halliday ( 1947) 15 C.L.R. 42; Lieberman v . 
Morris (1944) 69 C.L.R. 69.
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gross negligence). This might well be regarded as 
deplorable to the interests of passengers or cargo-owners.
If an action in respect of any damage is brought 
against a servant of a carrier, the servant or agent, if he 
proves that he acted within the scope of his employment 
or authority, is entitled to avail himself of the limits 
of liability, if any, which the carrier himself would be 
entitled to invoke under sec.31 of the Act in an action 
against him in respect of that damage. However, the 
aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, 
his servants and agents cannot exceed the limits fixed in 
the Act (sec.33(l) & (2)).
As in the case of international carriage (sec.14), it 
is laid down that certain liabilities (to indemnify an 
employer of a passenger or to pay contribution to a tort­
feasor) may not be excluded from the carrier's liability
(sec.37)•
(4) Liability in Special Carriages
International Carriage: With respect to the liability
of successive carriers, each carrier is subjected to the 
rules set out in the Convention, and is deemed to be one of 
the contracting parties to the contract of carriage insofar 
as the contract deals with that of the carriage which is 
performed under his supervision (Art«30(l)). A passenger
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or liis representative only has a right of action against 
the carrier who performed the carriage during which the 
accident or delay occurred, except where the first carrier, 
by express agreement, has assumed liability for the whole 
journey. The consignor of goods (i.e., baggage and cargo) 
has a right of action against the first carrier and the 
consignee entitled to delivery has a right of action 
against the last carrier; each has a right of action against 
the carrier who performed the carriage during which the 
loss, damage or delay took place. These carriers are 
jointly and severally liable to the consignor and 
consignee.
The liability of 1 actual carrier* is defined in the
Guadalajara Convention. Where an actual carrier performs
the whole or part of such carriage, both the contracting
carrier and the actual carrier are subject to the rules
of the Warsaw Convention, the former for the whole carriage
contemplated in the agreement, the latter solely for the
carriage which he performs (Art.2). The effect of Art.2
1is illustrated as follows:
1
Parliamentary Debates, H. of R., 15 May 1962, p.2291}
et seq., when the Civil Aviation (Carriers* Liability) Bill 
1962 was introduced.
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A person in Sydney books with Qantas to travel 
or to ship cargo by that airline from Sydney to 
London via San Francisco. Qantas finds itself 
unable to continue the carriage past San Francisco 
in its own aircraft and arranges for the passenger 
or cargo to be carried from there to London, the 
passenger or consignor would have a right of action 
both Qantas and Pan American.
His rights would be governed by the terms of the original
Warsaw Convention or by the Warsaw Convention as amended by
the Hague Protocol, according to whether the carriage
under the agreement made by the contracting carrier is
governed by the one or by the other. In relation to the
carriage which the actual carrier performs, Art.3 provides
that the acts and omissions of the actual carrier and his
servants and agents within the scope of their employment
are deemed to be also those of the contracting carrier, and
vice versa. A servant or agent of either carrier may
avail himself of the limits of liability applicable to
his employer, unless it is proved that he acted in a
manner which under the Warsaw Convention (or the Convention
as amended by the Protocol) prevents the limits of
liability from being invoked (e.g., wilful misconduct or
its successor in the Protocol). The rules concerning the
limitation of liability, the prohibition of 'contracting
out' or fixing a lower limit, and the exceptions
(inherent defect of the cargo carried, &c.) is the same
as those in the main Convention. Art.10 provides that
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the Guadalajara Convention does not affect the rights 
and obligations of the carriers as between themselves 
except that if an action is brought against one only of 
the carriers, he has the right to have the other carrier 
joined in the proceedings in accordance with the law of 
the country hearing the case. Bringing of actions where 
damage has occurred during the carriage performed by the 
actual carrier will be discussed when we deal with the 
subject of 1 action'.
Non-International Carriage: The provisions of
Part IV of the Commonwealth Act apply to the carriage 
performed by successive carriers (sec.27(4)). When the 
1 registered baggage1 carried by two or more carriers in 
successive stages regarded by the parties as a single 
operation to which Part IV applies, has been destroyed, 
lost or injured in circumstances in which, if the carriage 
had been performed by a single carrier, that carrier would 
be subject to liability, the carriers (other than a 
carrier who proves that the baggage was not in his charge 
at the time of the destruction, loss or injury) are jointly 
and severally subject to that liability (sec.29(5))« No 
such specific provisions are laid down with respect to 
the successive carriage of passengers, non-registered 
baggage, or cargo, but the successive carrier is subject
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to liability for the death or any personal injury of 
passengers as provided for in sec.28.
The rules of the Guadalajara Convention in respect 
of the liability of actual carriers have not been 
extended to non-international carriage. At any rate,
Part IV applies only when there is a contract between the 
parties. Accordingly, the liability of actual carriers 
who caused damage to passengers or goods carried by them 
would be decided by the common law rules of charter or 
hire of aircraft. The rights and obligations inter se of 
the contracting carrier and the actual carrier would 
depend upon the individual contract.
(5) Commonwealth1s Liability
The purpose of the Air Accidents (Commonwealth
'ILiability) Act 1963 is to establish a legislative scheme 
for payments to the dependants of a person who is killed 
or injured in an air accident while travelling as a 
passenger on Commonwealth business or at Commonwealth 
expense. Since 1941, the Commonwealth had provided an 
ex gratia scheme to the similar effect; with the passage 
of the Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959> the 
need for special cover ceased in respect of persons 
_
No.74 of 1963.
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travelling on Commonwealth business by Inter-State 
airline, but similar cover was not necessarily available 
in the case of other flights. For this reason the 
ex gratia scheme administered by the Treasury had been 
continued in respect of persons travelling as passengers 
for the purposes of the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth 
authority on flights to which the provisions of the Civil 
Aviation (Carriers* Liability) Act 1959-62 did not apply.
The Air Accidents (Commonwealth Liability) Act 1963 
replaced the ex gratia scheme of air travel cover. The 
Act is divided into four parts, viz., Part I (Preliminary), 
Part II (Carriage in Aircraft operated by the Commonwealth 
or Commonwealth Authority), Part III (Carriage in Aircraft 
not operated by the Commonwealth or Commonwealth Authority) 
and Part IV (Regulations).
Part II applies to the carriage of passenger in an 
aircraft operated by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth 
authority, not being carriage to which Part IV of the 
Civil Aviation (Carriers * Liability) Act 1959-62 applies 
(sec.6(l)) but the Act does not apply in relation to the 
death of, or injury to, a person in circumstances 
entitling any dependant of the person, or the person, to 
pension under the Repatriation Act 1920-62, the Repatriation
(Far East Strategic Reserve) Act 1956—62 or the Repatriation
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(Special Overseas Service) Act 1962 (sec.6(2)). The 
'Commonwealth authority1 2 is defined as 1 an authority of
the Commonwealth1 (sec.4); this would include any
1authority set up under Commonwealth legislation. It 
should be noted that the Act applies only to those 
travelling as 'passengers' but not to members of the crew, 
&c. By sec.4, ‘passenger1, in relation to an aircraft, 
does not include -
(a) a member of the crew, including a pilot, 
of the aircraft;
(b) a member of the Defence Force, whether a
member of the crew of the aircraft or not, 
who - 2
(i) is in receipt of flying pay; or 
(ii) is included in a prescribed class of 
members of the Defence Force, being a 
class as to whom the terms and 
conditions of their service include 
provision for risks arising out of the 
performance of duties in aircraft;
(c) a person whose carriage in the aircraft is 
specifically and only for the purpose of his 
performing in the aircraft -
(i) duties or services for the performance 
of which is employed or engaged by the 
Commonwealth or a Commonwealth 
authority; or
(ii) duties as a member of the Defence Force;
(d) a person whose carriage in the aircraft is 
specifically and only for the purpose of his 
performing duties or services in the aircraft; 
or
1
See Chapter IV, ante.
2
‘Flying pay1 includes flying instructional pay, flight 
pay and flying allowance and any other like pay or allowance 
(sec.4).
452
(e) a person who is not lawfully entitled to 
be on board the aircraft.
It is pointed out that some difficulties will arise in 
determining where to draw the line between passengers and 
crew because there are some civil employees, members of 
the services and employees and others who, although not 
normally regarded as passengers (e.g. a scientist engaged 
in rain-making operations, air evacuation nurses in the 
services or the employee of a private contractor to the 
Commonwealth). The definition (c) and (d) seems to 
exclude all persons flying other than for the purpose of 
transport from place to place. Members of the war 
services travelling as passengers by air on active
service during war or when engaged in warlike operations
1are also excluded. The basic principle of the
Commonwealth liability under the Act is the same as that
of a non-international commercial airline operator - that
is, it is not necessary to prove negligence of the
2Commonwealth or its servants or agents. The maximum 
liability in respect of any one person, by reason of his 
death or injury, is £A7»500, as in the Carriers* Liability
_
Parliamentary Debates, H. of R., 39* 14 August 1963? P*96.
See sec.28 of the Carriers* Liability Act, supra.
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Act, thus avoiding a distinction between persons 
travelling as passenger on Commonwealth business according 
to whether they fly in a Commonwealth aircraft or by 
commercial airline. The amount recoverable is reduced by 
any amount received or receivable by that person by 
reason of (a) insurance effected for the benefit of the 
deceased or injured person or his estate by the Commonwealth 
or the Commonwealth authority, or (b) insurance effected by 
the deceased or injured person that is referable to an 
allowance granted by the Commonwealth or the Commonwealth 
authority for the purpose of enabling him to effect such 
insurance (sec.8). Many provisions of the Civil Aviation 
(Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959-62 are made applicable to 
the carriage to which this Part applies, such as, sec.28 
(liability of the carrier for death or injury - absolute 
liability), sec.32(l) (prohibition of an agreement tending 
to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower 
limit), sec.33 (liability of servants and agents of 
carrier), sec.34 (time limitation of actions), sec.35 
(liability in respect of death - measure of damages, 
action, &c.), sec.37 (certain liability not to be 
excluded), sec.38 (proceeds of insurance policies, &c. not 
to be taken into account by way of reduction of the damages), 
sec.39 (contributory negligence). The liability of the
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Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority under this Part
1is in substitution for certain other liabilities, and
the Act provides with respect to the relation between
damages recoverable under this Part and such damages
2recoverable otherwise than under this Part.
Part III applies to the carriage in an aircraft 
operated by a person other than the Commonwealth or 
Commonwealth authority of a passenger being an employee 
who is travelling in the course of his employment (an 
employee within the meaning of the Commonwealth Employees1 
Compensation Act 1930-62, or a person to whom that Act 
applies as if he were such an employee; or a seaman to 
whom the Seamen1s Compensation Act 1911-60 applies, being 
a seaman employed by the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth 
authority), any person properly travelling at Commonwealth 
expense, whether on Commonwealth business or not, and any 
person travelling by air for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth (sec.11). The second category includes 
members of Parliament and their wives and children and 
persons visiting Australia at the invitation and expense 
of the Commonwealth. The third category includes a 
_
Sec.9•
Sec.10.
2
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diplomatic head of mission travelling in an aircraft 
provided by a foreign government. But this Part does not 
apply to carriage to which Part IV of the Civil Aviation 
(Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959-62 applies or to which 
any provisions of a State Act corresponding with the 
provisions of that Part apply, nor it apply to a person 
as provided for in sec.6(2), supra. Where this Part 
applies, the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth authority is 
liable for damage sustained by reason of the death of 
that person or any personal injury suffered by that person 
resulting from an accident that took place on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking (sec.12). The maximum liability 
is £A7j500, as in the case of Part II. The amount of 
damages recoverable is reduced by amount of any damages or 
compensation paid or payable from, the carrier, a servant 
or agent of the carrier or any other person other than 
the Commonwealth or the Commonwealth authority, as the 
case may be, and by any amount received or receivable by 
reason of insurance provided for in sec.8(2)(a) & (b) of 
Part II, supra. Certain provisions of the Civil Aviation 
(Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959-62 are also made applicable 
to carriage to which this Part applies. Sec.15 reproduces
the same rules of sec.10 of Part II, viz., the relation
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between damages recoverable under this Part and such 
damages recoverable otherwise than under this Part.
Certain circumstances in which damages are not recoverable 
if the person, or a person lawfully acting or entitled to 
act on behalf of that person, has, without the consent 
in writing of the Commonwealth or the Commonwealth 
authority, entered into a compromise, settlement or agreement 
whereby a person other than the Commonwealth or the 
Commonwealth authority has been discharged in whole or in 
part from the liability which he was, or might have been 
subject (sec.l6). An action against the Commonwealth or 
a Commonwealth authority for damages under this Part shall 
not be heard or determined if an action against a person 
other than the Commonwealth or the Commonwealth authority 
is pending in any court, whether in the Commonwealth or 
elsewhere (sec.17)« The whole structure of Part III is 
designed to supplement other recourse; that is to say, the 
Commonwealth assumes liability insofar as the rights, if 
any, existing against the operator of the aircraft or his 
servants or agents fall short of the rights that would 
exist had the flight been made by inter-State airline.
By Part IV (sec.18), the Governor-General is 
empowered to make regulations for carrying out or giving 
effect to this Act. By this Act, all persons travelling
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as passengers by air in the service of, or for the 
purposes of, the Commonwealth and authorities of the 
Commonwealth will have a uniform cover against death or 
injury, whether they are Commonwealth employees or not, 
whether they are travelling in Australia or abroad and 
whether in commercial aircraft or in aircraft owned by 
the Commonwealth. The constitutional basis for the 
legislation is sec.51(xxxix) of the Constitution, in 
association with powers in relation to the Commonwealth 
executive power, civil services and defence.
2. Documents of Carriage
International Carriage; Chapter 2 of the Convention 
contains provisions relating to the passenger ticket 
(Art.3)j baggage check (or luggage ticket) (Art.4), and 
air waybill (or air consignment note) (Arts.5“ l6). The 
original Convention of 19^9 contained meticulously detailed 
conditions of documents of carriage, but, in view of the 
fact that the principal object of the Convention was to 
establish uniform rules of air carriers’ liability, and 
documents of carriage were in practice largely governed 
by the I.A.T.A. Conditions, they were much simplified in 
the Hague Protocol so as to meet the practical demands of
international air transport. Under the Convention, a 
carrier of passengers by air must deliver a passenger 
ticket containing various details set out in the 
Convention, e.g., places of departure and destination, &c. 
Similarly, a luggage ticket must be issued by the carrier, 
prescribing certain particulars. In the case of goods 
carried by air, the carrier may require the consignor 
to deliver to him an 1 air consignment note1 (or 1 air 
waybill1) which must also contain certain particulars.
One of the main amendments in the Hague Protocol in 
respect of air consignment notes is Art.IX, added to Art.15 
of the original Convention, providing that nothing in the 
Convention prevents the issue of a negotiable air waybill - 
a subject which had been subject to considerable discussion 
under the original Convention. The carrier cannot avail 
himself of the provisions of the Convention (Art.22) which 
exclude or limit his liability if he accepts a passenger 
without a passenger ticket having been delivered, if he 
accepts luggage without a luggage ticket having been 
delivered, if -the ticket does not contain certain of the 
prescribed particulars, or if he accepts goods without an 
air consignment note having been made out or if it does
_
As to those amendments made by the Hague Protocol, see 
Calkins, op.cit., pp.258-62.
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not contain certain of the prescribed particulars. No 
implementing provision is laid down in the Commonwealth 
Act, and there are some uncertain points, e.g., whether 
the passenger ticket issued should be payable to order or 
not. 1
Non-International Carriage: Part IV of the
Commonwealth Act does not contain any provision relating 
to the passenger ticket, baggage ticket or air waybill 
to be issued. However, under sec.40, the regulations may 
make provision relating to passenger tickets and baggage 
checks for -
(a) the circumstances in which such tickets and 
checks must be issued by carriers;
(b) matters to be included in such tickets and 
checks; and
(c) the non-application of limitation of 
liability where such regulations relating 
to the issue, form and contents of such 
tickets or checks have not been complied 
with.
By sec.41, the regulations may also provide for waybill as 
well as for cargo. No such regulations have been made to 
date, so that the subject of documents of carriage in 
non-international carriage is governed largely by the 
special terms of contracts between the parties.
Ikeda, op.cit.,
1
p .109•
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3• Action against Carriers
International Carriage: (Subjects of Action) The
questions as to who are the persons laving the right to 
bring suit for damage arising from carriage of passengers
and what are their respective rights, are decided by the
1private international law of the lex fori» The 
Commonwealth Act sets out several provisions on this 
matter. The liability is enforceable for the benefit of 
such of the members of the passenger* s family as sustained 
damage by reason of his death (sec.12(3))» For this 
purpose, the 'members of the passenger*s family* are 
defined in the Act as the 'wife or husband, parents, step­
parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters, half-brothers, 
half-sisters, children, step-children and grand-children 
of the passenger*, and, in ascertaining the members of 
the passenger* s family, an illegitimate person or an 
adopted person shall be treated as being, or as having 
been, the legitimate child of his mother and reputed father 
or, as the case may be, of his adoptors (sec.12(5))«
Sec.12(6) provides that the action to enforce the liability 
may be brought by the personal representative of the 
passenger or by a person for whose benefit the liability
Cf. Act 24(2).
1
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is enforceable, but only one action shall be brought in 
Australia in respect of the death of any one passenger, 
and the action, by whomsoever brought, shall be for the 
benefit of all persons for whose benefit the liability is 
so enforceable who are resident in Australia, or not 
being resident in Australia express the desire to take the 
benefit of the action. This provision reproduces with 
slight modifications paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule 
of the Carriage by Air Act 1935 adopting the original 
Warsaw Convention. In Feher v. British Commonwealth 
Pacific Airlines (in liq.), the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales had to interpret this paragraph. A passenger 
in an aircraft owned and operated by the defendant company’ 
was killed when the aircraft crashed near San Francisco. 
His father, on behalf of himself and the mother and widow 
of the deceased, sued the defendant for damages for the 
loss of the passenger's life pursuant to the 1935 Act.
It appeared at the hearing that the widow, who had gone to 
the United States at the expense of the defendant company 
to attend the funeral of the deceased, had remained there,
_
( 1957) 7^ - w .N . 447.
2
As to the British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, see 
Appendix III, post.
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and had instituted proceedings in that country to recover 
compensation for the death of her husband, and had
1repudiated the Australian proceedings. Manning J. said:
In my view, any desire that she has expressed 
to take the benefit of this action has at all 
times been subject to her failing to obtain a 
verdict for a greater sum in one or other of 
her American actions, than she might recover 
in this one. Such an expression of desire is 
not in my view ’a desire to take the benefit 
of the action1 within the meaning of par.2 of 
the Second Schedule to the Act. Accordingly,
I am of opinion that this action is not one 
which is brought for the benefit of the 
widow of the deceased, and the only parties 
who may recover in this action are the plaintiff 
and his wife.
Then, the Court referred to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 
Second Schedule of the 1935 Act which are, in almost 
identical terms, reproduced in sec.12(9) and (10) of the 
present Commonwealth Act. Sec.12(9) now provides that 
the amount recovered in the action, after deducting any 
costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided 
amongst the persons entitled in such proportions as the 
court (or, where the action is tried with a jury, the 
jury) directs. Sec.12(l0) now provides that the court may 
at any stage of the proceedings make any such order as 
appears to the court to be just and equitable in view of
74, W.N. at p.449.
1
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the provisions of the Convention limiting the liability 
of the carrier and of any proceedings which have been, or 
are likely to be, commenced against the carrier, whether 
in or outside Australia. It was held that a fair 
estimate of the damage which had been suffered by the 
parents of the deceased, having regard to all the 
circumstances, was £2,500 and that on the evidence the 
widow was dependant upon the deceased at least to the 
same extent as were his parents. Finally, in view of the 
difficulty in ensuring that the carrier* s liability should
be limited as prescribed where actions were instituted in
1different countries, which was amply demonstrated by
the circumstances of this case, the Judge said:
If I make an award in this case in the sum of 
£2,500 it is almost certain that the carrier 
will suffer a verdict in America, if not for 
the whole of the permissible limit at least some 
substantial part of it, and I think the course 
I should take, which will be just and equitable 
in all the circumstances, is to scale down the 
amount which I would otherwise award to the parents 
of the deceased so that the total sum awarded to 
them will approximate one-half of the sum which 
the Convention fixes as the total liability of 
the carrier. In all circumstances, I think that 
the best I can do, having regard to the interests 
of the respective parties, is to enter a verdict 
for the plaintiff for the sum of £1,850 and I 
apportion such sums as to £750 to the plaintiff 
and as to £1, 100 to the plaintiff* s wife, ....
1
Cf. D. Goedhuis, National Air Legislation and the Warsaw 
Convention, 1937, at p.291, as cited by Manning J.
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The Convention does not provide for the persons who can
bring action for the damage arising from carriage of goods.
It seems that consignor as well as consignee can bring
action, but this must be read together with Art.12(4)
1prescribing their respective rights.
The Convention (and the Commonwealth Act) do not 
define the meaning of rair carrier’ against whom action 
is to be brought. In cases where the Guadalajara 
Convention applies, in relation to the carriage performed 
by the actual carrier, an action for damages may be brought, 
at the option of the plaintiff, against that carrier or the 
contracting carrier, or against both together or 
separately (Art.7)» In the case of the death of the 
person liable, an action for damages lies in accordance 
with the terms of the Convention against those legally 
representing his estate (Art.27)» In these respects, the 
Commonwealth Act provides only that a Party to the 
Convention which has not availed itself of the provisions 
of the Additional Protocol to the Convention with reference
1
Art.12(4) (unamended by the Protocol) provides that the 
right conferred on the consignor ceases at the moment 
when that of the consignee begins in accordance with 
Art.13; nevertheless, if the consignee declines to 
accept the air waybill or the cargo, or if he cannot be 
communicated with, the consignor resumes his right of 
disposition.
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to A r t .2 ( i .e .  the reservation of the right to declare 
the non-application of the Convention to international 
carriage performed directly  by the State, &c.) is ,  for 
the purposes of an action brought in a court in Australia 
to enforce a claim in respect of carriage undertaken by 
that Party, deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction 
of that court ( s e c .17)» However, this does not authorize 
the issue of execution against the property of a Party to 
the Convention.
(jurisdiction) An action for damages must be brought, 
at the option of the p la in t i f f ,  in the following three 
ju r isd ic t ions :
the place where the carr ier  is  ordinarily 
resident or has his principal place of 
business, ^
the place where the carrier has an 
establishment by which the contract has 
been made, or
the place of destination.
These places must be located in the terr i to ry  of one of
the Parties to the Convention (Art.28). This right of
option for an action is  further guaranteed by A rt .32
providing for the prohibition of any clause in the
_
Cf. Mott v. Pan-American Airways (1954) U.S. & CA.Av.R. 
p.70 ( t h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e a i r c a r r i e r  registered i t s  
business).
(a)
(b)
( c )
466
contract and special agreement entered into before the 
damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe 
the rules laid down by the Convention, whether by deciding 
the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as to 
jurisdiction. However, for the carriage of cargo, 
arbitration clauses are allowed, provided that the 
arbitration is to take place within one of the three 
jurisdictions mentioned above. It should be noted that 
an action for damages cannot be brought in the jurisdiction 
of the court where the damage has actually occurred, 
except when it falls within the above-mentioned 
jurisdictions. In contrast with the Rome Convention of 
1952 concerning surface damage caused by aircraft, the 
Convention does not provide for the reciprocal recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments; this may cause 
difficult problems if the action is brought in the several 
courts having jurisdiction, as Feher*s Case shows.
Sec.19 of the Commonwealth Act provides that, for 
the purpose of sec.38 of the Judiciary Act 1903-35» an
1
Judiciary Act sec.38: rThe jurisdiction of the High Court
shall be exclusive of the jurisdiction of the several 
Courts of the States in the following matters:
(a) matters arising directly under any treaty;....1 
The jurisdiction is given by sec.75(i) of the Constitution, 
but is not thereby rendered exclusive.
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action under the Convention shall be deemed not to be a 
matter arising directly under a treaty. This is to 
preserve the jurisdiction of Australian State courts.
(Procedure, &c.) The procedure of action is laid 
down in Arts.26-30; Art.28(2) provides that question of 
procedure must be governed by the law of the court seised 
of the case. Limitation of action is two years, reckoned 
from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the 
date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or 
from the date on which the carriage stopped (Art.29(l))* 
Non-International Carriage: (Subjects of Action)
Part IV of the Commonwealth Act provides for the subjects 
of action in respect of death (including the injury that 
resulted in the death) of a passenger in the exactly same 
way as provided for in Part II in respect of ’International 
carriage*. There is no provision concerning the rights of 
the persons in action in respect of the damages to cargo, 
nor is any mention made as to successive carriage.
(jurisdiction) No legislative provision has been 
made for jurisdiction of action for damages arising from 
the non-international carriage. Ordinary rules of
1private international law either of torts or of contracts,
_
Cf. Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., 
op.cit., pp.122-34, 149-54.
pp.310-12; McNair,
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would apply. However, with respect to Inter-State and 
some international carriages as to which the Commonwealth 
has legislative competence, the Commonwealth Parliament 
could have specified the jurisdiction of action for 
settling claims for damages arising from the Commonwealth 
Act. There is little doubt that the Commonwealth could 
give the fullest effect to the federal legislation under 
the fincidental powers*, so as to ensure that the 
carrier* s liability is limited as prescribed where actions 
are instituted in different State*s courts, and so as to 
prevent plurality of actions on the same issue. Moreover, 
under the more general Constitutional power as to * full 
faith and credit*, the Commonwealth could probably 
designate a specific State law (preferably the Commonwealth 
statute by virtue of the uniform adoption of State Acts 
except in New South Wales) for the settlement of claims for 
damages arising from intra-State carriages, which would
replace the rules of private international law on the
1inter-State level within Australia.
(Procedure, &c.) Limitation of action is the same 
as in the case of international carriage; sec.34 provides 
that the right of a person to damages under Part IV is
See Chapter V, ante.
1
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extinguished if an action is not brought by him or for 
his benefit within two years after the date of arrival 
of the aircraft at the destination, or, where the 
aircraft did not arrive at the destination -
(a) the date on which the aircraft ought to 
have arrived at the destination, or
(b) the date on which the carriage stopped, 
whichever is the later.
Sec.30 sets out detailed provisions relating to complaint 
to be made in respect of baggage (e.g., receipt of 
registered baggage without complaint is evidence that the 
baggage has been delivered in good condition and in 
accordance with the contract of carriage, etc.)
In New South Wales, in the absence of special 
legislation, actions against carriers are governed by the 
general State law (e.g., Compensation to Relatives Act 
1 8 9 7 - 1 9 5 3 » Workmen1s Compensation Act 1 9 2 6 -5 9 )» or by 
common law rules.
To sum up:
A considerable number of rules of international 
legislation have been adopted in the federal statute not 
only as to the so-called ’international* carriage but 
also as to carriage within the Commonwealth* s legislative 
competence, which has further been extended to the purely 
intra-State carriage under the uniform State Acts of all
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States except New South Wales. The predominance of the 
international air law over, and its permeation into, the 
national law is conspicuous in this field of air law. 
Whether over-all codification of the law would be desirable 
for the proper regulation of carriage by air in Australia 
is a question of the policy of law, the discretion thereto 
being left to the Parliament. Yet, considering the various 
merits to be obtained by uniformity of the law, one can 
easily see the advantages of the statutory rules in 
express terms, particularly in such a legal relation as 
carriage by air in which the public in general are closely 
involved in everyday life.
The provisions of the Convention are by no means 
complete, and, above all, they are applicable only to the 
'international1 carriage as defined. The Commonwealth 
Act to carry out them cannot replace them, but can 
implement to give to them the fullest effect in their 
application to Australia. From this point of view, the 
implementing provisions of the Commonwealth Act are also 
incomplete. It would be superfluous to repeat their 
deficiencies which have already been pointed out in the 
foregoing discussions on each subject matter of the law. 
Suffice it be to say that, in general, the Commonwealth 
Act is almost silent in supplementing the provisions of the
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Convention concerning carriers’ liability in respect of 
cargo and delay. Regulations are supposed to be made, but 
have not been issued yet. Hence, in applying the 
international rules of carriers’ liability in respect of 
cargo and delay, Australian courts will have to refer 
frequently to the rules of common law or special terms 
of contracts.
The scope of application of the Commonwealth Act in 
Part IV relating to the non-international carriage 
could be extended to the utmost of the Commonwealth 
legislative competence. Even though the Commonwealth 
power could not be regarded as overriding the State’s 
residuary powers totally in this field, the ’inter-State’ 
commerce power is wide enough to comprise in its 
application the combined carriages, border-hopping 
carriages, and other special carriages, &c., if those 
types of carriages fall within the ambit of the nature 
of ’inter—State’ commerce which we have expounded in 
Chapter II.
The characteristic deviations of the Australian 
legislation relating to the non-international carriage 
from international rules are those concerning the basic 
principles of carriers’ liability which vary according 
to whether the damages are to passengers, baggage, or
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cargo or are due to delay or to other causes, or due to 
‘wilful misconduct1 or similar act of the carrier. The 
omission of the rule as to wilful misconduct in the 
national legislation is questionable; should the carrier 
be protected by limited liability at the sacrifice of 
the public, even when the carrier causes an accident 
wilfully or recklessly?
The silence of the legislature is more remarkable in 
domestic legislation concerning damages to cargo and 
delay in non-International carriage.
The law governing this field in Australia varies in 
accordance with different applicable statutory rules. 
Indeed, one would feel lost in a maze when trying to find 
the proper rules for varying occasions of damage, unless 
he could put in order the scope of application of those 
rules. This complex situation is partly caused by the 
lack of uniform adoption of international conventions by 
States and partly by incomplete adaptation of international 
rules to the national laws, which are also divided into 
several different jurisdictions in the case of Australia. 
One possible general suggestion: Part IV should be 
amended so as to incorporate all the rules of the 
Convention in the form of a Schedule to the Act; if 
amendments or modifications are necessary for special
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domestic reasons, they should be added to each provision, 
as has been done in the United Kingdom legislation 
relating to non-international carriage. There seems to 
be no reason why the Commonwealth should not take 
advantage of the scope for securing uniformity of the 
law, especially since the uniform State Acts ensure the 
application of Commonwealth legislation in five States, 
and it may be expected before long in all.
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CHAPTER IX
Surface Damage by Aircraft
I General Background of the Law
1. International Legislation; Rome Convention
As early as 1926 C.I.T.E.J.A. started studying third 
party surface damage and liability of aircraft operators 
in international flight for such damage, as well as 
associated questions of insurance. It should be 
emphasized that here we are not concerned with damage to 
persons or goods in an aircraft, or as between aircraft, 
or, with damage to an aircraft or its contents caused by 
activities of persons on the ground; we are solely 
concerned with damage to persons, goods or land on the 
ground caused by an aircraft in flight. The Third 
International Conference on Private Air Law held in Rome 
adopted the ’Convention on the Unification of Certain 
Rules Relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third 
Parties on the Surface’ on 29 May 1933? the draft of 
which had been prepared by the Third Commission of 
C.I.T.E.J.A. The Convention was generally known as the 
Rome Convention of 1933»
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Owing to the difficult problems arising from insurers1
defences against the payment of insurance claims, the
Rome Conference of 1933 referred those questions to
C.I.T.E.J.A. for further study, and in 1938 an additional
protocol to the Rome Convention of 1933 allowing the
aviation insurers a limited number of defences was adopted
at the Fourth International Conference on Private Air Law
held in Brussels on 19-30 September 1938. However, this
Protocol had never been ratified.
The Rome Convention of 1933 was ratified by only five
States^ and its further ratification was interrupted by
the World War II. After the War, the sub-Committee of
the Legal Committee of ICAO which took over the functions
of C.I.T.E.J.A., was charged with the revision of the Rome
Convention and the Brussels Protocol, in view of the later
development of the international civil aviation. After 
2two drafts were prepared in 1950 and in 1951 respectively, 
a Diplomatic Conference on International Air Law held in 
Rome on September 9 - October 7> 1952, drew up a new
1
Belgium, Brazil, Guatemala, Roumania and Spain.
2
For the texts of those drafts, see 17 J.A.L.C. (1950) 
194-99 and 18 J.A.L.C. (l95l) 98-108. As for the history 
of the Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952 generally, see, 
e.g., E.G. Brown, The Rome Conventions of 1933 and 1952:
Do They Point A Moral? 28 J.A.L.C. (I96I-62) 4l8 et seq.
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fConvent ion on Damage caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third 
Parties on the Surface1 which replaced the 1933-38 
conventions. This Convention has been generally known 
as the Rome Convention of 1952.
The Rome Convention of 1952 was signed on 7 October 
1952, initially by 15 States and on subsequent dates by 
many States including the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia. As of June 1964, 7 States including Australia
ratified the Convention, and 9 States deposited instruments 
of adherence.'*' The Convention went into effect on 4 
February 1958? ninety days after the deposit of the fifth 
instrument of ratification. However, the major aviation 
countries, e.g. U.S.A. and the United Kingdom, have not 
ratified the Convention up to date. As between the 
contracting States which were the parties to the Rome 
Convention of 1933? the new Convention upon its entry 
into force superseded the old Convention.
Flights by aircraft above the surface can always 
cause direct danger to the subjacent inhabitants, not only 
by the fall of aircraft themselves but also by the fall 
of a person (including a parachutist) or an article from
1
Ratified countries; Australia, Brazil, Canada, Luxemberg, 
Pakistan, Spain and United Arab Republic. Adhered countries; 
Ceylon, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger and Tunisia.
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aircraft in flight. The national laws governing this legal 
relation varies from State to State. It is apparent in 
such situations that the aircraft operator is subject to 
unstable and fluctuating liabilities which change each 
time a border is crossed, and wherever the legislation in 
the country overflown is varied or modified.^ The Preamble 
to the Rome Convention of 1952 declares that the object of 
the Convention is to 1 2ensure adequate compensation for 
persons who suffer damage caused on the surface by foreign 
aircraft, while limiting in a reasonable manner the extent 
of the liabilities incurred for such damage in order not 
to hinder the development of international civil air 
transport1 and to 'meet the need for unifying to the 
greatest extent possible, through an international 
convention, the rules applying in the various countries of 
the world to the liabilities incurred for such damage'
The old Convention established the three principles, viz.
1
F.B. Davis, Surface Damage by Foreign Aircraft: The United 
States and the New Rome Convention, 38 Cornell Law 
Quarterly (1952-53) P»571« This article strongly recommends 
the ratification of the Convention by the United States.
2
It is pointed out that need for unification was the only 
purpose mentioned in the Preamble of the Rome Convention 
of 1933 while it is a secondary object in the Preamble of 
the 1952 Convention (cf. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities 
in International Air Law, 195^? p.88n).
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1 absolute liability’ of aircraft operators irrespective 
of their negligence, ’limited liability’ the amount of 
which is measured in accordance with the weight of 
aircraft, and ’compulsory insurance’ of all aircraft when 
flying over foreign territory. These basic principles 
have not been changed in the Convention of 1952, but 
appropriate amendments were made particularly with respect 
to the extent of liability and the insurance system.
Above all, the Convention of 1952 introduced three new 
principles of special importance; firstly, no compensation 
for mere flight in accordance with applicable regulations, 
secondly, ’single forum’ for actions, and thirdly, 
’recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments’.
The Convention applies to surface damage caused in 
the territory of a contracting State"*' by an aircraft 
registered in the territory of ’another* contracting 
State; the aircraft must be ’foreign’ aircraft flying 
over a contracting State’s territory, thus exiuding 
aircraft registered in a contracting State engaged in 
international flight but flying over its own territory.
For the purpose of the Convention, a ship or aircraft
I
’Contracting State’ means a ratified state or deposited 
state (Art.30).
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on the high seas is regarded as part of the territory of
the State in which it is registered."*”
The Convention does not apply to damage on the surface
if liability for such damage is regulated either by a
contract between the person who suffers such damage and
the operator or the person entitled to use the aircraft
at the time the damage occurred, or by the law relating
to workmen1s compensation applicable to a contract of
2employment between such persons. It does not apply to
3damage caused by military, customs or police aircraft, 
but doe s apply to all other aircraft even though they are 
owned by the State.
An aircraft is considered to be in flight from the 
moment when power is applied for the purpose of actual 
take-off until the moment when the landing run ends. In 
the case of an aircraft lighter than air (e.g. balloon), 
the expression fin flight* relates to the period from the 
moment when it becomes detached from the surface until
4it becomes again attached thereto. Thus, the scope of 
application of the Convention is limited to the damage
1
Art.23(2). See also Arts.30 and 3 6 .
2
Art.23.
3
Art.26.
4
Art.l(2).
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caused by aircraft during the period thus defined, which 
excludes, for example, damage caused by an aircraft 
during its taxiing term on an aerodrome.
As compared with the Ifarsaw Convention, the scope of 
application of the Rome Convention raises fewer 
difficulties, but some uncertain points remain, as for 
example, in the definitions of 1 2aircraft1 and 'surface1
2. Australian Legislation
The Commonwealth Government did not sign the Rome
Convention of 1933 or the Insurance Protocol to the
Convention of 1938, but had the matter under favourable 
2consideration. Australia signed the Rome Convention of 
1952 on 19 October 1953» and enacted the Civil Aviation
O(Damage by Aircraft) Act 1958^ whereby approval was given 
to ratification of the Convention. Until then, there 
had been no Commonwealth legislation in force regulating
1
As to the definition of 1 aircraft1, see reg.5(l) of the 
Air Navigation Regulations. 'Surface1 will include 'water 
areas’, but it is not clear whether it includes things 
beneath the water or ground (e.g., fish, oil, gas).
Semble, the word 'surface' covers them (cf. F. Ikeda, The 
Outline of International Air Law, Kokusai-koku-ho Gairon, 
p.170). But see Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., W. Vd. 
164, S.E. 292-3, limiting the scope of 'surface' to 
'superficial part of land'.
2
Cf. H. Poulton, Notes on Air Law, 1955? p.29*
No.81 of 1958.
3
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the basis of liability for surface damage or providing 
for limitation of liability for surface damage or requiring 
aircraft to be insured against such liability. Moreover, 
as we have already seen, there has been no federal 
legislation excluding liability for trespass and nuisance 
by aircraft flying in innocent passage; on the contrary, 
sec.90 of the Air Navigation Regulations has provided 
that ’ nothing in these Regulations shall be construed as 
conferring on any aircraft, as against the owner of any 
land, or as prejudicing the rights of remedies of any 
person in respect of any injury to persons or property 
caused by the aircraft'
The reasons for adoption of the new Rome Convention 
was explained when the Bill was submitted before 
Parliament:^
Adoption of the Convention will be of advantage 
to Australia’s international operator, since 
eventually it will establish uniform rules of 
liability in many countries over which Qantas 
operates, thus facilitating insurance 
arrangements and ensuring a limit of liability 
in the event of an unprecedented catastrophe.
It will also be substantial advantage to 
Australian victims of damage caused by aircraft,
1
See Chapter VI, ante.
2
Parliamentary Debates (H. of R.), 21, 22 Parliament
3rd Session, pp.l685-6.
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since they will be able to recover from 
foreign operators without proving 
negligence and without the necessity 
of suing in foreign courts up to 
relatively very high limits.
However3 the Commonwealth Act applies primarily only 
to 1 foreign1 aircraft of a contracting State engaged in 
international flight over Australian territory, and by 
the extension of the principles of the Convention it is 
made applicable to two further classes of aircraft engaged 
in international air commerce, namely, Australian aircraft 
on the domestic portion of an international flight, and 
foreign aircraft of a non-contracting State in flight over 
Australian territory. Hence, purely domestic flight, 
whether inter-State or intra-State, is governed by State 
legislation. The Commonwealth and the States communicated 
on a number of occasions prior to 1952, and subsequently 
New South Wales and Victoria in 1952 and 1953 respectively 
enacted legislation on the subject, which exactly followed 
the provisions of the United Kingdom Act.'*“ The question 
of the Commonwealth's extending the liability principles 
of the Convention to domestic aircraft (at least to 
aircraft engaged in inter-State trade) has since been
I
N.S.W.: Damage by Aircraft Act, 1952 (No .46). Victoria: 
Wrongs (Damage by Aircraft)^ct 1953? repealed and 
replaced by Wrongs Act 1958 (No. 4420), Part VI (Damage 
by Aircraft). Cf. United Kingdom: Civil Aviation Act 1949 
(sec.40).
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pending, because according to the Minister's statement,^
'a number of policy questions must be resolved before a
decision is reached on the desirability and scope of
further legislation'. In 1963 and 1964 Tasmania and
Western Australia respectively passed legislation in
2similar terms to the United Kingdom Act. In other States 
of Australia, the liability of aircraft operators for 
surface damage is governed generally by common law and 
partly by relevant general legislation, e.g. Fatal 
Accidents Acts or Wrongs Acts, not dealing specifically 
with aircraft.
(1) Commonwealth Legislation
The Civil Aviation (Damage by Aircraft) Act 1958 is 
divided into four Parts, viz. Part I (Preliminary), Part II 
(Damage to which the Rome Convention applies), Part III 
(Other Damage to which this Act applies) and Part IV 
(Regulations). In Part I, approval is given to ratification 
of Rome Convention of 1952, and the Crown in right of the 
Commonwealth is bound by the Act. Part IV (sec.20) gives 
regulation-making power to the Governor-General.
T
Civil Aviation Report, I96O-6I, p.23.
2
Tasmania: Damage by Aircraft Act 1963 (No.7)*
Western Australia: Damage by Aircraft Act 1964.
484
Part II gives the force of law in Australia to the 
provisions of the Convention'*' and contains a number of 
additional provisions necessary to supplement and give 
proper effect to the provisions of the Convention itself.
By sec.15 of the Act, the regulations may prescribe all 
matters that are necessary or convenient to be prescribed 
for carrying out or giving effect to the Convention. This 
regulation-making power, differing from a general 
regulation-making power (sec.20), is specifically directed 
to certain important subject-matters requiring Commonwealth 
implementation, for example, insurance and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. The constitutional basis for this 
power flows from the * external affairs1 power (sec.5l(xxix)) 
and incidental power (sec.5l(xxxix)) of the Constitution. 
This Part came into operation on 2 March 1959*
Part III extends certain of the basic principles of 
the Convention to Australian aircraft on the domestic 
portions of international flights and aircraft of a non­
contracting State in flight over Australia, but not to 
aircraft engaged in domestic trade and commerce between 
the States or between a State and Territory. Sec.l6 
provide s:
Sec•8.
1
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This Part applies to an aircraft registered 
in Australia which, while being used for the 
purposes of, or moved in the course of, trade 
and commerce between Australia and another 
country, is in flight in Australia -
(a) in the course of a journey of the 
aircraft between a place in 
Australia and a place outside 
Australia (either with or without 
intermediate stopping places in 
Australia); or
(b) in the course of a journey of the 
aircraft between two places in 
Australia, if passengers or goods 
are being carried in the aircraft 
in part performance of a contract 
for their carriage by a single 
carrier between a place in Australia 
and a place outside Australia.
(2) This Part also applies in relation to an
aircraft, not being an aircraft registered 
in Australia or in a Contracting State, 
which is being used for the purposes of, 
or moved in the course of, trade and 
commerce between Australia and another 
country and is in flight in Australia.
The constitutional basis for this extension of rules of
the Convention is the 'trade and commerce with other
countries' power (sec.5l(i))» but the power with respect
to 'trade and commerce between the States’ or 'air
navigation to or from the Commonwealth Territory' has not
been exercised. It is not clear whether this was the result
of policy objections to the application of similar
principles in the domestic sphere, or to a conservative
view of federal powers in the latter sphere. The federal
(1)
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'commerce* power might have been regarded as being too 
narrow for regulating the liability problems of aircraft 
operators and other associated questions, in respect of 
surface damage caused by domestic operators to third 
parties on land or waters located within a State 
jurisdiction. However, as we have mentioned before,"*” the 
clarification of liability principles, standardization of 
extent of damages, promotion and security of fair 
compensation therefor, etc. are not only advantageous 
for both operators and victims but also essential for 
the control of normal and regular flow of aircraft 
operation which would ultimately be conducive to the 
development of domestic aviation. Hence, insofar as the 
constitutional power is concerned, it is submitted that 
the Commonwealth could regulate this legal relation at 
least in respect of aircraft engaged in inter-State 
flights. For the extension of the rules of the Convention, 
we must examine the principles of the Convention in 
comparison with the scope of the federal commerce power. 
Certain provisions of Part II, which implement the 
Convention from domestic point of view, are also made 
applicable to Part III (sec.18). Part III came into 
operation on 1 July 1959*
See Chapter V, ante.
1
487
It is worthy of note that the Australian National
Airlines Act 1945-61^ limits damages in 1 any1 action
brought against the Commission for death or personal 
2injury* Prior to the 1959 amendment of the Act, the
maximum limit was fixed as £2,000, but now the limit is
£A7>500* This provision seems to have applied in respect
of death or personal injury suffered on the surface (in
addition to actions in respect of death or personal
injury of passengers). This was the sole federal Act
governing aircraft operators1 (or carriers1) liability
before the enactment of Civil Aviation (Damage by Aircraft)
Act 1958. By the amendment in 1959» however, this
provision no longer applies in relation to the liability
of the Commission by virtue of the Civil Aviation (Damage
by Aircraft Act or Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability) 
aAct 1959-82. In the case of aircraft carriers1 liability 
to air-borne passengers, the latter Act will cover the 
Commission’s liability, but the activity of the Commission 
normally confined to inter-State (and intra-State^) flights
1
No.31 of 1943? as amended.
2
Sec•66 (l)•
3Sec.66(2)•
4
The Commission can operate 1intra-State1 services if 
enabled to do so by an Act of the Parliament of the 
particular State referring the powers of air transport to 
the Commonwealth, or as incidental to an authorized service. 
See Appendix III, post.
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does not fall within the scope of application of the 
former Act which expressly limits its application to 
aircraft engaged in 'international1 flights and certain
flights incidental thereto. What, then, is the 'liability 
of the Commission* governed by the former Act? This must 
be read together with sec.19(3) of the Australian National 
Airlines Act, which empowers the Commission, with the 
approval of the Minister, to have and exercise in relation 
to airline services between any place in Australia and 
any place outside Australia the like powers as it has in 
relation to inter-State services. Hence, the provision 
limiting the Commission's liability for death or personal 
injury under the Australian National Airlines Act still 
applies to surface damage caused by the Commission's 
activity in the course of inter-State (and intra-State) 
air services, at least until the Civil Aviation (Damage 
by Aircraft) Act is amended so as to be applicable to 
purely domestic flights. If the constitutional basis 
for this limitation of the Commission's liability for 
surface damage is derived from, or incidental to, the 
federal 'commerce' power, then the same can be done with 
respect to other aircraft operators engaged at least in 
inter-State flights. But, if it is derived from the
Commission’s nature as a Commonwealth instrumentality,
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the same basis would not be available with respect to 
the other inter-State operators. It is true that the 
Commission derives its power to operate at all from 
sec.5l(i) or sec•51(xxxvii). But it is arguable that the 
incidental power, plus the general executive power (sec.6l), 
and the power to regulate federal liability (sec.78)? may 
enable the Commonwealth to go further in the regulation of 
mutual relations between its own air instrumentality and 
other parties, than it can go in the case of other 
ope rators.
(2) State Legislation
In New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and Western 
Australia, statutory enactments in almost identical terms 
with the United Kingdom Act govern the basic principles 
of liability for ground damage caused by aircraft and 
certain matters connected therewith. However, they do 
not cover other relevant subject matters dealt with in 
the Convention, e.g. limitation of liability, insurance 
system, actions, etc., so that these Acts leave plenty 
of room for common law rules. These enactments merely 
establish, first, no liability for technical legal injury 
(which we have discussed in Chapter Vi), and, secondly, 
strict liability for material loss or damage caused by 
aircraft on the surface. Although in those statutes there
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is no express limitation on the words 1 an aircraft*, the 
provisions must be read subject to the territorial 
limitations of the powers of the State Parliament, while 
sec.109 of the Commonwealth Constitution renders the 
provisions inoperative where the flight of the aircraft 
which gives rise to the damage falls within one of the 
categories set out in Parts II and III of the Commonwealth 
Act;'*' hence those State statutes are practically confined 
to damage caused by aircraft engaged in inter-State and 
intra-State flights passing over or within their respective 
territorie s.
Common law and relevant general legislation govern 
this legal raltion in other States, viz. Queensland and 
South Australia, and in the Commonwealth Territories.
Since the common law rules occupy a large portion of the 
substantive law in this field, as contrasted with the 
carriers* liability in respect of their passengers or 
shippers, we shall discuss them in comparison with the 
main topics of statutory rules.
II Main Provisions and Problems of the Law
The following discussions dealing with main topics of 
the law will be divided in accordance with the classes of
1
L.R. Edwards, Some Aspects of the Liabilities of Airline 
Operators in Australia, 34 A.L.J. p.l47*
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flights into 'international flights1 (which whenever 
necessary is further divided into 'Rome flights' governed 
solely by the Convention and 'Non-Rorne flights* to which 
the rules of the Convention are extended with certain 
modifications) and 'domestic flights' (which is also 
divided into 'flights in N.S.W., Victoria, Tasmania and 
Western Australia' and 'flights in other States'), whether 
inter-State or intra-State. The purpose of dividing the 
law into these categories is first to define clearly the 
present legal system prevailing in several jurisdictions 
respectively, and secondly to point out the differences 
of the law among them with the view of finding out 
possibilities of unifying the rules in Australia.
1• Operators' Liability
(l) Principles of Liability
International Flights: Art.l(l) of the Convention
sets up a basic principle of civil liability of the
operator for surface damage:
Any person who suffers damage on the surface 
shall, upon proof only that the damage was 
caused by an aircraft in flight or by any 
person or thing falling therefrom, be entitled 
to compensation as provided by this Convention. 
Nevertheless there shall be no right to 
compensation if the damage is not a direct 
consequence of the incident giving rise 
thereto, or if the damage results from the 
mere fact of passage of the aircraft through 
the airspace in conformity with existing air 
traffic regulations.
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The principal difference in respect of civil
liability between the Warsaw Convention and the Rome
Convention is that the latter applies the doctrine of
‘absolute liability1 2 while the former is based on the
principle of ‘negligence1 with a transfer of burden of
proof to the carrier. Hence, the operator is liable even
when the damage is caused by force majeure; this extremely
rigid application of ‘absoluteness1 of the operator1s
liability has been one of the main reasons why the United
States has not ratified the Convention.'*' It is suggested
that a compromise might be reached by allowing the operator
to set up the defence of force ma.jeure (not including
2specific aviation risks). However, the following 
exceptions to this absolute liability are recognized:
(a) The operator is not liable if the damage 
is not a direct consequence of the 
incident giving rise thereto (Art.l(l)).
(b) Compensation is denied if the damage 
results from the mere fact of passage 
of aircraft through the airspace in 
conformity with ‘existing air traffic 
regulations1, which, in the case of 
Australia, are embodied in Parts X, XI 
and XII (regs. 108-90) of the Air 
Navigation Regulations, and Annex 2 
(Rulesof the Air)of the Chicago 
Convention (Art.l(l)).
1
The United States sought a convention predicated on a 
rebuttable presumption of fault. Cf. Davis, op.cit., p.575*
2
G. Rinkc, Damage caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third 
Parties, 28 J.A.L.C. (1961-62) p.4l5.
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(c) There is no liability if the damage is 
the direct consequence of armed conflict 
or civil disturbance, or if the person 
has been deprived of the use of the 
aircraft by act of public authority 
(Art.5)•
(d) There is no liability if it is proved 
that the damage was caused solely through 
the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of the person who suffers the 
damage or of the latter1s servants or 
agents. If the damage was partly contributed 
to, the compensation is reduced to that 
extent proportionately. Nevertheless there 
is no such exoneration or reduction if, in 
the case of the negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of a servant or 
agent, the person who suffers the damage 
proves that his servant or agent was acting 
outside the scope of his authority (Art.6).
The exception (b) above is specially noteworthy.
There is no right to compensation under the Convention 
for ’damage resulted from the mere fact of passage of 
the aircraft through the airspace in conformity with 
existing air traffic regulations1. In order to prevent 
such a mere flight from causing any direct damage, much 
will depend upon the national regulations, such as, 
provision of a maximum unit of noise or vibration, or 
amendment to existing regulations so as to prevent such 
damage from occurring subsequently. Even without such 
preventive measures, it is unlikely that physiological 
injuries to human bodies or injuries to domestic animals 
are in fact often caused by noise or vibration of aircraft 
in ordinary cases, for today most national regulations
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require an aircraft to fly at a certain height. However, 
some actual damage may unavoidably be caused by nuisance 
around the vicinity of an aerodrome even though the 
aircraft taking off from or landing on the aerodrome 
complies with air traffic rules. In these limited 
occasions, Art.l(l) of the Rome Convention and sec.17 
of the Commonwealth Act extending the rule of Art.l(l) 
to other types of international flights deny (in a rather 
drastic way) the right to claim for material damage in 
nuisance which otherwise would have been given to the 
landowners under the State statutory rules or common law 
rules. This legislative interference with liability for 
actual damage must be distinguished from the grant of 
the innocent passage right which denies any action in 
trespass or nuisance by reason only of the mere passage 
of aircraft but does not deal with damage caused by such 
passage. We said in Chapter VI that the Commonwealth in 
establishing liberty to fly could also authorize noise 
and vibration to be caused by aircraft on or around 
aerodromes, so that any action in nuisance by reason only 
of such noise and vibration in such areas should also 
be denied. The present Commonwealth regulations providing 
for operation of aircraft in the vicinity of aerodrome^
Reg. 143«
1
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and rules for landing and take-off at aerodrome are
nothing but traffic rules for aircraft operation in
respect to conduct of pilots and general public safety,
as reg,90 avoids in express, but rather ambiguous, terms
any impact of the Regulations upon 1 the rights of remedies
of any person in respect of any injury to persons or
property caused by the aircraft’. The establishment of
the innocent passage right at specified altitudes
(including the altitude necessary for talcing off from or
landing on an aerodrome) goes a step further and operates
as a legislative limitation upon the landowner’s property
rights ’in airspace’ in relation to aircraft passage over
the land; it does not, however, affect liability for
actual damage. Aircraft flying under the privilege or
liberty to fly remain subject to tort liability for any
actual damage; recourse will be had to tort claims
2against the Commonwealth under the Judiciary Act or 
against private aviators under the State statutory or 
common law tort rules. There may be a constitutional 
remedy under the compulsory acquisition clause 
(sec.5l(xxxi)) if the damage occurs around the vicinity
1
Reg. 146.
No .6 of 1903 - No.32 of i960, sec.56.
2
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of Commonwealth-owned aerodromes. Aircraft flying in 
accordance with the rule contained in Art.l(l), 
establishing a non-liability principle in the stated 
circumstances, will be exempt from tortious liability for 
resulting damage, and redress can be obtained if at all 
only on the constitutional level.
Probably, foreign aviators of the contracting States 
would rely upon the privileges of Art.l(l) of the 
Convention, but other international aviators1 defense 
that they also have privileges under the Commonwealth Act 
may be assailed on the ground that such an enactment is 
ultra vires the Commonwealth * foreign commerce1 power.
In the present writer1s opinion, however, the ’commerce’ 
power is wide enough for establishing such authorized 
nuisance for the benefits of the public and commerce by 
air, provided that the rationale of fixing the 
circumstances for such authorization (e.g. the way of 
approaching to an aerodrome) is subject to judicial 
review. Moreover, once the Commonwealth interferred 
positively with the actual damage relation between 
landowners and aviators, some adequate compensation for 
the acquisition of property must always be provided under 
sec.5l(xxxi) of the Constitution; as we have already 
seen, the ’taking’ theory may be invoked whenever such
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noise and vibration cause serious and frequent damage 
to the landowner*s property rightsj irrespective of 
whether the intrusion of the upper airspace strata has 
established an air easement. Upon these views, the 
present Commonwealth legislation establishing a drastic 
exception to the absolute liability principle but having 
no standard of authorized circumstances or no measure 
for adequate compensation upon just terms is of doubtful 
constitutionality. On the contrary, if these conditions 
are fulfilled, there is no reason why the exception 
cannot also be extended to inter-State flights under the 
same power, as it is done with respect to flights engaged 
in 'foreign* commerce. Similarly, under sec»52(i) of 
the Constitution, the Commonwealth could permit authorized 
nuisance to be caused on its own aerodromes and, if 
necessary for their effective operation, around these 
aerodromes with respect to any flight. The widest approach 
to sec.52(i) will suggest that the Commonwealth in 
operating its own aerodromes can set out such non-liability 
exception for the purpose of the public using the 
aerodromes, provided that the above-mentioned conditions 
are duly observed in such authorization. It must be 
noted, however, that all regular international air transport 
flights take off from or land on the Commonwealth-owned
aerodromes but the extension of this non-liability rule
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to inter-State flights will involve some local aerodromes 
to which sec.52(i) does not apply. It seems that the 
present Commonwealth Act is based mainly on the ’commerce* 
power.
It is contended that, in view of the later
development of new technical standards, damage caused by
a sonic boom, which could not have been considered in
the Rome Conference in 1952, falls outside the privilege
granted in Art.l(l), makes the operator liable under the
broad principle of the same article.^ There is, however,
authority for the view that the intent of the members of
the Rome Conference was to deny compensation even for
’unusual noise1 and for damages resulting from
concentrated noise in the vicinity of an airport.^ It is
said that in Australia there is not the same intensive
use of airports by heavy jet aircraft as occurs at the
major airports in America and there has been no litigation
involving claims for damages arising from the use of
3airports or the noise of aircraft. An action brought 
by some 800 landowners in the vicinity of Idlewild
1
Rinck, op.cit., pp.408-9»
2
Ibid.
Second Civil Aviation Annual Report, p.27»3
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International Airport, New York, against the Port 
Authority operating the airport and some 40 international 
(including Australian Qantas) and American domestic 
airlines is pending before the Supreme Court of the State 
of New York; proceedings were commenced in December,
1961.^ The damages sought are for depreciation in value 
of their properties because of noise from aircraft flying 
at low heights over the properties while landing at and 
taking off from the airport. It is not the place to 
comment on this case in the absence of any detailed report 
or ruling on the application; since the United States is 
not a party to the Rome Convention, the decision will 
depend upon American domestic law, particularly the State 
law defining the liability principle of aircraft operators, 
and upon the Court’s attitude to the constitutional 
problems of deprivation of private property for public 
purposes. As we have already seen the problem in Australia 
is largely governed by the Commonwealth Act insofar as
1
Trippe and Others v. The Port of New York Authority and 
numerous Airlines including Qantas. As to the outline of 
the facts of this case, see Second Civil Aviation Annual 
Report, p.27, and Third Civil Aviation Annual Report, p«30* 
It is reported that the Port Authority has obtained an order 
striking out all references to complaints based on nuisance 
and trespass arising more than one year before the action 
was commenced under a provision contained in the Statute 
setting up the Port Authority, which requires action 
against the Authority to commence within one year.
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international flights are concerned, and so long as 
aircraft engaged in such flights comply with the existing 
air traffic regulations there would be no compensation 
whatsoever. However, the constitutional problem of 
acquisition of property remains relevant under the 
Australian law.
Domestic Flights
(N.S.W., Victoria, Tasmania and W.A.) The four 
States’ Damage by Aircraft Acts provide for the basic 
principle of operators’ liability for ground damage in 
common terms:
(1) No action shall lie in respect of trespass 
or in respect of nuisance, by reason only 
of the flight of an aircraft over any 
property at a height above the ground, which, 
having regard to wind, weather, and all
the circumstances of the case is reasonable 
or the ordinary incidents of such flight 
so long as the provisions of the Air 
Navigation Regulations are duly complied 
with.
(2) Where material loss or damage is caused 
to any person or property on land or 
water by, or by a person in, or an article 
or person falling from, an aircraft while 
in flight, taking off or landing, then 
unless the loss or damage was caused or 
contributed to by the negligence of the 
person by whom it was suffered, damages
in respect of the loss or damage shall be 
recoverable without proof of negligence 
or intention or other cause of action, 
as if the loss or damage had been caused 
by the wilful act, neglect, or default 
of the owner of the aircraft....
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As we have already discussed sub-sec.(1) in 
Chapter VI in connexion with the landowners1 property 
rights in airspace, it is sufficient here to say that 
even a flight in conformity with sub-sec.(1) which is 
exempt from action of trespass or nuisance is liable 
under sub-sec.(2) if it causes material loss or damage 
on the surface. What constitutes ’material loss or 
damage’ will be discussed later, but its scope will be
extensive, as sub-sec.(2) would certainly appear to be
1intended to provide ’the widest remedy’. These State 
statutory provisions have an impact on the operation of 
the Rome Convention. As we have seen, under that 
Convention there shall be no right to compensation if 
the damage results from the mere fact of passage of the 
aircraft through airspace in conformity with existing 
air traffic regulations (Art.l(l)). But that provision 
is not an international recognition of innocent passage 
of aircraft over privately held lands, so that, in the 
absence of any (Commonwealth or State) legislation 
establishing liberty to fly, the landowner, while unable 
to claim compensation for resulting damage, may claim 
injunctive prohibition of aircraft passage over his land.
McNair, The Law of the Air, second ed., pp.84-5#
1
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The problem is solved in these four States’ jurisdictions 
by virtue of sub-sec.(1).
The juristic character of the liability contained 
in sub-sec.(2) has been discussed by English writers in
respect to the equivalent provision of the United
1Kingdom Act. It is in substance different from other
tortious liabilities at common law modified by statutes.
The statutory imposition of strict liability in aviation
is a drastic change of the law of negligence, and,
except for analogies in the field of industrial injuries
(e.g. workers’ compensation), it is unique legislation in
2Australia in the accident field.
In the United States where several States enact a 
statutory absolute liability rule with respect to aircraft 
damage on the surface, questions were raised as to its 
constitutionality. The absolute liability of the aircraft
r>owner under sec.5 of the (State) Uniform Aeronautics ActJ
1
E.g. Shawcross and Beaumont, Air Law, second ed., p.431*
2
Cf. Fleming, The Law of Torts, second ed., p.282.
3Uniform Law Ann.XVI. In the United States, about one- 
half of the States have solved the aircraft-operators’ 
liability problem through legislation. Of those States 
which do have statutes several impose strict liability 
through laws modeled primarily on sec.5 of the Uniform 
Aeronautic A c t , which was promulgated by the Commission 
on Uniform State Laws in 1922, but was withdrawn by the 
(continued on page 503)
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was attacked as unconstitutional on the grounds that it
deprived aircraft owners of their property without due
process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution, and also as violative of the inter-State
commerce clause of the Constitution. However, the absolute
liability principle was held not to be a deprivation of
the owner1s property without due process of law, and also
not to be an unreasonable burden upon inter-State
1commerce so as to be unconstitutional. The latter 
question is relevant to the present Australian State 
legislation, but there is no doubt that such legislation 
is not contrary to the absolute freedom of inter-State 
trade. If the Commonwealth introduces similar 
legislation in respect of inter-State aircraft flights,
1 (continued from p.502)
Commissioners in 19^ -3» In other States in which statutes 
on this point have been enacted the liability imposed 
varies from absolute liability for forced landings only, 
to a presumption of negligence, to recovery only upon 
proof of negligence. The jurisdictions which rely upon 
common law principles are about equally divided between 
strict liability and ordinary negligence. The States 
which apply the rule of strict liability follow the 
attitude found in the Restatement of Torts published in 
1938, i.e., strict liability based upon the notion of
’ultra-hazardous1 nature of aviation. Cf. R.L. Trimble, 
Liability for Ground Damage caused by Aircraft - Trespass - 
Ultra-Hazardous Activity - Negligence, 28 J.A.L.C.
(1961-2 ), pp.315-7 .
1
W.C. Wolff, Liability of Aircraft Owners and Operators 
for Ground Injury, 24 J.A.L.C. (1957) p.210. See 
Prentiss v. National Airlines, Inc. (1953) 112 F. Supp.306.
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the above-mentioned two questions might arise, but the
High Court is likely to proceed upon the same line as the
1United States court’s decision.
Whether the common law relating to the effect of
contributory negligence is applicable, or whether the
statutory defence is a creature sui generis, is by no
means clear, but the common law rule would probably be
2applied under the State statutes. Hence, even if the
loss or damage was merely contributed to by the person
who has suffered it, there will be a complete defence
to an action under sub-sec.(2). However, since the
legislation on apportionment of loss concerning
accidents on land is now established in all States of
3Australia except New South Wales, it is no longer in 
these States a complete defence for the operator to a 
claim under the statutory rule. In considering the 
applicability of the apportionment legislation under the 
State Damage by Aircraft Act (or the Wrongs Act) 
something might turn on the order of legislation in the 
_
The court will probably apply the tests established in 
the Hughes & Vale Case (1955> 93 C.L.R. 1; A.C. 24l).
See Chapter II, ante.
2
Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., p.439*
See Chapter VIII, ante.
3
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various jurisdictions in Australia. In Victoria, for 
example, the apportionment legislation (Part V of the 
Wrongs Act 1958) is apt to cover the matter; sec.25 
defines 'fault* to include any 1act....which....would, 
apart from this Part, give rise to the defence of 
contributory negligence*. There seems to be no reason 
why this should not cover the situation of damage by 
aircraft which is now described in Part VI of the same 
Act. The matters relevant to the application of the 
apportionment legislation will be discussed later in 
relation to the occurrence of liability and measures of 
damages, but it will be seen that in New South Wales the 
common law rule of a complete defence in contributory 
negligence would still apply under the Damage by Aircraft 
Act.
Operator*s liability for third party surface damage 
is governed by common law in two States of Australia (i.e 
Queensland and South Australia) and in the Commonwealth 
Territories. It is improbable that aircraft would be 
regarded nowadays as things dangerous in themselves at 
common law, and therefore there is probably no strict 
liability at common law for damage or injury done by an 
aircraft by reason only of the notion of 'ultra-hazardous
nature of aviation. As aviation has developed and
50 6
progressed, the judicial trend has been to discard the
application of strict liability based upon such a notion.
The rule of evidence known as res ipsa loquitur would
1probably apply. Strictly speaking, however, res ipsa
loquitur creates a mere inference of negligence and
does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of showing
the cause of damage, so that the rule cannot, by itself,
2impute liability to the aircraft operator. The
desirability of applying a strict liability rule in
aviation accidents originates from the unusual difficulties
which a claimant may have in establishing the cause of an
aviation mishap, especially if he was on the ground; the
machine is usually travelling at high speed and a high
altitude, out of sight, and under conditions of operation
involving great technological complexity. Another reason
for applying strict liability may also be found in the
fact that the third party on the surface does not assume
any aviation risk, and so he deserves better protection
3than the user of an aircraft.
1
Cf. e.g. McNair, op.cit 
Law of Tort, fourth ed., 
2
Davis, op.cit., p.576.
3
Rinck, op.cit., p.407*
, p.70; Winfield, 
1948, p.321.
Textbook of the
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The introduction of the statutory absolute liability 
in this field, whether by Commonwealth legislation or 
by their own legislation, would not necessarily be 
incompatible with the policy of common law principles in 
these State jurisdictions. Probably, however, the common 
law cannot, or is too slow to, extricate itself from the 
ordinary law of negligence, modified by res ipsa loquitur, 
so that in these States the basic rule remains liability 
only for negligence. The rules of contributory negligence 
modified by apportionment legislation will also apply.
(2) Occurrence of Liability and Measures of Damages
International Flights: The Convention requires only
that the person suffering damage proves the damage to 
have been caused by an aircraft in flight, but, in order 
to be entitled for compensation, the damage must be a 
direct consequence of the incident giving rise thereto. 
Generally speaking, this is in accord with the common 
law rules relating to remoteness of damage which apply 
not only to wrongs of negligence, but to wrongs of all 
kinds, whether wilful, negligent, or of absolute 
liability. In any case, it is submitted that the expression 
‘direct1 in the Convention is intended only to narrow the 
scope of damage in causal relationship, but not to
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enforce it as a uniform principle on the causal relation
1theory in national laws.
The Convention does not apply to damage caused by
aircraft during the taxiing terms on the aerodrome.
It is desirable for the Commonwealth Act to have
supplementary provisions on this, but the 1 external
affairs’ power might not be sufficient to support such 
2provisions. However, sufficient power could be derived 
from the foreign commerce power (sec.5l(i)) and the power 
over Commonwealth-owned aerodromes (sec.52(i)).
The Convention entrusts to each contracting State 
to apply its own rules as to what elements of damage are 
recoverable. The Civil Aviation (Damage by Aircraft) Act 
1958 sets out provisions to fill this gap with respect to 
liability for death only, in which case the damages 
recoverable in the action include ’loss of earnings or 
profits up to the date of death and the reasonable expenses 
of the funeral of the deceased person and medical and
1
Ikeda, op.cit., pp.175-6.
2
R. y. Burgess; Ex parte Henry (the first Henry Case),
5 5 C.L.R. 0O8,established the test that a considerably 
rigid accordance to the languages of the Convention is 
necessary for the domestic implementation of the Convention. 
A more rigid test will be applied to the Rome Convention 
which deals with a more specific subject than the Chicago 
Convention.
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hospital expenses reasonably incurred in relation to 
the injury that resulted in the death of the deceased 
person1 (sec.ll(3))« In awarding damages, the Court is 
not limited to the financial loss resulting from the 
death of the deceased person (sec.ll(4)). By virtue of 
sec.18 of the Act, these provisions are made applicable 
to other ’international flights1 to which the Rome 
Convention does not apply. It will be noted that the 
recoverable damages are not prescribed with respect to 
injury of a person (that has not resulted in death) or 
damage to property, to which common law rules of measure 
of damages apply. The Act provides for a number of items 
not to be taken into account in assessing damages in 
respect of liability under the Convention in relation to 
the death of, or personal injury to, a person, viz. (a) 
contract of insurance, (b) superannuation, provident or 
like fund, or benefit from a friendly society or trade 
union, or (c) premium under a contract of insurance in the 
case of death (sec.12); by virtue of sec.18, this applies 
to other ’international’ flights. Unlike the Civil Aviation 
(Carriers’ Liability) Act 1959-62,^ the Civil Aviation
I
Sec.l6; see also sec»39> extending the measures to the 
domestic carriages.
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(Damage by Aircraft) Act 1958 does not prescribe what kind
of steps the Court should take in apportioning loss or
damages in the case of contributory negligence.
Domestic Flights: (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania
and Western Australia) In those States* jurisdiction,
liability occurs once material loss or damage is caused.
’Material loss or damage1 is deemed to be ’injury to
1persons or property which is of a physical nature’, as
distinct from injuria sine damno for which ’nominal
2damages’ are awarded. It will relate to the loss or
damage actually suffered by the plaintiff and is assessed
and awarded as real damages and not simply by way of mere
recognition of a legal right. It will include all such
damage or loss as can be recovered in a common law action
on negligence, since ’proof of actual damage is essential
3to an action of negligence'. It would certainly be 
difficult to contend that damages ought to be given for 
the mere sensation of fear, but when fear or any other 
sensation produces a definite illness, that consequence
_
Halsbury’s Laws of England, third ed., vol.5, p.246.
2
For the meaning of ’nominal damages’, see Salmond,
On Tort, 12th ed., by R.F.V. Heuston, 1957, P«705.
3
McNair, op.cit., p.88.
is no more remote than a broken bone or an open wound 1
Although liability for nervous shock is now well
2established, as in the case of Bourhill v. Young,
where the shock was caused by the tort of negligence, the
plaintiff may be so hypersensitive as to exclude him from
the scope of the defendant* s duty to take care. But this
common law rule is not applicable to the statutory
liability of sub-sec.(2) of the State statutes, where the
person caused physical shock need only prove that he has
3in fact suffered shock from the sight of accident, 
irrespective of the scope of the defendant’s duty to take 
care. It is also submitted that the spectator need only 
prove that he has in fact suffered shock from reasonable 
apprehension of danger to themselves, or to some other
4person, or even to ’property*. In cases other than 
such physical shock, the owner of the aircraft will normally 
be liable for every material damage on the surface due 
to the contact, fire, or explosion caused by the aircraft
1
Winfield, op.cit., p.78.
2
(19^3) A.C. 92. See also Farrugia v . G.W. Ry ( 19^ +7)
2 All E.R. 565.
3
Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., p.426.
4
Ibid.
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or things dropped from it, unless they are interrupted 
by a new intervening cause.
In the case of contributory negligence, the
apportionment legislation applies in Victoria, Tasmania
and Western Australia but not in New South Wales. The
following two points are important in the application of
the apportionment legislation under which, where any
person suffers damage as a result partly of his own fault
and partly of the fault of any other person or persons,
a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated
by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage,
but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be
reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and
equitable having regard to the claimant*s share in the
responsibility for the damage: Firstly, a claimant may
recover a proportion of his loss irrespective of whether
the degree of negligence was * slight* for the plaintiff
2and ‘gross* for the defendant in comparison, and secondly, 
where apportionment of the liability is required, the
1
In the State Acts, ‘article* is defined as including 
‘mail or animal*, and ‘loss or damage* including, in 
relation to persons, loss of life and personal injury.
2
As to the difference on this point between English law 
and some American experiments, see Fleming, op.cit.,
pp.228- 9 •
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claimant’s share in the responsibility is determined not 
only by the causative potency of his acts but also by 
their blameworthiness, and in such cases both the amount 
of the reduction of damages and the costs of the partially
successful plaintiff are in the discretion of the trial
1judge. Is the doctrine of ’last clear chance’ (or 
’last opportunity’ or ’last clear opportunity’) applicable 
under the State Damage by Aircraft Acts? The doctrine 
places its emphasis upon the time sequence of events, and 
holds the defendant wholly liable if he had, immediately 
prior to the harm, the superior opportunity to avoid it, 
even though the plaintiff was also careless. One of the 
main criticisms of its applicability to the general cases 
of contributory negligence at common law is the difficulty 
of defending a rule which absolves the plaintiff entirely 
from his own negligence, and places the loss upon the 
defendant whose fault, though in one sense determinative, 
may be the lesser of the two. Now that apportionment 
legislation has abolished the stalemate rule of the common 
law in respect of contributory negligence, ’last 
opportunity’ is capable of application to either party.2
1
Halsbury* s Laws of England, Vol.28, p.91 .
2
Cf» Fleming, op.cit., p.229» Note however that in Western 
Australia, the Act expressly provides that last clear chance 
is not to debar a plaintiff; Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence and Tortfeasors’ Contribution) Act, 1947, s.4.
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Hence, that notion, because it is a remoteness notion, 
does survive the apportionment legislation. In practice, 
however, the courts tend to have regard to all the causes 
and apportion the damages accordingly, and it has become 
very rare for a plaintiff or defendant to be deprived of 
all claim under ’last opportunity*. Semble, the 
contributory negligence and last opportunity rules at 
common law govern damage caused by aircraft in New South 
Wales. But in practice it is not easy to conceive of 
circumstances in which conduct on the surface could be 
contributory negligence or provide ’last opportunity’ 
vis-a-vis an aircraft in flight.
Some more questions arise from the State statutory 
rules. First, there is a divergency of opinion as to 
whether the expression ’person or property on land or 
water’ envisages damage caused by aircraft, even though the 
aircraft would not, apart from the Act, be open to a 
possible complaint of trespass or nuisance. McNair, 
assuming that sub-sec.(2) is intended to provide the 
widest possible remedy, considers it does so apply, while 
Shawcross and Beaumont regard this as ’extremely doubtful’.
1
McNair, op.cit., pp.84-5; Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit.,
p.437.
5 1 5
Judging from what the whole section intends to protect, the 
former view is here maintained, although the clarification 
of the point by amending legislation is very desirable. 
Secondly, is !inevitable accident* available as a defence 
for damage in sub-sec.(2)? Shawcros s and Beaumont consider 
that the defence other than * act of God* will not be 
available to a defendant under the statutory rule. It is 
submitted that, in practice, in every case of aircraft 
accident, many so-called * acts of God* should be treated 
as inevitable accidents and no defence (e.g., lightning, 
sudden fog, bird damaging propeller, &c.), and that only
such extraordinary cases as collision with a meteorite
1would amount to an *act of God*.
In Queensland and South Australia and in the 
Commonwealth Territories where the above statutory 
provisions have not been adopted, the ordinary rules of 
torts, remoteness of damage and assessment of damages 
apply to damage by aircraft flying in the course of 
inter-State and intra-State flights. Mention has already 
been made as to apportionment of loss in connection with 
contributory negligence.
Cf. Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., p.44o.
1
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(3) Persons made liable
International Flights: Under the Convention, the
liability attaches to the 1 operator1 of the aircraft, 
who is defined as ' the person who was making use of the 
aircraft at the time the damage was caused*, but if 
control of the navigation of the aircraft was retained 
by the person from whom the right to make use of the 
aircraft was derived, whether directly or indirectly, 
that person is considered the operator; a person is 
considered to be making use of an aircraft when he is 
using it personally or when his servants or agents are 
using the aircraft in the course of their employment, 
whether or not within the scope of their authority; the
registered owner of the aircraft is presumed to be the
1operator. However, if the person who was the operator
at the time the damage was caused had not the exclusive
right to use the aircraft for a period of more than
14 days, the person from whom such right was derived is
2liable jointly and severally with the operator. This 
provision is particularly for 'charter' flights. If a
1
Art, 2.
2
A r t .3 •
Ikeda, op.cit.,
3
p. 189
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person makes use of an aircraft without the consent of 
the person entitled to its navigational control, the 
latter, unless he proves that he has exercised due care
to prevent such use, is jointly and severally liable with
1the unlawful user for damage. When two or more aircraft
have collided or interfered with each other in flight
and damage results, or when two or more aircraft have
jointly caused such damage, each of the aircraft
concerned is considered to have caused the damage and the
operator of each aircraft is liable, each of them being
bound under the provisions and within the limits of
2liability of the Convention. A problem will arise when 
the damage is caused by two aircraft, one of them being 
registered in another contracting State, the other not 
(being either an aircraft of a non-contracting state or 
of the state where the damage is caused). By Art.23(l), 
the Convention applies to damage contemplated in Art.1 
caused in the territory of a contracting State by an 
aircraft registered in the territory of another State. 
Prion suggests that the literal interpretation of the 
Article is to be preferred, making the Convention
1
A rt.4.
Art.7.
2
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applicable to the liability of aircraft which are
registered either in the state where the damage occurred,
or in another non-contracting State, if such aircraft
caused the damage jointly with aircraft of another
1contracting State. But the soundness of this expansive 
interpretation of the scope of application of the Convention 
is doubtful. Difficult problems may therefore arise in 
collision cases where the Australian aircraft engaged in 
international flights collide or interfere with other 
Australian aircraft engaged in inter-State or intra-State 
flights.
Domestic Flights: (New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania
and Western Australia). The following proviso is attached
to the State statutory rules establishing the absolute
liability principle (sub-sec^2)):
Provided that where material loss or damage is 
caused as aforesaid in circumstances in which —
(a) damages are recoverable in respect of 
the said loss or damage by virtue only 
of the foregoing provisions of this 
sub-section; and
(b) a legal liability is created in some 
person other than the owner to pay 
damages in respect of the said loss 
or damage; the owner shall be 
entitled to be indemnified by that 
other person against any claim in 
respect of the said loss or damage.
Drion, op.cit.,
1
p. 89.
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Hence, the liability is imposed upon the ’owner*, subject
to his right of indemnity against any other person on
whom legal liability can be shown to rest. Where the
aircraft concerned has been bona fide demised, let or
hired out for a period exceeding fourteen days to any
other person by the owner thereof, and no pilot, commander,
navigator or operative member of the crew of the aircraft
is in the employment of the owner, liability of the owner
is substituted by that of the person to which the
1aircraft has been demised, let or hired out.
(Other States) At common law, liability falls upon
the person actually responsible for the ground damage,
namely, in normal cases the pilot who may be the owner
or operator (who has perhaps chartered the machine), and
also upon any person, such as the owner or operator, if
not the pilot, who is vicariously responsible for the
pilot’s actions. Here, the ordinary rules concerning the
2relation between master and servant becomes relevant.
1
This is expressly provided in the State Damage by Aircraft 
Acts.
2
Cf. Shawcross and Beaumont, op.cit., Part X (Law of Master 
and Servant in connection with use and operation of 
aircraft).
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(4) Limitation of Liability and its Exceptions
International Flights: The liability of the operator 
for surface damage is limited in international air law,
whatever justifications for or criticisms against it may be.
1The limits increase with the weight of the aircraft, but
the rate of increase becomes progressively lower as the
weight increases. Art.11 of the Rome Convention of 1952,
which amended Art.8 (2) of the 1933 Convention fixing a
rigid ceiling irrespective of the weight of the aircraft,
lists the limits fixed in accordance with the weight of
2the aircraft in five categories. For the purpose of 
illustration, the limits amount to £A253>000 for an aircraft
1
’Weight* means the maximum weight of the aircraft 
authorized by the certificate of airworthiness for take-off, 
excluding the effect of lifting gas when used (Art.11(3))» 
The Commonwealth Regulations relevant to the weight of 
aircraft are, regs.227, 225(b), 227(3)»
2
(a) 500,000 francs (approximately £A15»000)for aircraft 
weighing 1,000 kgs. or less;
(b) 500,000 francs plus 400 francs (£A12) per kg. over 
1,000 kgs. for aircraft weighing more than 1,000 but 
not exceeding 6,000 kgs.;
(c) 2,500,000 francs (£A75,000) plus 250 francs (£A7/10/-) 
per kg. over 6,000 kgs. for aircraft weighing more 
than 6,000 but not exceeding 20,000 kgs;
(d) 6,000,000 francs (£A180,000) plus 150 francs (£A4/10/-) 
per kg. over 20,000 kgs. for aircraft weighing more 
than 20,000 but not exceeding 50,000 kgs;
(e) 10,500,000 francs (£A315>000) plus 100 francs (£A3) 
per kg. over 50,000 kgs. for aircraft weighing more 
than 50,000 kgs.
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of the size of Vicount, and £A550,000 for an aircraft of
1the size of a Boeing 707* In addition to the over-all
limit, there is a sub-limit of approximately £A15j000 (500,000
francs as opposed to 200,000 francs in the 1933 Convention)
in respect of the death or personal injury of any person.
It is pointed out that the limits generally exceed the
amount of surface damage so far experienced in any civil
accident, not only in Australia but also elsewhere, so
that any reduction of the compensation payable to persons
suffering damage, due to the limitation provisions, would
2only arise in the most exceptional catastrophe. If the 
total amount of the claims established exceeds such limits, 
the rules as prescribed in the Convention apply, and the 
claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury are 
appropriated preferentially more than those in respect of
3damage to property.
There are two exceptions to the limitation of liability. 
First, if the person who suffers damage proves that it was 
caused by a deliberate act or omission of the operator, 
his servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage,
1
Edwards, op.cit., p.l47« See also Parliamentary Debates,
H. of R. 21, p.1684.
2
Ibid.
A rt.14 .
3
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the liability of the operator becomes unlimited; provided 
that in the case of such act or omission of such servant 
or agent, it is also proved that he was acting in the 
course of his employment and within the scope of his 
authority (Art.12(l)). This rule is not in harmony with 
Art.25 (a rule akin to wilful misconduct) of the Warsaw 
Convention as amended at the Hague, because there the 
passenger gets unlimited indemnification if the damage 
resulted fx^ orn an act ! done with intent to cause damage or 
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result1, while the third party, who did not agree to
bear any risk, is in a poor position before the court and
1has to prove intent of the operator or pilot. It is
submitted that the wording was adopted in order to make
sure that in all cases of negligence or wilful misconduct,
the liability should remain limited, while unlimited in the
2case of criminal acts. Since any proof of such an intent 
is extremely difficult, this would in practice exclude the 
case of unlimited liability. In any case, there is only 
limited liability however careless the operator may have 
been; thus to take off when in violation of safety
1
Rinck, op.cit., pp.410-11.
Ibid.
2
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regulations or with knowledge of some engine trouble
1gives rise to only limited liability. Secondly, if a
person wrongfully takes and makes use of an aircraft
without the consent of the person entitled to use it,
his liability becomes unlimited (Art.12(2)).
Those provisions in Chapter II of the Convention
relating to the limitation of liability are extended to
the Australian aircraft engaged in international flights
while flying over Australian territory, but not to
aircraft of non-contracting States of the Convention which
are engaged in trade and commerce between Australia and
2another country and in flight in Australia, partly because 
the operator of the non-contracting States would enjoy the 
benefit of limited liability without granting such benefit 
to the Australian aircraft, and partly because the limited 
liability system is closely related to the compulsory 
insurance system which is prescribed in the Convention 
only as between the contracting States.
Domestic Flights: There is no special legislation
limiting the aircraft operators* liability for surface 
damage either in the States which enacted the Damage by
1
Ibid.
Sec.17(3)•
2
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Aircraft Acts, or in the other States of Australia. In
the United States, the limits established by the new
Rome Convention (to which the United States has not
adhered) is greater, in practically every case, than the
limits imposed by the States either in workmen1 2s compensation
1death recoveries or under wrongful death statutes. The
situation seems to be still more so in Australia; although
2the Wrongs Act or similar legislation of the States has 
no limitation on the recoverable amount, the Workmen1s
3Compensation Act of the States fixes the awards according
to the nature of death or injury, which are far lower
4than those under the Convention. The Civil Aviation
1
Davis, op.cit.,pp.580-3•2
N.S.W.: 
Vic. :
Q 1 Id. :
S . A . :
W . A . :
Tas. :
A.C.T.: 
3
Compensation to Relatives Act, 1897-1953. 
Wrongs Act, 1958 (Part III).
Common Law Practice Acts, 1867-1940, s.12 ff.
Wrongs Act, 1936-39 j Part II.
Fatal Accidents Act, 1959»
Fatal Accidents Act, 1934, as amended in 1943. 
Comp. (Fatal In j .) "ord., 1938.
Cf. Chapter VIII, ante. 
4
For example, under the Workmen1s Compensation Ordinance 
(A.C.T.), where the death of the workman results from the 
injury and if the workman leaves any dependants wholly 
dependent upon his earnings, the amount of compensation is 
£A3,000 and, in addition, an amount of £A100 in respect of 
each such child (under the age of 16) (First Schedule).
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•jAct, 1949, of the United Kingdom sets out provisions 
concerning limitation of liability for surface damage, by 
which the owner *s liability to pay damages by reason of 
the loss or damage is limited in accordance with the 
provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Act, the limits 
of liability varying according to the description of 
aircraft; but the provision has not yet been brought in 
force.
(2) Security for Operators* Liability:
International Flights: (i) ’Rome’ Flights: The
insurance system to secure operators’ liability in the
international sphere traces back to the 1933 Rome
Convention and 1938 Brussels Protocol, but, for the
present purposes, it will be enough to examine the relevant
provisions of the 1952 Rome Convention. The system of
liability would be worth little if an operator turns out
2to be insolvent, and therefore those provisions relating 
to insurance &c. are ’an essential adjunct to the strict 
liability philosophy underlying the Convention’. The
1
Sec.42.
2
Rinck, op.cit., p.4l3. 
3
Poulton, op.cit., P.31
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outline of the security system under the Rome Convention 
is as follows:
(Financial Responsibility of the Insurer). Any
contracting State may require that the operator of an
aircraft registered in another contracting State be
insured in respect of his liability for damage by means
of insurance up to the limits prescribed by the Convention.
Insurance is to be accepted as satisfactory if it conforms
to the provisions of the Convention and if it has been
effected by an insurer (including a group of insurers)
authorized to effect such insurance under the laws of the
State where the aircraft is registered or of the State
where the insurer has his residence or principal place of
business, and whose financial responsibility has been
2verified by either of those States. The overflown
country is given safeguards against such financial
3irresponsibility on the part of foreign insurers; one of 
these safeguards is that any contracting State may refuse
1
Art.15(9)»
2
It is submitted that many States, first of all the United 
States, claimed the right to verify for themselves the 
solvency of each foreign insurance company (Rinck, op.cit., 
p.4l3, citing de Juglart, 1953 Revue G&n^rale de l'Air 
353» note 10, at 133)«
3
See Art.15«
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to accept the insurer as financially responsible if a
final judgment remains unsatisfied by payment in the
currency of that State (Art•15(2)(b )). It is said:
Another matter of great importance in relation 
to insurance is the provision of the appropriate 
currency to meet claims. Many attempts have 
been made in the past to devise some machinery 
which would guarantee that the claims of 
victims would in all cases be met in their 
national currency. The new Convention has, 
on this point, adopted a realistic approach.
It was recognized that national treasuries 
could hardly be expected, in relation to this 
particular matter of damage caused by aircraft, 
to give an unconditional assurance, in the 
convention, that the necessary currency would 
be made available. On the other hand, it is 
well known that, in practice, commercial self- 
interest, founded on the desire to obtain or 
retain insurance business, secures that, in 
fact, claims are always met. It has, therefore, 
been thought sufficient to provide that if any 
claim is not satisfied by payment in the currency 
of the State where the claim is made, the insurer 
in question may be regarded as not financially 
responsible.
By Art.27, contracting States are obligated to facilitate, 
as far as possible, payment of compensation under the 
provisions of the Convention in the currency of the State 
where the damage occurred.
(Certificate of Insurance). The State overflown may 
also require that the aircraft shall carry a certificate 
issued by the insurer certifying that insurance has been
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.H. of R. 21, p.l684.
1
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effected in accordance with, the provisions of the 
Convention, and specifying the person or persons whose 
liability is secured thereby, together with a certificate 
or endorsement issued by the 1 appropriate authority in 
the State* where the aircraft is registered or in the 
State where the insurer has his residence or principal
place of business certifying the financial responsibility
1of the insurer. The phase * appropriate authority* in 
a State includes the appropriate authority in the highest 
political subdivision thereof which regulates the conduct 
of business by the insurer (Art.15(9))« This wording was 
adopted so as to satisfy the United States objection that, 
if a certificate of verification of the insurer*s financial 
responsibility be issued by a *State* (in the sense of a 
*nation-State*), it creates problems in the federal 
structure of the United States where the authorities of
1
Any requirements in those respects must be notified to 
the Secretary General of the ICAO who shall inform each 
contracting State thereof (Art.15(8)). This certificate 
need not be carried in the aircraft if a certified copy 
has been filed with the appropriate authority designated by 
the State overflown or, if the ICAO agrees with that 
Organization, which furnishes a copy of the certificate to 
each contracting State. The State which has issued or 
endorsed a certificate must notify the termination or 
cessation, otherwise than by the expiration of its term, 
of the insurance or other security to the interested 
contracting States as soon as possible. The Convention 
prescribes several rules relating to the measures to be 
taken in the case of change of operators (Art.l6(3))«
529
the several States regulating Insurance would have to
1issue the required certificates.
(Defences of Insurer) The insurer or other person 
providing security for the liability of the operator may, 
in addition to the defences available to the operator, 
and the defence of forgery, set up only the following 
defences against claims:^
(a) that the damage occurred after the security 
ceased to be effective;
(b) that the damage occurred outside the 
territorial limits provided for by the 
security, unless flight outside of such 
limits was caused by force majeure, 
assistance justified by the circumstances, 
or an error in piloting, operation or 
navigation•
The insurer cannot avail himself of any grounds of nullity 
or any right of retroactive cancellation with regard to the 
policy underwritten, but the insurer or guarantor has a 
right of recourse against any other person.
(Other Securities) The Convention enumerates the 
following three securities other than insurance which 
must be deemed satisfactory:
(a) a cash deposit in a depository maintained
by the contracting State where the aircraft 
is registered or with a bank authorised to 
act as a depository by that State;
1
Cf. E.G. Brown, op.cit., p.433.
2
Art. 1 6( 1 ) .
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(b) a guarantee given by a bank authorised to 
do so by the contracting State where the 
aircraft is registered, and whose 
financial responsibility has been verified 
by that State;
(c) a guarantee given by the contracting State 
where the aircraft is registered, if that 
State undertakes that it will not claim 
immunity from suit in respect of that 
guarantee.
The requirements as to certificate and security amount
are the same as in the case of insurance.
The Civil Aviation (Damage by Aircraft) Act 1958 to
give effect to the Convention leaves these requirements
concerning security for operators* liability to be
carried out by the regulations to be made by the Minister
(sec.15(l))j the reasons for which were stated in the 
1Parliament:
There are a number of specific procedural and 
evidentially matters which could not be 
conveniently provided for in the bill or the 
need for which will only be determined in the 
light of experience. The regulation-making 
power expressly includes matters of this nature.
For example, Chapter III of the Convention, as 
we have seen, leaves it to each State to decide 
whether it will require foreign operators to 
insure against liability under the Convention.
If a State so decides, its insurance requirements 
must comply with principles laid down in the 
Convention. In the event of Australia requiring 
such matters a number of detailed rules will be 
necessary in relation to such matters as the
Parliamentary Debates, Vol. H. of R. 21, p.1685.
1
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carriage in aircraft of documents relating to 
insurance, the exercise of discretionary powers 
to decide whether the insurance effected is 
satisfactory or whether certificates will be 
required from appropriate authorities as to the 
financial stability of an insurer, and the form 
of documents required in connexion with insurance.
These requirements can be prescribed by the 
regulations.
(ii) * Non-Rome* Flights: The aforesaid rules of the
Convention concerning security of operators1 liability 
do apply to the damage caused by aircraft engaged in 
international flights other than those governed by the 
Rome Convention. However, the Minister is empowered to 
require operators engaged in ‘Non-Rome’ Flights to be 
adequately insured (sec.19); the Minister may, by notice 
in writing, prohibit a person from operating an aircraft 
engaged in such flights unless there is in force a 
certificate in writing issued by the Minister certifying 
that that person is insured to the satisfaction of the 
Minister against liability to an extent corresponding to 
the extent to which an operator may be required to be 
insured under Chapter III of the Convention. This power has 
never been exercised.^
1
Cf. A letter from the Assistant Crown Solicitor (Civil 
Aviation) of the Commonwealth of Australia, dated on 13 
October 1965? to the present writer. The Assistant Crown 
Solicitor points out also that the Australian authorities 
have accepted foreign airlines into Australia as being 
qualified to meet any claims for surface damage, in view 
of the fact that in practice most of well-established 
international airlines insure against their liability for 
such risks.
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Domestic Flights: Truly the rapid progress of
aviation has brought about a corresponding development
in the insurance market, and progress in aircraft
insurance is essential to the progress of civil aviation.
Various types of civil liability involved in air transport
are imposed upon the aircraft owners or operators by the
statutory provisions either of the Commonwealth or of the
States, or by common law. The Commonwealth enactments
on those civil liabilities do not provide for any control
over aviation insurance, except where in the case of
'international' ('Rome*) flights causing damage to the
third parties on the surface a regulation-making power is
given to the Minister which has not so far been exercised.
In fact, aviation insurance covering domestic flight is
governed generally by common law rules in respect of
operation, effect and performance of insurance contracts,
and partly by relevant general legislation relating to
2insurance companies. Since the Civil Aviation (Damage 
by Aircraft) Act 1958 does not extend the rules of the 
Convention to domestic flights, there is no extent and
T
See e.g. Shawcross and Beaumong, PP•538-51.
2
As to the Australian cases and statutes concerning 
insurance, see Halsbury's Laws of England, third ed., 
Australian Pilot, Vols.17-23, p.307, et seq.
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limitation of liability, so that an injured party is put
in an unsatisfactory position because while liability
of the defendant is unlimited his financial resources
1certainly are not. There is some compulsory insurance 
legislation in Australia, such as, workers' compensation 
insurance or motor vehicle (third party) insurance, but 
these are found not in a single Commonwealth statute but 
in the several States statutes. Apart from the economic 
and social problems involved, the question of introducing 
a compulsory insurance system in respect of domestic 
aviation involves constitutional problems. Sec.5 l(xiv) 
of the Commonwealth Constitution gives the Commonwealth 
Parliament power to make laws with respect to * insurance, 
other than State insurance; also State insurance extending 
beyond the limits of the State concerned1 2. As in the 
case of banking, this power extends to any form of 
insurance, covering every phase thereof, throughout the 
Commonwealth, save and except insurance carried on by a
2State Government and confined to the limits of the State. 
It has been argued that * insurance1 in sec.5 l(xiv) merely
1
McNair, op.cit., p.269.
2
Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in 
Australia, third ed., p.198.
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refers to the regulation of insurance contracts in their
ordinary sense, and does not contemplate a compulsory
levy or tax on the community for the purpose of a national
1insurance pool. However, compulsory aviation insurance
cannot in any sense be compared with ’social services’
insurance legislation, for it affects only small groups of
aircraft owners or operators and it does provide for
’insurance’ in its ordinary commercial sense. It is now
well established that sec.51 is not confined to 
2’regulation*. Moreover, with or without the aid of the 
’insurance’ power, the constitutional basis for justifying 
this kind of insurance should be sought in the inter-State 
’commerce’ power for the normalization and effective 
control of inter-State aviation in Australia. It is 
unlikely that this imposition of compulsory insurance 
system would be held to impair the freedom of inter-State 
commerce as guaranteed in sec.92 of the Constitution.
In view of the fact that there is no compulsory insurance 
system in aviation, it is not proposed to examine this
1
Cf. M.E.L. Cantor, National Insurance in its Constitutional 
Aspects, 2 A.L.J. 219» It is submitted that this question 
has been solved in effect by the introduction of paragraph 
(xxiiiA) relating to ’social services’ into sec.51 (Wynes, 
op.cit., p.199n ) .
2
Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 C.L.R.31»
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subject further; suffice it to say that the aircraft 
owners or operators voluntarily insure and ordinary law 
of insurance policies governs the rights and liabilities 
of the parties. The situation is the same in the United 
Kingdom where the limitation of liability and compulsory 
third party insurance was embodied in the Civil Aviation 
Act 19^9 (sec.42 et seq.) but has not been put into force.
3• Action against Operators
International Flights:
(i) Subjects of Action: The Convention is entirely
silent as to who can be a claimant for damages; the 
Commonwealth Act supplements on this point by providing 
that the action to enforce the liability may be brought 
by the personal representative of the deceased person or 
by one of the persons who suffered damage by reason of 
the death, but only one action shall be brought in Australia 
in respect of the death or any one person and the action, 
by whomsoever brought, shall be for the benefit of all 
persons for whose benefit the liability is enforceable who 
are resident in Australia or, not being resident in
536
Australia, express the desire to take the benefit of
1the action.
However, with respect to the person who is made
liable, the provisions of the Rome Convention are more
precise than those of the Warsaw Convention. Mention
has already been made as to the ’operator’ and
»unlawful user1. The person suffering damage may
furthermore bring a direct action against the ’insurer*
2or »guarantor* in certain cases. In the event of the
death of the person liable, an action lies against those
legally responsible for his obligations. The mutual
rights and liabilities of operators and other persons in
a plane who actually caused the damage in question - for
example, a crew member or a passenger - is left to be
3regulated by the national law concerned. The Convention 
does not apply to damage caused by military, customs or 
police aircraft, but it is recognized that it applies 
to the aircraft engaged in commercial air services
1
Sec.11(2). Cf. similar provisions in the Civil Aviation 
(Carriers* Liability) Act 1959» See also Feher v. B.C.P.A.
( 1 9 5 7 )  74 W *N * ^ 7 .2
Cf. Art.16(5)•
3The Convention expressly provides (Art.10) that such a 
right of indemnity is not inconsistent with its provisions.
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operated by a State or public entity, so that the State 
may become a subject of compensation for damage; the 
Commonwealth Act provides that in such a case the 
contracting State is deemed to have submitted to the 
jurisdiction of a Court in Australia in which an action 
was brought, but this does not authorize the issue of
1execution against the property of a contracting State.
(ii) Jurisdiction: Actions may be brought only 
before the courts of the contracting State where the damage 
occurred. The selection of the competent national 
court is left to the national laws of each State in order 
to make it easier for them to adhere to the Convention. 
However, when read together with Art.30 defining the 
* territory of a State1 as the metropolitan territory of 
a State and all territories for the foreign relations of 
which that State is responsible, it might be possible to 
sue the operator in far distant courts, even in the same 
territory. It is submitted that this situation can only 
be avoided if such a State has a national procedural 
law according to which the court in that part of the 
State where the accident happened has an exclusive
S ec.13»
1
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competence of jurisdiction. In order to make this 
* single forum1 system more effective, the Convention 
imposes upon a contracting State two procedural obligations; 
firstly, each contracting State must take all necessary 
measures to ensure that the defendant and all other 
parties interested are notified of any proceedings 
concerning them and have a fair and adequate opportunity 
to defend their interests, and secondly each contracting 
State 'so far as possible* must ensure that all actions 
arising from a single incident are consolidated for 
disposal in a single proceeding before the same court.
To meet those express obligations, the Commonwealth Act 
sets out several supplementary provisions (secs.9 & 10) 
concerning the single forum and consolidation of actions 
within its judicial system, which are also made applicable 
to international flights other than 'Rome1 flights.
There is one exception to the single forum system: 
actions may also be brought before the courts of any 
other contracting State by agreement between any one or 
more claimants and any one or more defendants, but such 
proceedings cannot have the effect of precluding in any 
way the rights of other persons who bring actions in the
1
Cf. A Toepper, Comments on Article 20 of the Rome 
Convention of 1952, 21 J.A.L.C. (1954) p.422.
539
State where the damage occurred. This provision for the
agreed jurisdiction is said to be practically worthless
if it is read together with Art.20(9) providing that the
court to which application for execution is made shall
refuse execution of any judgment rendered by a court of
a State other than that in which the damage occurred
until all the judgments rendered in that State have
1been satisfied. The parties may also agree to submit 
disputes to arbitration in any contracting State.^
(iii) Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Art.20(4)-(12) established comprehensive (but
complicated) rules for the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments in respect of surface damage caused 
by aircraft to which the Convention applies.
Where any final judgment (including a judgment by 
default) is pronounced by a competent court on which 
execution can be issued according to the procedural law 
of that court, the judgment is enforceable upon 
compliance with the formalities prescribed by the * laws
1
Toepper, op.cit., p.423.
2
As to the question whether all the parties must consent 
to the agreement for arbitration or not, Toepper thinks 
that arbitration can take place between a single party 
suffering damage and an operator (Toepper, op.cit., 
p.424)•
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of the contracting State, or of any territory, State 
or province thereof1 (the phrasing having been adopted 
apparently for the purpose of some federal countries), 
where execution is applied for;
(a) in the contracting State where the judgment 
debtor has his residence or principal place 
of business, or
(b) if the assets available in that State and
in the State where the judgment was pronounced 
are insufficient to satisfy the judgment, in 
any other contracting State where the 
judgment debtor has assets,^
Then, the foreign judgment must be enforced unless,
broadly speaking,one of the following five exceptions is
proved;
(a) if the defendant was not given a fair 
opportunity to defend his interests,
(b) if there was a final and conclusive 
judgment in respect of the same cause of 
action,
(c) if the judgment has been obtained by 
fraud,
(d) if the foreign judgment is contrary to the 
public policy of the other State, or,
(e) if the right to enforce judgment is not 
vested in the person by whom the application 
for execution is made.
1
Art.20(4). This paragraph gives an order of priority in 
which execution can be levied, so that the plaintiff is 
not allowed to levy execution immediately on the 
defendants assets anywhere. An application for execution 
of a judgment must be made within 5 years from the date 
when such judgment became final (Art.20(12)). The merits 
of the case may not be reopened in proceedings for 
execution of a judgment (Art.20(6)).
If the execution of any judgment is refused on any of 
the grounds (a), (b) or (d), the claimant is entitled to
bring a new action before the courts of the State where 
execution has been refused, in which case the new judgment 
may not increase the total compensation above the limits 
of liability under the Convention and the previous 
judgment shall be a defense to the extent to which it has 
been satisfied. At the same time, the previous judgment 
ceases to be enforceable. The Convention provides 
further for other procedural matters, including payment 
of costs, and relation of costs to the quantum of 
j udgments.
In order to carry out or give effect to this 
international obligation, various arrangements of the 
judicial system within the Commonwealth are necessary; 
for example, specification of competent courts in Australia, 
procedure, domestic jurisdictional problems (i.e., 
conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court, 
investing any Court of a State with federal jurisdiction, 
or conferring jurisdiction on a court of a Territory of 
the Commonwealth), registration system for judgments, 
competence of the Court to refuse registration of the 
judgment upon certain grounds prescribed by the Convention, 
and prevention of the use of actions or proceedings as a
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means of evading the limitations (provided by the 
Convention) on rights of execution of the judgments.
A regulation-making power is specifically granted to the 
Minister for such matters arising from Art.20 of the 
Convention.
These provisions are only applicable to damage caused 
by aircraft to which the Rome Convention applies, not to 
other types of aircraft engaged in international flights.
(iv) Procedure: The limitation of action is two years 
from the date of the incident which caused the damage. 
However, if a claimant has not brought an action to 
enforce his claim or if notification of such claim has 
not been given to the operator within a period of six 
months from the date of the incident, the claimant is 
only entitled to compensation out of the amount for which 
the operator remains liable after all claims made within 
that period have been met in full. The grounds for 
suspension or interruption of such period is to be 
determined by the law of the court trying the action; in 
any case the right to institute an action is to be 
extinguished on the expiration of three years from the 
date of the incident which caused the damage. By the 
Commonwealth Act, those provisions concerning procedural 
matters are made applicable to damage caused by Australian
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aircraft engaged in its international flight within 
Australian territory, but not to damage caused by aircraft 
of non-contracting State so engaged.
Domestic Flights
(i) Subjects of Action: The State Damage by Aircraft 
Acts are silent as to who can be a claimant for damages, 
and, therefore, as in other States having no legislation, 
common law rules of action modified by enactments similar
to Lord Campbell*s Act would be applicable in the case
1of death of the person; by this legislation, action is 
maintenable against any person causing death through 
wrongful act, neglect, or default, notwithstanding the 
death of the person injured. Mention has already been 
made elsewhere of the persons made liable under the State 
Damage by Aircraft Acts and under the common law rules.
(ii) Jurisdiction: The conflict-of-law rule 
governing torts is the law of the place where the injury 
occurred, namely, the law of the State where the aircraft 
was flying over. An action will normally be brought before
1
N.S.W.
Vic.
Q5 Id.
S .A. 
W.A. 
Tas.
A.C.T.
Law Reform (M.P.) Act 1944;
Admin. & Prob. Act, 1958, sec.29;
Common Law Practice Amend. Act, 1940; 
Survival of Actions Act, 1940;
Law Reform (M.P.) Act, 1941;
Adm. & Probate Act, 1935-47, s.27j
Law Reform (m >P.)"Ordinance, 1955, Part II.
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the courts of the State where the plaintiff suffering 
damage lives or his property situates. Although there 
are numerous advantages in the single forum system on 
the inter-State level, this can hardly be attained by the 
Commonwealth legislative intervention unless the broadest 
concept of the 1 incidental* power of the federal ’commerce* 
power were relied upon. But, with respect to actions 
arising from the international flights other than ’Rome* 
flights, which are quite independent of the obligations 
imposed upon by the Convention, the Commonwealth applying 
its own rules of liabilities, &c., has relied upon the 
’commerce* power for attaining the single forum and 
consolidation of actions. Apart from the exercise of the 
commerce power, the Commonwealth Parliament may be able 
to designate a law of a particular State for the settlement 
of claims for damages under the *full faith and credit* 
powers, in respect of the damage caused not only by 
inter-State aircraft but also by intra-State aircraft, if 
the claim relates to any conflict-of—law elements within 
the Federation. But it is assumed that the commerce 
power can attain the uniformity of applicable principles 
and rules in this legal field under the Commonwealth 
legislation, at least insofar as the damage caused by 
inter-State flights is concerned.
(iii) Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
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Judgments: With respect to damage caused by ’non-Rome1 
flights and purely domestic flights, ordinary rules of 
conflict-of-law govern the recognition and enforcement 
of other States’ judgments. However, the matter is
largely affected with by the Commonwealth, Service and
1Execution of Process Act and State and Territorial Laws 
and Records Recognition Act.~ Sec.3(h) of the latter Act 
defines ’judgment’ as including ’any judgment, decree, 
rule or order given or made by a Court in any suit 
whereby any sum of money is made payable or any person 
is required to do or not to do any act or thing other 
than the payment of money*. By sec.2l(2), the judgment, 
after registration required by the Act, has the force and 
effect of a judgment of the court in which it is so 
registered. There is no provision excluding a judgment 
not final from the scope of the Act, but the American 
pattern of judicial experiences will be followed - that 
is, judgments of a penal nature or not final are 
generally regarded as exceptions to the operation of the 
full faith and credit requirement, whereas judgments on
_
No.5 of 1901.
No. 11 of 1901 .
2
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taxation liability or not for a sum of money are not
1exceptions thereto. As regards judgments obtained by 
fraud, it is submitted that when the decree could be 
made the subject of an attack in collateral proceedings 
in the home State, on the score of fraud, such fraud could 
be set up as a defence in the proceedings in the second 
State as were it otherwise, the home State judgment would 
be given greater credit than it would possess at home.  ^
However, while the American decisions show that full 
faith and credit has not been regarded as precluding an
inquiry into jurisdiction and jurisdictional facts, the
3Harris Case has expounded the Australian rule that, in 
the absence of such a constitutional restriction as the 
due process clause, a judgment having a final and 
conclusive force in the original State should be recognized 
and cannot be challenged in other States on the ground 
that it had been pronounced without jurisdiction, if 
that challenge was no longer open in the State of origin.
1
Cf. E.I. Sykes, Full Faith and Credit - Further Reflections, 
Res Judicatae, 1954, Vol.6, p.354, et seq.
2
Sykes op.cit., p.356, citing Levin v, Gladstein, 1906,
142 N.C. 482.
3
Harris v. Harris (1947) V.L.R. 44.
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This interpretation is derived from a rather literal
approach to sec.18 of the State and Territorial Laws and
Records Recognition Act which provides:
All public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of any State or Territory, if 
proved or authenticated as required by 
this Act, shall have such faith and credit 
given to them in every Court and public 
office as they have by law or usage in the 
Courts and public offices of the State or 
Territory from whence they are taken.
The most difficult problem will be the recognition and
enforcement of judgments contrary to public policy of the
forum, but, as we have already seen in Chapter V dealing
with the scope of the constitutional power of full faith
and credit within the Commonwealth, it is to be determined
ultimately by weighing the relative interests of the two
disputing States, a final arbiter being the High Court;
the Commonwealth Parliament can be a policy-maker in
fixing the measures for such considerations. Another
difficult problem will be the procedural requirements
as to the service of process and enforcement of judgments,
which are reserved by the States. The Service and
Execution of Process Act gives a power to make rules of
court to carry into effect the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act.^ This rule-making power is vested in
1
But sec. 27(2) of the Act provides: ‘Until such rules have
been made and as far as any made do not provide for the 
circumstances of any particular case, the practice and
(cont. next page)
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the Supreme Court of each State or such of the judges
as may make rules of court in other cases.’*' Some such
2doubts based on Le Mesurier v« Conner exist as to the 
constitutionality of federal interference with State 
power to make rules of court, but the matter relates 
to the nature and scope of * 1 incidental1 powers of the 
Commonwealth powers. There is room for sec.109 of the 
Constitution to operate where the procedural rules and 
requirements made by the forum impose such burdens as to 
nullify the objectives of federal regulation of the 
recognition and enforcement of the judgments of sister- 
States.
In short, the rules of the Rome Convention concerning 
this topic are not incompatible with the Australian 
constitutional and judicial system, if similar rules were 
adopted in the sphere of domestic flights. Owing to the 
comprehensive powers of the Commonwealth power based upon 
the full faith and credit clause, a more speedy and fair 
trial of suits for ground damage caused by aircraft can
1 ( cont•)
procedure of the State in which the process is issued or 
in which the service is effected or the execution is 
enforced respectively shall apply as far as possible*.
1
Part V of the Act.
(1929) 42 C.L.R. 481.
2
5^ 9
be provided by the effective control of the Commonwealth 
within Australia than under the Convention in which 
national sovereignty is apt to be claimed in retaining 
the public policy or procedural laws concerning 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
(iv) Procedure; At present, there is no legislative 
provision concerning procedural matters in suing the 
aircraft operator for his liability for surface damage. 
These matters are entirely subject to the judicial 
proceedings of the States and of the Territories, 
respectively. An action arising from the Wrongs Act is 
subject to a fixed time of commencement."*'
To sum up:
(l) In this modern age of aviation when aircraft fly 
often across many States* borders in a short time, it is 
against one *s sense of justice if damage relations between 
aviators (owners or operators of aircraft) and persons 
(or property) on the ground be regulated by different 
principles and rules of liability under various national 
jurisdictions. Unlike the Warsaw Convention, the Rome 
Convention has not received wide support, but the need 
for the uniformity of relevant rules is important in this
1
E.g., under the Wrongs Act (South Australia), the time 
limit is one year (sec.2l).
i_
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field no less than in international carriage by air.
The present Australian legislation on this subject is 
lacking both in the uniformity of the law of several 
jurisdictions and in the consolidation of relevant rules 
in legislation. The applicable rules differ in accordance 
with whether the aircraft was at the very moment of an 
accident engaged in international flights (divided further 
into two categories - ’Rome' and 'non-Rome' flights) or 
in inter-State or intra-State flights. They also differ 
in accordance with which Australian State's territory the 
aircraft was then flying over. This unreasonableness is 
further aggravated by the fact that third parties on the 
surface who are involved in the accident against their 
will, must in some cases or places establish negligence 
of an operator but in other cases need not prove 
negligence; plaintiffs may or may not be compelled to 
insure, and so on. Whether and how far the law should be 
made uniform in this field would depend upon careful 
examination of economic and social factors in the 
Australian aviation industry, but, from the legal points 
of view, some remarks can be drawn from the foregoing 
discussions on the main provisions and problems of the 
law with respect to the extent of the Commonwealth 
legislative powers of attaining such uniformity and the
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possible impacts of the rules of the Convention upon the 
domestic legal system.
(2) The wide scope of the Commonwealth 'commerce1 
power in respect of this field needs no repetition in 
order to deny the presumption that the States should retain 
power to regulate the legal relations of liability for 
surface damage as between aircraft owners or operators 
and third parties resident in the respective territories 
of the States. The power to perform the investigation of 
accidents and incidents and the other powers relating to 
safety of aircraft operations are exclusively vested in 
the Commonwealth authority. Collecting evidence of the 
causes of accidents and incidents is a function of the 
Commonwealth aviation administration, and various 
administrative procedures have been established for these 
purposes under Commonwealth supervision.'*' Aided by such 
functions and technical knowledges in dealing with the 
subject, the Commonwealth is in a better position to 
determine what are the most suitable rules and policies 
for liability problems. This suggests that the Commonwealth 
should be empowered to deal with damage cases involving 
every aircraft including even aircraft solely engaged in 
intra-State operations.
Regs. 270-97» See also Appendix II, post.
1
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(3) The introduction of absolute liability on Rome 
Convention principles would not cause serious impacts 
upon the present Australian legal system, where similar 
statutory rules are embodied in four jurisdictions and 
some justifications are provided in common law analogies. 
However, the exception to the principle whereby the 
operator is given complete immunity from claims to 
compensation for the damage resulting from the mere fact 
of passage of aircraft through the airspace in conformity 
with existing air traffic regulations is, as we have 
seen, contrary to the State and Territory law in the two 
States and Territories which have not adopted a statutory 
’right to fly1 provision, and is not completely in accord 
with the law of the four States which have the ’Damage 
by Aircraft Act’ type of provision. It is possible that 
nevertheless the Commonwealth could supersede all these 
State provisions, at least in the field of interstate 
flight, by suitable legislation. But there seems little 
likelihood of its doing so and in any event the more 
extensive liability for damage under the four State Acts 
may be more in accord with Australian sentiment in these 
matters. The most serious problems can be solved by the 
adequate regulation of air traffic around aerodromes, by 
the proper selection of new aerodrome sites, or by just
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compensation for the acquisition of easements of flight 
around such aerodromes#
(4) In establishing uniform liability principle, a 
difficulty will probably arise from the law of New South 
Wales which has not adopted the apportionment of loss or 
damages in contributory negligence. It might be contended 
that the Commonwealth could at most lay down a rule that 
the Court may, in accordance with the law of the State, 
exonerate the operator (or the owner) wholly or partly 
from his liability. The possibility of attaining 
uniformity on this point depends upon the scope of 
Commonwealth incidental legislative powers. It is worthy 
of note that New South Wales seems to be prepared to 
adopt apportionment rules in respect of the carriers* 
liability for passengers and goods, keeping in step with 
other States in that respect.
(5) Various arguments may be put forward as to 
whether the principle of limited liability should be 
introduced in this field of domestic law. It will be 
noted, however, that the liability of the Australian 
National Airlines Commission has been in fact limited for 
the past twenty years for the death or injury compensation 
arising from its domestic activities. An account should 
also be taken as to whether the rule of limited liability
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should be based on the weight of aircraft or on the 
single-limit system in which ceilings are fixed in 
accordance with the nature of accidents.'*' The limits 
should be fixed as high as possible; it is submitted 
that since there has been a steady decrease of accident 
rates in aviation, higher limits will not greatly affect 
the premiums for insurance against third party risks.2
(6) A system of limited liability for both commercial
and private planes, coupled with compulsory liability
insurance to be established by federal legislation, was
considered to be 1 the most feasible and desirable solution
of the aviation liability problem and would be in the best
3interest of aviation and the general public1. From the 
viewpoint of constitutional law, the Commonwealth could 
certainly provide for a compulsory insurance system to the 
extent of the interstate commerce power, and might be able 
to go further under the insurance power.
1
It is said that under the weight system there is not 
necessarily a proportion-relation between the !weight * of 
aircraft and the 1 gravity* of accident, nor between the 
* weight* of aircraft and the compensation capacity of the 
aircraft owners (because several aircraft with different 
weights might be possessed by one company or person) - 
cf. Ikeda, op.cit., p.185*
2
Rinck, op.cit., p.409»
3
The so-called Sweeney Report, the 1941 proposal for a 
federal aviation liability act, cited from Billyou, Air 
Law, p.223*
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(7) With, respect to jurisdiction of actions and 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the 
Australian legislation need not necessarily follow the 
rules of the Rome Convention, Relying upon secs•77(iii)j 
5l(xxiv) and (xxv) and 118 of the Constitution, some 
fruitful developments can be provided in federal aviation 
legislation on this subject.
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CHAPTER X
Aircraft Crimes
The question as to which State should exercise 
jurisdiction over criminal offences committed on board 
an aircraft involves the broader subject of choice of 
law. The problem is so complicated and gives rise to so 
many views because aircraft pass at high speed over many 
States, each of which has under the present international 
law complete and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace 
above its territory. While a general rule may be that 
acts which are criminal under the law of a State are only 
criminal if done within the State, the territoriality of 
criminal law is not an absolute principle of international 
law and by no means coincides with territorial sovereignty, 
because all or nearly all systems of law extend their 
action to offences committed outside the territory of the 
State, in ways which vary from State to State.^ There is
1
See, S.S. Lotus Case (1927) Permanent Court of 
International Justice, (P.C.I.J.), Series A, No.10, p.20; 
Edward Hambro, The Case Law of the International Court, 
1952, p.85; for a brief summary of this case and judgment, 
see Lauterpacht, Oppenheim1s International Law, seventh 
ed., vol.l, pp.300-02.
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much argument about sec.62(l) of the U.K. Civil Aviation 
Act, 1 9 4 9 ?^ which provides that 1 any offence committed on 
a British aircraft shall, for the purpose of conferring 
jurisdiction, be deemed to have been committed in any 
place where the offender may for the time being be1.
McNair takes the wider view that, notwithstanding the 
narrow wording of the section, a court would apply English 
criminal law to crimes committed in aircraft as 
contemplated by the section in all respects as though the 
offence had been committed in England.^ Upon this view, 
the effect of the section is not limited to question of 
venue but is to render amenable to trial, wherever in 
the United Kingdom the offender may be, any person, whether 
British, foreign or stateless, who commits any offence 
on board an aircraft registered in the United Kingdom, or 
contravenes any of the relevant statutory provisions on 
civil aviation. This is not only to assert a total 
application of 'jurisdiction1 but also application of the
law of flag in the choice of applicable laws. In R. v.
3Martin, however, an English court construed the section 
1
12, 13 and 14 Geo. VI, c .6 7 •
2
McNair, op.cit., p.121. This position is maintained in 
the third edition of the same book.
3
(1 9 5 6 ) 2 W.L.R. 975; 1 9 5 6  U.S. Av. Rep. l4l; (1956)
2 Q.B. 272; (1956). All E.R. 8 6 .
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strictly, and held that the section did not apply to a
statutory offence (i.e., in this case, a conspiracy to
contravene the provision of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1951>
and the Dangerous Drugs Regulations, 1953) which was
local and not universal in character. The Court, however,
said that it did not follow that the same principle
necessarily applied to common law crimes which were
offences against the moral law (e.g., murder and theft),
and were not thought of as having a territorial limit.^
2ln R« V« Naylor, where the accused on a British aircraft 
in flight over the high seas stole three rings, it was 
argued that that was not an offence known to English law 
for which the accused could be tried in England. The 
Court followed McNair1s wider approach, saying that any 
act or omission which would constitute an offence if done 
in England is made an offence if done on a British 
aircraft, subject to this, that if the offence in question 
is clearly one of domestic application only, then, as in 
Martin1s Case, section 62 does not apply.
The Legal Committee of I.C.A.O. prepared a draft 
convention at Rome in 1962, which related to the 
jurisdiction of states to deal with such offences and also
1
See also Note, 72 Law Quarterly Review 318 (1956), by 
Prof A. Goodhart.
2
(1961) 3 W.L.R. 898; 1962 U.S. Av. Rep. 306.
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the powers of the aircraft commander to deal with persons
who committed offences during international flights or
acted or threatened to act in a manner which would
jeopardize the safety of the aircraft. An international
diplomatic conference convened by I.C.A.O. in Tokyo
adopted this ‘Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft’ on l4 September 1963; the
Convention is generally known as the Tokyo Convention.
Twelve ratifications are needed to bring the Convention
into force,^ but there has been so far only one ratification,
by Portugal. Hence, the matter is still largely governed
by the national laws which vary from State to State. In
these circumstances, it is intended here only to point out
the main provisions and objects of the Convention.
With respect to the question of ‘jurisdiction’, the
State of registration of the aircraft is competent to
exercise jurisdiction over offences and acts committed
on board; each contracting State is obligated to take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction
2as the State of registration. However, the Convention 
does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
1
Art.21.
Art.3(1) and (2).
2
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accordance with national law, even perhaps that of a 
non-contracting State, but special obligations are imposed 
upon contracting States under Art.4. Art.k provides that 
other contracting States (than a contracting State in 
which the aircraft is registered) may not interfere with 
an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over an offence committed on board except in 
the following cases
the offence has effect on the territory of 
such State;
the offence has been committed by or 
against a national or permanent resident 
of such State;
the offence is against the security of 
such State;
the offence consists of a breach of any 
rules or regulations relating to the 
flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in 
force in such State;
the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary 
to ensure the observance of any obligation 
of such State under a multilateral 
international agreement.
By Art.l6, offences committed on aircraft registered in a
contracting State are treated for the purpose of extradition,
as if they had been committed not only in the place in
which they have occurred but also in the territory of
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Art.3(3)•
1
the State of registration of the aircraft; hence, if the 
offender be or has taken refuge in a country which is 
party to the Convention and which is also a party to an 
extradition treaty with the country of registration, 
under which the offence or act in question is an extradition 
crime, the offender can be duly extradited."*' So the 
Convention renders it unlikely that there will be no 
State legally competent and ready to apprehend and try 
the offender, and also removes certain technical 
impediments relating to prosecution or extradition. These 
provisions apply in respect of offences committed or acts
done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a
* 2contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or
on the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside 
the territory of any State.
With respect to powers of the aircraft commander,
Art.6 provides that the aircraft commander may impose 
upon offenders reasonable measures including restraint 
which are necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft,
1
Cf. International Legal Notes, 39 A.L.J. pp.33“3^> by 
J.G . St arke.
2
For the purposes of the Convention, an aircraft is 
considered to be in flight from the moment when power is 
applied for the purpose of take-off until the moment when 
the landing run ends (Art.l(3)).
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or of persons or property therein, or to maintain good
order and discipline on board, or to enable him to deliver
such person to competent authorities or to disembark him
in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. By
Art.6(2), the assistance of the crew or passengers may
be obtained for 'the restraint of the offender, and in
certain cases a crew member of passenger may take action
which is immediately necessary for the safety of the
aircraft, or persons or property abroad. The Convention
provides further for the continuance of such measures of
restraint (art.7)> disembarkation of offenders in the
territory of any State in which the aircraft lands (Art.8),
delivery of offenders to the competent authorities of any
contracting State in the territory of which the aircraft
lands (Art.9)> protection of the aircraft commander, crew,
and passengers from any proceedings arising out of action
taken by them under the Convention (Art.lO). These
provisions do not apply to offences and acts committed
or about to be committed by a person on board an aircraft 
1in flight in the airspace of the State of registration 
1
Notwithstanding Art.l(3)> an aircraft is considered to 
be in flight at any time from the moment when all its 
external doors are closed following embarkation until the 
moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation.
In the case of a forced landing, the provisions of Chapter 
III continue to apply with respect to offences and acts 
committed on board until competent authorities of a State 
take over responsibility for the aircraft and for the 
persons and property on board (Art.5(2)).
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or over the high seas or any other area outside the 
territory of any State unless the last point of take-off 
or the next point of intended landing is situated in a 
State other than that of registration, or the aircraft 
subsequently flies in the airspace of a State other than 
that of registration with such person still on board.
The Convention deals with the 1 hijacking1 of aircraft 
(Art.ll): When a person on board has unlawfully committed 
by force or threat thereof an act of inteiference, seizure 
or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in 
flight or when such an act is about to be committed, 
contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to 
restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or 
to preserve his control of the aircraft; the contracting 
State in which such aircraft lands shall permit its 
passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as 
practicable, and shall return the ahcraft and its cargo 
to the persons lawfully entitled to possession. The 
Convention provides also for powers and duties of States 
for procedural problems, such as disembarkation or delivery 
of offenders, etc. It is worthy of note that, if 
contracting States establish joint air transport operating 
organizations or international operating agencies, which 
operate aircraft not registered in any one State, those 
States shall, according to the circumstances of the case,
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designate the State among them which, for the purposes
of the Convention, shall be considered as the State of
registration.^ The Convention does not apply to aircraft
2used in military, customs and police services.
Although Australia attended the Tokyo Conference, it 
has not signed nor ratified the Convention. However, the
OCommonwealth passed the Crimes (Aircraft) Act 1963 dealing 
with the subject immediately after the Tokyo Conference.
The Commonwealth Act deals in Part II with crimes on board 
aircraft and in Part III with crimes affecting the aircraft 
themselves. As with most of the Commonwealth civil aviation 
legislation, the scope of the Act is limited to aircraft 
engaged in the flights within federal jurisdiction; that 
is to say, the Act does not apply to aircraft which are 
in wholly and exclusively intra-State flights. Some 
complementary legislation by States will be necessary for 
the regulations of aircraft engaged in such flights. 
Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia have already 
passed legislation to create offences closely related to
1
Art.18.
2
Art.l(4).
No.64 of 1963.3
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those created under the Commonwealth Act.1 2 However, the 
terms and conditions under the States1 legislation amending 
their own criminal codes differ from State to State and 
are by no means identical with those under the Commonwealth 
Ac t.
Part II relating to crimes on board aircraft applies 
to any aircraft (including a foreign aircraft) that -
(a) is engaged in a flight between two States 
in the course of trade and commerce with 
other countries or among the States;
(b) is engaged in a flight within a Territory, 
between two Territories or between a State 
and a Territory;
(c) is outside Australia while engaged in a 
flight that commenced in Australia; or
(d) is engaged in a flight between a part of 
Australia and a country or place outside 
Australia.
The Part also applies to -
2(a) an Australian aircraft that is engaged in 
a flight wholly out of Australia; and
(b) a Commonwealth aircraft or a defence 
aircraft that is engaged in any flight, 
including a flight wholly out of 
Australia.
1
Vic.: Crimes (Aircraft) Act, 1963 (N0.7O88). Q ’ld.: 
Criminal Code Amendment Act 1964 (No.l4). W.A.: Criminal 
Code Amendment Act, 1964 (Nh.53)•
2
’Australian aircraft1 means - (a) an aircraft registered 
or required to be registered in accordance with the Air 
Navigation Regulations as an Australian aircraft, (b") a 
Commonwealth aircraft, or (c) a defence aircraft (sec*3(l))*
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Sec.7 establishes the principle that any act, which would
be an offence against the laws of the Australian Capital
Territory^- if it took place there, is an offence against
the Act if committed on board an aircraft to which the Act
applies. It should be noted, however, that conduct
affected by the Act can be a crime both under the
Commonwealth Act and under the Acts and Ordinances of the
various States or Territories. Its legislative intention
was explained in the Parliament:^
The basic principle of law is that where an 
aircraft is flying above the territory of any 
particular country the law applicable to events 
occurring on board is the law in that country, 
that is, in the country immediately below the 
aircraft at the time. So that if one passenger 
in an aircraft assaults another whilst the 
aircraft is flying, for example, above Victoria, 
he is guilty of an offence against the laws of 
that State dealing with assaults: and this is
so regardless of the nationality of the aircraft.
That position remains the same even though the 
aircraft simply flies over Victoria without, 
on that particular flight, either landing or 
taking off in Victoria. This bill does not 
attempt to alter that position. The powers 
above their respective territories will 
remain unaffected.
1
The A.C.T. law consists of (a) laws of the Commonwealth in 
force in that Territory, (b) the Crimes Act, 1900 of the 
State of New South Wales, in its application to that 
Territory under the Seat of Government Acceptance Act 
1909-38, s.6., as amended or affected by Ordinances from 
time to time in force in that Territory, (c) the Police 
Offences Ordinance 1930-61 of that Territory, as amended 
from time to time.
2
Parliamentary Debates, Vol.H of R. 391 1963j at p.97j by 
Sir Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs and 
Attorney-General •
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The Commonwealth Government described it as a policy 
decision1 to allow State offences to run in duality with 
Commonwealth offences, while it maintains the views that 
the Commonwealth, if wished, could have by this legislation 
over-ridden State legislation insofar as State legislation 
relates to a flight within the federal jurisdiction. By 
sec.21, prosecutions of an offence against the Act shall 
not be instituted except with the consent in writing of 
the Attorney-General or a person authorized by the 
Attorney-General, by writing under his hand, to give such 
consents. Hence, if the Commonwealth does not elect to 
prosecute in a case, the State concerned may do so. This 
is evidenced further by sec.28 prohibiting the double 
conviction for the same act or omission: the section
provides that where an act or omission of a' person is 
both an offence against this Act and an offence under the 
law of a State or Territory and that person is convicted 
of either of those offences, he is not liable to be 
convicted of the other of those offences.
Perhaps, the only aviation case involving a conflict 
between Federal and State criminal law is an American 
case, Grace v. MacArthur, where the question before the
1
United States District Court, Eastern District of Arkansas 
(1959) 170 F.Supp. 442.
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court was whether, for the purpose of service of summons,
the defendant passenger on a commercial aircraft was
within the territorial limits of the State of Arkansas
over which the plane happened to be flying at a particular
time. Having referred to a leading case of Smith v. New
1 2England Aircraft Co.} Inc., and others which established 
the principle that the sovereign power and jurisdiction of 
a State was not confined to the ground but extended to an 
aircraft in the air flying over the territory of the State, 
the Court concluded that at the time the Marshall served 
the summons on the defendant, the plane and its passengers 
were within the 1 2territorial limits1 of the State of 
Arkansas, so that the defendants motion to quash service 
of summons upon him was denied. In doing so, the Court 
relied upon the Uniform Aeronautics Act, a version of 
which had been adopted by Arkansas, providing that all 
crime s, torts, and other wrongs committed by or against 
a pilot of passengers while in flight over the lands and 
waters of the State shall be governed by its laws, and 
that the question of whether damage occasioned by or
1
(1930) 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 389; (1930) U.S. Av.
Rep. 1.
2
E.g., State v. Northwest Airlines, 213 Minn. 395, 7 N •U . 
2d 69I; Erickson v. King, 218 Minn, 98* 15 N*W. 2d 201,
204; People v. Katz, l40 Misc. 46, 249 N.Y.S. 7195 United 
States v. One Pitcairn Biplane, D.C.N.Y., 11 F. Supp. 24,
25
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to an aircraft while over this State constitutes a tort,
crime or other wrong shall be governed by Arkansas law.1
According to the Court's opinion, it did not follow from
Congressional declarations of national sovereignty over
the navigable airspace of the United States, or from
Congressional regulation of air traffic, that the States
had been denuded of all of their sovereignty and
jurisdiction with respect to such airspace or that the
same had been excluded from their boundaries or limits.
No particular explanation will be necessary here for these
points, but the important points are, first, that the
State jurisdiction over crimes, etc., is valid only where
it does not conflict with controlling federal legislation,
and secondly that aircraft fly over the territory of a
State with tremendous speed and height at a particular
time. The Court mentioned the latter point:
It cannot seriously be contended that a person 
moving interstate commerce is on that account 
exempt from service of process while in transit, 
and we think it makes no practical difference 
whether he is travelling at the time on a plane, 
or on a bus or train, or in his own car. True, 
if he is going by plane the duration of his 
presence in the State will probably be much 
shorter than if he were availing himself of some 
other means of transportation, but that is a 
difference of degree only, not of principle.
Ark. Stats., Section 7^-101 et seq.
1
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It may be conceded, perhaps, that a time 
may come, and may not be far distant, when 
commercial aircraft will fly at altitudes so 
high that it would be unrealistic to consider 
them as being within the territorial limits 
of the United States or of any particular 
State while flying at such altitudes. But no 
such situation is here presented. Me have an 
ordinary commercial aircraft, flying on an 
ordinary commercial flight in the ordinary 
navigable and navigated airspace of 1958»*»*
Similar attitudes will quite likely be taken by the
Australian courts in pin-pointing the location of an
aircraft flying in the air at a particular time, but we
are more concerned with the former question as to whether
the Commonwealth can deny, or cover the field of, State
legislation or jurisdiction on aircraft crimes under its
legislative powers. Although the Commonwealth has no
express power of legislation with respect to criminal law
and procedure as such, the Commonwealth may, in the
exercise of the incidental power, enact penal provisions
designed to secure effective operation of valid legisiation.^
This must be qualified in the point that there is no
reason why the actual existence of some legislation
relating to a subject should be required before any matter
2can be called incidental to its execution. The Commonwealth
1
Wynes, op.cit., p.167.
2
See Chapter V, ant e
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Crimes (Aircraft) Act has been enacted under various 
legislative heads in respect of foreign and inter-State 
commerce by air, Territorial aviation, etc., as aided by 
their incidental powers. That this Commonwealth legislation 
is squarely incidental, and important, to carry into 
execution these aviation powers is beyond doubts. As we 
have already seen, it can intrude into what is prima facie 
the province of the State constitutional powers, such as 
criminal jurisdiction of States; hence, it can specify 
an applicable law for an offence committed on an aircraft 
engaged in flights within the federal jurisdiction.^
However, as stated before, the Commonwealth legislation 
allows State offences to run in duality with Commonwealth 
offences; perhaps, the Act is primarily intended to be 
administered so as to deal with crimes that may be committed 
in international flights or in such circumstances that it 
is difficult to determine exactly where the acts 
constituting an offence were committed, such as, when the 
aircraft is at the time close to a border between two 
States.
In relation to certain aircraft flying outside 
Australia, the Act gives extra-territorial effect to
I
Similar results may be attained by the exercise of the 
* full faith and credit1 power (sec.5l(xxv)) of the 
Constitution, but here we do not develop the problem further.
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Australian law in respect of aircraft registered in 
Australia, even if the law of some other country is, by 
virtue of the aircraft’s presence in or over that country, 
also in force on board the aircraft. Australian law 
applies on board foreign aircraft while they are within 
Australia, but the Act goes further and applies Australian 
law to them while they are outside Australia when their 
flights begin or end in Australia.^ The questions which 
offences are indictable and what are alternative verdicts 
are also governed in accordance with the law of A.C.T. 
(secs. 8 and 9)•
Part III relating to crimes affecting aircraft 
themselves applies to -
(a) an Australian aircraft (other than a
Commonwealth aircraft or a defence aircraft) 
that is used principally for the purpose of 
prescribed flights, or is engaged, or is 
intended or likely to be engaged, in a 
prescribed flight;
1
In the case of flights beginning in Australia, if there is 
any doubt which law is to be applied (e.g., aircraft over 
the high seas), if no other law is applicable or if the 
authorities administering another applicable law are not 
willing or feel themselves unable to enforce it, there 
should be an Australian law ready to be applied. In the 
case of flights ending in Australia, a person who commits 
an offence whilst on board the aircraft might very well 
need to be dealt with in Australia, in the first instance 
at any rate, and legal provisions to enable this to be 
done are needed (Parliamentary Debates, op.cit., at p.98).
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(b) a Commonwealth, aircraft;
(c) a defence aircraft; and
(d) a foreign aircraft that is in Australia, 
or is outside Australia while engaged in 
flight that commenced in Australia or 
was, at its commencement, intended to end 
in Australia.
'Prescribed flight* means a flight -
(a) between two States, in the course of 
trade and commerce with other countries 
or among the States;
(b) within a Territory, between two Territories 
or between a State and a Territory;
(c) between a part of Australia and a country 
or place outside Australia; or
(d) wholly outside Australia.^“
Various crimes affecting such aircraft are created; taking 
control of an aircraft without lawful excuse (sec.ll(l)), 
seizing control of an aircraft, without lawful excuse, while 
there are persons on board (i.e., aircraft piracy, or 
’hijacking’) (sec.ll(2) and (3))> destruction of aircraft 
(sec.12), destruction of aircraft with intent to kill 
persons or with reckless indifference to the safety of the 
life of persons (sec.13)} prejudicing safe operation of 
aircraft with intent to kill persons, &c. (sec.l5)>
assaulting, intimidating or threatening with violence a
r~
Sec.10(l) and (2).
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member of the crew (sec.16), endangering safety of 
aircraft, to his knowledge (sec.l7)> taking or sending 
dangerous goods on aircraft (sec.18),^ threats and false 
statements to destroy, damage or endanger the safety of 
aircraft, or to kill or injure persons on board the 
aircraft (i.e., bomb hoaxes) (sec.19)» We shall discuss 
the following points in relation to new crimes affecting 
aircraft under the Commonwealth Act.
Firstly, by sec.10(1)(a), Part III applies to an 
Australian aircraft (other than a Commonwealth aircrafr or 
a defence aircraft) that is ’used principally for the 
purpose of prescribed flights, or is engaged, or is 
intended or likely to be engaged, in a prescribed flight*.
In view of the rigid distinction between inter-State and 
intra-State commerce adopted by the present High Court, 
some doubts might be felt as to the scope of the 
Commonwealth commerce power (sec.5l(i) of the Constitution). 
In the present writer’s opinion, however, a danger to an 
aircraft as such affects directly the safety of other 
aircraft, and so it is possible that the Court might hold
1
Unlike sec.l7j the words * to his knowledge* were omitted 
from sec.18. It is submitted that a person on board an 
aircraft may do something accidentally, whereas carrying 
dangerous goods on board an aircraft would be an act which 
he obviously intended to do (cf. Parliamentary Debates, 
op.cit., p.1499)•
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valid the Commonwealth regulation of crimes affecting every 
aircraft, as distinct from usual crimes committed on 
aircraft in flight, under a doctrine similar to that of 
the Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No .2).^
Secondly, by sec.ll(l), a person cannot, without 
lawful excuse, take or exercise control, whether direct 
or through another person, of an aircraft to which Part III 
applies. It will be applicable to aircraft on the ground 
as well as aircraft in flight, but the person who was 
charged under the section may be competent to argue that 
the aircraft was on the ground and therefore was not on 
an inter-State journey. It is said that the draftsman 
was very aware of this problem and defined ‘flight1 in a 
very narrow meaning - thst a flight commences with the 
closing of the last door before take-off and ends with the 
opening of the first external door after landing (sec.3(2)). 
This is an extremely narrow approach to the inter-State 
commerce power and its incidental powers; the provision 
should extend to aircraft engaged in inter-State commerce, 
wherever it may be.
Thirdly, sec.18 does not apply in the case of a 
Commonwealth aircraft to or in relation to the carrying or 
placing of dangerous goods on board the aircraft by the
38 A.L.J.R. 388.
1
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governmental officers, &c. 'Commonwealth aircraft' 
is defined as an aircraft, other than a defence aircraft, 
that is in the possession or control of the Commonwealth 
or an authority of the Commonwealth (sec«3(l))« This 
includes an aircraft operated by Trans-Australia Airlines 
of the Australian National Airlines Commission, so that 
the effect of sec.18 may have placed aircraft operated by 
T.A.A. in a different position from aircraft operated by 
private airline companies (e.g., Ansett-A.N.A.). However, 
the section was amended in the course of the Parliamentary 
debates in the Senate so as to insert after 'Commonwealth 
aircraft' the words '(not being an aircraft that is being 
used for commercial transport operations)'. Hence, 
aircraft operated by T.A.A. will, for the purpose of 
sec.18, be in the same position as any other aircraft 
engaged in commercial transport operations. As a result, 
only aircraft operated by the Department of Civil Aviation 
or other departments or authorities of the Commonwealth 
which operate their own aircraft are excluded from the 
operation of sec.18.
Fourthly, penalties are imposed in relation to these 
crimes affecting aircraft which, according to the nature 
of offences, range from seven years imprisonment to death.
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During the Parliamentary discussion of the bill, use of 
the death penalty was vigorously debated.^-
Fifthly, the creation of such new crimes in relation 
to aircraft does not conflict with sec.92; such provisions 
would certainly be treated as regulatory and not as 
imposing a burden.
The Commonwealth Act contains a number of 
miscellaneous provisions of a procedural nature, covering 
jurisdiction of courts, venue, etc.
In short, the Australian enactment concerning aircraft 
crimes is generally in line with the Tokyo Convention, 
save provisions concerning the powers of an aircraft 
commander and matters ancillary thereto. It will not be 
difficult for the Commonwealth to ratify the Convention, 
particularly in reliance upon the external affairs power 
(sec•51(xxix)) of the Constitution. No such uncertainty 
as to the limits of the territorial effect of national
1
’I mention here that although the question of the retention 
of the death penalty is a controversial one, it is still 
retained by the Commonwealth in the Crimes Act and in 
certain other Commonwealth laws, and it is retained in all 
the Commonwealth Territories. The inclusion of the death 
penalty in this bill is in line with existing Commonwealth 
and Territory provisions. It has seemed inappropriate to 
deal with the general question of the retention of capital 
punishment, which, it seems to me, can be reserved for some 
occasion of general revision of the criminal law. I 
mention, however, that of the States, only Queensland has 
abolished the death penalty completely, although it has 
virtually been abolished in New South Wales’. Cf. 
Parliamentary Debates, op.cit., p»98»
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criminal law as contained in the ambiguous provisions of 
sec.62 of the U.K. Civil Aviation Act, 19^ +9 j exists under 
the Australian legislation, which clearly assimilates the 
status of aircraft to that of ships.
Offences relating to civil aviation are thus now 
governed by two different sets of the Commonwealth 
enactments; one is the Air Navigation Act and Regulations 
made thereunder in respect of offences in breach of air 
navigation rules or regulations,1 and the other is the 
Crimes (Aircraft) Act in respect of any crimes on board 
aircraft and special crimes affecting aircraft themselves.
1
See, esp. sec.27 of the Act providing for extra-territorial 
operation of air navigation regulations.
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CHAPTER XI
Conclusion
Tension between an existing legal system and an 
emerging new field of law in solving newly created social 
problems is universal, and not peculiar to federal systems. 
The fact that reported aviation cases in the Courts are 
few has tended to obscure the development of a generic 
branch of air law in Australia, but in this as in many 
subjects of the law, special enactments containing special 
principles and rules, largely independent of the existing 
common law or other relevant fields of law, have come 
into existence.
However, the whole system of legal control of civil 
aviation in Australia is inescapably circumscribed by 
thefederal Constitution. The historical condition that 
the Commonwealth of Australia had not experienced an 
aviation age at the time of its birth has exerted far- 
reaching influences on the development of the law. The 
lack of a specific power over the subject has put the 
Commonwealth in the position of having no express 
constitutional basis for generally intruding into intra­
state aviation matters, and has brought about a dual
system of Commonwealth and State law. On another view
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the system is triple - common law, State statutory law 
and Commonwealth statutory law are basic features of air 
law in Australia, Owing to the nature of the Commonwealth 
powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution which 
are relevant, the scope of Commonwealth authority in 
respect of various subjects incidental to aviation has 
become extremely obscure and complicated.
The movements towards centralization of power over 
aviation have been fluctuating and intermittent, though 
there have been always some outcries for uniformity of 
the law. Such uniformity has been attempted by a parallel, 
co-operative effort of the Commonwealth and the State 
Legislatures working on this topic with unusual intimacy, 
at all times under the guidance of the Commonwealth 
Government. It is surprising that the subject was not 
covered by amending the Constitution, but attempts have 
failed and the issues depend finally on peoples1 views 
or politicians* ideologies as to the general structure 
of Australian federalism, or on temporary political 
factors, rather than on the specific problems of aviation.
Short of constitutional amendment, an attentive 
inquiry into the exact limits of the Commonwealth powers 
in respect of aviation and their application to each 
subject of the law suggests ways in which the Commonwealth 
might assume more legislative jurisdiction in various
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aspects of the law. In each of the foregoing Chapters 
of Parts II and III, some concluding remarks have been 
made as to the interactions between the branch of law 
in question and Australian federalism, and possible 
Commonwealth action to promote uniformity of the law 
has been suggested. Among the topics on which, it has 
been suggested, the Commonwealth could take bolder 
initiatives are: every citizen’s and foreign aviators’
liberty to fly as against landowners’ property rights 
or States’ jurisdictional rights in airspace above their 
lands or territories; economic controls of intra-State 
aviation activities having an effect on the safety, 
regularity and efficiency of the aviation industry as a 
whole; carriers’ liability for damage to passengers and 
cargoes and other ancillary matters in certain types of 
carriages by air within the ambit of the nature of inter­
state commerce; aircraft operators’ liability for damage 
to third parties on the ground and other ancillary 
subjects in inter-State, if not all, aircraft flights; 
establishment of the federal recording system of rights 
in every Australian aircraft and designation of applicable 
law of aircraft transactions in conflict of laws; extension 
of newly created criminal offences affecting aircraft 
under Commonwealth legislation to every Australian 
aircraft, and so on.
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These suggestions depend partly on basic approaches 
to the Constitution which are somewhat different from 
those maintained by the High Court of Australia. Above 
all, a comprehensive concept of ’commerce1 and of 1 external 
affairs1 corresponding to the composite realities of the 
aviation industry cannot properly be achieved without 
due regard to the dynamic changes in social factors 
relevant to the working of the Federal Compact.
The effects of international legislation deserve 
special emphasis. Because of the inherent internationality 
of aviation, a positive participation in and effective 
implementation of international agreements is a main 
resort for the development of civil aviation in any 
country. The permeation of international law into national 
law has occurred on an unparalleled scale in the law of 
civil aviation, where a unitary system of regulation not 
only for one but for all countries is essential and 
inevitable. Due largely to their impact upon existing 
common law rules and Australian State laws, there are 
some difficulties in the way of domestic implementation 
of international rules in some subject-matters of air law. 
While it is true that most of the rules of international 
air law do not directly regulate purely domestic aviation 
problems, the trend of international legislation and
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international administrative regulation of air navigation 
will in time deepen awareness of the need for central 
control in Australia, and provide many of the standards 
by which that central control needs to be governed.
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APPENDIX I
Some Problems of Rights in Aircraft
Commercial aircraft are expensive objects and most 
of them are bought by airlines under some form of credit 
arrangement. It is important to the manufacturing industry, 
to financial institutions and to the users of aircraft 
that means should be found of reducing the attendant risks 
of using aircraft as security which result from their 
very great mobility. In the absence of some form of 
international recognition of rights in aircraft, a financial 
institution may find that it lacks an effective means of 
satisfying an unpaid debt by claim on the security. So 
the 'Convention on the International Recognition of Rights 
in Aircraft1 was adopted at Geneva in 1948. The Geneva 
Convention has now been ratified by, and is in force 
between, 22 countries including most of the important 
aviation countries except U.K., Canada and Australia.
Under the Geneva Convention there are broad categories 
of rights which contracting States undertake to recognize 
mutually. They are: (a) rights of property in aircraft,
(b) rights to acquire aircraft by purchase coupled with 
possession of the aircraft, (c) rights to possession of
585
aircraft under leases of six months or more, and (d) 
mortgages, hypotheques and similar rights in aircraft 
which are contractually created as security for payment 
of an indebtedness (Art.l(l)). However, it is left to 
each of the contracting States to determine the precise 
form of the rights it will allow on its register for the 
purpose of seeking their recognition in the other 
contracting States. These rights are recognised by other 
contracting States, provided that such rights have been 
constituted in accordance with the law of the contracting 
States in which the aircraft was registered as to 
nationality at the time of their constitution, and are 
regularly recorded in a public record of the contracting 
State in which the aircraft is registered as to nationality. 
The Convention provides for ways in which these rights and 
interests in aircraft are recorded, for priority claims 
against such aircraft rights and for the settlement of 
the question of sale of aircraft in execution.
Australia has not ratified the Geneva Convention, and 
the subject is governed entirely by the domestic legislation 
which has no special enactment relating to the subject 
either in Commonwealth or in State legislation. The 
Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations setting up provisions 
concerning registration and nationality of Australian 
aircraft is only for purposes of public law and does not
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affect title or property interests in aircraft. Sale, 
mortgage and hire-purchase of aircraft are governed by 
ordinary law (mostly in statutory forms) of sale of goods, 
bills of sale or hire-agreements, which are regulated 
under the State legislation. Moreover, conflict of laws 
arising from aircraft transactions on an inter-State level 
is governed by ordinary common law rules of private 
international law (i.e., proper law of contract and proper 
law of transfer). Hence, the law governing the constitution 
and recording of aircraft charges is wholly governed by 
the State law, so that the other countries must look into 
the law of Australian constituent States for the validity 
of constitution and recording of such rights.
The possibility of adopting the rules of the Convention 
or of extending them into domestic aviation depends upon 
the following two key-questions.
Firstly, the Geneva Convention if adopted would not 
impose upon Australia an express obligation to maintain 
a public record, in respect of proprietary rights in every 
national aircraft, but the assumption of the Convention 
is that the contracting States would themselves maintain 
a record in their own interest to attract other contracting 
States* recognition. The scope of the * external affairs* 
power (sec.51(xxix)) would cover such a * situation’ as 
implied in the Convention, but there is some uncertainty
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as to the exact scope of the power for the establishment
and maintenance of a public record in respect of rights
in all Australian aircraft, due largely to the uncertainty
of international 1 2obligations1* Perhaps, the federal
'commerce1 power (sec«5l(i)) would more amply justify
Commonwealth occupation of the whole field. Precedents
for the exercise of the commerce power in this field have
been provided in shipping and aviation legislation and
judicial decisions^ in the United States where a federal
recording system of rights in every civil aircraft of the
2U.S. nationality have been firmly established. The 
questions arising from the application of the Australian 
'commerce1 clause are whether the recording of titles or 
interests in Australian aircraft engaged in inter-State 
or overseas operations is sufficiently 'incidental* to 
'commerce*, and whether such recording system can be
1
(Shipping cases) White's Bank v. Smith (1869) 7 Wall 646,
74 U.S. 646, 19 L.ed.211; Aldrich v. The AEtna Insurance Co. 
(I869) 8 Wall 491, 75 U.S. 491, 19 L.ed. 473; Howe v. Tefft 
(1887) 15 R.I. 477, 8 A 709; Haug v. Third National Bank 
(1889) 77 Mich. 474, 43 N.W. 939. (Aviation cases)
Aviation Credit Corp. v. Gardner et al. (l940) 174 Misc.
798, 22 N.Y. Supp. 2nd ed. 37; Re Veterans' Air Express 
Co. Inc. (1948) D.C., N.J., 76 F. Supp. 684; U.S.A. v .
United Aircraft Corp. (1948) D.C., Conn., 80 F. Supp. 52; 
Blalock v. Brown (1949) 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E. 2d. 610,
9 A.L.R. 2d. 476.
2
See now Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Public Law 85-726,
72 Stat. 731)•
588
extended to 1intra-Stater aircraft. In short, the status 
of aircraft which is a necessary means of traffic carrying 
on of 1 commerce1 as property sui generis similar to the 
status of ships would justify the recording system as 
incidental to federal r.egulation of air commerce activities, 
and the extension of such federal regulations to intra- 
State aircraft must be justified under sec.109 of the 
Constitution to such a large extent that the effects of 
recorded rights in inter-State and overseas aircraft 
should have substantial continuity irrespective of 
diversion of aircraft operations.
Secondly, the provisions of the Geneva Convention 
refer frequently to the 1 law of the contracting State1, 
which is prima facie divided into several States* 
jurisdictions in Australia, and an applicable law must be 
ascertained by ordinary rules of conflict of laws in such 
matters as constitution of rights in aircraft, effects of 
recorded rights against third parties, etc. Although 
there are some confusions between contract and transfer 
in English law, one thinks naturally of the lex situs 
when concentrating on the security aspects, and when 
concentrating on the contractual relations between the 
parties, one thinks naturally of the proper law, thus 
leaving some room for choice of law by the parties 
themselves. The possibility of federal action in this
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field depends upon the scope of sec.118 and sec.5l(xxv) 
of the Constitution which we have already discussed in 
Chapter V. The common law rule on the conflict of laws 
admitting party TautonomyT in choosing the law to govern 
their contract is not always compatible with the 
constitutional requirements of ffull faith and credit1, 
for their selection of a particular law might disregard 
the State law with which the contractual transaction has 
the most substantial connection in the interests of the 
Federation. The Commonwealth Parliament as a policy­
maker should be competent to give guidance for choosing 
the proper law of the contract under sec.5l(xxv).
Similarly, the selection of the law gaerning the aircraft 
conveyances by which property in aircraft is transferred 
falls within the legislative competence of the Commonwealth 
Parliament under the same power; owing to the high-speed 
mobility and novelty of aircraft, common law rules of 
private international law cannot offer an adequate 
solution, and a State tends to assert the dominion over 
property transactions within its borders upon some 
jurisdictional nexus. In either case, the law of the 
domicile of the airline, or the law of the State where 
the principal business place of the airline or aircraft- 
owner exists, gives the most satisfactory solution.
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The Commonwealth is now giving serious consideration 
to the ratification of the Geneva Convention. Such 
ratification, especially if combined with a more 
adventurous approach to rfull faith and credit1 than has 
hitherto been displayed either by text-writers or 
governments, could produce at least an alleviation of the 
difficulties now facing airline operators and their 
creditors in the matter of title to aircraft.
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APPENDIX II
Main Topics of the Governmental Regulations 
ol Air Navigation
1. Aircraft
Part III of the Regulations sets out provisions 
concerning registration of aircraft,"*' viz. register and 
certificates of registration, declarations as to the truth 
of the statements by applications, duration of certificates, 
change of ownership of aircraft, procedure of registration 
in the case of destruction etc. of aircraft, inspection 
of register (regs. 14-19)* Note reg.332 providing that, 
unless Director-General directs, an aircraft shall not be 
registered to a person not a British subject ordinarily 
resident in Australia or a corporation substantially 
owned or controlled by such persons,^ and reg.l4(3) 
providing that the certificate of registration shall be 
in accordance with the form adopted in pursuance of the 
Convention. An aircraft shall not be registered while it 
is registered in any other country (reg.20(3))* An
T ~
'Aircraft1 means any machine that can derive support in 
the atmosphere from the reactions of the air (reg.3(l))*
2
Cf. Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948-60 (No•83-No.82) 
and Aliens Act 1947-59 (No.22-No•32).
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aircraft is deemed to possess the nationality of the
contracting State on the register of which it is entered,
and an aircraft registered in accordance with the
Commonwealth Regulations is deemed to be an Australian
aircraft (reg.20(l) and (2)). An aircraft must bear
nationality and registration marks, and marking of aircraft
is prescribed in regs.22-25A, viz. location of marks, type
and measurements of letters for marks, marking of heavier-
than-air aircraft, advertisements and owners1 2 marks: cf.
Annex 7 (Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks). An
Australian aircraft shall not fly unless it is certified
as airworthy and complies with the conditions of its
certificate of airworthiness in accordance with Part IV of
the Regulations, which provides for airworthiness
requirements and type approval as a prerequisite to
certificate of airworthiness, and supervision of aircraft 
2.design: cf. Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft).
1
Cf. Flags Act 1953-54 (No.1-No.58).
2
Certain information as to design must be submitted to the 
Department of Civil Aviation by the designer of an 
Australian designed and constructed aircraft or items of 
equipment. Aircraft and equipment designed overseas are 
accepted primarily on the basis of certification by the 
Civil Aviation Authority of the country of design against 
the design standards of the country, but, additional 
standards are further applied in the case of Australia. 
Then, a ‘Permit to Fly1 for the purpose of testing flight 
(in the case of complete aircraft), a ‘Certificate of Type 
Approval*, and a ‘Certificate of Airworthiness* are issued 
subsequently.
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The Air Navigation Regulations do not provide for 
the import and export of aircraft, but the Customs Act 
1901-63^ and Regulations made thereunder deal with the 
topic, Reg.4(2) of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) 
Regulations provides that the importation into Australia 
of the goods (specified in the second column of the Third 
Schedule to the Regulations) is prohibited unless the 
conditions, restrictions or requirements to the description 
of the goods are complied with. Item 1 of the Third 
Schedule is 'Aircraft, airframes and aircraft engines* 
and the condition specified is expressed in the following 
words: * The importer shall produce to the Collector the
permission in writing of the Director-General of Civil 
Aviation to import the goods*. By means of such an import 
control of aircraft, the Commonwealth Government may 
affect to a large extent the economic pattern of the 
domestic aviation industry, as shown in the most recent
2case, the Queen v. Anderson; Ex parte IPEC-Air Pty. Ltd.
The company applied to the Director-General for permission 
to import five Douglous DC.4 aircraft and for a charter 
licence under the Air Navigation Regulations to conduct 
an inter-State air freight service. Neither the permission
1
1901 (No.6) - 1963 (No.48).
2
(1965) 39 A.L.J.R. 66.
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nor the licence was granted. With respect to the charter 
licence which we will discuss later, the High Court held 
(by majority) that a writ of mandamus should go commanding 
the Director-General to issue a charter licence, when the 
applicant could demonstrate ability to operate to the 
safety requirements of the Air Navigation Regulations. 
However, the company's operation is practically barred 
by the Director-General’s refusal of import permission 
which is based on the government’s economic policy of air 
transport within Australia, and the same case decided 
(by majority) that this refusal was a valid exercise of 
the Director-General’s functions. Moreover, as we have 
already seen/ it was held unanimously that the connexion 
between the refusal of permission and the prevention from 
engaging in inter-State trade was too remote to make the 
refusal obnoxious to sec.92 (absolute freedom of the inter­
state trade) of the Constitution. The questions raised 
in this case related closely to the extent of the 
Director-General’s exercise of administrative discretion, 
which we have already mentioned in relation to the 
administration of civil aviation in general in Australia. 
The Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations were later 
amended by the Commonwealth Government to make the Minister
See Chapter II, ant e.
I
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for Civil Aviation responsible for granting aircraft 
import permission instead of the Director-General.^"
2. Licences
(1) Licensing of Operating Crew and other Personnels:
Part V of the Regulations prescribes various technical
2provisions concerning licensing of operating crew and 
licensing (or grant of certificate of approval) of 
maintenance personnel in respect of design, manufacture, 
maintenance, etc. of aircraft (regs.38-42, 50-66). Flight
crew licences are broadly classified into pilot licences 
(student, private, commercial, senior commercial, second 
class airline transport pilot, first class airline 
transport pilot), navigator licences, radio operator 
licences and engineer licences (reg.5l)» Privileges and 
limitations vary according to the category of licence 
held, and licences are endorsed for particular types and
ocategories of aircraft: cf. Annex 1 (Personal Licensing).
1
The change in the Regulations meant that IPEC (interstate 
Parcel Express Co.) Air Co. Ltd. had to seek an adjournment 
of its application for an appeal to the Privy Council until 
October 19^5« The company accused the Commonwealth of 
having attempted to block its appeal.
2
’Operating crew1 means any person having duties on board 
in connexion with the flying or safety of the flight of an 
aircraft (reg.5(l))*
3Reg.52 and reg.60. See also reg.203» providing for the 
exemption from necessity for obtaining an airline licence 
in certain circumstances.
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(2) Licensing of Flying Schools, Training
Organizations and of their Activities: cf. Part VI
(regs.68-70).
(3) Licensing!: of Air Service Operations: The subject
is regulated both by federal law and by State law; the 
former in Part XIII (regs.191-253) and the latter in 
State transport legislation. TAir transport’ is classified 
into (a) private operations, (b) aerial work operations,
(c) charter operations, and (d) regular public transport 
operations (reg.l9l)» Aircraft is classified in accordance 
with the type of operations. An aircraft shall not be 
used in any class of operations unless the particular type 
of aircraft is authorized and approved for such use by
the Director-General. Aircraft engaged in private 
operations shall comply with the provisions of the 
Regulations and such additional conditions as the Director- 
General from time to time directs in the interests of 
safety (reg.195)» As to other types of operations, the 
Regulations provide that an aircraft shall not be used by 
any person in each operation except under the authority 
of and in accordance with an aerial work licence (reg.196), 
charter licence (reg.197) or airline licence (reg.198).
Reg.199 is the most important provision prescribing the
conditions of issue for these licences:
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(1) An applicant for an aerial work, charter
or airline lieence, shall furnish such
information in relation to the proposed 
service as the Director-General requires.
(2) Where the proposed service is an interstate 
service, the Director-General shall issue 
an aerial work, charter or airline licence, 
as the case requires, unless the applicant 
has not complied with, or has not 
established that he is capable of complying 
during the currency of the licence with, 
the provisions of these Regulations, or of 
any direction or order given or made under 
these Regulations, relating to the safety 
of the operations.
(2A) Where in the case of an application for an 
airline licence, the proposed service is 
an interstate service with a terminal or 
an intermediate stopping place in a 
Territory of the Commonwealth, the Director- 
General may -
(a) grant the licence;
(b) refuse the licence; or
(c) issue a licence for a service between 
the places, being places in different 
States, specified in the application 
subject to the condition that aircraft 
engaged in the service shall not land 
in the Territory unless such conditions 
as the Director-General considers 
necessary are complied with.
(3) Subject to the next succeeding sub-regulation, 
where the proposed service is other than an 
interstate service, the Director-General
may issue an aerial work, charter or airline 
licence, as the case requires, upon such 
conditions, in addition to compliance with 
these Regulations, as the Director-General 
considers necessary or may refuse to issue 
a licence.
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(4) Where the proposed service does not involve 
air navigation of a kind specified in 
paragraph (a), (b) , (c), (d) or (da) of sub­
regulation (l) of regulation 6 of these 
Regulations, the Director-General shall, on 
and after the date fixed for the purposes 
of paragraph (f) of that sub-regulation1 
in in deciding whether or not to grant an
aerial work, charter or airline licence, 
and in determining the conditions upon 
which the licence is to be granted, have 
regard to matters concerned with the 
safety, regularity and efficiency of air 
navigation and to no other matters.
With respect to inter-State service, the Director-General’s
discretion is limited to ’safety’ considerations, perhaps
pursuant to the High Court’s decision in the Australian
2National Airways Case. In the IPEC-Air Case, the 
application of regs.l97(l) and 1 9 9 (2) in respect of charter 
licence were in question. The company applied to the 
Director-General for a charter licence to carry freight 
between State capitals by means of aircraft which it was 
in a position to obtain if the Director-General granted 
a licence for their importation into Australia. The 
company established to the Director-General’s satisfaction 
that subject to obtaining the aircraft it was capable of 
complying during the currency of the licence with the 
provisions of the Regulations, or of any direction or 
order made under the Regulations, relating to the safety
1
The date fixed was 10 October 1964.
(1945) 71 C.L.R.; 71 C.L.R. 715-
2
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of the aircraft. The Director-General, acting in
accordance with government policy against allowing persons
other than those already engaged in it to operate Inter-
State air freight services (two-airline policy),^ refused
permission to import the aircraft and refused the charter
licence on the basis that the company would not be in a
position to provide the necessary aircraft to operate
the service to which the application related. The High
Court held (by majority) that a writ of mandamus should
go commanding the Director-General to issue a charter
licence, but two Judges in their dissenting opinion took
the view that the application for a charter licence was
not refused on the ground of the governmental policy of
the air transport industry; according to their opinion,
in view of the company*s inability to obtain aircraft for
its proposed service, charter licence would for all
practical purposes be futile and in the exercise of the
court1s discretion it should refuse mandamus requiring
2the Director-General to issue the licence. However, this 
contention has to yield, it seems, to the majority 
interpretation of the provisions set out in reg.199(2) -
that is, a difficulty in obtaining a particular aircraft
T
See Appendix III, post.
39 A.L.J.R. at p.74, per Taylor and Owen JJ.
2
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or the absence of an import permit is not one of the 
grounds on which the Director-General can lawfully refuse 
a charter licence under the Regulations. tfindeyer J. 
said:^
The prosecutor desires to have a licence 
notwithstanding that it may prove of no use.
That is a matter for it. It may be that it 
hopes that it will be able to obtain suitable 
aircraft in Australia. The Director-General 
could not lawfully impede its efforts to do 
so. That no suitable aircraft are at present 
available to be brought in Australia is not 
a decisive consideration. It may be that 
before the expiration of the period of a 
licence the prosecutor will be able to buy 
or by some other permissible arrangement 
gain the use of suitable aircraft in 
Australia. The prosecutor may well think 
a licence necessary to warrant its expenditure 
of money on obtaining aircraft. It may think, 
and apparently does think, that having a 
licence may aid it in efforts to persuade 
the authorities to relax in its favour the 
prohibition against importing them. It may 
hope that possession of a licence would give 
it an advantage over others if there should be 
a change in government policy. Whatever its 
motives for wishing to have a licence it seems 
to me that on the evidence it established its 
right to one, the only ground for refusal being 
unsound in law.
With respect to Territorial service, the Director- 
General 1s discretion is almost unlimited, and no 
constitutional restrictions apply to it.
1
39 A.L.J.R. at p.75*
See Chapter IV, ante.
2
With respect
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to intra-State service, his discretion is limited to 
Safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation1, 
and, as we have already seen, the High Court in the 
Airlines of N.S.¥. Case (No.2)  ^ assimilated these 
conditions (in respect of airline licence) in effect to 
1 safety’ considerations as contained in sub-reg.(2); 
regs.198 and 199 were held valid as relating to the use 
of aircraft, as distinct from the authorization of air 
transport activity, in the interests of safe and orderly 
operations of every aircraft in Australia. Reg.200B 
provided:
An aerial work licence, a charter licence or an 
airline licence authorizes the conduct of 
operations in accordance with the provisions of 
the licence but subject to the Act and these 
Regulations and to the other laws of the 
C ommonwealth.
This licensing provision was invalidated by the Court 
in the above case as giving a Commonwealth franchise or 
positive authority to conduct wholly intra-State services, 
notwithstanding any State prohibitions. The right to 
carry in the case of inter-State and foreign public air 
transport operations is not derived from the airline 
licence alone but now from reg.200B operating upon the
38 A.L.J.R. 388.
1
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licence* In this very limited area of purely intra­
state air transport operations, the State legislation is 
operative and, in order to operate on intra-State routes, 
an air service operator is required to hold both a State 
licence (to engage in that service) and a Commonwealth 
licence (to use aircraft for that purpose). The main 
provisions of the State legislation are as follows.
2In New South Vales, the Air Transport Act 1964
Oamended the State Transport (Co-ordination) Act 1931-56"^
by making the latter Act no longer applicable to carriage
by air of passengers and goods. The Air Transport Act
1964, which also affected the Air Navigation Act (N.S.W.)
1938-47 and the Transport Act 1930-84, provides:
3(l) A person shall not, on or after the 
appointed day, carry by an aircraft 
from a place in New South Wales to 
another place in New South Wales any 
passengers or goods unless -
(a) the aircraft is licensed under this 
Act;
(b) that person is the holder of the 
licence; and
(c) where the licence was granted in 
respect of a route or routes, the 
route over which the passengers or 
goods are so carried is such a route.
1
Airlines of N.S.W. Case (No.2), 1964-63? 38 A.L.J.R. at
p .396, per Barwick, C.J.
2
N o.36 of 1964.
No.32 of 1931 - No.l6 of 1936.3
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6(l) The Commissioner may grant or refuse 
any application for a license.
(2) A license may be granted subject to or 
not subject to conditions, including 
conditions as to whether the carriage 
of passengers or goods or of both 
passengers and goods is authorised by 
the license.
(3) In deciding whether to grant or refuse 
a license and the conditions, if any, 
subject to which it should be granted, 
the Commissioner shall have regard to 
such of the following matters as to 
him seem appropriate and to no other 
matter s:-
(a) the needs, in relation to air transport 
services, of the public of New South 
Wales as a whole and of the public of 
any area or district to be served by 
the route or routes, or by any of the 
routes, specified in the application 
for the license;
(b) the extent, if any, to which the needs 
of the public of New South Wales as a 
whole or of the public of any area or 
district to be served by the route or 
routes, or by any of the routes, 
specified in the application for the 
license are already, or are likely to 
be, served by public air transport
servie e s ;
(c) the allocation of routes for public air 
transport services between persons holding 
or applying for licenses under this Act
so as to foster as far as possible the 
existence of more than one airline 
operating in New South Wales capable of
1
The Commissioner for Motor Transport constituted under the 
Transport (Division of Functions) Further Amendment Act, 
1952, as amended b y t h e  State Transport (Co-ordination) 
Amendment Act 195^-«
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providing adequate and reasonable public 
air transport services within New South 
Wales and so as to discourage the 
development of any monopoly of public 
air transport services within New South 
Wales;
(d) where the applicant is an individual, his 
character and suitability and fitness to 
hold the license applied for and, where 
the applicant is a corporation, the 
character of the persons responsible for 
the management or conduct of the 
corporation and the suitability and 
fitness of the corporation to hold the 
license applied for;
(e) the extent to which the area or district 
to be served by the route or routes, or 
any of the routes, specified in the 
application for the license are already, 
or likely to be, served by forms of 
public transport other than public air 
transport and the effect that the public 
air transport services proposed to be 
conducted by the applicant for the 
license over that route or those routes 
may have upon those other forms of 
transport.
Other important provisions of the Act are sec.3(3) (the 
persons who committed the offence or who are deemed to 
have committed the like offence), sec.3 (applications for 
licenses), sec.8 (revocation, suspension and variation 
of licenses) and sec.13 (regulation-making power of the
In Queensland, the State Transport Act 1960,^ which
2repealed the State Transport Facilities Act 1946-39
1
No.48 of i960.
No.17 of 1946 - No.21 of 1939.
2
605
provides in Part VIII for 1 2air transport* and * when 
transport by water or air unlawful* (Divisions II and 
III) :
58(l) The Commissioner^ may from time to time 
prohibit the carriage of passengers, or 
goods, or both passengers and goods by 
air from any place within this State to 
any other place within this State, 
except under and in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of a license under 
this Part••.
59 Subject to this Act the Commissioner may 
grant to any person a license to provide 
and carry on a service for the carriage 
by air of passengers or goods, or both 
passengers and goods between places 
specified in any notice of a prohibiton 
under this Division of this Part.
60 It shall be unlawful to carry passengers, 
or goods, or both passengers and goods 
by water or air at any time when such 
carriage is prohibited by the Commissioner....
In Western Australia, the State Transport Co-
2ordination Act 1933-61 provides for * aircraft* in 
Division (4) of Part III (Licenses):
45 No aircraft shall operate intra-State unless 
such aircraft is licensed in accordance with 
this Part•..
1
The Commissioner for Transport appointed or deemed to be 
appointed under the Act: the term includes the Deputy
Commissioner while acting as the Commissioner and any 
person who may be appointed by the Governor in Council 
to act as Commissioner for Transport.
2
No.42 of 1933 - No.59 of 1961.
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46 Subject to this Part the Board may, on
the application of the owner of an aircraft, 
and provided that all laws or regulations 
of the Commonwealth relating to the aircraft 
and its operation have been and are at all 
time complied with, grant a lie ense in 
respect of the aircraft, or may refuse 
to grant the same. The decision of the 
Board shall be final and without appeal.
Every license granted shall, subject to 
the conditions of the license, authorize 
the operation of the aircraft between any 
points which are otherwise prohibited 
under the preceding section.
2In Tasmania, the Transport Act 1938-61 deals with 
’road, water and air transport1 2 (Part V) which applies the 
Traffic Act 1925-61^ as part of the Act. Part III of the 
Traffic Act contains the following provisions:
l4AB(3 ) Subject to sub-section (5 ) of this section, 
where an aircraft -
(a) is used or let for the carriage of 
passengers or goods for hire or for 
any other consideration; or
(b) is, except as otherwise may be 
prescribed, used for the carriage 
of goods either for sale or for 
offering for sale or in the course 
of a trade of business,
that aircraft shall for the purposes of 
this Act be deemed to be used as a public 
vehicle.
1
The Western Australian Transport Board appointed under 
the Act.
2
No.70 of 1938 - No.30 of 1961.
No.38 of 1925 - No.31 of 1961.3
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15(l) The Commission may issue public vehicle 
licences in accordance with this Act.
(2) Public vehicle licences may be - (a) 
aircraft licences...
(3) Subject to this Act - (a) an aircraft 
licence authorizes the use of an 
aircraft as a public vehicle;...
24(1) No person shall drive or use or cause 
or permit to be driven or used as a 
public vehicle any vehicle -
I. In respect of which a licence is in 
force, for any other purpose other 
than a purpose for which it is 
authorized to be used under that 
licenc e :
II. In or upon any area, route, or place
in or upon which the licence in respect 
thereof does not authorise it to be 
so driven or used:
III. In respect of which a licence is not 
in force:•..
¥
Next, Victoria. Until repealed by the Ministry of 
„ 1 2Transport Act 1958» the Transport Act 1951 had dealt 
with air transport, providing for licences for commercial 
aircraft, power to attach conditions to licence, variation 
and cancellation of conditions, period of licence, fee 
(sec.IO). But now there is no provision relating to
3’aircraft1 23 or 1 air transport1 in the relevant legislation.
1
No.6322 of 1958.
2
No.5559 of 1951.
3Cf. Transport Regulations Act 1958 (No.6400) and Commercial 
Goods Vehicles Act ("No. 6222) .
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In South. Australia, as in Victoria, the State 
transport legislation does not apply to aircraft, and no 
licensing system in respect of aircraft is established. 
Semble, in Victoria and South Australia, only the licensing 
regulations of the Commonwealth apply to intra-State air 
service operations.
( 4 ) Refusal_to Grant, and Suspension and Cancellation
of, Licences and Certificates: Among the regulations
relating to this topic,’*' the subject of 1 appeal to board
of review or court’ appears to warrant special mention.
A person aggrieved by the Director-General1s decision,
except suspension of licence or certificate pending
investigation, may elect at his option either to have the
matter submitted for review to a board of review, or to
appeal to a specified court against that decision.
The Board of Review is an administrative machinery
2comparable to tax Boards of Review; it consists of a 
chairman and two other members, all of whom are to be 
appointed by the Minister; the chairman is a person, 
nominated by the Attorney-General, who is qualified to
1
Cf. Part XV (regs.254-69)• See also reg.200A as to 
cancellation or suspension of licence in respect of air 
service operations.
2
Cf. Symon v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932)
47 C.L.R. 538.
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practice as a barrister or solicitor of the High Court 
or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory of the 
Commonwealth,^ and the other two members are to be persons 
who possess aeronautical or engineering knowledge or 
experience or other special knowledge or experience of air 
navigation or aircraft.^ Proceedings before the Board 
are as follows: notice of time and place for consideration 
of the matter to be sent to the Director-General and the 
applicant within seven days after the appointment of a 
board of review; evidence including one not considered by 
the Director-General; finding without being bound by 
legal rules of evidence; determination of any question 
according to a majority opinion of the members; an 
applicant or the Director-General to be represented by 
counsel, solicitor or agent; the hearing to be in principle
1
Before i960, the chairman was either an officer of the 
Attorney-General1 2s Department, of the Crown Law 
Department of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea 
or a qualified barrister or solicitor of the High Court 
or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory.
2
The practice has been to nominate as members of the 
board persons qualified to hold the same licence as the 
appellant. For example, in the case of a commercial 
pilot, the Airline Pilots Association nominates a short 
list of pilots having similar qualification, at least 
one of whom is invariably appointed as a member of the 
board. Cf. Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. 27 (17 May
I960) p.1769.
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open to the public. The Board may summon witnesses^ to 
give evidence or procedure documents, etc., and the decision 
of the Board is final. It is submitted that those 
provisions go a good deal further than other Commonwealth 
countries have yet done, giving more consideration to the 
interests of the licence-holder than any other Commonwealth 
country.^
The Supreme Court of each State is invested with 
federal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is conferred on 
the Commonwealth Industrial Court and on the Supreme Court 
of each Territory of the Commonwealth, respectively, to 
hear and determine appeals for this purpose. The 
Judiciary Act 1903-60^ applies to and in relation to the
1
A witness to a board of review or to a court is protected 
in that his statement or disclosure is not admissible in 
evidence against him in civil or criminal proceedings in 
a court except in a prosecution for giving false testimony 
in proceedings under the Regulations (reg.263).
2
In the United Kingdom, the relevant orders provide that 
the Minister may 1 2on sufficient ground being shown to his 
satisfaction after due investigation by him cancel or 
suspend any certificate, licence or other document issued 
under the order1. There is no provision whatsoever for 
appeal. The relevant regulations in New Zealand (and Union 
of South Africa) are very similar to the United Kingdom 
orders and do not make provision for any sort of appeal. 
Under the Canadian Air Regulations, a pilot licence may be 
suspended at any time by the Minister for any reason that 
to him seems sufficient, and there is also no provision for 
appeal. Cf. Parliamentary Debates, supra.
No.6 of 1903 - No.109 of i960.
3
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exercise of such jurisdiction. An appeal in which the 
Director-General shall be the respondent, is by way of 
re-hearing, and the Court may make such order as to the 
costs of an appeal as it thinks fit. In deciding an appeal 
the Court may confirm, vary or reverse the decision of 
the Director-General and may by order give effect to the 
Court1s decision.
3. Flight
(1) Logs and Log Books: Log books and specified logs
must be maintained in respect of aircraft and operating 
crew. The Regulations (Part VII - regs. 71-78A) provide 
for detailed rules for maintenance and contents of logs 
and log books (i.e. aircraft log book, engine log book, 
journey log, signal log, radio maintenance log book, 
propeller log book, logs of members of operating crew, 
navigation logs): cf. Annex 1 (Personal Licensing) and
Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft - International Commercial 
Air Transport).
(2) Rules of Flight and Manoeuvre: Division 1 of 
Part X (Conditions of Flight) contains general provisions, 
most of which give effect to the limitations to the right 
to fly under the international agreements, and their 
adaptations to Australian aircraft (e.g. pilotless aircraft, 
flight manuel, documents to be carried in aircraft,
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dangerous cargo, prohibited (restricted or dangerous) 
areas/ etc.). Division 2 of the Part provides for flight 
rules, viz. towing, dropping of articles, picking up 
articles, parachute descents, flight under simulated 
instrument flying conditions, flight instruction to a 
student for solo flying, acrobatic flying over public 
gatherings, low flying, reports at designated points of 
intervals, procedure on radio failure, etc. It is 
specifically provided that an aircraft shall not be 
operated in a negligent manner or in a reckless manner 
so as to be likely to endanger life or the property of 
others, and that an aircraft shall not be flown in such 
a manner or in such circumstances as is or are likely to 
cause avoidable danger to any person or property
2(including animals) on land or water or in the air.
1
Cf. also Defence (Special Undertakings) Act 1952 (N0.I9)3 
providing for aircraft in prohibited or restricted areas.
2
Reg.133 provides for low flying: an aircraft shall not
fly over any city or town or other populous area except 
at such a height that the aircraft could land outside the 
city, town or populous area, in the event of the means 
of propulsion failing through any cause, or, if it is an 
aeroplane with more than one engine, at such a height that 
it could land outside the city, town or populous area, in 
the event of one of its engines failing. With such 
conditions, an aircraft shall not fly over (a) any city, 
town or populous area, at a lower height than 1,500 feet; 
or (b) any other area at a lower height than 500 feet. A 
height specified above is the height above the highest point 
of the terrain, or any obstacle thereon, within a radius 
of 2,000 feet of a line extending vertically below the 
aircraft. Sub-reg.(3) lays down various exception to the
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Part XI (Rules of the Air) lays down general provisions 
of rules of the air, such as right of way, rules for 
prevention of collision, operation in proximity to other 
aircraft, and provides further for rules of the air 
concerning operation on and in the vicinity of aerodromes, 
visual flight rules and instrument flight rules."*"
Part XII (Signals for the Control of Air Traffic) contains 
the rules relating to signals for the control of air 
traffic of aerodrome traffic, special signals relating to 
danger areas, prohibited areas and restricted areas, 
visual signals between State aircraft and other aircraft 
in flight, emergency signals, lights to be displayed by 
aircraft, and lights and markings to be displayed on 
mooring cables: cf. Annex 2 (Rules of the Air).
4. Accident
Part XVI (regs.270-97) of the Regulations lays down 
provisions concerning accident inquiry. An accident or 
incident to aircraft must be reported or notified to the
2 (cont.)
minimum height, including cases where, through stress of 
weather or any other unavoidable cause, it is essential 
that a lower height be maintained.
1
Note reg.l47s in relation to prevention of collisions at 
sea, requiring every aircraft on the water to comply with 
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, contained in the Schedule to the Navigation (Collision) 
Regulations in force under the Navigation Act 1912-61.
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Director-General. The Customs Act I9OI-63 provides also
for an obligation of pilot or owner of a wrecked aircraft
to report certain matters to Collector of Customs."^ The
procedures of accident investigation under the Regulations
are as follows: The Director-General may authorize one or
more investigators to conduct an investigation into any
matter connected with any accident or incident occurring
in Australian territory. The powers of investigator are
to summon any person as a witness, to take evidence on
oath or affirmation, and to require the production of
documents, or any part or component of an aircraft,
relevant to the investigation. Upon conclusion of an
investigation, the investigator forwards a report in
writing to the Director-General, who may cause the whole
2or any part of the report to be made public. The 
Regulations provide also for the investigations and 
inquiries into accidents to aircraft of contracting States, 
and for investigations of accidents and incidents to 
Australian aircraft outside Australian territory: cf.
Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident Inquiry).
The Minister may appoint a Board of Accident Inquiry 
to inquire into the causes of an accident and such other
1
Sec.65(2).
Reg.283(2).
2
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matters relating to the accident as are referred to it 
by the Minister, if he is not satisfied that the report 
of the investigation adequately covers the matter. The 
Board, which replaced the Air Courts of Inquiry in 1955 
is constituted by a Chairman and such assessors as the 
Minister considers necessary; a Chairman is to be a person 
who is a Justice or Judge of a Federal Court, a State 
Court or a Court of a Territory or a person possessing 
legal, aeronautical or engineering knowledge or experience 
or other special knowledge or experience of air navigation, 
and the assessors are to be persons possessing legal, 
aeronautical or engineering knowledge or experience or 
other special knowledge or experience of air navigation.
The Attorney-General may appoint a person to the Secretary 
of a Board of Accident Inquiry. Proceedings before the 
Board are as follows: the inquiry to be conducted in such
manner as the Board thinks fit without being bound by 
legal rules of evidence; the time and place for conducting 
the inquiry to be fixed by the Chairman who may also grant 
leave to appear before the Board to certain persons; the 
sittings of the Board to be in principle open to the 
public. The Chairman may summon witnesses to give evidence 
or produce documents, etc. and, after conducting the
S.R. 1955? No.29.
I
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inquiry, forward to the Minister a written report. He 
may state his findings, together with notes of the evidence 
taken, and adding any observations and recommendations 
which he thinks fit to make with a view to the prevention 
of life and the avoidance of future accidents. Assessors 
have no powers of adjudication, but each assessor shall 
sign the report with the Chairman, with his statement in 
writing of his reasons for the disagreement with a finding 
or recommendation of the Chairman. Inquiry may be 
extended or re-opened as the Minister thinks fit, and 
publication of the whole or a part of a report of the 
Board depends upon the Minister* s discretion.
5. Aerodromes, Facilities and Services
The Regulations provide for establishment of aerodrome 
and air routes and airway facilities, designation of air 
routes and airways, licensing of aerodromes, authorization 
of places for use as aerodromes, accessability of official 
aircraft (i.e. aircraft belonging to or employed in the 
service of the Crown) to aerodromes, use of aerodromes by 
aircraft of contracting States, dangerous lights, removal 
or marking of objects which constitute obstructions or 
potential hazards to air navigation (Division 1 and 1A 
of Part IX)• The sources of power to regulate these 
topics are laid down in sec.26(2)(e) and (g) of the Air
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Navigation Act. Sec.26(3) of the Act provides further 
that where the regulations make provision for the removal 
or marking of structures of obstacles referred to in 
para.(g) of sec.26(2) the regulations shall also include 
provision for the payment of compensation to any person 
who suffers loss or damage or incurs expense in or as 
a direct result of the removal or marking. Reg.92(4) 
provides for the owner’s right to compensation from the 
Department of Civil Aviation. State legislation concerning 
local government deals with power to acquire land or 
exercise control over land. Division 2 (Air Traffic 
Control) includes an important power of the Director- 
General to designate ’controlled airspace’. Division 3 
provides for meteorological services, Division 4 for 
search and rescue service, and Division 6 for fares, 
freights, time-tables and statistical returns. The 
Regulations do not provide for quarantine, customs, and 
immigration, but the relevant Commonwealth enactments 
deal with these topics:'*' cf. Annexes 3 (Meteorology),
1
Quarantine Act 1908-61 (No.3-No.6l); Quarantine (Air 
Navigation) Regulations, Quarantine (Animals) Regulations, 
Quarantine (Plant) Regulations, Local Quarantine Ordinance 
(applying to Papua-New Guinea, Norfolk Island,and Nauru),
Migration Act 1958 (No.62) (see Immigration Act_1901 -
Immigration Restriction Act - 1949), Aliens Act 1947-59 
(No.22-N0.32), Aliens Regulations, Customs Act I9OI-63, 
and various Regulations made thereunder.
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4 (Aeronautical Charts), 5 (Units of Measurement to be
used in Air-Ground Communication), 9 (Facilitation),
10 (Aeronautical Telecommunications), 11 (Air Traffic 
Services - Air Traffic Control Services, Flight Information 
Service and Alerting Service), 12 (Search and Rescue),
14 (Aerodromes) and 15 (Aeronautical Information Services).
The Commonwealth regulations to prohibit or authorize 
the use of the Commonwealth-aerodromes and controlled 
airspace have been already discussed in Chapter IV. The 
relevant regulations are as follows:
320A-(l) On and after such date as is fixed 
by the Minister for the purposes 
of this regulation by notice in the 
Gazette, ^ an aircraft shall not land at 
or take-off from any place, being 
a place acquired by the Commonwealth 
for public purposes, except under 
the authority of, and in accordance 
with, a permit issued under this 
regulation by the Director-General.
(2) The application of the last preceding 
sub-regulation is not limited by the 
operation of sub-regulation (l) of 
regulation 6 of these Regulations.
320B On and after such date as is fixed 
by the Minister for the purposes of 
this regulation by notice in the 
Gazette, an aircraft shall not be 
flown in controlled airspace in 
the course of air navigation of a 
kind specified in paragraph (e) of
The date fixed was 10 October 1964.
1
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sub-regulation (l) of regulation 6 
of these Regulations except under 
the authority of, and in accordance 
with, a permit issued under this 
regulation by the Director-General,
In respect of Commonwealth aerodromes and facilities 
the Commonwealth has enacted the following special 
legislation:
Airports (Surface Traffic) Act 1960  ^provides for
the control of surface traffice within Commonwealth 
2airports. Owing to the difficulties in enforcing the
3previous provisions of reg.315C? this Act puts into 
statutory form what, until then, had been only in the 
form of regulations. The Director-General is authorized 
to determine, indicate or notify areas and positions, 
days and hours, periods, conditions, and fee (if any)
(sec.6). Other main provisions of the Act are as follows.
1
No.40 of i960.
2
For the purpose of the Act, * airport* is defined as (a) 
an aerodrome owned or held under lease by the Commonwealth, 
or owned by the Crown in right of a Territory of the 
Commonwealth or by the Administration of a Territory of the 
Commonwealth, and operated in pursuance of the Air Navigation 
Act 1920-60 or of the regulations under that Act^ or (b) 
such part of an aerodrome owned or held under lease by the 
Commonwealth and under the control of a part of the Defence 
Force as is made available for civil aviation purposes in 
pursuance of arrangements made under sec.18 of that Act
( sec.3(l))•
3The matter was controlled by reg.315C, originally 
promulgated in 195 -^ and amended in 1957? which contained 
detailed rules relating to the parking of vehicles, and 
provided for the imposition of parking fees; it was 
repealed by i960 Regulations (No.99)»
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The Act adopts the system of owner-onus liability
(sec.ll). The Act is not to be construed as intended to
exclude the operation of any law of a State or Territory
of the Commonwealth in which an airport is situated that
can operate without prejudice to the express provisions
of the Act or the regulations and, in particular, of any
law of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth relating
to the registration and equipment of vehicles, the
licensing of drivers of motor vehicles and the rules to
be observed by persons driving or in charge of vehicles
or animals, or by pedestrians, on roads (sec.18). The
annual report to Parliament on the administration of the
Air Navigation Act and Regulations must also include a
statement setting out details of prosecutions and parking
infringements under this Act (sec.2l).
Airports (Business Concessions) Act 1959 aims at
facilitation of development of the business potential of 
2airports of the Commonwealth so as to obtain the maximum 
economic return from land, terminal buildings and other
1
Arrangements are made with the States for the performance 
of the duties and the discharge of the functions of 
authorized persons by members of the police force of the 
State and for the payment to be made by the Commonwealth 
for any such service (sec.19)*
2
The definition of the term 1 airport1 is same as in the 
Airports (Surface Traffic) Act.
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facilities not required for operational purposes and to 
meet the requirements of the travelling public for goods 
and services.^" The Minister may, on behalf of the 
Commonwealth, grant leases and licences in respect of 
land within an airport on such terms and conditions, and 
subject to payment of such rent or other considerations, 
as he thinks fit, and he may exercise any power or remedy 
of the Commonwealth in respect of any such lease or 
licence; this has effect notwithstanding anything contained 
in the Lands Acquisition Act 1955-57 (sec,6). The sale 
or supply of goods or services within an airport or the 
carrying on or soliciting for any business is prohibited 
except in accordance with the terms and conditions of an 
authority issued under the Act (sec.7)* The Act provides 
for various aspects of business activities at airports,
1
Before this Act was enacted, there was provision for the 
establishment, maintenance and operation of aerodromes 
including conditions for their use under the Air Navigation 
Act 1920-50, by which the Director-General was responsible 
for the control and management of Commonwealth-owned 
aerodromes. However, insofar as business concessions 
require the granting of leases or licences, the Department 
of the Interior had the primary statutory responsibility 
by virtue of the Lands Acquisition Act and the Administrative 
Arrangements Order. Under this Act, the administrative 
responsibility was shifted to the Department of Civil 
Aviation, while other land acquired for civil aviation 
purposes and the acquisition and disposal of land, 
including aerodrome land, continue to be governed by the 
Lands Acquisition Act and remain within the administrative 
responsibility of the Minister of the Interior.
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leases, etc., but special mention must be made as to an 
issue of an authority to sell or supply intoxicating 
liquor. As we have already seen, sec#52(i) of the 
Constitution gives to the Commonwealth Parliament exclusive 
power to make laws relating to places acquired by the 
Commonwealth for public purposes, and therefore the 
Commonwealth can prescribe anything which it thinks fit 
for the operation of its aerodromes. However, as regards 
intoxicating liquor, there is a compromise between the 
Commonwealth* s and States* laws; in any case where a 
Commonwealth authority is issued, it must contain conditions 
and restrictions, especially those relating to the days 
on which and the times during which liquor may be sold, 
corresponding with the provisions of State law which are 
applicable in the State in which the airport is situated 
(sec.9)* The intention of this clause is to permit the 
conduct of all businesses, other than the sale of 
intoxicating liquor, outside normal trading hours, but 
only in circumstances where the extension of trading hours 
is necessary to meet the needs of the travelling public.
Air Navigation (Charges) Act 1952-57^ prescribes 
the charges payable, in accordance with the Schedules to 
the Act, in respect of the use by aircraft of aerodromes,
No.101 of 1952 - No.87 of 1957.
1
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air route and airway facilities, meteorological services 
and search and rescue servicesnaintained, operated or 
provided by the Commonwealth, The mode of calculating 
charges are specified in the First Schedule (i.e, charges 
payable by the holders of airline licences"*' and of charter 
licences engaged in the course of regular public transport 
operations), Second Schedule (i.e, charges payable by the 
registered owners of aircraft not being persons who are 
the holders of airline licences, viz. private aircraft, 
aerial work aircraft or charter aircraft), and Third 
Schedule (i.e. charges payable by the owners of foreign 
aircraft being aircraft which are not operated by the 
holders of airline licences). For example, charges for 
airline operations are calculated by multiplying the unit
2rating of an aircraft which is based on its all-up weight 
by the factor specified in the Act for the flight in 
question. Flights for which a factor is specified amount 
to more than 300 to cover all flights being operated by 
regular public transport services. One of the main 
purposes of the amendment in 1957 was to increase by 10
1
This includes 'international airline licence’; see reg.198.
2
’Weight* means the maximum all up weight of the aircraft 
as specified in the Certificate of Airworthiness for the 
aircraft (cl.7(2) of the First Schedule).
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per cent the charges payable for the Commonwealth 
facilities. A regulation-making power is conferred on 
the Governor-General (sec.6). The Act of 1952 authorized 
regulations amending the Schedules to the Act, but such 
a wide power in the executive was repealed in 1957? 
although if a new route is developed regulations may 
specify the factor applicable to a flight over that 
route.^
6. Enforcement of Air Navigation Act and Regulations
The rules concerning offences and penalties had been 
governed by the Air Navigation Regulations, but by the 
i960 amendment some important provisions were added or 
shifted to the Air Navigation Act. Sec.26(2)(k) of the 
Act authorizes the regulations to be made with respect to 
1 the imposition of penalties not exceeding a fine of 
£A500 or imprisonment for a term of two years, or both, 
for a contravention of, or failure to comply with, a 
provision of the regulations or a direction, instruction 
or condition issued, given, made or imposed under, or in 
force by virtue of, the regulations1.
I
Cf. Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. (27 November 1957)?
p .2608•
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A person who contravenes or fails to comply with a
provision of the Act or the Regulations is guilty of an
offence; the owner, the operator and the hirer (not being
the Crown), and the pilot in command and any other pilot,
of an aircraft that flies in contravention of, or fails
to comply with, a provision of the Act or the Regulations
is guilty of an offence.'*' In any proceedings with respect
to an offence against the Act or the regulations, it is
a defence if the act or omission charged is proved to
have been due to stress of weather or other unreasonable
cause, and in any proceedings against the owner, operator,
hirer, pilot in command or other pilot of aircraft, it
is a defence if the act or omission charged is proved to
2have taken place without his fault or privity. An
offence against the Act or the Regulations may be
prosecuted either summarily or upon indictment, but, both
in the Act and in the Regulations, provisions are
respectively laid down for the prohibition of double
3punishment of the same offence. The rules for penalty 
for an offence against the Act or the Regulations are 
same; if the offence is prosecuted summarily - a fine not
1
Sec.22(l) and (2); reg.312(l) and (2).
2
Sec.23•
Sec.22(3); reg.312(4).
3
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exceeding £A200 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding
six months, or both, or if the offence is prosecuted
upon indictment - a fine not exceeding £A500 or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both."^
The Act specifically provides that the Crown in right of
the Commonwealth or of a State is not liable to
prosecution for an offence, but this does not affect any
liability of a member of the crew of an aircraft of which
the Crown is the owner or of any other person in the
2employment of the Crown to be so prosecuted. The
Regulations enumerate offences in various items, e.g.,
offences in relation to licences and certificates
(reg.312A), false statements (reg.312B), interference
with crew or aircraft (reg.312C), stowaways (reg.313)»
creation of fire hazard (reg. 315-A.) , etc. Proceedings for
the commitment of a person for trial on indictment for, or
proceedings for the summary prosecution of, an offence
shall not be instituted except with the consent of the
Director-General or (in the latter case) a person authorized
3by the Director-General. Time limit for commencing
T
Sec.22(4); reg.312(5)»
2
Sec.24.
Sec.22(5) and (6); reg.317(l) and (2).
3
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prosecutions in respect oi any offence against the 
regulations is one year after the commission of the 
off ence.^
The provisions relating to jurisdiction of Courts
2are laid down in the Act. The several courts of the 
States are invested with federal jurisdiction, and 
jurisdiction is conferred on the several courts of the 
Territories of the Commonwealth, with respect to offences 
against the Act or the Regulations. The jurisdiction 
so invested in or conferred on courts is invested or 
conferred within the limits (other than limits having 
effect by reference to the places at which offences are 
committed) of their several jurisdictions, whether those 
limits are as to subject-matter or otherwise. The trial 
on indictment of an offence against the Act or the 
regulations, not being an offence committed within a 
State, may be held in any State or Territory of the 
Commonwealth. Where an appeal lies from a court to the 
Supreme Court of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth, 
an appeal from a decision of the court exercising 
jurisdiction by virtue of the Act may be brought to the 
High Court. The High Court may grant special leave to
1
Reg.319(1)•
2
Sec.25•
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appeal to the High Court from a decision of such a court, 
notwithstanding that the law of that State or Territory 
prohibits the appeal. Subject to the Act, the laws of 
a State or Territory of the Commonwealth with respect to 
arrest and custody of offenders or persons charged with 
offences and the procedure for certain matters (i.e., 
their summary conviction, their examination and commitment 
for trial on indictment, and the hearing and determination 
of appeals arising out of any such trial or conviction or 
out of any proceedings connected therewith), and for 
holding accused persons to bail apply, so far as they 
are applicable, to a person who is charged in that State 
or Territory with an offence against the Act or the 
regulations. Except as provided by the Act, the Judiciary 
Act 1903-60 applies in relation to these offences.
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APPENDIX III
Legislation relating to Air Corporations
Legal aspects of the governmental control over air 
corporations and their transport operations in Australia 
cannot be satisfactorily discussed without examining 
carefully economic and political considerations relevant 
to the industry as a whole. A detailed survey of these 
problems is, however, beyond the scope of the present 
study, and it is intended here to give only an outline of 
the Commonwealth legislation in this field. The 
Commonwealth and State licensing regulations of air 
transport service operations have already been mentioned 
in Chapter VII and Appendix II.
1. International aviation
(l) Qantas Empire Airways Ltd. (Q.E.A.) is a public 
company incorporated under the Queensland Companies Act 
1931? as amended,^ in which the Commonwealth and its 
nominees hold all shares. Historically, the Queensland 
and Northern Aerial Services Ltd. (Q.A.N.T.A.S.), the 
first airline in eastern Australia, was formed in 1920, and
I
No.53 of 1931; as amended. See now the uniform Companies 
Act (Queensland, 1961 - date of commencement, 1 July 1962)•
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Q.E.A. was registered in Queensland in 1934, combining the
interests of Imperial Airways Ltd. and Q.A.N.T.A.S. Ltd.
The Qantas Empire Airways Agreement Act, 1946,^ authorized
the execution of an agreement for the purchase by the
Commonwealth of the shares held by British Overseas Airways
Corporation (B.O.A.C. - successor to Imperial Airways Ltd.)
in Q.E.A., so that the Commonwealth became the owner of
these shares on 31 March 194-7» By the Qantas Empire
2ALrways Act, 1948, approval was given to the purchase by
the Commonwealth of all the remaining 261,500 shares which
3had been owned by Q.A.N.T.A.S.; Q.E.A. became thus entirely
Commonwealth-owned. It is managed by a board of directors
who are appointed by the Federal Government, and its powers
and capacity are formally governed by its Memorandum and
Articles of Association. By the abovementioned Act of
1948, approval was given to subscription by the Commonwealth to
issues of capital by Qantas. Several Loan (Qantas Empire 
x 4Airways Ltd.) Acts have been enacted from time to time 
to approve the raising by way of loan of moneys to be 
lent to Qantas.
1
No.75 O f  1946.
2
N o .30 of 1948.
3The shareholding of Q.A.N.T.A.S. passed to the Commonwealth 
on 30 June 1947»
4
Loan (Qantas Empire Airways Limited) Act 1957 ; 1958 j 
I960; 1962; 1963 and 1964.
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(2) The agreement between the United Kingdom and
Australia in respect of the participation by Australia in
the Empire Air Mail Scheme was ratified by the Empire Air
Service (England and Australia) Act, 1938?^ and the
execution of an agreement between the Commonwealth and
2Qantas, as the contractor, was also authorized. This
agreement was amended as a result of certain changes in
the form of administration of the governmental control
3of civil aviation in the Commonwealth, and the Empire
Air Service (England and Australia) Act, 1941,^ gave
effect to the amendment. However, the Act was repealed
5by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1950 > and is not now in 
f ore e•
(3) The British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines Act,
z
19 +^7 3 authorized the execution of an agreement between 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand for the
1
No.13 of 1938.
2
The agreement between the U.K. and Australia was contained 
in the despatch and cablegram, the copies of which were set 
out in the First Schedule to the Act. The agreement between 
the Commonwealth and Qantas was set out in the Second 
Schedule to the Act.
3This had connection with the re-organization of the civil 
aviation administration in 1938»
4
No.11 of 1941.
5
No.80 of 1950> sec.5 (Third Schedule, Part VIl).
6
No.32 of 1947.
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establishment of British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines 
Ltd. (B.C.P.A.), a tripartite organization for establishing, 
operating and developing trans-Pacific air services between 
Australia and North America and between New Zealand and 
North America, under arrangements to be agreed between 
the three governments. The Act also provided for the 
appropriation of such amounts as were required to be paid 
by the Commonwealth under this inter-governmental agreement. 
The air services agreement between the United States and 
Australia was signed on 3 December 1946, in which the 
U.S.A. designated Pan American Airways and Australia 
designated B.C.P.A. to operate a service between the both 
countries. B.C.P.A. was incorporated under the New South 
Wales Companies Act 1936-40,"^ in which the partner 
governments were the sole shareholders. Control was 
exercised by financial directives issued by the shareholders. 
The contributions by the Government was in the following 
ratio which was fixed in accordance with the degree of 
general interest which each country had in the services 
to be operated by the company: Australia 30 per cent, New 
Zealand 30 per cent and United Kingdom 20 per cent. This 
tripartite organization was in accord with the policy of 
international ownership and control of international air
T
No. 33 of 1936, as amended. See now the uniform Companies 
Act (New South Wales, I96I - date of commencement, 1 July
1962).
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transport which was unsuccessfully advanced by the
Australian and New Zealand Governments at the Chicago
Conference of 1944.^ As a result of a conference which
took place in Christchurch, New Zealand, in October 1953>
between the three Governments1 delegates, B.C.P.A. was
merged with Qantas Empire Airways Ltd, in 1934, and was
placed in liquidation. Until the l i t ig a t io n  in Executors
2of William Kapell v, B.C.P.A. now pending before a U.S. 
court is  f inal ly  disposed of, the liquidation of the 
company will not be completed.
2• Domestic Aviation
O
(l) The Australian National Airlines Act 1943-61^ 
establishes a Commonwealth instrumentality, viz . ,  the 
Australian National Airlines Commission (hereinafter ’the 
Commission’ ), to operate national a irl ine services. The 
Commission is a body corporate with perpetual succession 
and a common seal, and may acquire, hold and dispose of 
real and personal property, and is  capable of suing and 
being sued in i t s  corporate name. I t  shall have and may
1
The policy has now been abandoned. See Chapter VI, ant e.
2
As to this  case, see Chapter VIII, ante.
3
N o . 31  o f  1 9 4 3 j a s  a m e n d e d  b y  N 0 . 9 O, 1 9 4 7 ;  N o . 1 0 2 ,  1 9 3 2 ;
No.103» 1936; No.70, 1938 (Airlines Equipment Act); No.3?
1939; and No.71, 1 9 6 1 .
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exercise the rights, powers, authorities and functions 
conferred, and shall be charged with and perform the duties 
and obligations imposed, upon it by the Act. Its head 
office is to be established at such place as the Minister 
appoints, and the Minister has appointed Melbourne as the 
head office. The Commission carries on its operational 
activities under the name of Trans-Australia Airlines 
(T.A.A.). The Commission consists of 6 Commissioners 
(including a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman), who are 
appointed by the Governor-General. A Commissioner is 
appointed to hold office for a period not exceeding 3 
years and is eligible for re-appointment. However, the 
Governor-General may terminate the appointment for 
inability, inefficiency or misbehaviour; a Commissioner 
or an Acting Commissioner may resign his office on his own 
accord, but the resignation is not effective unless it 
has been accepted by the Governor-General or the Minister, 
as the case may be. The Act provides further for vaciion 
of office of the Commissioner/ meetings of Commission,
1
Sec.l4. A Commissioner who is directly or indirectly 
interested in a contract made or proposed to be made by 
the Commission otherwise than as a member, and in common 
with the other members, of an incorporated company 
consisting of not less than 23 persons must, as soon as 
possible after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge,
(cont. next page)
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delegation of powers by Commission, appointment of officers
and of temporary and casual employees.^- The Public SeivLce
2Arbitration Act 1920, as amended, does not apply in
relation to the employment of officers or employees of
3the Commission, For industrial disputes relating to 
conditions of employment, the Conciliation and Arbitration
, 4Act, I9O4 , as amended, applies, and there have been
several applicable judgments of the Commonwealth Court of
5Conciliation and Arbitration, It is provided that rights
1 (cont,)
disclose the nature of his interest at the meeting of the 
Commission. Such a Commissioner cannot take part after 
the disclosure in any deliberation or decision of the 
Commission with respect to that contract and is disregarded 
for the purposes of constituting a quorum of the Commission. 
1
Secs. 14-18.
2
No.28 of 1920 - No.4l of 1959« Earlier Acts were cited 
as Arbitration (Public Service) Acts.
3
This section was inserted by sec.3 of the Australian 
National Airlines Act 1956. See also sec.4. Previously, 
employees of the Commission also had access to the Public 
Service Arbitrator under the Public Service Arbitration Act 
1920-52 (secs. 3 and 122); see Australian Pilot, vols.
1-5? civil aviation, p.442.
4
No.13 of 1904 - N o .40 of 1961. Earlier Acts were cited 
as Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Acts•
5See, Qantas Empire Airways Limited v. The Australian Air 
Pilots1 Association and Others (No.496 of 1952); Australian
Air Pilots1 Association v. Airlines_(Western Australia)
Limited and Other's (No. 139 °E 1954) ; Australian Air Pilots1 
Association v. Australian National Airlines Commission 
(No s .11 and 202 of 1954); Australian National Airlines
Commission v. Australian Air Pilots1_Association (No •230
o f 1 9 5 3 ) ? see also R. v. Portus: Ex parte Australian Air 
Pilots1 Association (1953) 27 A.L.J. 627«
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of officers of Public Service of Commonwealth who 
transferred to the Commission are to be preserved, and 
the Officers1 Rights Declaration Act ~^ applies. The
2Commonwealth Employees1 Compensation Act 1930 j as amended,
3applies to employees of the Commission.
The powers, functions and duties of the Commission
are prescribed in secs.19-29 of the Act. Sec.19 provides
for general functions and duties of Commission:
(l) For thepurposes of this Act and subject to 
the provisions of this Act and of the Air 
Navigation Regulations and with full regard 
to safety, efficiency and economy of 
operation the Commission may do all that is 
necessary or convenient to be done for, or 
as incidental to, in relation to, or in 
connexion with the establishment 
maintenance or operation by the Commission 
of airline services for the transport, 
for reward, of passengers and goods by air -
(a) between any place in a State and any 
place in another State;
(b) between any place in any Territory of 
the Commonwealth and any place in 
Australia outside that Territory; and
(c) between any place in any Territory of 
the Commonwealth and any other place 
in that Territory.
1
No.16 of 1928 - No.15 of 1959.
2
No.24 of 1930 - No.94 of 1962.
3
Cf. Australian National Airlines Commission and Another 
. Cassidy, 1964, 38 A.L.J.R. 47.v
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or for the transport of mails by air 
between any places in Australia in 
pursuance of an agreement entered into 
under section twenty-two of this Act.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Commission to 
exercise the powers conferred by the last 
preceding sub-section, as fully and 
adequately as may be necessary to satisfy 
the need for the service specified in 
that sub-section, and to carry out the 
purposes of this Act.
(3) The Commission, with the approval of
the Minister, shall have, and may exercise 
in relation to airline services between 
any place in Australia and any place 
outside Australia, the like powers as it 
has in relation to airline services 
specified in sub-section (l.) of this 
section.
The Australian National Airways Case'*' has already been 
discussed in relation to the Commonwealth*s unsuccessful 
attempt to confer on the Commission on a monopoly in 
respect of services between States. Sec.l9A provides for 
the Commission*s intra-State services in pursuance of 
powers referred by State Parliaments:
(l) Vbare the Parliament of any State has, prior 
to the commencement of section ten of the 
Australian National Airlines Act 1959s by 
any State Act, referred to the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth the matter of air 
transport, or the matter of the regulation 
of air transport, or the matter of the 
regulation of air transport, the Commission 
may, subject to this section, during the 
period of operation of that State Act, or 
during any extension of that period -
(1945), 71s C.L.R. 29.
1
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(a) establish airline services for the 
transport for reward of passengers 
and goods within that State; and
(b) maintain and operate airline services 
for any such transport,
and shall have, in relation to any such 
service, the like powers as it has in 
relation to airline services specified 
in sub-section (l.) of the last preceding 
section.
(2) The Commission shall not -
(a) establish any service which it could 
not lawfully establish but for this 
section unless the Premier of the State 
in which the service is to be established 
has notified the Prime Minister in writing 
that he consents to the establishment
and operation of the service; or
(b) continue the operation of any service in 
respect of which consent has been given 
under the last preceding paragraph after 
the Premier has notified the Prime 
Minister in writing that he withdraws 
his consent to the operation of that 
service•
(3) The Commission shall, in respect of any service 
operated by it in pursuance of consent under the 
last preceding sub-section by the Premier of a 
State, pay to the State from time to time 
amounts equivalent to the licence fees (if any) 
which would be payable under the law of the 
State if the service were operated by a person 
other than the Commission.
Only the Queensland’s and Tasmanian Parliaments have so 
far passed legislation of this kind, and the Public Vehicles 
Licensing Appeal Tribunal (Tasmania) Case~*~ has already been
(1964), A.L.R. 918; 37 A.L.J.R. 303.
1
639
discussed in relation to the Commission1s authority under 
this section to establish and operate within Tasmania 
intra-State airline services without a licence under the 
Tasmanian traffic legislation. Fares and charges may be 
imposed by the Commission in respect of its transport 
activity, but its power to purchase and dispose of assets 
is restricted by the provisions of the Act. According to 
sec. 21, the Commission may (a) acquire by lease or purchase 
any land, buildings, easements or other properties (whether 
real or personal), rights or priviledges which it thinks 
necessary for the purposes of the Act; and (b) exchange, 
lease, dispose of, turn to account or otherwise deal 
with, any property, rights or priviledges of the Commission. 
But the Commission cannot, without the approval of the 
Minister, purchase any land for a consideration exceeding 
£A20,000, enter into a lease of land for a period exceeding 
10 years, or dispose of any property, right or priviledge 
where the consideration for the disposal, or the value 
of the property, right or priviledge, exceeds £A50,000; 
the Commission cannot, without the approval of the 
Minister, enter into a contract for the supply of aircraft, 
equipment or materials to the Commission for a consideration 
exceeding £A50,000. General contractual powers of the 
Commission are conferred by sec.23 for the execution of
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any work or service authorized by the Act or any other 
Act to be executed by the Commission, in such manner, 
upon such terms, for such sums, and under such stipulations, 
conditions, and restrictions as the Commission thinks 
proper. The Commission may enter into any agreement or 
contract with the Commonwealth for the transport of 
mails by air. In Helicopter Utilities Case/  the Commission 
successfully tendered for the hire to the Commonwealth 
of helicopters and crews to accompany the Australian 
National Antartic Research Expedition on a voyage to the 
Antartic; H., who had supplied helicopters for use by 
the Commonwealth in respect of a previous Antartic 
expedition and on this occasion had placed the only other 
tender, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain 
the Commission from carrying out the contract for the hire 
of the helicopters, on the ground that the Commission 
had no power to make such a contract. The Court considered 
that if the power to conduct this operation was not 
conferred by the Act whereby the defendant Commission was 
incorporated, then, the act would be ultra vires and void. 
According to the Court’s opinion, the only power conferred 
upon the Commission by the Act was a power to conduct
(1962), n .s .w .r . 7^7; 1963 (voi. 80), vr.N. 48.
I
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airline services, and the charter of two helicopters for
an expedition of that kind was not any part of the
conducting of an airline service. Having referred to
the definitions of ’interstate airline service1 2 and
’territorial airline service* which were set out in the
Act,'*' the Court defined what was envisaged in sec.19 in
its references to airline services as ’the services of a
regular succession of aircraft plying between certain 
2places*. However, the defendant relied on the incidental 
power under sec.19 and on a wider power under sec.21.
The Court said:^
1
’Airline services’ is not defined in the Act, but in 
sec.4, ’air service* is defined as a * service established 
or conducted by the Commission for the transport by air of 
passengers or goods*. *Interstate airline service* is 
defined to mean ’a service providing for the transport 
by air, for reward, of passengers or goods and operating 
from one place in Australia to another and having 
scheduled stopping places in two or more States*. 
’Territorial airline service* is defined to mean *a 
service providing for the transport by air, for reward, 
of passengers or goods and having a scheduled stopping 
place in a Territory of the Commonwealth*. ’Scheduled 
stopping places’, in relation to any airline service, 
means * the terminal and scheduled intermediate stops 
specified in the conditions of any airline licence issued 
in respect of the service and includes such other stopping 
places as are prescribed*.
2
80 W.N. at p.52; the court referred to the definition of 
’airline* in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary - *a line of 
air craft*, and in the definition of ’line’ in the same 
dictionary - (in such a context) ’a regular succession of 
public conveyances plying between certain places*.
80 W.N. at p.52.
3
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I do not consider that s.21 can be read so as to 
widen the power to conduct air sendees which is 
contained in s.19; and I do not think that any 
of the other sections in Division 2 of the Act 
widen this primary power so as to permit the 
operation of a charter helicopter service as 
an operation in itself. It seems to me that the 
only right which the defendant Commission can 
assert to conduct such a service is under an 
incidental power. It is argued that there is an 
incidental power to engage in the performance of 
the present contract because the airline service 
may have helicopters for use in the course of its 
regular flights. Reliance is placed on the fact 
that helicopters are used for the transport of 
airline passengers from airport to city terminal.
It is then argued that if the helicopters are not 
required for this purpose it is open to the 
defendant to make use of the helicopters in order 
to avoid economic waste. I do not doubt that the 
defendant may operate helicopters as an incident 
of its regular airline services and that it could, 
when they were not required for that purpose, 
make use of them in other ways in order to avoid 
wasted....It is clear that a question of fact 
arises, namely, whether this is an incidental use 
of the helicopters or not. However it appears to 
me on such evidence as is before me that there 
is nothing to suggest that the proposed use of 
helicopters is an incidental use; rather, it is 
the assertion of a right to conduct charter 
services of extended duration in a manner which, 
in my view, goes beyond power.
It will be seen that the only question was as to the scope
of the Act, not of the constitutional power which we have
2already discussed elsewhere. Nothing in the Act is to
1
The court cited as authorities, Foster v. London Chatham 
and Dover Railway Co. (l895) 1 Q»B. 7 H |  Forrest v . 
Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway Co. Ltd.
(1861) 30 Beav. 40; E.R. 803; Lyde v. The Eastern 
Bengal Railway Co. (l866) 36 Beav. 10; 55 E.R. 1059»
2
See Chapter IV, ante.
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be construed to confer on the Commission any power which,
for the time being, are exercisable under the Air Navigation
Regulations by the Minister or any other authority, and
the provisions of the Regulations, so far as applicable,
apply to and in relation to the Commission.^
The Act provides for finances of the Commission,
including such matters as capital of the Commission,
borrowing by the Commission, Commission1s duty to prepare
annual estimates, bank accounts, application of moneys,
proper accounts to be kept, audit, profits of the 
2Commission. Above all, the Commission must pay all rates,
taxes and charges imposed by or under any law of the
Commonwealth and such other rates, taxes or charges as
the Minister specifies; the Commission is not a public
authority for certain purposes either of the Income Tax
3and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act or of 
the Sales Tax (Exemptions and Classifications) Act.^
1
Secs. 28 and 29•
2
Sec s. 0 1 •00
3No. 27 of 1936 - No.69 of 1963
4
No. 60 of I933 _ No.44 of 1963
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An annual report of Commission is to be submitted 
to the Minister, who subsequently lays it and financial 
statements, together with the report of the Auditor- 
General, before each House of the Parliament.^
Part VI of the Act provides for penalties and 
2procedure. If on demand any person fails to pay the 
fares or charges due to the Commission in respect of any
service rendered by the Commission the Commission -
(a) may detain and sell all or any of the goods 
of the person which are in its possession, 
and out of the moneys arising from the sale 
retain the fares or charges so payable, and 
all charges and expenses of the detention, 
and shall render the surplus, if any, of 
the moneys arising by the sale and such of 
the goods as remain unsold, to the person 
entitled to that surplus; or
(b) may recover the fares and charges in any 
court of competent jurisdiction.
If any person inflicts, through any act, neglect, or 
default whereby he has, on conviction, incurred any penalty
imposed by the Act or any other Act, any damage upon any 
aircraft or other property vested in the Commission,
damage must be made good in addition to penalty, the 
amount of that damage being to be determined by the court
1
Sec.40. See also sec.4l for further reports to the 
Minister.
2
Secs.60-63*
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by which he was convicted. Any office^ employee or 
agent of the Commission and any person called by him to 
his assistance may seize and detain any person who has 
committed any offence against the provisions of the Act 
and whose name and residence are unknown to the officer, 
employee or agent, and may, without any warrant or other 
authority than the Act, convey him with all convenient 
despatch before a court of summary jurisdiction; the court 
may proceed with all convenient despatch to the hearing 
and determination of the complaint against the offender. 
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other Act, any 
justice or justices of the peace of a State sitting at 
any place as a court for the summary punishment of 
offences under the law of the State shall, at that place, 
have jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint 
against an offender who is so arrested and who cannot be 
brought before a Police, Stipendiary or Special Magistrate 
within seventy-two hours after he has been brought to 
that place for the purpose of the hearing and determination 
of the complaint, or, if he was seized at that place, 
within seventy-two hours after he was so seized. It should 
be noted, however, that secs.69(1)(g) and 70 of the Act 
authorize the Commission to make by-laws and regulations 
respectively providing for penalties, but, it seems, no 
by-laws or regulations creating offences have been made
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to date- It is also to be noted that by virtue ol sec.29
of the Act, the Air Navigation Regulations including the
penal provisions apply to and in relation to the Commission
in like manner as they apply to and in relation to other
persons. The period of limitation for actions against
the Commission is two years after the act complained of
was committed, but this does not apply to an action to
which a period of limitation is applicable by virtue of
the Civil Aviation (Damage by Aircraft) Act 1958^" or the
Civil Aviation (Carriers1 Liability) Act 1959»^
In an action brought against the Commission to recover
damages or compensation in respect of personal injury or
death (including proceedings for the recovery of
contribution from the Commission brought by a tort-feasor
who is liable in respect of the same injury or death) the
plaintiff is not entitled to recover an amount exceeding
£A7,500, but again this does not apply in relation to the
liability of the Commission by virtue of the said
3Commonwealth Acts. The power to enter into insurance 
contracts, agreements is conferred to the Commission.
1
No.81 of 1958.
2
No.2 of 1959, as amended by No.38 of 1962.
3
Sec.63*4
Sec•68.
One
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of the main features of the amendment to the Act in I96I * 
relates to insurance against (a) risk of loss of, or 
damage to, aircraft of the Commission and parts of, and 
equipment for, such aircraft, (b) risk of liability in 
respect of the death of, or injury to, passengers in 
aircraft of the Commission, and (c) risk of liability in 
respect of the death of, or injury to, persons on the 
surface, or damage to property on the surface, caused by 
an aircraft of the Commission in flight or by any person or 
thing falling from such an aircraft. So long as the 
Commission is not fully insured by policies of insurance 
against all such risks, the Commission must maintain an 
account (referred to as ’the prescribed account’) for the 
purpose of making provision against such risks, so far as 
they are not covered by insurance. Provisions are laid 
down respectively for the prescribed account to which the 
Commission shall credit and debit.^
The Loan (Australian National Airlines Commission) Acts 
have been enacted to approve the raising by way of loan of 
moneys to be lent to the Commission.
(2) Prior to 1946, the only trunkline operator of 
significance in the domestic civil aviation was Australian
1
Sec.5 of No.71 of 1961.
No.71 of 1958 and N0.3I of 1963.
2
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National Airways Pty. Ltd. (A.N.A.),^ which was incorporated 
under the laws of the State of Victoria relating to 
companies and whose registered office was situated in 
Melbourne in Victoria. It was controlled by the larger 
shipping companies operating on the Australian coast and 
had grown rapidly by absorbing small operators and linking 
their services into a single network. However, following 
the establishment of T.A.A. by the Commission in 1946, 
competition within the industry impinged with great 
severity on A.N.A. By 1949 > A.N.A. faced the dilemma of 
incurring losses at a time when substantial investment in 
new heavy aircraft was necessary for its continued 
existence. In that year A.N.A. approached the Government 
to merge the two major trunkline enterprises. However, 
with the Government's early objective of a public monopoly 
almost achieved, the negotiations for the merger foundered 
on the obstacle of personalities. Shortly after, the 
Labour Party was defeated in the elections and the Liberal 
Party gained control of the Federal Parliament. The new 
Government’s solution to the industry’s problems was to 
establish ’fair and active competition’ between the major
1 ~ ~
This company had no connection with the earlier company 
of the same name (Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd.), 
which was formed in 1929 by C.E. Kingsford Smith and 
C.T.P. Ulm but ceased operations in 1941 because of 
financial difficulties after the loss of the ’Southern 
Cloud’•
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airlines. This policy required, the resuscitation of
A.N.A.^ The measures necessary to secure equitable
competition between the two major airlines were given
legislative form in the Civil Aviation Agreement Act 
21952-57 • The Act was later amended by the Airlines
3Agreement Act 1961.
The Civil Aviation Agreement Act 1952 approves an 
agreement made between the Commonwealth and A.N.A. on 24 
October 1952 (a copy of which is set forth in the Schedule 
to the Act), and requires the Commission to do all such 
things as the agreement provides that the Commission will 
do. The Preamble to the agreement declares, inter alia, 
that in order to facilitate trade and commerce among the 
States, provide for the efficient carriage of mail by air 
within Australia and assist for defence of the Commonwealth, 
it is expedient to make provision for the purpose of 
ensuring - (a) the continued existence of the Company, as 
well as of the Commission, as an operator of airline 
services within Australia, (b) the maintenance of 
competition between the Commission and the Company, and
1
Cf. P.H. Karmel and M. Brunt, The Structure of the Australian 
Economy, first published 1962, reprinted in 1963* pp.111-12.
2
No.100 of 1952, as amended by No.86 of 1957*
No.70 of 1961.3
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(c) the efficient and economical operation of air services 
within Australia. The agreement, an operative period of 
which was fixed as for 15 years, covered such matters as 
financial assistance to A.N.A. in the form of guaranteed 
loans for purchasing new equipment, reduced air route 
charges^ to be paid by the Company, air mail to be shared 
equally, government business to be accessed by A.N.A., 
rationalization of services (i.e., air routes, time­
tables, fares and freights and other related matters), 
exercise of Commonwealth powers, and associated matters. 
Among them, the rationalization of airline sendees (cl.7) 
appears to warrant special mention. The Commission and 
the Company will rationalize such services in respect of 
routes on which both parties are operating services so 
as to avoid unnecessary overlapping of services and 
wasteful competition, to provide the most effective and 
economical services with due regard to the interests of 
the public and to bring earnings into a proper relation to 
overall costs. If the Commission and the Company are 
unable to agree on any matter arising under such
T
’Air route charges’ means the amounts charged by the 
Commonwealth to owners of Australian aircraft engaged in 
regular public transport operations in respect of their 
use of aerodromes, and air route and airway facilities, 
meteorological services and the search and rescue service 
maintained and operated by the Commonwealth (cl.18).
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rationalization review, a representative of the Commission
and a representative of the Company will confer together
upon that matter under the Chairman"'' and, if still not
agreed, the Chairman himself decides the matter in dispute.
The Chairman may require the Commission and the Company
to furnish or produce to him all information &c., necessary
for his making decision. The Commission and the Company
assume an obligation to obey any such decision.
Early in 1957 A.N.A., whose finances were deteriorating
again, proposed the formation of a holding company to
operate T.A.A. and A.N.A. This suggestion was rejected
by the Government, on the ground that it was inconsistent
with its philosophy of competing airlines. A.N.A. then
proceeded to sell the enterprise to Ansett Transport
Industries Ltd. on 3 October 1957? the new firm taking
2the name of Ansett-A.N.A. The Civil Aviation Agreement
Act 1957 approved the execution on behalf of the 
Commonwealth of the proposed agreement made on l6 December 
1957 between the Commonwealth, the Commission, A.N.A.,
Ansett Airways Pty. Ltd. and Ansett Transport Industries
1
* Chairman1 2 is an independent person appointed by agreement 
between the Commission and the Company or in default of 
agreement is a retired Justice of the High Court of 
Australia or of the Supreme Court of a State appointed 
by the Minister (cl.l4).
2
Cf. Karmel and Brunt, op.cit., p.112.
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Ltd. (A.T.I.), in accordance with the form in the Schedule 
to the Act, and empowered the Commission to enter into 
the agreement and to carry out its obligations and avail 
itself of its rights under the agreement. The period of 
the agreement was fixed as until the termination of the 
1952 agreement, namely, until October 1967» and the 
agreement covered the following two main topics. First, 
rationalization was extended in respect of routes (in 
addition to the routes on which both T.A.A. and A.N.A. 
were competing in 1952) on which both the Commission and 
any one airline in which A.T.I. had a controlling interest 
(including A.N.A.) operate, or propose to operate.'*' 
Secondly, the Rationalization Committee was established.
It is constituted from time to time by the Co-ordinator 
nominated by the Minister and two members nominated by 
the Commission and the Company respectively. Functions 
of the Co-ordinator are similar to those of the Chairman 
as provided for in cl.7 of the 1952 Act. His decision 
is binding, but either airline, if still dissatisfied,
1
By purchasing all the shares in A.N.A., A.T.I. automatically 
assumed the obligations, as well as the benefits, of A.N.A. 
under the Civil Aviation Agreement. Before concluding its 
purchase, A.T.I. therefore entered into detailed negotiations 
with the Government to obtain a rearrangement of the loans 
in default, and to allow a reasonable period in which to 
discharge the outstanding obligations it hereby assumed. Cf. 
Parliamentary Debates, H. of R. 27 Nov. 1957? p.2606. See 
also cl.5 providing for the ceasing of Ansett Airways Pty. 
Ltd.'s operation of airline services and for prohibition of 
resumption of the operation during the continuance of the 
agreement.
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may appeal to the Chairman, in which event the Co-ordinator 
will furnish the reasons for his decisions to the Chairman 
(els# 3 and 4)•
The Airlines Agreement Act 196l, by which the Civil 
Aviation Agreement Act 1952-57 was amended and its citation 
became the Airlines Agreement Act 1952-61, approves the 
agreement made on 26 September 1961 between the Commonwealth, 
Commission, A.T.I. and A.N.A., a copy of which is set out 
in the Second Schedule to the Act. Among other things, 
the agreement provides for acquisition and use of turbo­
jet aircraft on the equal basis by hie Commission and the 
Company, guarantees of loans for turbo-jet aircraft to 
A.T.I. or A.N.A., rationalization of services, establishment 
and procedure of Rationalization Committee and related 
matters. As provided for in the Preamble, the parties 
desire to consolidate the procedures relating to the 
rationalization of domestic air services in the light of 
experience of the operation of the Civil Aviation 
Agreements of 1952 and 1957« The matters relating to 
rationalization of services which the Commission and the 
Company agree to keep under review are:-
(a) time-tables, frequencies and stopping places,
(b) the aircraft types and aircraft capacity used 
on those air services,
(c) proposed variations in the levels of fare 
and freight rates,
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(d) the industry passenger load factor and 
freighter load factor necessary to permit 
profitable airline operations by the 
Commission and the Company in relation to 
particular periods on specified groups of 
competitive routes, and
(e) any other matters affecting the efficient 
and economical operation of those air
s e rvices*
If the airlines are unable to agree in relation to any 
matter which is the subject of review, either airline may 
refer it to the Rationalization Committee - a successor 
of the Committee established under the 1957 agreement.
If, after consideration by the Committee, the airlines 
are still unable to agree, the matter is decided by the 
Co-ordinator. Under the new Airlines Agreement, an airline 
which is dissatisfied with a decision of the Co-ordinator 
may refer the matter to an Arbitrator,^ who exercises 
similar functions as the Chairman exercised under the 1952 
agreement. The Civil Aviation Agreement 1952 as affected 
by 1961 agreement continues in force until 1977> and the 
1961 agreement is to be read and construed as forming part 
of that agreement as so extended and affected.
1
1 Arbitrator* 1 is a person appointed by agreement between 
the Commission and Ansett-Transport Industries Ltd. or 
in default of agreement a Justice of a federal court 
other than the High Court made available under arrangements 
made by the Attorney-General (cl.l3(l))*
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(3) The Airlines Equipment Act 195£> authorizes the
Commonwealth to give assistance to the major domestic
airlines in respect of their aircraft re-equipment under
terms and conditions which will ensure the stability of
the domestic air transport industry and promote the
objectives of the Civil Aviation Agreement Acts of 1952
and 1957» Part II and Part III of the Act, setting out
provisions relating to financial arrangements, enable the
Commission and the Ansett-A.N.A. to re-equip aircraft
(including the purchase of two Lockheed Electra aircraft)
respectively. Part IV (rationalization of aircraft
fleets) sets up machinery to ensure that the two airlines
do not provide excess capacity. An estimate is to be
made by the Minister of the traffic on competitive and
3non-competitive routes during a specified period. A 
determination is then to be made by him mainly on the
1
No.70 of 1958.
2
Sec.31 (borrowing of moneys by the Commission) of the 
Australian National Airlines Act 19^5, as amended, was 
amended by this A c t (sec.5(l)) so as to expand the limits 
of borrowing.
3
’Competitive route’ means a route over which air 
services are operated both by the Commission and by the 
Company, and ’non-competitive route’ means any other 
route (sec.ll).
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basis of an optimum revenue load factor of the aircraft 
2capacity necessary for the Commission and the Company
respectively to carry one-half of the total traffic on
competitive routes and to operate its non-competitive
3services during that period. In the light of this 
determination the two operators will then be mutually 
bound during the period in which any guaranteed loans are 
not repaid in full by the following obligations: first, 
neither airline must provide on competitive routes, during 
the specified period, more aircraft capacity than is 
necessary to carry half the estimated traffic at the 
predetermined revenue load factor* Secondly, the operators
1
’Revenue load factor1 2, in relation to an aircraft, means, 
in respect of a period, the percentage that the revenue 
value of the work performed on the flights made by the 
aircraft during that period is of the revenue value of the 
work that could have been performed on those flights, 
ascertained in accordance with the equation — _ 100(B + CD),
A ” E
where A is the revenue load factor; B is the number of 
passenger ton-miles performed by the aircraft in the period, 
based on a passenger weight (including free baggage) of 
£A200; C is the non-passenger revenue traffic ton-miles 
performed by the aircraft in the period; D is the ratio of 
the revenue yield per ton-mile of non-passenger traffic 
to the revenue yield per ton-mile of passenger traffic; 
and E is the total revenue traffic ton-miles for which 
the aircraft could have been used on the flights performed 
in the period (see sec.ll)•
2
’Aircraft capacity’, in relation to aircraft, means, in 
respect of a period, the number of revenue traffic ton- 
miles capable of being performed by the aircraft in the 
period (sec.ll).
Sec.12•
3
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must dispose of any aircraft capacity in excess of that 
required to operate their competitive and non-competitive 
services after making due allowances for the need for 
stand-by aircraft, maintenance and overhaul of aircraft 
and crew training and similar matters. Thirdly, the 
airlines are required not to acquire additional aircraft 
which would result in the capacity limitations being 
exceeded, and not to introduce aircraft of a type which, 
having regard to the types already in operation, would 
be detrimental to the stability of the domestic air 
transport industry. Finally, there is an obligation to 
furnish to the Minister, within such times as the Minister 
specified, such information in respect of traffic as the 
Minister requires.'*’ The Director-General may convene 
conferences to be attended by representatives of the 
Department of Civil Aviation, the Commission and the 
Company, for the purpose of considering matters relevant 
to the making of such estimates and determinations by the 
Minister. The Minister is expressly required to accord 
Commission and Company equal treatment.
These Commonwealth Acts aim at the Government's ’two 
airlines’ policy to rationalize two, and not more than two,
Sec. 13 »
1
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operators of trunk route airline services, one being He 
Commission, each capable of effective competition with 
the other. However, as shown in the IPEC-Air Case~^, a 
successful application for a licence of inter-State air 
transport service operations on the strength of sec.92 
of the Constitution has recently put the Commonwealth in 
a difficult position to maintain its two-airlines policy, 
save by relying upon its control over aircraft importation 
into Australia; there are indications that several other 
airline companies wish to enter into the inter-State air 
transport businesses.
The Ansett Transport Industries Ltd. carries on
various transport undertakings including Ansett-A.N.A. and
associated businesses (e.g., hotel, communication), whose
internal regulations are generally outside the Commonwealth 
2powers; hence, the Australian National Airlines Commission 
operating T.A.A. whose capacity, powers, etc, are defined 
in detail by the Commonwealth legislation may well feel 
discontented with being restricted in acting for itself in 
its economic competition with another competitor, Ansett- 
A.N.A.
1
The Queen v. Anderson; Ex parte IPEC-Air Pty. Ltd.
(1965) 39 A.L.J.R. 66.
2
As to the Commonwealth powers generally in respect of 
corporations (sec.5l(xx) of the Constitution), see tfynes, 
op.cit., p.211, et seq.
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